The deadline approaches – overnight into Friday, the EU’s provisional additional tariffs on Chinese vehicles will come into effect. Negotiations thus far have yielded no resolution, report Amelie Richter and Till Hoppe. Manufacturers must brace for the rates announced in June – meaning between 17 and 38.1 percent on top of the existing ten percent. A decision on whether these additional tariffs will be long-term must be made by November. This leaves room for further negotiations between Beijing and Brussels.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana reveals the shifting power dynamics between China and Russia in Central Asia. While Xi Jinping receives grand ceremonial receptions, Putin’s arrival has gone almost unnoticed. Fueled by infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing’s influence continues to grow steadily. The fact that Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are engaging in bilateral talks on the sidelines of the summit should not deceive us, writes Michael Radunski.
The SCO’s increasingly anti-Western actions extend well beyond Central Asia. In the Middle East, Beijing courts Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates as potential partners. However, the presence of President Erdogan in Astana raises the greatest concerns. Turkey holds significant strategic value for the West – not only in migration policy.
The planned provisional extra tariffs by the EU on Chinese EVs are expected to take effect on Friday night. Negotiations between the EU’s Directorate-General for Trade and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce have made no progress, according to EU sources on Wednesday. The European Commission will publish the regulation on Thursday morning, detailing the import tariffs for individual EV manufacturers.
There will be no surprises, according to Brussels; the tariffs will largely match what the European Commission announced to manufacturers on June 12. The German government is still trying to reduce the burden, especially for its own manufacturers, but talks between Beijing and Brussels have so far shown little progress.
The Chinese leadership has not yet been willing to change its subsidy practices, but at least talks are ongoing, which is better than stubborn silence. The next step is for the EU to request member states’ comments on the procedure by mid-July.
During their visits to Beijing, Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD), Minister of Economic Affairs Robert Habeck (Greens), and Minister of Transport Volker Wissing (FDP) all expressed hope for a negotiated solution. The entire coalition was thus already on site for this matter.
Despite differing focuses due to their mentalities and party affiliations, the representatives shared the attempt to avoid tariffs in the interest of the German economy. From the German government’s perspective, it is now up to the European Commission to conduct negotiations and leave room for compromises.
Only purely battery-powered vehicles are affected. The EU already imposes a ten percent tariff on Chinese EVs and the additional tariffs will be on top of this.
When the provisional additional tariffs take effect, it does not mean that the additional tariff must be paid directly from that date. Companies must provide a bank guarantee upon import. If the European Commission then decides on final tariffs – which must happen by Nov. 4 of this year – the provisional additional charges can be fully applied retroactively.
The EU would then cash in the bank guarantees. Until then, the manufacturers’ duties are held in escrow. The Brussels authority can also introduce final tariffs without retroactive provisional tariffs. There is still time for further negotiations between both sides.
Beijing appears to be focusing less on questioning the facts of the Commission’s investigation than on influencing the positions of the EU member states. According to a survey by the Reuters news agency, numerous EU countries are still undecided as to whether they should support the special tariffs on Chinese EVs announced by the European Commission.
Reuters asked the governments of the 27 EU member states. According to the report, the majority of states are still weighing up the pros and cons of an escalating trade dispute with the world’s second largest economy. According to government information, this group includes
Belgium currently has a caretaker government, and the new Dutch government just formed this week. France, however, supports the tariffs, with Italy and Spain also in favor.
The German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA) warned vehemently on Wednesday about the consequences for the domestic economy. The punitive tariffs are neither effective for the EU nor for Germany, according to a position paper. The association warned of the “enormous” damage that potential countermeasures from Beijing could cause. “The stated goal of ensuring fair competition and protecting the domestic industry from unfair practices will not be achieved.”
In 2023, Germany exported vehicles worth 15.1 billion euros to China, according to VDA data. Imports from China amounted to 4 billion euros – significantly lower. Federal Minister of Transport Volker Wissing also opposed the tariffs in an interview with Table.Briefings, stating that they were not in the citizens’ interest.
