To admirers, the diligence and commitment of China’s children and workforce are one of Chinese society’s core strengths. In direct comparison to the West, it’s a common assertion that we can hardly match this zeal. And in truth, one cannot help but tip one’s hat to children in primary schools, who do not collapse under a 9-9-6 rhythm. But this perspective on things just doesn’t give us enough credit and fails to recognize that one of the great achievements of our society is the fact that our children no longer have to study hard from morning to night to have a chance at a better life.
We should not set our focus on the effort that is necessary to be allowed to study in a country with outdated learning concepts and obsolete educational strategies. The need for the surveillance of children in order to maintain their competitiveness is a clear sign of a flawed development, not the childlike need for laziness and free time. In her article, Ning Wang shows us how tech company Bytedance promotes this form of surveillance.
Imagine, if you will, that only professions, that require many years of hard study and training are worth pursuing. Who would fit China’s presidents with tailor-made Mao suits, as the Hongdu (Red Capital) tailor shop does, which our columnist Johnny Erling took a close look at in the past.
And what else is there? Keep your eyes on East Africa, warns the US military. China’s military presence in Djibouti is said to be the mere vanguard of its gobal expansion.
With this in mind, best wishes to you
Homework leads to quarrels and tears in China’s families on a daily basis. Children and parents alike suffer under this heavy burden and for many, it can be a real nightmare. Particularly affected are middle-class families, where often both parents are employed full-time. In addition to the time spent on their jobs, it is not uncommon for mothers and fathers to have to spend three, sometimes four hours a day watch over their children while they do their homework. And for the children, the workload is by no means a cakewalk. After a very long day at school, it’s hard for them to muster up any more motivation and energy for homework or extra classes.
This drill is still a common practice in the outdated education system of the People’s Republic because academic performance is usually the only chance at social advancement. But the competition in a nation of billions is huge, that’s why success is often linked to strict performance control, even if it increases the pressure on everyone involved. For parents, nothing is too expensive and no effort too great when it comes to the education of their children. They invest money, time and energy, and in many cases, the end justifies the means.
The developers of the Dali Smart Lamp (大力智能台灯), or “lamp of great power”, had precisely these middle-class families in mind when they defined the target group for their new product. The Smart Lamp resembles a desk lamp and comes with a built-in smartphone-sized screen, as well as two built-in cameras that are primarily used for monitoring. Parents can use the cameras to monitor their offspring while they are learning, even over vast distances. Another perk of the lamp, as the advertisement promises, is an improved relationship between parents and children: family peace for only 799 yuan or around 100 Euro.
From now on, parents can precisely track what their children are up to at their workplace. And for only around 40 euros more, you gain access to an app provided by manufacturer Bytedance that is specifically tailored to the Dali lamp and has a warning function that sends parents messages and even photos if their children are no longer paying attention, are slouching or are doing nothing at all instead of what they should be doing. It sounds like a dream at a low price. But there is a risk that artificial intelligence will strain the parent-child relationship in the long run. For it begs the question: Can empathy really be replaced by technology?
Part of the answer will come from the market. The product has been available since last fall. Within the first four months, Bytedance recorded 10,000 orders. Back in spring, internet giant Tencent announced plans to introduce a similar AI-powered homework lamp that offers the same features as Bytedance’s product. However, the lamps are still not turning a profit. Chen Lin, head of Bytedance’s newly formed education technology division, expects it to take three years for its division to break even. However, that didn’t stop him from hiring more employees. Out of Bytedance’s 100,000 employees, 10,000 already work in the education division, and the number is expected to grow this year (China.Table reported).
Additional expenses of many families for the education of their own child quickly amount to several hundred Euros per month. This eagerness to spend money spurs tech companies into action. Additionally, the Covid pandemic has made competition for services in the education tech sector even fiercer. By 2020, the online education market in China has surpassed the $40 billion mark and is expected to reach $100 billion by 2026. Bytedance wants to help set the course and speed at which this sector will grow. In July 2020, Chen Lin announced that the company would invest a “huge amount” in new education technologies.
