In the race for economic supremacy, a familiar term is once again in vogue. So-called overcapacity is again a regular source of friction between China and the West – unused production facilities that allow production well above demand. The resulting low prices can put pressure on industries worldwide.
Such overcapacities have existed since 1978, when China started its economic reform. Christiane Kuehl has taken a closer look at why the issue is currently boiling over. It has to do with China’s industrial policy, declining domestic demand, and the fact that important sectors are affected, for instance, the automotive industry, where the US, Europe, and China are currently in fierce competition as it is.
Christian Domke Seidel has analyzed how Europe could actually catch up with autonomous driving in this race. A new initiative brings together industry leaders from many countries with the aim of creating global safety standards. From the perspective of the European participants, this is an area where Chinese suppliers can still learn from European manufacturers. In any case, it helps counter the impression that China has long since surpassed Europe here.
Although overcapacity has existed in China’s industry since the beginning of the country’s economic reform in 1978, the problem has never caused as much controversy as it does now. One reason is that the West has become much more aware of the vulnerability of its own markets – partly because China is now importing innovative products instead of cheap plastic tubs and T-shirts. “Today, overcapacity is concentrated in equipment manufacturing and downstream consumer industries, involving more private producers than SOEs,” the South China Morning Post quotes a study by Zhong Zhengsheng, chief economist at Ping An Securities in Shenzhen. A decade ago, however, state-owned manufacturers of steel, cement and non-ferrous metals were at the center of the problem.
According to the German business dictionary “Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon,” the term “overcapacity” describes a situation in which there is not enough available use for the “facilities or production factors of a company, an economic sector or an entire economy.” This means that demand is below the potential production output of factories. This leaves them with the choice of either leaving production capacities idle – or producing large quantities and then exporting them abroad, provided there is demand. Only the latter case creates a problem for Western economies.
And that is precisely what is increasingly happening. This is because Beijing’s strategy has changed: The government used to tackle the overcapacity of inefficient state-owned companies. Now, however, Beijing sees cleantech products such as the “new three” – electric cars, solar modules and lithium batteries – as rays of hope amid a weak economy. Like the “Old Three” – clothing, household appliances and furniture – they are set to become export hits.
According to a study by the Australian Griffith Asia Institute, the combined export value of the “new three” will reach more than 150 billion US dollars, or over one trillion yuan, by 2023. However, China’s solar companies already groan about falling prices and company deaths, forcing them to shut down capacities on a large scale. It remains to be seen how the flood of solar module exports will continue.
Either way, Beijing is specifically promoting innovative sectors. The state newspaper China Daily recently reported on plans to support the development of solid-state batteries for electric cars with up to six billion yuan (around 763 million euros). Some critics even assume that China is inflating its production capacities for the sole purpose of dominating global supply chains.
China strongly rejects such accusations by claiming that its low-cost cleantech products are helping the world’s energy transition. Indeed, developing countries, in particular, benefit from this. But which of Beijing’s promotion plans are considered illegal subsidies in international trade? The EU, among others, is currently trying to determine this in the EV segment.
Another question is whether China’s industrial policy alone is really responsible for the overcapacity. Louise Loo, senior economist at the British consultancy firm Oxford Economics, doubts this. She writes that a more nuanced view of the current industrial cycle suggests that the existing imbalance between supply and demand is primarily due to much weaker domestic demand. According to Loo, Inventories in the Chinese industry have increased by 39 percent since the end of 2019, which is far higher than the 24 percent increase in industrial production. For example, the property crisis has led to a slump in demand for products from the metallurgical industry. However, their capacities are still standing.
Given the “weak domestic demand and a production-oriented economic program,” Loo suggests that there will be a “cyclical oversupply.” She also notes that various documents suggest that the country’s political circles are well aware of this economic risk. However, the risk of truly excessive overcapacity in China is limited to a handful of sectors.
According to data from Oxford Economics, overcapacity in the first quarter of 2024 was most severe in the non-ferrous metals industry (under 65 percent capacity utilization), followed by car manufacturing and food production. Official data shows that industrial capacity utilization across all sectors averaged just under 73.6 percent in the first quarter. According to Zhong Zhengsheng, a capacity utilization rate of 76 to 80 percent is considered normal in most sectors.