Beijing has already retaliated by launching an anti-dumping investigation into European pork. Should a decision be made to impose additional duties, this would primarily affect
as the largest exporters. There is also an investigation into whether EU suppliers are selling chemicals in China below cost. There is also an ongoing investigation into whether EU suppliers are underpricing chemicals in China.
Additionally, an anti-dumping investigation into French cognac is underway. China’s threatened increase in import tariffs on luxury cars with more than 2.5 liters of engine capacity would severely impact German carmakers like Mercedes and Porsche. Around 120,000 of the cars exported from Europe to China fall into this segment. However, this measure has not yet been officially announced or initiated.
In Astana, the shifting power dynamics between China and Russia, as well as in Central Asia, are becoming evident these days. Europe is also affected. At the annual SCO summit on Wednesday and Thursday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also traveled to Kazakhstan.
Although Turkey is not yet an SCO member, Erdogan has already expressed his desire to join. This indicates that the interests of the SCO extend far beyond Central Asia. One should not be misled by the fact that Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are again meeting for bilateral talks on the sidelines of the summit. A closer look behind this public facade reveals subtle lines of conflict.
The first shift in power is reflected in the arrival of the SCO heads of state – between China and Russia. Upon entering Kazakh airspace, Xi Jinping’s government plane was met by the national air force and escorted to the capital. The celebration continued on the tarmac on Tuesday. In contrast, Russian leader Vladimir Putin only arrived on Wednesday – a day after Xi. There was no known personal air escort for him.
The power shift continues in the Central Asian SCO member states: Once, Moscow was the key player in the region, but now it is Beijing. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – launched by Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in 2013 – plays a crucial role in this.
China is building new railways and other infrastructure in Kazakhstan. Trade and investments are significantly increasing. Last year, China surpassed Russia as Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner. In neighboring Tajikistan, the new power balance is even more evident: A 2023 US State Department report shows that 99.8 percent of foreign direct investment in Tajikistan comes from China. While China expands, Russia has directed its economy entirely towards the war against Ukraine.
On Wednesday, Xi and his Kazakh counterpart Kassym-Jomart Tokayev praised the “unique, enduring, comprehensive, strategic partnership” between their countries. Given the apparent need for such partners elsewhere, it was agreed that China would support Kazakhstan’s entry into the BRICS group.
However, Putin does not intend to accept Russia’s loss of significance quietly: At the Astana summit, Belarus is set to become a full SCO member. President Alexander Lukashenko is Putin’s closest foreign ally and would thus be a staunch supporter of Russian interests. Another minor success is that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is skipping the Astana summit. Instead, Modi plans to travel to Moscow next week for his own talks with Putin.
This is significant because Beijing increasingly ties such partnerships to conditions. Once, the SCO’s goal was to combat the “three evils”: terrorism, separatism, extremism. Now, more and more states are agreeing with Beijing to support each other’s core interests.
Moreover, China seeks to expand its influence through additional new institutions. A key step was the convening of the China-Central Asia Summit in May 2023 and the establishment of a permanent secretariat in March 2024 to coordinate the C5 + China (or China-Central Asia Mechanism, as it’s known in China) in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province.
It’s all about geopolitics. The SCO, once a small, informal assembly, is increasingly becoming a geostrategic factor. As early as 2017, Chinese scholar Pan Guang predicted in an essay that China would attempt to extend the SCO’s influence, including in the Middle East.
And the SCO appears attractive. Saudi Arabia is a dialogue partner. Qatar, Azerbaijan, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates are also on the list. These are developments that should be closely monitored in Western capitals. A direct cause for concern is President Erdogan’s presence in Astana. Economically, Turkey’s integration into the SCO has already begun: Over the past five years, Turkish exports to SCO countries have increased by 85 percent.
