This weekend, Taiwan will witness the election of a new president and a new parliament. A free, democratic election in the Chinese cultural sphere! This event impressively refutes the absurd notion that Chinese people and democracy are incompatible. It will be a compelling event with far-reaching consequences for international politics and global trade, as well as for democracy and society.
Incumbent Tsai Ing-wen is not running for re-election and polls indicate a close race for her successor. Leonardo Pape spoke with political scientist Nathan Batto a few days before the election. The researcher from the Academia Sinica in Taipei explains which candidates pursue what political goals, what Taiwan’s voters want and the role that historical identity plays in all of this.
The relationship with the People’s Republic also plays a crucial role in the election decision. Not only do the candidates of the DPP, KMT and TPP parties try to persuade voters, but the Beijing leadership also has its goals firmly in mind for Saturday’s election.
Fabian Peltsch illustrates how the CCP aims to help its former adversary from the times of the civil war to victory. With a “cooperative development zone” between Taiwan and the coastal province of Fujian, the CCP seeks to demonstrate the opportunities Taiwan would have under the KMT through a closer connection to the People’s Republic. At the same time, China’s state media warns that another victory for the DPP would result in economic losses for Taiwan’s citizens. It is the classic concept of carrot and stick.
Just days before the elections in Taiwan, Beijing has revealed further details this week about its “cooperative development zone” between Taiwan and the coastal province of Fujian. The goal is to integrate the democratically governed island more closely into the mainland Chinese economic sphere – provided the Taiwanese are willing to agree. This would presuppose a vote for the pro-Chinese KMT.
Southeastern Fujian is the province closest to Taiwan. From the offshore island of Kinmen, which belongs to Taiwan, it is only about two kilometers to the Chinese port city of Xiamen.
Another Taiwanese island, Matsu, is only about 20 kilometers from the provincial capital Fuzhou. Both are already closely connected to the mainland, for example, through direct ferry connections or a shared drinking water supply. Once integrated into an economic model zone, they could become a shining example for all of Taiwan, according to the calculations of the Chinese government.
In mid-September, Beijing had already presented a 21-point plan for the “deepening of the integrated development of the Taiwan Strait and the promotion of the process of peaceful reunification.” It includes eliminating certain trade and investment restrictions between Fujian and Taiwan. The plan guarantees Taiwanese companies that want to invest in the pilot zone faster customs clearance and mutual recognition of professional qualifications and common industry standards.
Taiwanese individuals should also find it easier to settle on the mainland, buy houses, and participate in the social system. More study and job opportunities will be created. Taiwanese are even allowed to produce radio and television programs on the mainland, it is said. However, democratic values in Taiwan’s sense are likely not to be a topic there.
The fact that the Chinese government is circulating these plans in the months and days leading up to the election is, of course, no coincidence. Beijing aims to ensure that the rhetoric of reunification is not perceived as a military threat by Taiwanese voters but primarily as a beneficial outlook into a shared future.
However, Taiwan’s government under Tsai Ing-wen coldly describes Beijing’s integration plans as “wishful thinking”. And since China is approaching its island with large military maneuvers, many Taiwanese view Beijing’s idea of cooperation on an equal footing as hypocrisy. Instead of China, Taiwan’s ruling DPP party has approached the US and other Western partners since 2016. It also promotes programs to further reduce economic dependencies on the mainland.
Effectively diversifying Taiwan’s trade, for example, to other Southeast Asian markets, could take years. The People’s Republic is still Taiwan’s largest trading partner, with the mainland and Hong Kong being the most important destinations for Taiwan’s exports. According to the Taiwanese Bureau of Foreign Trade, Taiwan and China had a trade volume of 205 billion dollars in 2022.
As of November 2023, around 35 percent of Taiwan’s total exports were destined for the mainland – the lowest value in years but still very high. The economic dependence on the mainland is “not the path Taiwan should take,” said DPP presidential candidate and poll favorite William Lai in December.
Chinese state media warn that a re-election of the DPP will have economic consequences for Taiwan’s citizens. To influence the elections, Beijing repeatedly plays with economic pressure on Taiwan. China has imposed repeated import bans, such as for fruits or fish. Individual trips to Taiwan have been prohibited, or fines have been imposed on Taiwanese companies operating in China, such as the Far Eastern Group.
Officially, reasons such as pest infestation or violation of local environmental regulations have been cited. However, a political motivation can be easily discerned in many cases. After it was announced in the summer of 2022 that the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, would travel to Taiwan for a meeting with Tsai Ing-wen, the Chinese customs administration suspended the import of more than 2,000 food items from Taiwan.