So far, the tech company, founded in 2016, has generated most of its revenue from its viral short-video platform Douyin (the Chinese equivalent of Tiktok) and news and information platform Jinri Toutiao (Headlines of the Day). Its push into the technology education market (education-tech) is expected to generate the next big revenue stream. The Dali Lamp is expected to mark a big step in that direction. The company has been developing applications for e-learning for some time now, which are now being used in conjunction with the lamp. They help with hard-to-learn English vocabulary or quote classical Chinese poems ever popular in Chinese lessons.
However, it is not only the product’s monitoring function that should attract customers. The “lamp of great power” is also intended to save precious time or family, especially when it comes to tutoring, which often took place online during the pandemic. Bytedance offers its own apps for this very purpose. Through these apps, tutoring lessons can be booked directly. In addition, Bytedance offers digital homework supervision to relieve busy parents who don’t mind the cost.
Instead of figuring out new learning concepts for children, the Dali lamp made by Bytedance relies primarily on parents’ guilty conscience of not being able to support their children in their learning efforts. This not only has an impact on the parent-child relationships, which is not particularly warm or empathetic in China’s meritocracy, it could also cause serious harm to the attention span of the children who learn with the help of these devices. And they learn, above all, that they no longer have to cope with problems on their own. Yet the Department of Education has long come to realize that future generations need to learn independent problem solving rather than dull memorizing. After all, the ability to develop own ideas is elementary to China’s goal of technological leadership.
But the Dali lamp’s victory march in China’s kids’ rooms also carries loads of privacy and security concerns. In March, negative reviews piled up on social media. One user complained that the app allowed children to post videos of themselves on the internet. According to another user, user profiles and videos of other children were accessible, and the app even suggests connections with other users. Bytedance defended this practice. Any video upload requires parental consent, the company stated. And without proper authorization, no one else has access to live images of the children.
Concerns are also voiced by teachers who warn against giving children in the target group of four to twelve years access to interactive touchscreens, which tempts children to look for solutions to difficult tasks via the apps provided. British and Swedish researchers found that “heavy users” of touchscreen devices were more easily distracted.
Another glaring issue of the product is the protection of families’ privacy. Dali’s move into children’s bedrooms poses similar risks as the does use of voice assistants like Alexa. Despite existing regulations, laws offer little protection in practice. As early as 2019, data collection from children under 14 is meant to be restricted. As is so often the case, however, the room for interpretation is so wide that Bytedance does not even bother mentioning the risks for privacy or details the method of data collection in the product description.
Bytedance founder Zhang Yiming, who announced his retirement as CEO just over a month ago (China.Table reported), recently told that the company is only at the “first step of a long journey” when it comes to education. In late June, the billionaire donated US$77 million of his private assets to an education fund in his hometown in southern China. Whether this is a charm offensive towards Beijing or a means to gain more influence at the provincial level with educational institutions – both will be well-considered by Bytedance.
When General Stephen Townsend reported on the latest findings by US forces in the US Senate a few weeks ago, he aimed to leave no room for doubts. China is building a platform in the Horn of Africa with which it can exert lasting influence over the entire continent and the surrounding areas. China’s activities in Djibouti represent the most significant threat currently posed by the People’s Republic, the supreme commander of US forces in Africa warned in Washington in mid-April.
China has maintained a military base in Djibouti since August 2017. It’s China’s only base abroad to date. But even then, the choice of location was evidence of Beijing’s great ambitions and strategic foresight: the small state on the Horn of Africa lies on the strait between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, a major route for global trading. Arguably, Djibouti is one of the most important countries in the world for securing trade routes – especially the indispensable supply of oil for China’s economy. It also marks the western end of the Indo-Pacific.
Other countries are equally aware of this: The US, Japan and France have all maintained their own military presence in Djibouti for years. By building its own base, China signaled that it is now officially entering the race for geostrategic influence. “In Djibouti, China is openly demonstrating that Beijing’s military might follows economic and diplomatic influence,” says Hal Brands of the Johns Hopkins University.