A political integration would be problematic. Turkey holds significant strategic value for the West – not just in migration policy. Turkey hosts important NATO facilities that are crucial for deploying NATO forces in the Middle East.
The problem for the West: The SCO threatens to become more anti-Western. A common sentiment is forming within the SCO: criticism of the global institutions dominated by the West. Crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical upheavals have undermined the credibility of such institutions and revealed deficiencies in addressing challenges, it is said.
Constructive criticism – for example, of the outdated composition of the UN Security Council – quickly turns into categorical rejection of existing institutions. A growing SCO then becomes a building block of an alternative order.
The German Ministry of Economic Affairs intends to closely examine the agreement for the supply of Chinese wind turbines for an offshore project in the German North Sea. The German asset manager Luxcara has signed a preliminary agreement with Ming Yang Smart Energy as the preferred turbine supplier for the Waterkant offshore wind project in the German North Sea. According to Luxcara, the preliminary contract was signed following an international tender and extensive due diligence, and it includes the delivery of 16 offshore wind turbines, each with a capacity of up to 18.5 megawatts, for installation in 2028.
In Berlin, alarm bells are ringing over Chinese supplies for energy infrastructure. “The federal government will scrutinize this decision very closely, considering the critical infrastructure question on the one hand and ensuring a level playing field in terms of competition on the other,” a spokesperson told Reuters on Wednesday. The government needs to address questions regarding critical infrastructure and competition, the spokesperson said.
The government had already blocked the planned sale of MAN’s gas turbine business to China on Wednesday. The decision is based on a regulation from the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, which allows the government to prohibit sales to non-European countries if these transactions could endanger national security. The cabinet approved the proposal from the Ministry of Economic Affairs on Wednesday. The concern: The prospective buyer, Chinese company CSIC Longjiang GH Gas Turbine Co (GHGT), might use the gas turbines not only for energy generation or pipeline propulsion but also for warships. GHGT is part of the shipbuilding conglomerate China State Shipbuilding Corp (CSSC), which also builds ships for the Chinese navy. ari
Suddenly, her relatives were gone – fled to Canada, far away from then-Czechoslovakia. Renata Alt was still a toddler in the late 1960s. However, the flight of her great-aunt and daughters in the wake of the Prague Spring shaped her own life path.
Today, Alt, 58, is the chairwoman of the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid in the German Bundestag. In this role, she repeatedly deals with the People’s Republic of China. Whether it’s the situation of the Uyghurs or Tibetans, the enforcement of the death penalty, illegal organ trafficking or the supply chains of German companies that often start in China.
Alt interprets her role as committee chair as one where she comments on and condemns the egregious human rights violations in China. She makes appeals and demands to the Communist Party and informs her parliamentary colleagues about developments in the country and expert assessments. Her sharp criticism is not well received by the Chinese government. However, Alt makes no concessions.
Her own family history is too closely tied to the deprivation of civil and human rights for her to accept flimsy excuses from an authoritarian state. In a sense, Renata Alt’s political career began to take shape when the Soviets intervened militarily in Prague, prompting her father’s aunt to leave her homeland. Alt vividly remembers that the topic of freedom gained special significance in her family, and she herself became politicized at a young age.
The authorities of the then-government did not even allow relatives to return to Czechoslovakia for funerals. Correspondence was monitored. The state read along when the family at home told their relatives in North America about their life behind the Iron Curtain. Thus, the political circumstances accompanied her daily life for decades, repeatedly providing topics of conversation in the family and provoking intense emotions. “There was always a latent fear in the air that we had written something that could cause us problems,” Alt recalls.
She believes that the state-imposed restrictions on freedom of movement and speech have traumatized her to some extent and created a strong awareness of the value of civil and human rights. Nevertheless, it was largely by chance that she can manifest this importance today as a German parliamentarian.