In December, in the final stretch of the election campaign, Beijing also suspended tariff reductions for 12 Taiwanese chemical products introduced in 2010 under the “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”. This was a groundbreaking bilateral trade agreement at the time.
This was Beijing’s final signal to undecided voters to perhaps choose a more Beijing-friendly party this Saturday. The message behind it is clear: The previous measures mainly had symbolic value. China could economically hit Taiwan much harder if it wanted to.
Professor Batto, who is most likely to win the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Taiwan on Jan. 13?
The poll this year do not give a clear indication of what will happen. It’s not like four years ago or eight years ago where Tsai Ing-wen had a huge lead in the polls and we pretty much knew that she would win and the DPP would do very well in the legislative elections. This year, the polls are close enough that most outcomes are still in play. William Lai is probably the favorite to win. But it’s certainly not impossible that Hou Yu-ih (KMT) or even Ko Wen-je (TPP) could win the presidency.
What is your forecast for the composition of the parliament?
The legislature could go any of three ways. It’s possible that the KMT or the DPP could come out with a majority. And it’s also possible that neither one would get a majority, and the TPP would hold the balance of power.
Why are the elections closer than the last time?
There is a sense of fatigue with the DPP governing for eight years, and a desire for change. A lot of the problems that nearly every economy around the world faces are also here. We’re not in a booming economy. So there is frustration among a lot of people, especially among younger voters who hear the stories about the previous generations who did very well, who came into a society that was prospering, and everything was getting better. That’s not the story of young people today. It’s difficult to be a young college graduate right now. They don’t have a wide array of high paying jobs just waiting for them.
Does the People’s Republic play a role?
I think there’s also some frustration with the cross-straits relationship and a bit of trepidation about the threat from China, which has always been there but is getting more immediate and more serious now. I think that probably has worn down some of the support for the DPP.
How do the DPP, the KMT and the TPP each present themselves to voters as a distinct and better party?
The parties are grounded in a national identity cleavage. It is based on attitudes towards China and being Chinese in which the question is: Who are we? Are we Chinese or not? Around 60-65 percent say, no, we’re not Chinese at all, we are just Taiwanese. And other people say yes, we are Chinese, or that we’re both Taiwanese and we’re Chinese, and those are not mutually exclusive identities. The DPP is founded on a very Taiwanese nationalist logic. The DPP thinks of themselves as representing Taiwan and nothing else. The KMT was founded in China over 100 years ago, lost the Chinese civil war to the Communist Party, resettled here in Taiwan and refounded themselves. They have a Chinese identity embedded deep in their DNA, for decades they justified their power by claiming to be the legitimate government of all of China. So, they have a Chinese nationalist heritage that shapes the way that they approach politics.
What are the wishes and expectations of the voters?
Since the most important question facing Taiwan is how to deal with China, this big colossus to the west, the China cleavage is going to continue to shape Taiwan politics. Many Taiwanese wish that politics were about other issues such as environment, social policies, unequal income distribution, and so on. However, these other issues are always overwhelmed by the dominant national identity cleavage. If, for example, you think of yourself as Taiwanese first and Taiwanese only, then you tend to vote for the DPP, no matter what you think on topics like taxes or environmental protection or infrastructure development or education policy or whatever. The KMT and the DPP are big tent parties on all these different policies. They have all kinds of people with all kinds of positions in their party.
What impact does the TPP’s committed campaign have on the positioning of the parties?
There have been several smaller parties that have tried to break through the duopoly of KMT and DPP. They have usually tried to take a more extreme position on the Chinese vs. Taiwanese spectrum. They usually haven’t done very well. They’ve been eaten up by the logic of majoritarian government where the need to create a majority coalition has driven their potential sympathizers toward one of the two big parties.
The TPP has taken a different path. They have tried to ignore the identity cleavage and said they are against using “ideology” to make all decisions. They would like you to think that they’re moderate, but they also have to take a position. And the TPP has increasingly been identified as being closer to the KMT on questions of how to deal with China than to the DPP. But still, what they claim is that they will do everything else better because they’re not obsessed with unification and independence. And they claim that these two big parties are corrupt because their voters are trapped by “ideology”. These voters have no choice but to support either the KMT or DPP, and they dare not punish corruption.
How are the attitudes toward China among the population right now?
There is a widespread consensus that Taiwan does not want to be part of the PRC and that this society wants to maintain its democratic system and its sovereign, independent status. Whether you call this society Taiwan or the Republic of China is a debate, but nearly everybody wants to maintain Taiwan’s current status. Usually, under 3 percent in polls want to be unified with the PRC.