However, Beijing was initially very keen to marginalize the military aspect of its own base. The Ministry of Defence announced that the base was primarily intended to guarantee China’s participation in escorting and peacekeeping missions as well as in humanitarian rescue operations. The base is merely intended to “fulfill its international obligations and guarantee peace and stability,” Beijing said. In a statement published by Global Times, Li Jie, a naval expert, stressed the difference to facilities of Western countries: “It will not be a military base in the style of the Americans, which use them as a bridgehead for military deterrence and intervention in other countries.” And from the Foreign Ministry’s point of view, the base would serve only as a simple logistics hub for Chinese ships.
China’s restraint has long since come to an end. It systematically expanded its base on the Horn of Africa. Most recently, a 340-meter-long landing bridge was constructed – large enough for even China’s new aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and other large warships to dock. According to U.S. General Townsend, it is no longer just a small supply port where ships of the People’s Liberation Army stop to refuel and replenish their food supply. “It’s a port where China rearms and maintains their warships.” And it’s located just a few miles off U.S. Camp Lemonnier.
Yet China’s base covers only half a square kilometer – Camp Lemonnier of the US armed forces is four times as large. But China’s base is heavily defended, with 23,000 square meters of underground facilities and space for around 2,000 soldiers. It includes a tower, a runway, a hospital – and, most recently, a landing bridge that reaches far out into the sea. “This base is the military foundation of Beijing’s ambitions to become the patron of states in Africa and the Middle East,” as Timothy Heath of the US military-affiliated think tank Rand Cooperation analyzes. The base in Djibouti serves as a bridgehead, so to speak.
And indeed, China is not just pursuing military interests on the eastern continent, but also economic ones – and the area place is predestined for this endeavor: in addition to its geostrategically ideal location, it is the most stable and secure country in the region. It has a basic infrastructure on which the Chinese can build upon and offers room for expansion – into Djibouti and other parts of Africa.
In Djibouti alone, China has provided around USD 14 billion in investments and loans between years 2012 and 2020, including projects such as the USD 3,5 billion free trade area, arguably the largest in Africa. It created around 200,000 new jobs in its first phase and generated more than USD 7 billion in trade between 2018 and 2020. Beijing has bought shares of the capital’s port and wishes to expand its capacity. As part of a USD 4 billion project to extract natural gas in neighboring Ethiopia, China is building the drilling rig as well as the corresponding pipeline and a railway line to export the resource. And Chinese telecommunications supplier Huawei wants to lay undersea fiber-optic cable as far as Pakistan.
Moreover, Djibouti serves as China’s gateway to Africa. Chinese loans and investments span the entire continent, from ports and railways to overland roads and gas as well as oil pipelines. Huawei is in the process of building respective 5G networks in many African nations. While the U.S. commitment since the September 11 terrorist attacks has primarily revolved around anti-terrorism measures, the Chinese have been directing their focus and rhetoric toward infrastructure development and growth. That’s why it doesn’t come as a surprise that Beijing replaced Washington as Africa’s leading trading partner as early as 2009 – and has maintained its lead ever since.
Africa is both a huge market for China, where it sells its own products and procures raw materials and a crucial region in the struggle for geostrategic influence, as well as an important diplomatic pillar in international organizations. “The Chinese are in it for the long game. It is here from where they want to change the international order in their favor,” warns US General Townsend. The approach is always the same: first, establish economic dependence, and then convert it into political support. Among international organizations, China thus creates a broad front of supporters for its policy on African countries.
And the effort is paying off. Djibouti’s finance minister recently brusquely dismissed US warnings of a Chinese debt trap: “we are old enough to know what we need to do for our country.”
Hal Brands of the Hopkins University assigns the country a prominent role in the global competition between the US and China – and the West is lagging in this race. According to him, the US strategy looks like a relic of the past, when it was all about the war on terror. China’s strategy, on the other hand, is geared towards future generations striving for jobs and prosperity.