Moving to Germany was not her plan. Alt had studied biotechnology and worked in foreign trade for a chemical company. After the end of the communist dictatorship, the state quickly needed new personnel with international exchange experience. Alt applied, and her democratized homeland sent her to Munich. Or love: It was also by chance that Renata Alt met her future husband in Munich. She decided to stay, get married, and swap her then-Slovak citizenship for German citizenship. This highly emotional moment was almost 25 years ago.
After leaving the diplomatic service, Renata Alt returned to foreign trade for a Baden-Württemberg company for a few years. Her political socialization in childhood and youth led her to join the FDP in 2009. This had two reasons: She had had to hide liberal ideas during her youth and childhood. It was time to stand up for them. Secondly, it was then-Foreign Minister and later FDP leader Klaus Kinkel who issued Renata Alt’s diplomatic accreditation – a formal act for Kinkel that completely changed Alt’s life. Thus, she felt a special connection to the FDP. Since 2017, she has been a member of the Bundestag for the party.
Alt sees her work on the committee as a privilege. She has the opportunity to learn about the human rights situation in many countries around the world and take a stand. China also concerns her in her Nürtingen constituency, where numerous medium-sized businesses have connections to the People’s Republic. For her, it is sometimes a balancing act to find the right balance between criticizing China and considering the interests of the companies. Because Alt also says, “Good relations with China are important and legitimate.”
Her goal, therefore, is to raise awareness – about the Chinese strategy to gain political influence through global investments on the one hand, and the possibilities for German companies to avoid or minimize dependencies on the world’s largest dictatorship on the other. Because she always has in mind that the political system in China is similar to the one her own family suffered under for many years. Marcel Grzanna
Wedding sweets, known as 结婚喜糖, are an important part of Chinese wedding celebrations. They are carefully chosen and symbolize good luck, success and healthy offspring depending on their names. However, due to the declining marriage rate, their demand has significantly decreased. This trend is noticeable even in cityscapes, such as in Zigu Street in Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi Province. There used to be 20 shops specializing in individually wrapped candies, but now there are only eight.
The deadline approaches – overnight into Friday, the EU’s provisional additional tariffs on Chinese vehicles will come into effect. Negotiations thus far have yielded no resolution, report Amelie Richter and Till Hoppe. Manufacturers must brace for the rates announced in June – meaning between 17 and 38.1 percent on top of the existing ten percent. A decision on whether these additional tariffs will be long-term must be made by November. This leaves room for further negotiations between Beijing and Brussels.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana reveals the shifting power dynamics between China and Russia in Central Asia. While Xi Jinping receives grand ceremonial receptions, Putin’s arrival has gone almost unnoticed. Fueled by infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing’s influence continues to grow steadily. The fact that Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are engaging in bilateral talks on the sidelines of the summit should not deceive us, writes Michael Radunski.
The SCO’s increasingly anti-Western actions extend well beyond Central Asia. In the Middle East, Beijing courts Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates as potential partners. However, the presence of President Erdogan in Astana raises the greatest concerns. Turkey holds significant strategic value for the West – not only in migration policy.
The planned provisional extra tariffs by the EU on Chinese EVs are expected to take effect on Friday night. Negotiations between the EU’s Directorate-General for Trade and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce have made no progress, according to EU sources on Wednesday. The European Commission will publish the regulation on Thursday morning, detailing the import tariffs for individual EV manufacturers.
There will be no surprises, according to Brussels; the tariffs will largely match what the European Commission announced to manufacturers on June 12. The German government is still trying to reduce the burden, especially for its own manufacturers, but talks between Beijing and Brussels have so far shown little progress.
The Chinese leadership has not yet been willing to change its subsidy practices, but at least talks are ongoing, which is better than stubborn silence. The next step is for the EU to request member states’ comments on the procedure by mid-July.
During their visits to Beijing, Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD), Minister of Economic Affairs Robert Habeck (Greens), and Minister of Transport Volker Wissing (FDP) all expressed hope for a negotiated solution. The entire coalition was thus already on site for this matter.
