Since Lai Ching-te became Taiwan’s new president, China’s threats have been louder than ever. However, researcher Angela Stanzel, who recently returned from a two-month stay in Taiwan, still interprets Beijing’s behavior as a warning, not the start of an invasion. In an interview with Michael Radunski, she urges Germany to show more presence in the region and help maintain the peace that is also precious to Germany.
But there is positive news from the region. Representatives from China, Japan and South Korea met in Seoul to strengthen mutual trust. Although expectations for the summit are not overly high, the fact that the quarreling countries of East Asia are talking to each other is symbolic. At least: China and South Korea want to start a security policy dialogue.
What the EU elections mean for the Union’s future course towards the People’s Republic should not be underestimated, writes Amelie Richter. In particular, the feared rise of far-right parties could change the stance towards China – in a dangerous direction for Europe.
The spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry allegedly spoke of “crushed skulls” and blood. Official threats speak of annihilation. Has the time now come for China to strike against Taiwan?
I don’t think so. Sure, the current military exercises are bigger, the rhetoric sharper than before. But I still see it as a warning to Taiwan and its partners – and not as the start of a naval blockade or even an invasion.
Why is China acting so hostile now?
China is using the tactics of previous years: It is deploying more military forces, making its presence felt ever more strongly, and moving ever closer to Taiwan. At the moment, China has simply used the inauguration of the new Taiwanese President, Lai Ching-te, to once again demonstrate what it has and what it can do.
Is Lai Ching-te’s inauguration a legitimate occasion? Did Lai provoke or even attack China in his speech?
No, not at all. Quite the opposite. It became clear that Lai is not trying to abandon the current policy, but will continue to handle the whole situation very carefully. Although he has a reputation for supporting Taiwan’s independence, Lai has never actively called for Taiwan’s independence. This is the Chinese narrative and serves as a justification for the military exercises.
But Lai must have said something in his speech that at least upset Beijing.
Lai took a two-sided approach in his speech. He has to, because he naturally also has to consider the wishes of the Taiwanese people into account. This means that, on the one hand, he could not take a big step toward China – neither the population nor his party would support that. On the other hand, he cannot provoke China unnecessarily.
How does Lai manage this balancing act?
He very clearly emphasized Taiwan’s right to exist. That was the signal to China to say: We will stand our ground. On the other hand, he also made China an offer and campaigned for more reciprocal tourism, so-called people-to-people contacts should be expanded. So he has certainly tried to be very balanced. It is interesting to see how China’s behavior towards Lai is changing. After his election victory in January, Beijing remained fairly calm and wise. But now, its behavior has increasingly escalated to the point of aggression.
So, the military exercises were not all that surprising?
I believe China has been planning them for some time. But it had to tinker a bit beforehand with exactly what justification it would use. And that’s the tricky thing that Lai and Taiwan will face over the next four years: China will use any reason to perceive it as a provocation. It almost doesn’t matter what Lai does. Even if he stopped talking about China, Beijing would still see it as a provocation.
Ever more aggressive, ever stronger, ever closer – how dangerous is the current situation around Taiwan?
The danger increases with every day and every exercise. Taiwan’s military and coast guard take great care to de-escalate and not provoke the situation, which is very professional. But the danger is growing. The risk of an unintentional escalation, for example, through an accident, is also increasing.
And then?
Then things get really dangerous. After all, there has been no direct communication channel between Taipei and Beijing since 2016. No red telephone and thus no way to quickly respond to unintended events. A third party, the USA or Japan, would have to intervene and mediate. But it could be too late by then.
Back to the current military exercises. They are being held to the north, south and east of the island. Also around the islands of Matsu and Kinmen. Also around the islands of Matsu and Kinmen. What are the actual benefits of such exercises?
In addition to the psychological effect from Taiwan, they are also important from a military perspective because they allow China to practice on the ground how a naval blockade of the Taiwan Strait could be carried out or an invasion, which would first have to take the form of an amphibious landing. It is important to train this on the ground because the waters in the Taiwan Strait are considered highly difficult. There is only a tiny window of a few months every year in which China could even carry out such an amphibious landing. All of this has to be trained on the spot in order to be successful.