However, according to Loo, the picture is also mixed within sectors. For example, the plants of EV market leaders such as BYD, Li Auto and SAIC have a significantly higher capacity utilization of over 80 percent than the average of a meager 50 percent in the electric segment.
Just months ago, top Chinese politicians admitted that “overcapacity in some industries” would pose a major economic challenge this year. In March, President Xi Jinping warned against “rushing into new projects” as part of his push for “new productive forces.” At a meeting with economists and business leaders on 23 May, he said that overinvestment in the cleantech sector would be “counterproductive” and more investment should go into modernizing traditional industrial sectors instead.
Analysts at Trivium China say that Xi wants investment to be spread more broadly across the “new high-quality productive forces.” These are usually associated with high-tech upgrades to “increase economic, resource and energy efficiency.” They say the problem is that “domestic innovators will continue to focus on cleantech as long as it has the best growth prospects. Telling them to invest in modernizing traditional industries such as steel is difficult to convey.” Therefore, the Trivium analyses expect: “The cleantech sector will remain overheated without (unlikely) direct government intervention.”
The official line has also changed in the meantime, no doubt in response to the concentrated criticism from the West. Today, government politicians insist that there is no such thing as “China’s overcapacity problem.”
The initiative “The Autonomous” aims to promote global safety standards for autonomous driving. The European participants in the new platform believe that Chinese manufacturers can learn from European manufacturers, at least in this regard. The industry leaders, scientists and experts involved in the initiative want to counter the impression that China is pulling away when it comes to autonomous driving, leaving Europe in the dust.
Indeed, representatives of the German government and Chinese Industry Minister Jin Zhuanglong signed a memorandum of understanding on autonomous driving during Olaf Scholz’s visit to China. It states that the two countries will continue cooperating and exchanging ideas on developing technologies and international standards for automated driving.
What is it about? The automotive industry is currently working on the big technological leap from Level 3 to Level 4 autonomous driving, where the system takes over control of the vehicle permanently while the driver can focus on other activities. At least until the system needs assistance. Some experts see level 5 as the ultimate goal, where cars have neither steering wheel nor pedals because human intervention is no longer necessary.
A technological fantasy that Ricky Hudi, Chairman of The Autonomous, firmly rejected in an interview with Table.Briefings on the fringes of the Vienna Motor Symposium. He believes level 5 is simply unrealistic with the current and foreseeable technology. He should know, as he is bringing together current research under one roof with “The Autonomous.” In addition to initiator TTTech, Nvidia, SAIC, Continental, BMW, Volkswagen, Infineon, Amazon and the Fraunhofer Institute are also involved in the alliance. The most important output to date is the study “Safe Automated Driving: Requirements and Architectures.”
As Hudi puts it, autonomous driving is “the biggest challenge since the invention of the car.” Alone, companies could only fail, hence the collaboration. In fact, neither Chinese, American, nor European manufacturers can build reliable Level 4 vehicles on a large scale. The chaos surrounding Cariad and the glaring safety deficiencies at Tesla are two prominent examples of major players in this field.
That is why Hudi says it is important to share progress on security first and foremost. “The Autonomous” aims for an open-source solution. Scarce R&D resources could be pooled in this way – cooperation instead of competition, as Hudi summarizes it. What sounds altruistic has an economic background. “We must not wait until harmful measures force us to work together,” Hudi said in a 20222 keynote speech.
The EU has set itself the target of halving the number of traffic deaths by 2030. And by 2050, the aim is for no one to die on the roads. Some US cities have set themselves similar targets. Achieving these goals depends heavily on technical progress in the automotive sector – and companies do not want to be forced to do so by law as soon as the EU’s self-imposed deadlines approach.
Although China is regarded as a pioneer in autonomous driving, this alliance also benefits companies from the People’s Republic. According to Hudi, this is mainly due to the different working methods. While in the US, and especially in Europe, a great deal of testing is carried out before a new technology is put on the road, Chinese companies push ahead and work with much trial and error. The right conclusions can then be drawn in cooperation with the companies of “The Autonomous.”
However, cooperation is reaching its limits. The biggest hurdle is China’s restrictive data legislation. Strict regulations make it difficult to transfer data from China to the EU. Conversely, as digital expert Rebecca Arcesati recently explained in an interview, there are still questions about data security.