Where do the debates begin?
Once you get past the question of maintaining Taiwan’s current political system of liberal democracy with free and open elections, then how to deal with China economically is a much more debatable proposition. There are people who think that Taiwan should integrate into the Chinese economy, that this is a huge market and Taiwan should be active in it. And there are people who think that China uses its market politically and strategically to coerce other countries into certain behavior. In Taiwan’s case, the PRC will try to use its market to coerce Taiwan into eventually giving up his sovereignty and accepting unification.
What follows in practice?
That is a question in which identity comes into full focus. Because if you identify as Taiwanese and only Taiwanese, you tend to gravitate towards the answer that Taiwan is better off developing economic ties with other countries. If you think that you are Chinese in some way, then you tend to think that it’s natural that Taiwan and China should have close economic ties.
What does the Chinese leadership think of the current elections?
I am not a China expert, and I don’t know what Chinese leaders are thinking. That said, I don’t think they want William Lai to win. They seem to be spooked by his statement a few years ago. He said he’s a pragmatic Taiwan independence worker, and they’ve never forgotten that. Both Ko Wen-je and Hou Yu-ih say they want to deal constructively with China. I think China assumes that that means they will both accept the one China principle. And so I think they would be more comfortable with either one of them.
Does China seriously hope for cooperation for reunification from Taiwan?
I doubt that China thinks they are going to achieve unification through domestic Taiwan politics. They had high hopes for Ma Ying-jeou (the previous president 2008-2016, from the KMT). He was a strong Chinese nationalist who wanted a unification with China eventually. He didn’t produce unification, and if he couldn’t do it, then I don’t think China has any hopes for Hou or Ko to produce unification. So I don’t think that the Chinese leadership are really that concerned about who wins and who loses, because none of them are going to be what the PRC wants.
Based on who will win in the elections, how could Taiwan’s cross-strait policy develop?
If William Lai wins, we will experience pretty much the same thing as in the last eight years. He will not recognize the 1992 consensus, and China will continue not to communicate with Taiwan in any official form. It will continue to harass Taiwan militarily and increase the pressure. It will probably exert economic pressure against Taiwan, which it has been doing for eight years. If Ko wins, the outcome is hard to judge as we don’t know how far he will go in dealing with China. Ko has said he wants to have a constructive and positive dialog with China, but he has not explained how he will do what he is willing to do to make that happen. If Ko wins, the result is hard to judge, because we don’t know how far he will go to deal with China. Ko has said that he wants to have constructive and positive engagement with China but he hasn’t explained how he’ll do that, what he’s willing to do or say to make that possible.
And if Hou of the KMT wins?
If Hou wins, he has indicated that he’ll basically go back to the policies of Ma Ying-jeou. They’ll accept the “92 consensus”. He’ll try to have constructive engagement with China, and he’ll try to have formal meetings with Chinese officials. They’ll welcome the Chinese tourists back into Taiwan, try to build more economic and social ties. Hou hasn’t said anything about political agreements, though. So he might not be ready to go there. But I think that if Hou wins, then China will probably reduce the pressure a little bit. But not completely. China has never backed away completely. Even when Ma was president, they were building up the number of missiles they were aiming at Taiwan. And that’s when they built their big navy, by now the biggest in the world. So the idea that that if Hou wins, then the ties between China and Taiwan will become warm and the world will be at peace, is probably overstated.
Nathan Batto is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica and Jointly Appointed Associate Research Fellow at the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University in Taipei. He has been researching and following politics and elections in Taiwan for over three decades. He also writes a blog on elections in Taiwan, frozengarlic.wordpress.com.
China’s President Xi Jinping has emphasized the role of ordinary people in US-China relations. In a letter to Sarah Lande from Muscatine, Iowa, Xi encouraged more personal exchange between the two superpowers.
Xi seems to be signaling to the public that he is genuinely interested in stable relations with the US beyond the political and economic tensions between the two nations.
According to media reports, Xi wrote in his letter that the successes in China-US relations are primarily due to the efforts of people in both countries. Accordingly, increased exchange could lead to more mutual understanding. “China and the US are the world’s largest developing and developed countries, and the future and destiny of this planet demand China-US relations to be more stable and to be better,” wrote Xi.
Xi Jinping addressed the letter to Sarah Lande from Muscatine, a small town in the Midwest, where he led a delegation almost four decades ago. Lande and Xi first met in 1985 when the then 31-year-old Xi visited Muscatine with a delegation from Hebei to learn about agricultural production in the US.