Is it possible to discern a tactical development by observing the Chinese military exercises?
Yes, you can see that Beijing has identified strategically advantageous positions for new warships, for example, to conduct a naval blockade and completely isolate Taiwan. You can clearly see that China has evolved. That is a new quality.
In this difficult situation, Germany now also wants to become more involved in the Indo-Pacific. A good decision?
An excellent decision. Germany must become more involved in this region.
Among other things, the debate centers on whether the German frigate Baden-Wuerttemberg should pass through the Taiwan Strait. Should it?
Absolutely. If we’re going to show a presence in the Indo-Pacific and make such an effort, then it would be appropriate to approach it with some self-confidence and make this voyage through the Taiwan Strait. Given the tensions and the huge military exercises, it’s the right time to do it right now.
China has already warned the German government against such a passage.
Yes, but China will always warn and criticize, even if the frigate doesn’t cross the Taiwan Strait. That’s what we saw last time with the frigate Bayern.
Does that mean Beijing is criticizing too much?
This is another problem that China should realize: When criticism is constantly being voiced everywhere, it’s almost impossible to take it seriously. You don’t even know which of these red lines you may cross at the moment. So, I believe it would be good for Germany to make this passage. It would send a clear signal, including to our partners like Japan, Australia and other countries in Southeast Asia, that Germany is serious about its commitment in the Indo-Pacific and that it is not just empty words.
Angela Stanzel is a China expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. She has just spent a two-month research visit to Taiwan.
In two weeks, the EU elections will take place. Their impact on the future direction of the European Union towards China should not be underestimated. The future of the Brussels agenda partly depends on whether Ursula von der Leyen will return as head of the EU Commission. This, in turn, rests on the EU Parliament, which must ultimately approve the new EU Commission.
The composition of the Parliament itself is also important for the direction of the European institutions’ China policy. For example, in 2021, the EU Parliament refused to work on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China (CAI) after Beijing sanctioned several MEPs. CAI was put on the famous shelf and stayed there. The composition of Parliament’s committees will, therefore, have a tangible impact on the direction of new legislation and regulation.
“There is a lot at stake in the EU elections when it comes to China,” says Niclas Frederic Poitiers, an analyst at Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, specializing in trade policy. He says that the EU Commission has adopted an increasingly confrontational stance towards China in recent years. Economic security has become more prominent, and Europe has to assert itself between the USA and the People’s Republic.
The election marks a significant turning point in how this approach will continue, says Poitiers. “Not least because of the rise of the far right, some of which are very close to China.” Poitiers says many votes for far-right parties could shift majorities in the European Parliament in Beijing’s favor.
One decision with repercussions is likely to be made before the EU elections: The EU investigation into Chinese electric vehicles, which has been ongoing since autumn, is expected to find evidence of unfair subsidies, von der Leyen said last week at a debate with other EU candidates organized by Bruegel and the Financial Times. She added that the Commission would impose tariffs “correspondent to the level of damage.” China has already threatened to impose tariffs on cars with an engine displacement of more than 2.5 liters.
However, von der Leyen insisted that the EU was not in a trade war with Beijing, thus contradicting EU Commissioner Nicolas Schmit, lead candidate of the Socialists, who described the situation as “the beginning of a war or at least the risk of escalation.” During the trade policy debate, Sandro Gozi said: “We are under attack from China.” The Italian MEP is the lead candidate for the liberal Renew party. It is clear that China is completely violating the spirit and rules of the WTO and the EU must defend itself against an increasingly aggressive Chinese policy, Gozi said.
At the official top candidate debate last Thursday, China only played an indirect role in economic security matters. The focus was on other issues.
Filip Šebok, analyst at the Association for International Affairs (AMO) in Prague, assumes that this will also be the case in the actual election on the second weekend in June: “In the EU elections in the individual countries, the Domestic issues are usually in the foreground, not EU trade or foreign policy.”
Indirectly, the China issues received attention in the election campaign when it came to whether Chinese companies were investing in EU countries and the future of European competitiveness, explains Šebok, who follows China’s influence primarily in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In these countries, several parties advocated a revision of the Green Deal and less EU regulation of the economy. “Specifically in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, it is often claimed that we are surrendering to China by abandoning internal combustion engines, where the European industry has been traditionally strong, and switching to EVs, where China dominates.” Šebok emphasizes that there are also increasing connections between EU parliamentarians from the right-wing and left-wing extremist parties and Beijing.