Whether there is actually that much interest in China is at least questionable. “The Autonomous” and the envisaged open-source solution cannot conceal the fact that China and Europe are working at two completely different paces. Geely recently proved this again by becoming the first car manufacturer with its own satellite network – a technology that is considered a foundation for relevant progress in the field of connectivity and autonomous driving.
Sinolytics is a research-based business consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and specific business activities in the People’s Republic.
In April 2024, the Beijing Internet Court issued another landmark ruling on the use of artificial intelligence (AI), after the same court ruled in November 2023 that AI-generated images can be copyrightable. The new ruling concerns the infringement of personal rights by AI-generated voice imitations.
The plaintiff in the case, a voice artist, discovered that her voice had been used in numerous audio books without her consent. Through her own research, she discovered that audio recordings of her that she had previously made for audio books with a media company had been licensed by the company to an AI software company with permission to commercially use, reproduce and modify the audio recordings. This company used the voice to train an AI-based tool (text-to-speech application) and marketed the application with the plaintiff’s voice. Another company acquired the application and used it to produce various audio books.
The court found that the defendants had used the plaintiff’s voice without her consent, thereby violating her personal rights, and ordered the defendants to pay damages and apologize.
A key question for the court was whether a person’s right to their voice includes the voice reproduced by the use of AI. The court’s answer was in the affirmative. A person’s natural voice can be identified by its tone and frequency. It has unique and consistent characteristics that are capable of evoking thoughts and feelings associated with that person. Minor changes to the voice through the use of the AI application do not prevent listeners from associating the voice generated by the application with natural voices, thereby evoking the thoughts and feelings associated with the original person and directly associating the voice heard with that person. This reveals the person’s identity.
In the proceedings, the court found that the AI-generated voice and the plaintiff’s voice were very similar in timbre, tonality and pronunciation style, which could lead listeners to associate or attribute the AI-generated voice to the plaintiff herself. The AI-generated voice is identifiable as the plaintiff’s voice, so that the plaintiff’s rights in her voice can be extended to the AI-generated voice.
According to the Chinese Civil Code, the provisions on the protection of the right to one’s own image also apply to the protection of the right to one’s own voice. Accordingly, any natural or legal person is prohibited from using, falsifying or manipulating a person’s voice using technology. The law prohibits the production, use or distribution of a person’s voice without his or her consent.
The decision of the Beijing Internet Court is likely to set the standard for all cases in which an AI-generated voice can be traced back to the voice of a natural person. If the person has not consented to the use of his or her voice, the person’s personal rights have been violated, which may lead to a claim for damages.
However, even if there is a contract with a person, e.g. for the production of an advertisement, the recordings cannot simply be used for other purposes. According to the Beijing Internet Court, the purpose and scope of a person’s original contractual consent to use, for example, their voice, must be considered.
The training of generative AI requires the use of a variety of existing data, such as text, images, videos, etc. Many of these sources may be copyrighted. The use of such sources for training may therefore involve a risk of copyright infringement.
Sebastian Wiendieck and Peter Stark are lawyers at Roedl & Partner in China. They mainly advise German and European companies represented in China by subsidiaries and branches or wishing to become active in the Chinese market in other ways.
This article is part of the event series “Global China Conversations” by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW). On Thursday (June 6, 2024; 11 a.m., CEST), Stephan Meyer, Professor of Public Law at the Technical University of Applied Sciences Wildau, and Sebastian Wiendieck, author of this text and Head of the Legal Department of Roedl & Partner in China, will discuss the topic of data handling under the moderation of Dietmar Baetge, Professor of International Business Law and Private Business Law at the Technical University of Applied Sciences Wildau: What are the challenges for foreign companies in China?
China.Table and Rödl & Partner are media partners of this event series.
On International Children’s Day on June 1, “Doraemon the Movie: Nobita’s Earth Symphony” hit the Chinese box office. According to data from the China Movie Data Information Network, the Japanese animated film grossed around 2.49 million US dollars by Sunday.
The robot cat is one of the most popular cartoon characters in Asia, as this light spectacle performed by drones in Hong Kong shows. The character, who was invented in 1969, made her cinema debut in China in 2007. A new film has been released on the mainland every year since 2015. “Nobita’s Earth Symphony” is already the 43rd installment in the series.