In 2012, Xi visited Muscatine again, this time as vice president, just a few months before being promoted to general secretary of the Communist Party. The most recent meeting between Lande and Xi took place in November at a dinner for the Chinese president in San Francisco. rad
Berlin didn’t play a decisive role in the musical education of Carmen Herold, co-founder of the Zhao Dai Club (招待会). Although some might assume otherwise at first glance, the daughter of a Chinese mother and a German father sees herself more connected to the traditional lines of the Frankfurt metropolitan area, where she grew up. “Music and fine arts were historically more closely intertwined in the Frankfurt scene than in Berlin. There was a totality of different aesthetic experiences that were not present elsewhere,” says Herold.
With a scholarship from the Confucius Institute, Carmen Herold went to China for a year immediately after graduating from high school. During this time, she devoted herself to studying language and culture but mainly established contacts with the local art scene through endless city explorations. After obtaining a bachelor’s degree in Berlin, a city that seemed to have run its course for her, she was clear that she had to go back. She found a position in the cultural department of the Goethe-Institut Beijing, where she implemented curatorial projects in film, theater, and discourse.
In 2017, a wave of club openings swept across the country. “Club spaces were incredibly important during that time for subversive cultures, where emancipatory potentials could be unleashed.” Along with three allies she met during her first stay, Herold then founded Zhao Dai. The program went beyond just music. “The iconic clubs in China were iconic because they also exhibited artists who couldn’t exhibit in galleries. This way, artistic positions that had no place in the establishment could find a stage and an audience.”
But there was a more significant dream that seemed unattainable for a long time. “Organizing a festival in China is almost unfeasible.” Then an opportunity arose: Aranya (安啊呀), a newly built resort, offered grants to artistic projects, hoping that the influx of cultural capital would attract financial capital. Although such a location was not Herold’s first choice, “we had hardly any restrictions and could sell subsidized tickets for a line-up that we put together with a free hand.”
Zhao Dai On Leave, as the festival was named, is heading into its third round next year. In addition to electronic music, experimental live music and performances by independent artists are also planned for the first time.
The reason that sound in China is often biting, burning and brutal is that it expresses aesthetic resistance that can be collectively experienced. It provides an alternative to other forms of opposition, such as street protests. “A language-less music is protected from censorship, and yet it can precisely address its audience. That makes the current scene more exciting than many others I know,” explains Herold.
However, it is currently uncertain whether this liveliness can be sustained. Most foreigners are no longer there, and many Chinese who have the opportunity are leaving. “We have lost 40 percent of our old allies.” Whether the large-scale departure will give new, emerging acts the chance to unfold or whether a self-contained scene will exhaust itself sooner rather than later is not yet foreseeable, says Herold.
She herself is no longer on-site and no longer in Zhao Dai’s core team. She has now become more of an advisory foreign correspondent. For a year now, Carmen Herold has been dedicated to a training program at the Goethe-Institut, preparing prospective institute directors for their assignments. One thing is certain, no matter where she ends up: In addition to her close contacts with the Chinese art scene, Herold will always bring the experiences and convictions she gained during her master’s in Postcolonial Studies at New York University. “If you ask how cultural institutions can be made future-proof and what topics should still be brought in, you have to realize that postcolonial approaches are still an underrepresented topic in Germany.”
This applies not only to cultural discourses and art funding but also to the German view of the Far East. Herold has sharp words for the often politically demanded China competence: “Terms like ‘China watcher’ are so problematic that it would be better if they disappeared.” If China competence is understood only as generating extractive knowledge about China in the service of economic interests, Herold does not want to be considered a China expert.
Anyone who wants to take China seriously must engage with a diverse range of people and their specific concerns, in personal contact. It should still be possible to express differentiated and critical views on China – just without placing the entire country under general suspicion, as still frequently happens, says Herold.
In addition, Carmen Herold wishes that more “aesthetic agency” is attributed to the Chinese. In Germany, there is a tendency for China, unlike Japan, to be overpoliticized and underaestheticized. If this doesn’t change, it is almost unavoidable that dissidents and subversive Chinese voices will elude the local observation, especially when these voices make themselves heard in techno sounds rather than sentences and words. Julius Schwarzwaelder
What looks like a new video game is actually Taiwan’s Election-O-Mat. It is designed to assist undecided voters in finding their best candidate before casting their votes. However, the pixelated individuals here don’t engage in a jump-and-run adventure. Users can arrive at a result by answering ten questions. This Election-O-Mat is created by the digital Taiwanese media house, The News Lens. In Germany, a similar tool, the “Wahl-O-Mat”, is provided by the Federal Agency for Civic Education.