Beijing will keep a close eye on how the right-wing parties fare in the EU elections. “The risk is that a strong showing for the far right in the EU elections, followed by similar results in elections in three eastern German states in early September, may create an impression of political disarray and distract Europe from the major geopolitical and economic challenges,” writes Noah Barkin, an analyst at the German Marshall Fund think tank. The EU must quickly agree on the makeup of a new Commission after the elections and show that “it can keep up the momentum on China policy.”
64-year-old Li Xiaopeng (李小鹏) has been in office since fall 2016. Under him, the Ministry of Transport expanded the high-speed train network in particular. According to the 14th five-year plan, which Li helped draw up and runs until 2025, every Chinese citizen will be able to reach a highway within 15 minutes and a railroad within an hour. Li aims to create a world-class transport architecture with a transport network of around 700,000 km by 2035: 200,000 km of railways, 460,000 km of roads, and 25,000 km of waterways. And all of this will be cost-efficient and environmentally friendly, as Li repeatedly emphasizes.
Li is one of the highest-ranking “princelings 太子党” in the People’s Republic. This is the name given to children of veteran cadres who have made a career in the Communist Party. Li is the son of former Premier Li Peng, whom regime critics still vilify today as the “Butcher of Beijing.” Li Peng urged a severe crackdown on the student protests in June 1989.
Deng Xiaoping, the de facto leader of the People’s Republic at the time, listened to the hardliners around Li and declared martial law. Soon after, the tanks rolled across the square. Li senior remained in office and served, among other things, as chairman of the National People’s Congress. He regarded the Three Gorges Dam as his life’s work, the construction of which he drove forward and supervised as a trained electrical engineer.
Li Xiaopeng, whose name can be translated as “little Li Peng,” also benefited from a technical education. He studied at the North China Electric Power University and briefly studied overseas at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg, Canada. From 1982, Little Li worked as an engineer in the energy industry and quickly took on more and more management positions. In April 1999, he was appointed Chairman of the Board of the China Huaneng Group. A year later, he floated the state-owned power generator on the Hong Kong stock exchange. After several mergers and acquisitions, China Huaneng developed into one of Asia’s largest energy companies – and Li was nicknamed the “Asian King of Power.”
His political career began in the summer of 2008 when Li was appointed to the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of Shanxi Province. Shortly afterward, he became the province’s Deputy Governor. In the following four years, during which Li climbed to governor, he launched several anti-corruption campaigns that saw high-ranking provincial officials ousted.
Nevertheless, it seems that his power was also curtailed around 2015. His responsibilities within the CCP administration were drastically reduced from one month to the next. Li never ascended to provincial CP leader, although that would have been the most logical next step compared to other party careers. He obviously had other plans.
In September 2016, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress appointed Li as Minister of Transport. He replaced Yang Chuantang, who held the post from 2012 to 2016. In the same year he took office, his sister, businesswoman Li Xiaolin, made the headlines. The so-called Panama Papers revealed that she had transferred vast sums of money abroad via offshore companies. Li, who lived in Hong Kong, was until then considered one of the wealthiest women in China. She made most of her fortune by investing in state-owned hydropower plants, which once again raised suspicions that the Li clan controlled and exploited parts of China’s energy sector.
Despite suspicions of corruption, Li Xiaopeng was given a seat on the CCP Central Committee in 2017, which he held until 2022. His sister Li Xiaolin retired in 2018, ending her 35-year career in the state-owned electricity industry. Fabian Peltsch
Did you know that there are not only iPhones, iPads and iWatches in China, but also iPeople? However, they have absolutely nothing to do with Apple. They are part of a letter oracle that has been circulating through China’s internet landscape for some time now. It is the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, or MBTI for short, a famous personality test dating back to 1944, designed to identify the psychological types originally developed by Carl Gustav Jung. Dismissed by some as management esotericism, it is still the most widely used personality test by companies worldwide.