In Djibouti, the next step in Chinese influence can be observed: China’s growing economic and diplomatic power is being followed by a military component. Accordingly, more and more observers are certain that Djibouti will not remain the only Chinese military base abroad.
The current annual report of the US Department of Defense reads: “beyond the current base in Djibouti, the People’s Republic is very likely already surveying and planning additional military bases abroad for its air, sea and ground forces”. Among the possible candidates are Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Tanzania.
As early as 2016, the renowned Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong called for the People’s Republic to adopt a more brash foreign policy. Military bases outside of China should be a key component. “For its own sake, China should establish military bases in countries it considers allies,” Yan said.
Timothy Heath also sees this as a necessity for the Chinese. “Lack of bases is a big problem for China because it makes them very dependent on markets, energy and natural resources that are all far away, like the Middle East, Africa or Latin America.” Combined with the New Silk Road projects, this creates a fragile structure that could have devastating effects on the Chinese economy should problems arise. However, it would not necessarily always have to be military bases. “China will also gain military influence through dual-use facilities along the Indian Ocean, through partnerships with other countries’ armed forces, or by hiring Chinese security firms for the myriad of infrastructure projects along the New Silk Road.”
For Heath, at least, one thing is clear. The West should keep a close eye on China’s involvement in the Horn of Africa.“The actions of the People’s Liberation Army in Djibouti tell us a lot about how China plans to expand its forces and military presence on the African continent well into the Middle East.”
“In China, even clothing is political,” reads the headline of a Beijing magazine on its monthly cover story on fashion in the People’s Republic. This was also true for party leader Xi Jinping last week. On his speech on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, he wore the traditional party uniform, known abroad as the Mao suit. He chose a light gray as its color.
Xi’s outfit made him stand out from the group of senior officials who flanked him in Western-style suits, white shirts and red ties. TV cameras broadcast his appearance from the balcony of Tiananmen Gate. But they deliberately avoided making a shot of the six-meter-sized portrait of Mao Zedong hanging on the gate below him. It depicts the dictator in a light gray Mao suit. The similarity of clothing and color apparently seemed too obvious even to the propagandists.
“Grey was Mao’s favorite color,”. This is what Gao Limin, chief couturier at Beijing tailor Hongdu 红都, (Red Capital), based not far from Tiananmen Square, once told me. The state-owned manufactory is a court supplier to China’s leadership. Gao specializes in tailoring Mao suits. He learned his craft from legendary master Tian Atong (田阿桐), who cut all the suits for Mao since 1956. “The chairman wore them on all occasions. Gray was the color he requested, a light gray in summer and a darker shade in winter,” recalls Ma Baofeng, former chief of protocol at China’s Foreign Ministry.
Xi’s impersonation stood out. With his message of being a second Mao he “made a political statement”, commented the website “Duowei News”. At the same time, he demonstrated that he distinguished himself from the Western world.
The founder of the first republic Sun Yatsen (1866-1925, another name: Zhongshan) had already demonstrated this 100 years prior – but inwards. Of course the term “Mao suit” is not used in China, instead, it is called Zhongshan clothing, (中山装) named after the bourgeois revolutionary, was co-designed it.
Sun wanted China’s men and women to also rid themselves of their flowing robes, their braids and bound feet as an outward sign of the end of feudal imperial rule. According to his ideas, the first new evening gown is said to have been created around 1912, with four outside pockets and a modern stand-up collar, which was later turned inside out. Japan’s cadet clothing and Prussian uniforms served as inspiration.
Its design holds symbolic meaning, or so the myth goes. After all, the new frock coat with its pockets and buttons was supposed to remind state employees of who, how and for what they served the republic as soon as they put it on.
The three cufflinks symbolize Sun’s program of the three people’s principles: People’s Welfare, People’s National State, and People’s Rule. The four pockets on the jacket are said to recall Confucian state virtues. The five centered buttons and the inside pocket would represent constitutional rights, separation of powers and prevent abuse of power.