This weekend, Taiwan will witness the election of a new president and a new parliament. A free, democratic election in the Chinese cultural sphere! This event impressively refutes the absurd notion that Chinese people and democracy are incompatible. It will be a compelling event with far-reaching consequences for international politics and global trade, as well as for democracy and society.
Incumbent Tsai Ing-wen is not running for re-election and polls indicate a close race for her successor. Leonardo Pape spoke with political scientist Nathan Batto a few days before the election. The researcher from the Academia Sinica in Taipei explains which candidates pursue what political goals, what Taiwan’s voters want and the role that historical identity plays in all of this.
The relationship with the People’s Republic also plays a crucial role in the election decision. Not only do the candidates of the DPP, KMT and TPP parties try to persuade voters, but the Beijing leadership also has its goals firmly in mind for Saturday’s election.
Fabian Peltsch illustrates how the CCP aims to help its former adversary from the times of the civil war to victory. With a “cooperative development zone” between Taiwan and the coastal province of Fujian, the CCP seeks to demonstrate the opportunities Taiwan would have under the KMT through a closer connection to the People’s Republic. At the same time, China’s state media warns that another victory for the DPP would result in economic losses for Taiwan’s citizens. It is the classic concept of carrot and stick.
Just days before the elections in Taiwan, Beijing has revealed further details this week about its “cooperative development zone” between Taiwan and the coastal province of Fujian. The goal is to integrate the democratically governed island more closely into the mainland Chinese economic sphere – provided the Taiwanese are willing to agree. This would presuppose a vote for the pro-Chinese KMT.
Southeastern Fujian is the province closest to Taiwan. From the offshore island of Kinmen, which belongs to Taiwan, it is only about two kilometers to the Chinese port city of Xiamen.
Another Taiwanese island, Matsu, is only about 20 kilometers from the provincial capital Fuzhou. Both are already closely connected to the mainland, for example, through direct ferry connections or a shared drinking water supply. Once integrated into an economic model zone, they could become a shining example for all of Taiwan, according to the calculations of the Chinese government.
In mid-September, Beijing had already presented a 21-point plan for the “deepening of the integrated development of the Taiwan Strait and the promotion of the process of peaceful reunification.” It includes eliminating certain trade and investment restrictions between Fujian and Taiwan. The plan guarantees Taiwanese companies that want to invest in the pilot zone faster customs clearance and mutual recognition of professional qualifications and common industry standards.
Taiwanese individuals should also find it easier to settle on the mainland, buy houses, and participate in the social system. More study and job opportunities will be created. Taiwanese are even allowed to produce radio and television programs on the mainland, it is said. However, democratic values in Taiwan’s sense are likely not to be a topic there.
The fact that the Chinese government is circulating these plans in the months and days leading up to the election is, of course, no coincidence. Beijing aims to ensure that the rhetoric of reunification is not perceived as a military threat by Taiwanese voters but primarily as a beneficial outlook into a shared future.
However, Taiwan’s government under Tsai Ing-wen coldly describes Beijing’s integration plans as “wishful thinking”. And since China is approaching its island with large military maneuvers, many Taiwanese view Beijing’s idea of cooperation on an equal footing as hypocrisy. Instead of China, Taiwan’s ruling DPP party has approached the US and other Western partners since 2016. It also promotes programs to further reduce economic dependencies on the mainland.
Effectively diversifying Taiwan’s trade, for example, to other Southeast Asian markets, could take years. The People’s Republic is still Taiwan’s largest trading partner, with the mainland and Hong Kong being the most important destinations for Taiwan’s exports. According to the Taiwanese Bureau of Foreign Trade, Taiwan and China had a trade volume of 205 billion dollars in 2022.
As of November 2023, around 35 percent of Taiwan’s total exports were destined for the mainland – the lowest value in years but still very high. The economic dependence on the mainland is “not the path Taiwan should take,” said DPP presidential candidate and poll favorite William Lai in December.
Chinese state media warn that a re-election of the DPP will have economic consequences for Taiwan’s citizens. To influence the elections, Beijing repeatedly plays with economic pressure on Taiwan. China has imposed repeated import bans, such as for fruits or fish. Individual trips to Taiwan have been prohibited, or fines have been imposed on Taiwanese companies operating in China, such as the Far Eastern Group.
Officially, reasons such as pest infestation or violation of local environmental regulations have been cited. However, a political motivation can be easily discerned in many cases. After it was announced in the summer of 2022 that the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, would travel to Taiwan for a meeting with Tsai Ing-wen, the Chinese customs administration suspended the import of more than 2,000 food items from Taiwan.