The basic data in a nutshell: The MBTI divides people into different categories based on four contrast scales: Introverts (I) vs. Extroverts (E), Observant (S) vs. Intuitive Experiencers (N), Thinkers (T) vs. Feelers (F) and Judgers vs. Perceivers. This results in 16 possible personality types, each labeled with a four-digit letter code such as “ISTJ” or “ENFP.”
Horoscopes and zodiac signs are so yesterday! Since the MBTI (in Mandarin: MBTI人格测试 MBTI réngé cèshì) has spread like wildfire on the Chinese web, this matrix has evolved into a quick-witted small talk pickaxe in the Middle Kingdom. Because the question 你的MBTI是什么类型？ Nǐ de MBTI shì shénme lèixíng? (“Which MBTI type are you?”) is a quick way to break the ice (破冰 pòbīng) in awkward introductory meetings.
The dichotomy between i-people (i人 – àirén) and e-people (e人 – yìrén), i.e., introverts and extroverts, made it into daily language and became a popular online meme. People who used to be embarrassed about outing themselves as introverts (内向 nèixiàng), because it sounded pretty uncool compared to being an extrovert (外向 wàixiàng), now nonchalantly introduce themselves as part of the Chinese i-community.
If you’re not sure whether you’re an i or an e person, just take the battery test: If you recharge your emotional battery outside in social interaction (社交就是充电 shèjiāo jiù shì chōngdiàn), you’re clearly an e model. However, if small talk and get-togethers drain your last reserves, which then have to be replenished at home (社交就是耗电 shèjiāo jiù shì hàodiàn), you are an i-human.
By the way, based on this, China’s internet community has also come up with the joking neologism “ePhone.” It refers to the constantly buzzing and jingling smartphone of extroverted “social butterflies.” The counterpart to this is, of course, the “iPhone” of an introverted i-person, which is always silent.
Things get complicated for dog owners, especially when their owner’s psychogram doesn’t quite match their dog’s. In other words, when i-owners go for a walk with e-doggies, for example. While the four-legged friends are out and about, wagging their tails and jumping happily at each other, the i-owners stand awkwardly by until they start tugging at the leash to try and escape the social trap. There are plenty of amusing photos and videos circulating on the Chinese internet under the hashtags e-dog (e狗 yì-gǒu – extroverted dog) and i-dog (i狗 ài-gǒu – introverted dog).
And if you really want to give the i-people around you a hard time, the firepot restaurants of the Haidilao (海底捞 Hǎidǐlāo) chain in China are the perfect place to do so. Here, shy i-recluses are in for the ultimate cringe meltdown, especially on birthdays. That’s when the staff arrive armed with loudspeakers and cardboard crowns to belt out the in-house birthday hit 跟所有的烦恼说拜拜，跟所有的快乐 say 嗨嗨 Gēn suǒyǒu de fánnǎo shuō báibái, gēn suǒyǒu de kuàilè say hāihāi). The stares of all neighboring tables are, of course, guaranteed.
But even on regular days, Haidilao can make shy guests slide under the table in embarrassment. All you have to do is order the home-made hand-pulled noodles (拉面 lāmiàn). This is because they are thrown and pulled directly at the table in kung fu style by athletic lads – accompanied by a snazzy little dance to groovy music. A spectacle that activates the sweat glands and flight reflexes in these sensitive souls.
But there are also ways to annoy other letter characters. For example, j-people (j人 “dschey-rén”) and their counterpart, p-people (p人 pìrén). Both have also made a name for themselves as psycho-prototypes in Chinese colloquial speech. Similar to i- and e-people, this pair of opposites also seem to come from different planets. J-folk are known to be meticulous planners (爱计划ài jìhuà) who leave nothing to chance, while P-people prefer to float in the here and now. The latter are like free-spirited chameleons who can adapt to all circumstances with ease (适应能力强 shìyìng nénglì qiáng).
If you want to drive p-people crazy, have them draw up a meticulous travel plan (preferably in Excel) before going on vacation together. The heart rate of j-people, on the other hand, can be raised by telling them in response to the question about the exact travel itinerary: “We’ll see !” (到时候再说吧 dào shíhòu zài shuō ba!). Just try it out in your own personal environment – but please do so at your own risk!