In 1929, Kuomintang President Chiang Kai-shek made the suit his official dress. Mao, who saw himself as the successor of Sun’s revolution, also donned it when he founded the People’s Republic in 1949. While Sun saw the suit as a symbol of diversity and democratic self-determination, Mao transformed it into the uniform garb of Chinese communism, soon to be called “Renminfu” (people’s clothing).
Xi has also worn the Mao suit on special occasions. In 2019, for example, he wore it to celebrate the 70th founding anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. The president and his wife Peng Liyuan presented themselves much more elegantly at the state banquet as guests of the Dutch royal family in 2014. Xi had his suit tailored, the stand-up collar turned down and only three pockets sewn instead of four. The gala attire caused a big sensation in China.
It takes tailor Gao about 20 days to tailor a Mao suit in around 60 work steps. He sews the four pockets first from the inside and then from the outside. The lining of the suit is the most expensive part because only imported, fine cloth with special elasticity is suitable for the luxury version. Technically, the most difficult part is cutting the sleeves and collar.
Among court tailors who come and go in the seat of power, a political joke circulates, “Lingxiu hen bu hao zuo.” (领袖很不好做) Literally, “It’s very difficult to tailor collars and sleeves.” Pronounced the same way, but written in different characters, the saying means, “To be a leader is very difficult.”
Gao came up with several innovations for former party leader Hu Jintao, who ordered a special suit in 2009 to mark the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic. He used a waist cut, tightened the collar and rounded the jacket pockets. “After Hu’s performance, our house put out a special collector’s edition with 100 copies in different sizes.” Made of silk fabrics and with buttons made of Hetian jade, the suits, which cost more than 2200 Euros, quickly sold out.
For the manufactory, “Red Capital” in 2009 such publicity came at the right moment. Its reputation faded after China’s fashion market opened up to foreign masters and boomed. Luxury brands Pierre Cardin and Yves Saint-Laurent were followed by Hugo Boss, Ralph Lauren, Brioni and then followed by Japanese brands. Today, China Daily reported, that at the end of June, China’s textile and footwear production accounts for a quarter of the world market. But at present, China’s consumers are returning to domestic brands. “Patriotism plays an important role in this,” claims China Daily, pointing to the boycotts of Western companies from H&M to Nike, which no longer procure cotton from Xinjiang due to allegations of forced labor.
Thanks to Xi Jinping’s demonstrative fondness for the Mao suit and tricks of Chinese propaganda, Beijing’s policy is now trying to gain a new foothold in the fashion market.
Small steps for the giant panda: The number of giant pandas in China’s wilderness has reached more than 1,800 specimens, according to government agencies – the status of the bears has therefore been downgraded from “endangered” to “threatened”. In addition to the wild giant pandas, living conditions have also improved for other rare and endangered species, such as the Tibetan antelope and Père David’s deer, also known as milu.
To admirers, the diligence and commitment of China’s children and workforce are one of Chinese society’s core strengths. In direct comparison to the West, it’s a common assertion that we can hardly match this zeal. And in truth, one cannot help but tip one’s hat to children in primary schools, who do not collapse under a 9-9-6 rhythm. But this perspective on things just doesn’t give us enough credit and fails to recognize that one of the great achievements of our society is the fact that our children no longer have to study hard from morning to night to have a chance at a better life.
We should not set our focus on the effort that is necessary to be allowed to study in a country with outdated learning concepts and obsolete educational strategies. The need for the surveillance of children in order to maintain their competitiveness is a clear sign of a flawed development, not the childlike need for laziness and free time. In her article, Ning Wang shows us how tech company Bytedance promotes this form of surveillance.
Imagine, if you will, that only professions, that require many years of hard study and training are worth pursuing. Who would fit China’s presidents with tailor-made Mao suits, as the Hongdu (Red Capital) tailor shop does, which our columnist Johnny Erling took a close look at in the past.