In December, in the final stretch of the election campaign, Beijing also suspended tariff reductions for 12 Taiwanese chemical products introduced in 2010 under the “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”. This was a groundbreaking bilateral trade agreement at the time.
This was Beijing’s final signal to undecided voters to perhaps choose a more Beijing-friendly party this Saturday. The message behind it is clear: The previous measures mainly had symbolic value. China could economically hit Taiwan much harder if it wanted to.
Professor Batto, who is most likely to win the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Taiwan on Jan. 13?
The poll this year do not give a clear indication of what will happen. It’s not like four years ago or eight years ago where Tsai Ing-wen had a huge lead in the polls and we pretty much knew that she would win and the DPP would do very well in the legislative elections. This year, the polls are close enough that most outcomes are still in play. William Lai is probably the favorite to win. But it’s certainly not impossible that Hou Yu-ih (KMT) or even Ko Wen-je (TPP) could win the presidency.
What is your forecast for the composition of the parliament?
The legislature could go any of three ways. It’s possible that the KMT or the DPP could come out with a majority. And it’s also possible that neither one would get a majority, and the TPP would hold the balance of power.
Why are the elections closer than the last time?
There is a sense of fatigue with the DPP governing for eight years, and a desire for change. A lot of the problems that nearly every economy around the world faces are also here. We’re not in a booming economy. So there is frustration among a lot of people, especially among younger voters who hear the stories about the previous generations who did very well, who came into a society that was prospering, and everything was getting better. That’s not the story of young people today. It’s difficult to be a young college graduate right now. They don’t have a wide array of high paying jobs just waiting for them.
Does the People’s Republic play a role?
I think there’s also some frustration with the cross-straits relationship and a bit of trepidation about the threat from China, which has always been there but is getting more immediate and more serious now. I think that probably has worn down some of the support for the DPP.
How do the DPP, the KMT and the TPP each present themselves to voters as a distinct and better party?
The parties are grounded in a national identity cleavage. It is based on attitudes towards China and being Chinese in which the question is: Who are we? Are we Chinese or not? Around 60-65 percent say, no, we’re not Chinese at all, we are just Taiwanese. And other people say yes, we are Chinese, or that we’re both Taiwanese and we’re Chinese, and those are not mutually exclusive identities. The DPP is founded on a very Taiwanese nationalist logic. The DPP thinks of themselves as representing Taiwan and nothing else. The KMT was founded in China over 100 years ago, lost the Chinese civil war to the Communist Party, resettled here in Taiwan and refounded themselves. They have a Chinese identity embedded deep in their DNA, for decades they justified their power by claiming to be the legitimate government of all of China. So, they have a Chinese nationalist heritage that shapes the way that they approach politics.
What are the wishes and expectations of the voters?
Since the most important question facing Taiwan is how to deal with China, this big colossus to the west, the China cleavage is going to continue to shape Taiwan politics. Many Taiwanese wish that politics were about other issues such as environment, social policies, unequal income distribution, and so on. However, these other issues are always overwhelmed by the dominant national identity cleavage. If, for example, you think of yourself as Taiwanese first and Taiwanese only, then you tend to vote for the DPP, no matter what you think on topics like taxes or environmental protection or infrastructure development or education policy or whatever. The KMT and the DPP are big tent parties on all these different policies. They have all kinds of people with all kinds of positions in their party.
What impact does the TPP’s committed campaign have on the positioning of the parties?
There have been several smaller parties that have tried to break through the duopoly of KMT and DPP. They have usually tried to take a more extreme position on the Chinese vs. Taiwanese spectrum. They usually haven’t done very well. They’ve been eaten up by the logic of majoritarian government where the need to create a majority coalition has driven their potential sympathizers toward one of the two big parties.
The TPP has taken a different path. They have tried to ignore the identity cleavage and said they are against using “ideology” to make all decisions. They would like you to think that they’re moderate, but they also have to take a position. And the TPP has increasingly been identified as being closer to the KMT on questions of how to deal with China than to the DPP. But still, what they claim is that they will do everything else better because they’re not obsessed with unification and independence. And they claim that these two big parties are corrupt because their voters are trapped by “ideology”. These voters have no choice but to support either the KMT or DPP, and they dare not punish corruption.
How are the attitudes toward China among the population right now?
There is a widespread consensus that Taiwan does not want to be part of the PRC and that this society wants to maintain its democratic system and its sovereign, independent status. Whether you call this society Taiwan or the Republic of China is a debate, but nearly everybody wants to maintain Taiwan’s current status. Usually, under 3 percent in polls want to be unified with the PRC.