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
Since Lai Ching-te became Taiwan’s new president, China’s threats have been louder than ever. However, researcher Angela Stanzel, who recently returned from a two-month stay in Taiwan, still interprets Beijing’s behavior as a warning, not the start of an invasion. In an interview with Michael Radunski, she urges Germany to show more presence in the region and help maintain the peace that is also precious to Germany.
But there is positive news from the region. Representatives from China, Japan and South Korea met in Seoul to strengthen mutual trust. Although expectations for the summit are not overly high, the fact that the quarreling countries of East Asia are talking to each other is symbolic. At least: China and South Korea want to start a security policy dialogue.
What the EU elections mean for the Union’s future course towards the People’s Republic should not be underestimated, writes Amelie Richter. In particular, the feared rise of far-right parties could change the stance towards China – in a dangerous direction for Europe.
The spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry allegedly spoke of “crushed skulls” and blood. Official threats speak of annihilation. Has the time now come for China to strike against Taiwan?
I don’t think so. Sure, the current military exercises are bigger, the rhetoric sharper than before. But I still see it as a warning to Taiwan and its partners – and not as the start of a naval blockade or even an invasion.
Why is China acting so hostile now?
China is using the tactics of previous years: It is deploying more military forces, making its presence felt ever more strongly, and moving ever closer to Taiwan. At the moment, China has simply used the inauguration of the new Taiwanese President, Lai Ching-te, to once again demonstrate what it has and what it can do.
Is Lai Ching-te’s inauguration a legitimate occasion? Did Lai provoke or even attack China in his speech?
No, not at all. Quite the opposite. It became clear that Lai is not trying to abandon the current policy, but will continue to handle the whole situation very carefully. Although he has a reputation for supporting Taiwan’s independence, Lai has never actively called for Taiwan’s independence. This is the Chinese narrative and serves as a justification for the military exercises.
But Lai must have said something in his speech that at least upset Beijing.
Lai took a two-sided approach in his speech. He has to, because he naturally also has to consider the wishes of the Taiwanese people into account. This means that, on the one hand, he could not take a big step toward China – neither the population nor his party would support that. On the other hand, he cannot provoke China unnecessarily.
How does Lai manage this balancing act?
He very clearly emphasized Taiwan’s right to exist. That was the signal to China to say: We will stand our ground. On the other hand, he also made China an offer and campaigned for more reciprocal tourism, so-called people-to-people contacts should be expanded. So he has certainly tried to be very balanced. It is interesting to see how China’s behavior towards Lai is changing. After his election victory in January, Beijing remained fairly calm and wise. But now, its behavior has increasingly escalated to the point of aggression.
So, the military exercises were not all that surprising?
I believe China has been planning them for some time. But it had to tinker a bit beforehand with exactly what justification it would use. And that’s the tricky thing that Lai and Taiwan will face over the next four years: China will use any reason to perceive it as a provocation. It almost doesn’t matter what Lai does. Even if he stopped talking about China, Beijing would still see it as a provocation.
Ever more aggressive, ever stronger, ever closer – how dangerous is the current situation around Taiwan?
The danger increases with every day and every exercise. Taiwan’s military and coast guard take great care to de-escalate and not provoke the situation, which is very professional. But the danger is growing. The risk of an unintentional escalation, for example, through an accident, is also increasing.
And then?
Then things get really dangerous. After all, there has been no direct communication channel between Taipei and Beijing since 2016. No red telephone and thus no way to quickly respond to unintended events. A third party, the USA or Japan, would have to intervene and mediate. But it could be too late by then.
Back to the current military exercises. They are being held to the north, south and east of the island. Also around the islands of Matsu and Kinmen. Also around the islands of Matsu and Kinmen. What are the actual benefits of such exercises?
In addition to the psychological effect from Taiwan, they are also important from a military perspective because they allow China to practice on the ground how a naval blockade of the Taiwan Strait could be carried out or an invasion, which would first have to take the form of an amphibious landing. It is important to train this on the ground because the waters in the Taiwan Strait are considered highly difficult. There is only a tiny window of a few months every year in which China could even carry out such an amphibious landing. All of this has to be trained on the spot in order to be successful.