In the race for economic supremacy, a familiar term is once again in vogue. So-called overcapacity is again a regular source of friction between China and the West – unused production facilities that allow production well above demand. The resulting low prices can put pressure on industries worldwide.
Such overcapacities have existed since 1978, when China started its economic reform. Christiane Kuehl has taken a closer look at why the issue is currently boiling over. It has to do with China’s industrial policy, declining domestic demand, and the fact that important sectors are affected, for instance, the automotive industry, where the US, Europe, and China are currently in fierce competition as it is.
Christian Domke Seidel has analyzed how Europe could actually catch up with autonomous driving in this race. A new initiative brings together industry leaders from many countries with the aim of creating global safety standards. From the perspective of the European participants, this is an area where Chinese suppliers can still learn from European manufacturers. In any case, it helps counter the impression that China has long since surpassed Europe here.
Although overcapacity has existed in China’s industry since the beginning of the country’s economic reform in 1978, the problem has never caused as much controversy as it does now. One reason is that the West has become much more aware of the vulnerability of its own markets – partly because China is now importing innovative products instead of cheap plastic tubs and T-shirts. “Today, overcapacity is concentrated in equipment manufacturing and downstream consumer industries, involving more private producers than SOEs,” the South China Morning Post quotes a study by Zhong Zhengsheng, chief economist at Ping An Securities in Shenzhen. A decade ago, however, state-owned manufacturers of steel, cement and non-ferrous metals were at the center of the problem.
According to the German business dictionary “Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon,” the term “overcapacity” describes a situation in which there is not enough available use for the “facilities or production factors of a company, an economic sector or an entire economy.” This means that demand is below the potential production output of factories. This leaves them with the choice of either leaving production capacities idle – or producing large quantities and then exporting them abroad, provided there is demand. Only the latter case creates a problem for Western economies.
And that is precisely what is increasingly happening. This is because Beijing’s strategy has changed: The government used to tackle the overcapacity of inefficient state-owned companies. Now, however, Beijing sees cleantech products such as the “new three” – electric cars, solar modules and lithium batteries – as rays of hope amid a weak economy. Like the “Old Three” – clothing, household appliances and furniture – they are set to become export hits.
According to a study by the Australian Griffith Asia Institute, the combined export value of the “new three” will reach more than 150 billion US dollars, or over one trillion yuan, by 2023. However, China’s solar companies already groan about falling prices and company deaths, forcing them to shut down capacities on a large scale. It remains to be seen how the flood of solar module exports will continue.
Either way, Beijing is specifically promoting innovative sectors. The state newspaper China Daily recently reported on plans to support the development of solid-state batteries for electric cars with up to six billion yuan (around 763 million euros). Some critics even assume that China is inflating its production capacities for the sole purpose of dominating global supply chains.
China strongly rejects such accusations by claiming that its low-cost cleantech products are helping the world’s energy transition. Indeed, developing countries, in particular, benefit from this. But which of Beijing’s promotion plans are considered illegal subsidies in international trade? The EU, among others, is currently trying to determine this in the EV segment.
Another question is whether China’s industrial policy alone is really responsible for the overcapacity. Louise Loo, senior economist at the British consultancy firm Oxford Economics, doubts this. She writes that a more nuanced view of the current industrial cycle suggests that the existing imbalance between supply and demand is primarily due to much weaker domestic demand. According to Loo, Inventories in the Chinese industry have increased by 39 percent since the end of 2019, which is far higher than the 24 percent increase in industrial production. For example, the property crisis has led to a slump in demand for products from the metallurgical industry. However, their capacities are still standing.
Given the “weak domestic demand and a production-oriented economic program,” Loo suggests that there will be a “cyclical oversupply.” She also notes that various documents suggest that the country’s political circles are well aware of this economic risk. However, the risk of truly excessive overcapacity in China is limited to a handful of sectors.
According to data from Oxford Economics, overcapacity in the first quarter of 2024 was most severe in the non-ferrous metals industry (under 65 percent capacity utilization), followed by car manufacturing and food production. Official data shows that industrial capacity utilization across all sectors averaged just under 73.6 percent in the first quarter. According to Zhong Zhengsheng, a capacity utilization rate of 76 to 80 percent is considered normal in most sectors.