Where do the debates begin?
Once you get past the question of maintaining Taiwan’s current political system of liberal democracy with free and open elections, then how to deal with China economically is a much more debatable proposition. There are people who think that Taiwan should integrate into the Chinese economy, that this is a huge market and Taiwan should be active in it. And there are people who think that China uses its market politically and strategically to coerce other countries into certain behavior. In Taiwan’s case, the PRC will try to use its market to coerce Taiwan into eventually giving up his sovereignty and accepting unification.
What follows in practice?
That is a question in which identity comes into full focus. Because if you identify as Taiwanese and only Taiwanese, you tend to gravitate towards the answer that Taiwan is better off developing economic ties with other countries. If you think that you are Chinese in some way, then you tend to think that it’s natural that Taiwan and China should have close economic ties.
What does the Chinese leadership think of the current elections?
I am not a China expert, and I don’t know what Chinese leaders are thinking. That said, I don’t think they want William Lai to win. They seem to be spooked by his statement a few years ago. He said he’s a pragmatic Taiwan independence worker, and they’ve never forgotten that. Both Ko Wen-je and Hou Yu-ih say they want to deal constructively with China. I think China assumes that that means they will both accept the one China principle. And so I think they would be more comfortable with either one of them.
Does China seriously hope for cooperation for reunification from Taiwan?
I doubt that China thinks they are going to achieve unification through domestic Taiwan politics. They had high hopes for Ma Ying-jeou (the previous president 2008-2016, from the KMT). He was a strong Chinese nationalist who wanted a unification with China eventually. He didn’t produce unification, and if he couldn’t do it, then I don’t think China has any hopes for Hou or Ko to produce unification. So I don’t think that the Chinese leadership are really that concerned about who wins and who loses, because none of them are going to be what the PRC wants.
Based on who will win in the elections, how could Taiwan’s cross-strait policy develop?
If William Lai wins, we will experience pretty much the same thing as in the last eight years. He will not recognize the 1992 consensus, and China will continue not to communicate with Taiwan in any official form. It will continue to harass Taiwan militarily and increase the pressure. It will probably exert economic pressure against Taiwan, which it has been doing for eight years. If Ko wins, the outcome is hard to judge as we don’t know how far he will go in dealing with China. Ko has said he wants to have a constructive and positive dialog with China, but he has not explained how he will do what he is willing to do to make that happen. If Ko wins, the result is hard to judge, because we don’t know how far he will go to deal with China. Ko has said that he wants to have constructive and positive engagement with China but he hasn’t explained how he’ll do that, what he’s willing to do or say to make that possible.
And if Hou of the KMT wins?
If Hou wins, he has indicated that he’ll basically go back to the policies of Ma Ying-jeou. They’ll accept the “92 consensus”. He’ll try to have constructive engagement with China, and he’ll try to have formal meetings with Chinese officials. They’ll welcome the Chinese tourists back into Taiwan, try to build more economic and social ties. Hou hasn’t said anything about political agreements, though. So he might not be ready to go there. But I think that if Hou wins, then China will probably reduce the pressure a little bit. But not completely. China has never backed away completely. Even when Ma was president, they were building up the number of missiles they were aiming at Taiwan. And that’s when they built their big navy, by now the biggest in the world. So the idea that that if Hou wins, then the ties between China and Taiwan will become warm and the world will be at peace, is probably overstated.
Nathan Batto is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica and Jointly Appointed Associate Research Fellow at the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University in Taipei. He has been researching and following politics and elections in Taiwan for over three decades. He also writes a blog on elections in Taiwan, frozengarlic.wordpress.com.
China’s President Xi Jinping has emphasized the role of ordinary people in US-China relations. In a letter to Sarah Lande from Muscatine, Iowa, Xi encouraged more personal exchange between the two superpowers.
Xi seems to be signaling to the public that he is genuinely interested in stable relations with the US beyond the political and economic tensions between the two nations.
According to media reports, Xi wrote in his letter that the successes in China-US relations are primarily due to the efforts of people in both countries. Accordingly, increased exchange could lead to more mutual understanding. “China and the US are the world’s largest developing and developed countries, and the future and destiny of this planet demand China-US relations to be more stable and to be better,” wrote Xi.
Xi Jinping addressed the letter to Sarah Lande from Muscatine, a small town in the Midwest, where he led a delegation almost four decades ago. Lande and Xi first met in 1985 when the then 31-year-old Xi visited Muscatine with a delegation from Hebei to learn about agricultural production in the US.