Is it possible to discern a tactical development by observing the Chinese military exercises?
Yes, you can see that Beijing has identified strategically advantageous positions for new warships, for example, to conduct a naval blockade and completely isolate Taiwan. You can clearly see that China has evolved. That is a new quality.
In this difficult situation, Germany now also wants to become more involved in the Indo-Pacific. A good decision?
An excellent decision. Germany must become more involved in this region.
Among other things, the debate centers on whether the German frigate Baden-Wuerttemberg should pass through the Taiwan Strait. Should it?
Absolutely. If we’re going to show a presence in the Indo-Pacific and make such an effort, then it would be appropriate to approach it with some self-confidence and make this voyage through the Taiwan Strait. Given the tensions and the huge military exercises, it’s the right time to do it right now.
China has already warned the German government against such a passage.
Yes, but China will always warn and criticize, even if the frigate doesn’t cross the Taiwan Strait. That’s what we saw last time with the frigate Bayern.
Does that mean Beijing is criticizing too much?
This is another problem that China should realize: When criticism is constantly being voiced everywhere, it’s almost impossible to take it seriously. You don’t even know which of these red lines you may cross at the moment. So, I believe it would be good for Germany to make this passage. It would send a clear signal, including to our partners like Japan, Australia and other countries in Southeast Asia, that Germany is serious about its commitment in the Indo-Pacific and that it is not just empty words.
Angela Stanzel is a China expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. She has just spent a two-month research visit to Taiwan.
In two weeks, the EU elections will take place. Their impact on the future direction of the European Union towards China should not be underestimated. The future of the Brussels agenda partly depends on whether Ursula von der Leyen will return as head of the EU Commission. This, in turn, rests on the EU Parliament, which must ultimately approve the new EU Commission.
The composition of the Parliament itself is also important for the direction of the European institutions’ China policy. For example, in 2021, the EU Parliament refused to work on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China (CAI) after Beijing sanctioned several MEPs. CAI was put on the famous shelf and stayed there. The composition of Parliament’s committees will, therefore, have a tangible impact on the direction of new legislation and regulation.
“There is a lot at stake in the EU elections when it comes to China,” says Niclas Frederic Poitiers, an analyst at Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, specializing in trade policy. He says that the EU Commission has adopted an increasingly confrontational stance towards China in recent years. Economic security has become more prominent, and Europe has to assert itself between the USA and the People’s Republic.
The election marks a significant turning point in how this approach will continue, says Poitiers. “Not least because of the rise of the far right, some of which are very close to China.” Poitiers says many votes for far-right parties could shift majorities in the European Parliament in Beijing’s favor.
One decision with repercussions is likely to be made before the EU elections: The EU investigation into Chinese electric vehicles, which has been ongoing since autumn, is expected to find evidence of unfair subsidies, von der Leyen said last week at a debate with other EU candidates organized by Bruegel and the Financial Times. She added that the Commission would impose tariffs “correspondent to the level of damage.” China has already threatened to impose tariffs on cars with an engine displacement of more than 2.5 liters.
However, von der Leyen insisted that the EU was not in a trade war with Beijing, thus contradicting EU Commissioner Nicolas Schmit, lead candidate of the Socialists, who described the situation as “the beginning of a war or at least the risk of escalation.” During the trade policy debate, Sandro Gozi said: “We are under attack from China.” The Italian MEP is the lead candidate for the liberal Renew party. It is clear that China is completely violating the spirit and rules of the WTO and the EU must defend itself against an increasingly aggressive Chinese policy, Gozi said.
At the official top candidate debate last Thursday, China only played an indirect role in economic security matters. The focus was on other issues.
Filip Šebok, analyst at the Association for International Affairs (AMO) in Prague, assumes that this will also be the case in the actual election on the second weekend in June: “In the EU elections in the individual countries, the Domestic issues are usually in the foreground, not EU trade or foreign policy.”
Indirectly, the China issues received attention in the election campaign when it came to whether Chinese companies were investing in EU countries and the future of European competitiveness, explains Šebok, who follows China’s influence primarily in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In these countries, several parties advocated a revision of the Green Deal and less EU regulation of the economy. “Specifically in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, it is often claimed that we are surrendering to China by abandoning internal combustion engines, where the European industry has been traditionally strong, and switching to EVs, where China dominates.” Šebok emphasizes that there are also increasing connections between EU parliamentarians from the right-wing and left-wing extremist parties and Beijing.