However, according to Loo, the picture is also mixed within sectors. For example, the plants of EV market leaders such as BYD, Li Auto and SAIC have a significantly higher capacity utilization of over 80 percent than the average of a meager 50 percent in the electric segment.
Just months ago, top Chinese politicians admitted that “overcapacity in some industries” would pose a major economic challenge this year. In March, President Xi Jinping warned against “rushing into new projects” as part of his push for “new productive forces.” At a meeting with economists and business leaders on 23 May, he said that overinvestment in the cleantech sector would be “counterproductive” and more investment should go into modernizing traditional industrial sectors instead.
Analysts at Trivium China say that Xi wants investment to be spread more broadly across the “new high-quality productive forces.” These are usually associated with high-tech upgrades to “increase economic, resource and energy efficiency.” They say the problem is that “domestic innovators will continue to focus on cleantech as long as it has the best growth prospects. Telling them to invest in modernizing traditional industries such as steel is difficult to convey.” Therefore, the Trivium analyses expect: “The cleantech sector will remain overheated without (unlikely) direct government intervention.”
The official line has also changed in the meantime, no doubt in response to the concentrated criticism from the West. Today, government politicians insist that there is no such thing as “China’s overcapacity problem.”
The initiative “The Autonomous” aims to promote global safety standards for autonomous driving. The European participants in the new platform believe that Chinese manufacturers can learn from European manufacturers, at least in this regard. The industry leaders, scientists and experts involved in the initiative want to counter the impression that China is pulling away when it comes to autonomous driving, leaving Europe in the dust.
Indeed, representatives of the German government and Chinese Industry Minister Jin Zhuanglong signed a memorandum of understanding on autonomous driving during Olaf Scholz’s visit to China. It states that the two countries will continue cooperating and exchanging ideas on developing technologies and international standards for automated driving.
What is it about? The automotive industry is currently working on the big technological leap from Level 3 to Level 4 autonomous driving, where the system takes over control of the vehicle permanently while the driver can focus on other activities. At least until the system needs assistance. Some experts see level 5 as the ultimate goal, where cars have neither steering wheel nor pedals because human intervention is no longer necessary.
A technological fantasy that Ricky Hudi, Chairman of The Autonomous, firmly rejected in an interview with Table.Briefings on the fringes of the Vienna Motor Symposium. He believes level 5 is simply unrealistic with the current and foreseeable technology. He should know, as he is bringing together current research under one roof with “The Autonomous.” In addition to initiator TTTech, Nvidia, SAIC, Continental, BMW, Volkswagen, Infineon, Amazon and the Fraunhofer Institute are also involved in the alliance. The most important output to date is the study “Safe Automated Driving: Requirements and Architectures.”
As Hudi puts it, autonomous driving is “the biggest challenge since the invention of the car.” Alone, companies could only fail, hence the collaboration. In fact, neither Chinese, American, nor European manufacturers can build reliable Level 4 vehicles on a large scale. The chaos surrounding Cariad and the glaring safety deficiencies at Tesla are two prominent examples of major players in this field.
That is why Hudi says it is important to share progress on security first and foremost. “The Autonomous” aims for an open-source solution. Scarce R&D resources could be pooled in this way – cooperation instead of competition, as Hudi summarizes it. What sounds altruistic has an economic background. “We must not wait until harmful measures force us to work together,” Hudi said in a 20222 keynote speech.
The EU has set itself the target of halving the number of traffic deaths by 2030. And by 2050, the aim is for no one to die on the roads. Some US cities have set themselves similar targets. Achieving these goals depends heavily on technical progress in the automotive sector – and companies do not want to be forced to do so by law as soon as the EU’s self-imposed deadlines approach.
Although China is regarded as a pioneer in autonomous driving, this alliance also benefits companies from the People’s Republic. According to Hudi, this is mainly due to the different working methods. While in the US, and especially in Europe, a great deal of testing is carried out before a new technology is put on the road, Chinese companies push ahead and work with much trial and error. The right conclusions can then be drawn in cooperation with the companies of “The Autonomous.”
However, cooperation is reaching its limits. The biggest hurdle is China’s restrictive data legislation. Strict regulations make it difficult to transfer data from China to the EU. Conversely, as digital expert Rebecca Arcesati recently explained in an interview, there are still questions about data security.