In 2012, Xi visited Muscatine again, this time as vice president, just a few months before being promoted to general secretary of the Communist Party. The most recent meeting between Lande and Xi took place in November at a dinner for the Chinese president in San Francisco. rad
Berlin didn’t play a decisive role in the musical education of Carmen Herold, co-founder of the Zhao Dai Club (招待会). Although some might assume otherwise at first glance, the daughter of a Chinese mother and a German father sees herself more connected to the traditional lines of the Frankfurt metropolitan area, where she grew up. “Music and fine arts were historically more closely intertwined in the Frankfurt scene than in Berlin. There was a totality of different aesthetic experiences that were not present elsewhere,” says Herold.
With a scholarship from the Confucius Institute, Carmen Herold went to China for a year immediately after graduating from high school. During this time, she devoted herself to studying language and culture but mainly established contacts with the local art scene through endless city explorations. After obtaining a bachelor’s degree in Berlin, a city that seemed to have run its course for her, she was clear that she had to go back. She found a position in the cultural department of the Goethe-Institut Beijing, where she implemented curatorial projects in film, theater, and discourse.
In 2017, a wave of club openings swept across the country. “Club spaces were incredibly important during that time for subversive cultures, where emancipatory potentials could be unleashed.” Along with three allies she met during her first stay, Herold then founded Zhao Dai. The program went beyond just music. “The iconic clubs in China were iconic because they also exhibited artists who couldn’t exhibit in galleries. This way, artistic positions that had no place in the establishment could find a stage and an audience.”
But there was a more significant dream that seemed unattainable for a long time. “Organizing a festival in China is almost unfeasible.” Then an opportunity arose: Aranya (安啊呀), a newly built resort, offered grants to artistic projects, hoping that the influx of cultural capital would attract financial capital. Although such a location was not Herold’s first choice, “we had hardly any restrictions and could sell subsidized tickets for a line-up that we put together with a free hand.”
Zhao Dai On Leave, as the festival was named, is heading into its third round next year. In addition to electronic music, experimental live music and performances by independent artists are also planned for the first time.
The reason that sound in China is often biting, burning and brutal is that it expresses aesthetic resistance that can be collectively experienced. It provides an alternative to other forms of opposition, such as street protests. “A language-less music is protected from censorship, and yet it can precisely address its audience. That makes the current scene more exciting than many others I know,” explains Herold.
However, it is currently uncertain whether this liveliness can be sustained. Most foreigners are no longer there, and many Chinese who have the opportunity are leaving. “We have lost 40 percent of our old allies.” Whether the large-scale departure will give new, emerging acts the chance to unfold or whether a self-contained scene will exhaust itself sooner rather than later is not yet foreseeable, says Herold.
She herself is no longer on-site and no longer in Zhao Dai’s core team. She has now become more of an advisory foreign correspondent. For a year now, Carmen Herold has been dedicated to a training program at the Goethe-Institut, preparing prospective institute directors for their assignments. One thing is certain, no matter where she ends up: In addition to her close contacts with the Chinese art scene, Herold will always bring the experiences and convictions she gained during her master’s in Postcolonial Studies at New York University. “If you ask how cultural institutions can be made future-proof and what topics should still be brought in, you have to realize that postcolonial approaches are still an underrepresented topic in Germany.”
This applies not only to cultural discourses and art funding but also to the German view of the Far East. Herold has sharp words for the often politically demanded China competence: “Terms like ‘China watcher’ are so problematic that it would be better if they disappeared.” If China competence is understood only as generating extractive knowledge about China in the service of economic interests, Herold does not want to be considered a China expert.
Anyone who wants to take China seriously must engage with a diverse range of people and their specific concerns, in personal contact. It should still be possible to express differentiated and critical views on China – just without placing the entire country under general suspicion, as still frequently happens, says Herold.
In addition, Carmen Herold wishes that more “aesthetic agency” is attributed to the Chinese. In Germany, there is a tendency for China, unlike Japan, to be overpoliticized and underaestheticized. If this doesn’t change, it is almost unavoidable that dissidents and subversive Chinese voices will elude the local observation, especially when these voices make themselves heard in techno sounds rather than sentences and words. Julius Schwarzwaelder
What looks like a new video game is actually Taiwan’s Election-O-Mat. It is designed to assist undecided voters in finding their best candidate before casting their votes. However, the pixelated individuals here don’t engage in a jump-and-run adventure. Users can arrive at a result by answering ten questions. This Election-O-Mat is created by the digital Taiwanese media house, The News Lens. In Germany, a similar tool, the “Wahl-O-Mat”, is provided by the Federal Agency for Civic Education.