Beijing will keep a close eye on how the right-wing parties fare in the EU elections. “The risk is that a strong showing for the far right in the EU elections, followed by similar results in elections in three eastern German states in early September, may create an impression of political disarray and distract Europe from the major geopolitical and economic challenges,” writes Noah Barkin, an analyst at the German Marshall Fund think tank. The EU must quickly agree on the makeup of a new Commission after the elections and show that “it can keep up the momentum on China policy.”
64-year-old Li Xiaopeng (李小鹏) has been in office since fall 2016. Under him, the Ministry of Transport expanded the high-speed train network in particular. According to the 14th five-year plan, which Li helped draw up and runs until 2025, every Chinese citizen will be able to reach a highway within 15 minutes and a railroad within an hour. Li aims to create a world-class transport architecture with a transport network of around 700,000 km by 2035: 200,000 km of railways, 460,000 km of roads, and 25,000 km of waterways. And all of this will be cost-efficient and environmentally friendly, as Li repeatedly emphasizes.
Li is one of the highest-ranking “princelings 太子党” in the People’s Republic. This is the name given to children of veteran cadres who have made a career in the Communist Party. Li is the son of former Premier Li Peng, whom regime critics still vilify today as the “Butcher of Beijing.” Li Peng urged a severe crackdown on the student protests in June 1989.
Deng Xiaoping, the de facto leader of the People’s Republic at the time, listened to the hardliners around Li and declared martial law. Soon after, the tanks rolled across the square. Li senior remained in office and served, among other things, as chairman of the National People’s Congress. He regarded the Three Gorges Dam as his life’s work, the construction of which he drove forward and supervised as a trained electrical engineer.
Li Xiaopeng, whose name can be translated as “little Li Peng,” also benefited from a technical education. He studied at the North China Electric Power University and briefly studied overseas at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg, Canada. From 1982, Little Li worked as an engineer in the energy industry and quickly took on more and more management positions. In April 1999, he was appointed Chairman of the Board of the China Huaneng Group. A year later, he floated the state-owned power generator on the Hong Kong stock exchange. After several mergers and acquisitions, China Huaneng developed into one of Asia’s largest energy companies – and Li was nicknamed the “Asian King of Power.”
His political career began in the summer of 2008 when Li was appointed to the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of Shanxi Province. Shortly afterward, he became the province’s Deputy Governor. In the following four years, during which Li climbed to governor, he launched several anti-corruption campaigns that saw high-ranking provincial officials ousted.
Nevertheless, it seems that his power was also curtailed around 2015. His responsibilities within the CCP administration were drastically reduced from one month to the next. Li never ascended to provincial CP leader, although that would have been the most logical next step compared to other party careers. He obviously had other plans.
In September 2016, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress appointed Li as Minister of Transport. He replaced Yang Chuantang, who held the post from 2012 to 2016. In the same year he took office, his sister, businesswoman Li Xiaolin, made the headlines. The so-called Panama Papers revealed that she had transferred vast sums of money abroad via offshore companies. Li, who lived in Hong Kong, was until then considered one of the wealthiest women in China. She made most of her fortune by investing in state-owned hydropower plants, which once again raised suspicions that the Li clan controlled and exploited parts of China’s energy sector.
Despite suspicions of corruption, Li Xiaopeng was given a seat on the CCP Central Committee in 2017, which he held until 2022. His sister Li Xiaolin retired in 2018, ending her 35-year career in the state-owned electricity industry. Fabian Peltsch
Did you know that there are not only iPhones, iPads and iWatches in China, but also iPeople? However, they have absolutely nothing to do with Apple. They are part of a letter oracle that has been circulating through China’s internet landscape for some time now. It is the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, or MBTI for short, a famous personality test dating back to 1944, designed to identify the psychological types originally developed by Carl Gustav Jung. Dismissed by some as management esotericism, it is still the most widely used personality test by companies worldwide.