Despite differing focuses due to their mentalities and party affiliations, the representatives shared the attempt to avoid tariffs in the interest of the German economy. From the German government’s perspective, it is now up to the European Commission to conduct negotiations and leave room for compromises.
Only purely battery-powered vehicles are affected. The EU already imposes a ten percent tariff on Chinese EVs and the additional tariffs will be on top of this.
When the provisional additional tariffs take effect, it does not mean that the additional tariff must be paid directly from that date. Companies must provide a bank guarantee upon import. If the European Commission then decides on final tariffs – which must happen by Nov. 4 of this year – the provisional additional charges can be fully applied retroactively.
The EU would then cash in the bank guarantees. Until then, the manufacturers’ duties are held in escrow. The Brussels authority can also introduce final tariffs without retroactive provisional tariffs. There is still time for further negotiations between both sides.
Beijing appears to be focusing less on questioning the facts of the Commission’s investigation than on influencing the positions of the EU member states. According to a survey by the Reuters news agency, numerous EU countries are still undecided as to whether they should support the special tariffs on Chinese EVs announced by the European Commission.
Reuters asked the governments of the 27 EU member states. According to the report, the majority of states are still weighing up the pros and cons of an escalating trade dispute with the world’s second largest economy. According to government information, this group includes
Belgium currently has a caretaker government, and the new Dutch government just formed this week. France, however, supports the tariffs, with Italy and Spain also in favor.
The German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA) warned vehemently on Wednesday about the consequences for the domestic economy. The punitive tariffs are neither effective for the EU nor for Germany, according to a position paper. The association warned of the “enormous” damage that potential countermeasures from Beijing could cause. “The stated goal of ensuring fair competition and protecting the domestic industry from unfair practices will not be achieved.”
In 2023, Germany exported vehicles worth 15.1 billion euros to China, according to VDA data. Imports from China amounted to 4 billion euros – significantly lower. Federal Minister of Transport Volker Wissing also opposed the tariffs in an interview with Table.Briefings, stating that they were not in the citizens’ interest.
Beijing has already retaliated by launching an anti-dumping investigation into European pork. Should a decision be made to impose additional duties, this would primarily affect
as the largest exporters. There is also an investigation into whether EU suppliers are selling chemicals in China below cost. There is also an ongoing investigation into whether EU suppliers are underpricing chemicals in China.
Additionally, an anti-dumping investigation into French cognac is underway. China’s threatened increase in import tariffs on luxury cars with more than 2.5 liters of engine capacity would severely impact German carmakers like Mercedes and Porsche. Around 120,000 of the cars exported from Europe to China fall into this segment. However, this measure has not yet been officially announced or initiated.
In Astana, the shifting power dynamics between China and Russia, as well as in Central Asia, are becoming evident these days. Europe is also affected. At the annual SCO summit on Wednesday and Thursday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also traveled to Kazakhstan.
Although Turkey is not yet an SCO member, Erdogan has already expressed his desire to join. This indicates that the interests of the SCO extend far beyond Central Asia. One should not be misled by the fact that Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are again meeting for bilateral talks on the sidelines of the summit. A closer look behind this public facade reveals subtle lines of conflict.
The first shift in power is reflected in the arrival of the SCO heads of state – between China and Russia. Upon entering Kazakh airspace, Xi Jinping’s government plane was met by the national air force and escorted to the capital. The celebration continued on the tarmac on Tuesday. In contrast, Russian leader Vladimir Putin only arrived on Wednesday – a day after Xi. There was no known personal air escort for him.
The power shift continues in the Central Asian SCO member states: Once, Moscow was the key player in the region, but now it is Beijing. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – launched by Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in 2013 – plays a crucial role in this.