Whether there is actually that much interest in China is at least questionable. “The Autonomous” and the envisaged open-source solution cannot conceal the fact that China and Europe are working at two completely different paces. Geely recently proved this again by becoming the first car manufacturer with its own satellite network – a technology that is considered a foundation for relevant progress in the field of connectivity and autonomous driving.
Sinolytics is a research-based business consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and specific business activities in the People’s Republic.
In April 2024, the Beijing Internet Court issued another landmark ruling on the use of artificial intelligence (AI), after the same court ruled in November 2023 that AI-generated images can be copyrightable. The new ruling concerns the infringement of personal rights by AI-generated voice imitations.
The plaintiff in the case, a voice artist, discovered that her voice had been used in numerous audio books without her consent. Through her own research, she discovered that audio recordings of her that she had previously made for audio books with a media company had been licensed by the company to an AI software company with permission to commercially use, reproduce and modify the audio recordings. This company used the voice to train an AI-based tool (text-to-speech application) and marketed the application with the plaintiff’s voice. Another company acquired the application and used it to produce various audio books.
The court found that the defendants had used the plaintiff’s voice without her consent, thereby violating her personal rights, and ordered the defendants to pay damages and apologize.
A key question for the court was whether a person’s right to their voice includes the voice reproduced by the use of AI. The court’s answer was in the affirmative. A person’s natural voice can be identified by its tone and frequency. It has unique and consistent characteristics that are capable of evoking thoughts and feelings associated with that person. Minor changes to the voice through the use of the AI application do not prevent listeners from associating the voice generated by the application with natural voices, thereby evoking the thoughts and feelings associated with the original person and directly associating the voice heard with that person. This reveals the person’s identity.
In the proceedings, the court found that the AI-generated voice and the plaintiff’s voice were very similar in timbre, tonality and pronunciation style, which could lead listeners to associate or attribute the AI-generated voice to the plaintiff herself. The AI-generated voice is identifiable as the plaintiff’s voice, so that the plaintiff’s rights in her voice can be extended to the AI-generated voice.
According to the Chinese Civil Code, the provisions on the protection of the right to one’s own image also apply to the protection of the right to one’s own voice. Accordingly, any natural or legal person is prohibited from using, falsifying or manipulating a person’s voice using technology. The law prohibits the production, use or distribution of a person’s voice without his or her consent.
The decision of the Beijing Internet Court is likely to set the standard for all cases in which an AI-generated voice can be traced back to the voice of a natural person. If the person has not consented to the use of his or her voice, the person’s personal rights have been violated, which may lead to a claim for damages.
However, even if there is a contract with a person, e.g. for the production of an advertisement, the recordings cannot simply be used for other purposes. According to the Beijing Internet Court, the purpose and scope of a person’s original contractual consent to use, for example, their voice, must be considered.
The training of generative AI requires the use of a variety of existing data, such as text, images, videos, etc. Many of these sources may be copyrighted. The use of such sources for training may therefore involve a risk of copyright infringement.
Sebastian Wiendieck and Peter Stark are lawyers at Roedl & Partner in China. They mainly advise German and European companies represented in China by subsidiaries and branches or wishing to become active in the Chinese market in other ways.
This article is part of the event series “Global China Conversations” by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW). On Thursday (June 6, 2024; 11 a.m., CEST), Stephan Meyer, Professor of Public Law at the Technical University of Applied Sciences Wildau, and Sebastian Wiendieck, author of this text and Head of the Legal Department of Roedl & Partner in China, will discuss the topic of data handling under the moderation of Dietmar Baetge, Professor of International Business Law and Private Business Law at the Technical University of Applied Sciences Wildau: What are the challenges for foreign companies in China?
China.Table and Rödl & Partner are media partners of this event series.
On International Children’s Day on June 1, “Doraemon the Movie: Nobita’s Earth Symphony” hit the Chinese box office. According to data from the China Movie Data Information Network, the Japanese animated film grossed around 2.49 million US dollars by Sunday.
The robot cat is one of the most popular cartoon characters in Asia, as this light spectacle performed by drones in Hong Kong shows. The character, who was invented in 1969, made her cinema debut in China in 2007. A new film has been released on the mainland every year since 2015. “Nobita’s Earth Symphony” is already the 43rd installment in the series.