The basic data in a nutshell: The MBTI divides people into different categories based on four contrast scales: Introverts (I) vs. Extroverts (E), Observant (S) vs. Intuitive Experiencers (N), Thinkers (T) vs. Feelers (F) and Judgers vs. Perceivers. This results in 16 possible personality types, each labeled with a four-digit letter code such as “ISTJ” or “ENFP.”
Horoscopes and zodiac signs are so yesterday! Since the MBTI (in Mandarin: MBTI人格测试 MBTI réngé cèshì) has spread like wildfire on the Chinese web, this matrix has evolved into a quick-witted small talk pickaxe in the Middle Kingdom. Because the question 你的MBTI是什么类型？ Nǐ de MBTI shì shénme lèixíng? (“Which MBTI type are you?”) is a quick way to break the ice (破冰 pòbīng) in awkward introductory meetings.
The dichotomy between i-people (i人 – àirén) and e-people (e人 – yìrén), i.e., introverts and extroverts, made it into daily language and became a popular online meme. People who used to be embarrassed about outing themselves as introverts (内向 nèixiàng), because it sounded pretty uncool compared to being an extrovert (外向 wàixiàng), now nonchalantly introduce themselves as part of the Chinese i-community.
If you’re not sure whether you’re an i or an e person, just take the battery test: If you recharge your emotional battery outside in social interaction (社交就是充电 shèjiāo jiù shì chōngdiàn), you’re clearly an e model. However, if small talk and get-togethers drain your last reserves, which then have to be replenished at home (社交就是耗电 shèjiāo jiù shì hàodiàn), you are an i-human.
By the way, based on this, China’s internet community has also come up with the joking neologism “ePhone.” It refers to the constantly buzzing and jingling smartphone of extroverted “social butterflies.” The counterpart to this is, of course, the “iPhone” of an introverted i-person, which is always silent.
Things get complicated for dog owners, especially when their owner’s psychogram doesn’t quite match their dog’s. In other words, when i-owners go for a walk with e-doggies, for example. While the four-legged friends are out and about, wagging their tails and jumping happily at each other, the i-owners stand awkwardly by until they start tugging at the leash to try and escape the social trap. There are plenty of amusing photos and videos circulating on the Chinese internet under the hashtags e-dog (e狗 yì-gǒu – extroverted dog) and i-dog (i狗 ài-gǒu – introverted dog).
And if you really want to give the i-people around you a hard time, the firepot restaurants of the Haidilao (海底捞 Hǎidǐlāo) chain in China are the perfect place to do so. Here, shy i-recluses are in for the ultimate cringe meltdown, especially on birthdays. That’s when the staff arrive armed with loudspeakers and cardboard crowns to belt out the in-house birthday hit 跟所有的烦恼说拜拜，跟所有的快乐 say 嗨嗨 Gēn suǒyǒu de fánnǎo shuō báibái, gēn suǒyǒu de kuàilè say hāihāi). The stares of all neighboring tables are, of course, guaranteed.
But even on regular days, Haidilao can make shy guests slide under the table in embarrassment. All you have to do is order the home-made hand-pulled noodles (拉面 lāmiàn). This is because they are thrown and pulled directly at the table in kung fu style by athletic lads – accompanied by a snazzy little dance to groovy music. A spectacle that activates the sweat glands and flight reflexes in these sensitive souls.
But there are also ways to annoy other letter characters. For example, j-people (j人 “dschey-rén”) and their counterpart, p-people (p人 pìrén). Both have also made a name for themselves as psycho-prototypes in Chinese colloquial speech. Similar to i- and e-people, this pair of opposites also seem to come from different planets. J-folk are known to be meticulous planners (爱计划ài jìhuà) who leave nothing to chance, while P-people prefer to float in the here and now. The latter are like free-spirited chameleons who can adapt to all circumstances with ease (适应能力强 shìyìng nénglì qiáng).
If you want to drive p-people crazy, have them draw up a meticulous travel plan (preferably in Excel) before going on vacation together. The heart rate of j-people, on the other hand, can be raised by telling them in response to the question about the exact travel itinerary: “We’ll see !” (到时候再说吧 dào shíhòu zài shuō ba!). Just try it out in your own personal environment – but please do so at your own risk!
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