China is building new railways and other infrastructure in Kazakhstan. Trade and investments are significantly increasing. Last year, China surpassed Russia as Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner. In neighboring Tajikistan, the new power balance is even more evident: A 2023 US State Department report shows that 99.8 percent of foreign direct investment in Tajikistan comes from China. While China expands, Russia has directed its economy entirely towards the war against Ukraine.
On Wednesday, Xi and his Kazakh counterpart Kassym-Jomart Tokayev praised the “unique, enduring, comprehensive, strategic partnership” between their countries. Given the apparent need for such partners elsewhere, it was agreed that China would support Kazakhstan’s entry into the BRICS group.
However, Putin does not intend to accept Russia’s loss of significance quietly: At the Astana summit, Belarus is set to become a full SCO member. President Alexander Lukashenko is Putin’s closest foreign ally and would thus be a staunch supporter of Russian interests. Another minor success is that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is skipping the Astana summit. Instead, Modi plans to travel to Moscow next week for his own talks with Putin.
This is significant because Beijing increasingly ties such partnerships to conditions. Once, the SCO’s goal was to combat the “three evils”: terrorism, separatism, extremism. Now, more and more states are agreeing with Beijing to support each other’s core interests.
Moreover, China seeks to expand its influence through additional new institutions. A key step was the convening of the China-Central Asia Summit in May 2023 and the establishment of a permanent secretariat in March 2024 to coordinate the C5 + China (or China-Central Asia Mechanism, as it’s known in China) in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province.
It’s all about geopolitics. The SCO, once a small, informal assembly, is increasingly becoming a geostrategic factor. As early as 2017, Chinese scholar Pan Guang predicted in an essay that China would attempt to extend the SCO’s influence, including in the Middle East.
And the SCO appears attractive. Saudi Arabia is a dialogue partner. Qatar, Azerbaijan, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates are also on the list. These are developments that should be closely monitored in Western capitals. A direct cause for concern is President Erdogan’s presence in Astana. Economically, Turkey’s integration into the SCO has already begun: Over the past five years, Turkish exports to SCO countries have increased by 85 percent.
A political integration would be problematic. Turkey holds significant strategic value for the West – not just in migration policy. Turkey hosts important NATO facilities that are crucial for deploying NATO forces in the Middle East.
The problem for the West: The SCO threatens to become more anti-Western. A common sentiment is forming within the SCO: criticism of the global institutions dominated by the West. Crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical upheavals have undermined the credibility of such institutions and revealed deficiencies in addressing challenges, it is said.
Constructive criticism – for example, of the outdated composition of the UN Security Council – quickly turns into categorical rejection of existing institutions. A growing SCO then becomes a building block of an alternative order.
The German Ministry of Economic Affairs intends to closely examine the agreement for the supply of Chinese wind turbines for an offshore project in the German North Sea. The German asset manager Luxcara has signed a preliminary agreement with Ming Yang Smart Energy as the preferred turbine supplier for the Waterkant offshore wind project in the German North Sea. According to Luxcara, the preliminary contract was signed following an international tender and extensive due diligence, and it includes the delivery of 16 offshore wind turbines, each with a capacity of up to 18.5 megawatts, for installation in 2028.
In Berlin, alarm bells are ringing over Chinese supplies for energy infrastructure. “The federal government will scrutinize this decision very closely, considering the critical infrastructure question on the one hand and ensuring a level playing field in terms of competition on the other,” a spokesperson told Reuters on Wednesday. The government needs to address questions regarding critical infrastructure and competition, the spokesperson said.
The government had already blocked the planned sale of MAN’s gas turbine business to China on Wednesday. The decision is based on a regulation from the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, which allows the government to prohibit sales to non-European countries if these transactions could endanger national security. The cabinet approved the proposal from the Ministry of Economic Affairs on Wednesday. The concern: The prospective buyer, Chinese company CSIC Longjiang GH Gas Turbine Co (GHGT), might use the gas turbines not only for energy generation or pipeline propulsion but also for warships. GHGT is part of the shipbuilding conglomerate China State Shipbuilding Corp (CSSC), which also builds ships for the Chinese navy. ari
Suddenly, her relatives were gone – fled to Canada, far away from then-Czechoslovakia. Renata Alt was still a toddler in the late 1960s. However, the flight of her great-aunt and daughters in the wake of the Prague Spring shaped her own life path.