And what else is there? Keep your eyes on East Africa, warns the US military. China’s military presence in Djibouti is said to be the mere vanguard of its gobal expansion.
With this in mind, best wishes to you
Homework leads to quarrels and tears in China’s families on a daily basis. Children and parents alike suffer under this heavy burden and for many, it can be a real nightmare. Particularly affected are middle-class families, where often both parents are employed full-time. In addition to the time spent on their jobs, it is not uncommon for mothers and fathers to have to spend three, sometimes four hours a day watch over their children while they do their homework. And for the children, the workload is by no means a cakewalk. After a very long day at school, it’s hard for them to muster up any more motivation and energy for homework or extra classes.
This drill is still a common practice in the outdated education system of the People’s Republic because academic performance is usually the only chance at social advancement. But the competition in a nation of billions is huge, that’s why success is often linked to strict performance control, even if it increases the pressure on everyone involved. For parents, nothing is too expensive and no effort too great when it comes to the education of their children. They invest money, time and energy, and in many cases, the end justifies the means.
The developers of the Dali Smart Lamp (大力智能台灯), or “lamp of great power”, had precisely these middle-class families in mind when they defined the target group for their new product. The Smart Lamp resembles a desk lamp and comes with a built-in smartphone-sized screen, as well as two built-in cameras that are primarily used for monitoring. Parents can use the cameras to monitor their offspring while they are learning, even over vast distances. Another perk of the lamp, as the advertisement promises, is an improved relationship between parents and children: family peace for only 799 yuan or around 100 Euro.
From now on, parents can precisely track what their children are up to at their workplace. And for only around 40 euros more, you gain access to an app provided by manufacturer Bytedance that is specifically tailored to the Dali lamp and has a warning function that sends parents messages and even photos if their children are no longer paying attention, are slouching or are doing nothing at all instead of what they should be doing. It sounds like a dream at a low price. But there is a risk that artificial intelligence will strain the parent-child relationship in the long run. For it begs the question: Can empathy really be replaced by technology?
Part of the answer will come from the market. The product has been available since last fall. Within the first four months, Bytedance recorded 10,000 orders. Back in spring, internet giant Tencent announced plans to introduce a similar AI-powered homework lamp that offers the same features as Bytedance’s product. However, the lamps are still not turning a profit. Chen Lin, head of Bytedance’s newly formed education technology division, expects it to take three years for its division to break even. However, that didn’t stop him from hiring more employees. Out of Bytedance’s 100,000 employees, 10,000 already work in the education division, and the number is expected to grow this year (China.Table reported).
Additional expenses of many families for the education of their own child quickly amount to several hundred Euros per month. This eagerness to spend money spurs tech companies into action. Additionally, the Covid pandemic has made competition for services in the education tech sector even fiercer. By 2020, the online education market in China has surpassed the $40 billion mark and is expected to reach $100 billion by 2026. Bytedance wants to help set the course and speed at which this sector will grow. In July 2020, Chen Lin announced that the company would invest a “huge amount” in new education technologies.
So far, the tech company, founded in 2016, has generated most of its revenue from its viral short-video platform Douyin (the Chinese equivalent of Tiktok) and news and information platform Jinri Toutiao (Headlines of the Day). Its push into the technology education market (education-tech) is expected to generate the next big revenue stream. The Dali Lamp is expected to mark a big step in that direction. The company has been developing applications for e-learning for some time now, which are now being used in conjunction with the lamp. They help with hard-to-learn English vocabulary or quote classical Chinese poems ever popular in Chinese lessons.
However, it is not only the product’s monitoring function that should attract customers. The “lamp of great power” is also intended to save precious time or family, especially when it comes to tutoring, which often took place online during the pandemic. Bytedance offers its own apps for this very purpose. Through these apps, tutoring lessons can be booked directly. In addition, Bytedance offers digital homework supervision to relieve busy parents who don’t mind the cost.