Today, Alt, 58, is the chairwoman of the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid in the German Bundestag. In this role, she repeatedly deals with the People’s Republic of China. Whether it’s the situation of the Uyghurs or Tibetans, the enforcement of the death penalty, illegal organ trafficking or the supply chains of German companies that often start in China.
Alt interprets her role as committee chair as one where she comments on and condemns the egregious human rights violations in China. She makes appeals and demands to the Communist Party and informs her parliamentary colleagues about developments in the country and expert assessments. Her sharp criticism is not well received by the Chinese government. However, Alt makes no concessions.
Her own family history is too closely tied to the deprivation of civil and human rights for her to accept flimsy excuses from an authoritarian state. In a sense, Renata Alt’s political career began to take shape when the Soviets intervened militarily in Prague, prompting her father’s aunt to leave her homeland. Alt vividly remembers that the topic of freedom gained special significance in her family, and she herself became politicized at a young age.
The authorities of the then-government did not even allow relatives to return to Czechoslovakia for funerals. Correspondence was monitored. The state read along when the family at home told their relatives in North America about their life behind the Iron Curtain. Thus, the political circumstances accompanied her daily life for decades, repeatedly providing topics of conversation in the family and provoking intense emotions. “There was always a latent fear in the air that we had written something that could cause us problems,” Alt recalls.
She believes that the state-imposed restrictions on freedom of movement and speech have traumatized her to some extent and created a strong awareness of the value of civil and human rights. Nevertheless, it was largely by chance that she can manifest this importance today as a German parliamentarian.
Moving to Germany was not her plan. Alt had studied biotechnology and worked in foreign trade for a chemical company. After the end of the communist dictatorship, the state quickly needed new personnel with international exchange experience. Alt applied, and her democratized homeland sent her to Munich. Or love: It was also by chance that Renata Alt met her future husband in Munich. She decided to stay, get married, and swap her then-Slovak citizenship for German citizenship. This highly emotional moment was almost 25 years ago.
After leaving the diplomatic service, Renata Alt returned to foreign trade for a Baden-Württemberg company for a few years. Her political socialization in childhood and youth led her to join the FDP in 2009. This had two reasons: She had had to hide liberal ideas during her youth and childhood. It was time to stand up for them. Secondly, it was then-Foreign Minister and later FDP leader Klaus Kinkel who issued Renata Alt’s diplomatic accreditation – a formal act for Kinkel that completely changed Alt’s life. Thus, she felt a special connection to the FDP. Since 2017, she has been a member of the Bundestag for the party.
Alt sees her work on the committee as a privilege. She has the opportunity to learn about the human rights situation in many countries around the world and take a stand. China also concerns her in her Nürtingen constituency, where numerous medium-sized businesses have connections to the People’s Republic. For her, it is sometimes a balancing act to find the right balance between criticizing China and considering the interests of the companies. Because Alt also says, “Good relations with China are important and legitimate.”
Her goal, therefore, is to raise awareness – about the Chinese strategy to gain political influence through global investments on the one hand, and the possibilities for German companies to avoid or minimize dependencies on the world’s largest dictatorship on the other. Because she always has in mind that the political system in China is similar to the one her own family suffered under for many years. Marcel Grzanna
Wedding sweets, known as 结婚喜糖, are an important part of Chinese wedding celebrations. They are carefully chosen and symbolize good luck, success and healthy offspring depending on their names. However, due to the declining marriage rate, their demand has significantly decreased. This trend is noticeable even in cityscapes, such as in Zigu Street in Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi Province. There used to be 20 shops specializing in individually wrapped candies, but now there are only eight.