Instead of figuring out new learning concepts for children, the Dali lamp made by Bytedance relies primarily on parents’ guilty conscience of not being able to support their children in their learning efforts. This not only has an impact on the parent-child relationships, which is not particularly warm or empathetic in China’s meritocracy, it could also cause serious harm to the attention span of the children who learn with the help of these devices. And they learn, above all, that they no longer have to cope with problems on their own. Yet the Department of Education has long come to realize that future generations need to learn independent problem solving rather than dull memorizing. After all, the ability to develop own ideas is elementary to China’s goal of technological leadership.
But the Dali lamp’s victory march in China’s kids’ rooms also carries loads of privacy and security concerns. In March, negative reviews piled up on social media. One user complained that the app allowed children to post videos of themselves on the internet. According to another user, user profiles and videos of other children were accessible, and the app even suggests connections with other users. Bytedance defended this practice. Any video upload requires parental consent, the company stated. And without proper authorization, no one else has access to live images of the children.
Concerns are also voiced by teachers who warn against giving children in the target group of four to twelve years access to interactive touchscreens, which tempts children to look for solutions to difficult tasks via the apps provided. British and Swedish researchers found that “heavy users” of touchscreen devices were more easily distracted.
Another glaring issue of the product is the protection of families’ privacy. Dali’s move into children’s bedrooms poses similar risks as the does use of voice assistants like Alexa. Despite existing regulations, laws offer little protection in practice. As early as 2019, data collection from children under 14 is meant to be restricted. As is so often the case, however, the room for interpretation is so wide that Bytedance does not even bother mentioning the risks for privacy or details the method of data collection in the product description.
Bytedance founder Zhang Yiming, who announced his retirement as CEO just over a month ago (China.Table reported), recently told that the company is only at the “first step of a long journey” when it comes to education. In late June, the billionaire donated US$77 million of his private assets to an education fund in his hometown in southern China. Whether this is a charm offensive towards Beijing or a means to gain more influence at the provincial level with educational institutions – both will be well-considered by Bytedance.
When General Stephen Townsend reported on the latest findings by US forces in the US Senate a few weeks ago, he aimed to leave no room for doubts. China is building a platform in the Horn of Africa with which it can exert lasting influence over the entire continent and the surrounding areas. China’s activities in Djibouti represent the most significant threat currently posed by the People’s Republic, the supreme commander of US forces in Africa warned in Washington in mid-April.
China has maintained a military base in Djibouti since August 2017. It’s China’s only base abroad to date. But even then, the choice of location was evidence of Beijing’s great ambitions and strategic foresight: the small state on the Horn of Africa lies on the strait between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, a major route for global trading. Arguably, Djibouti is one of the most important countries in the world for securing trade routes – especially the indispensable supply of oil for China’s economy. It also marks the western end of the Indo-Pacific.
Other countries are equally aware of this: The US, Japan and France have all maintained their own military presence in Djibouti for years. By building its own base, China signaled that it is now officially entering the race for geostrategic influence. “In Djibouti, China is openly demonstrating that Beijing’s military might follows economic and diplomatic influence,” says Hal Brands of the Johns Hopkins University.
However, Beijing was initially very keen to marginalize the military aspect of its own base. The Ministry of Defence announced that the base was primarily intended to guarantee China’s participation in escorting and peacekeeping missions as well as in humanitarian rescue operations. The base is merely intended to “fulfill its international obligations and guarantee peace and stability,” Beijing said. In a statement published by Global Times, Li Jie, a naval expert, stressed the difference to facilities of Western countries: “It will not be a military base in the style of the Americans, which use them as a bridgehead for military deterrence and intervention in other countries.” And from the Foreign Ministry’s point of view, the base would serve only as a simple logistics hub for Chinese ships.
China’s restraint has long since come to an end. It systematically expanded its base on the Horn of Africa. Most recently, a 340-meter-long landing bridge was constructed – large enough for even China’s new aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and other large warships to dock. According to U.S. General Townsend, it is no longer just a small supply port where ships of the People’s Liberation Army stop to refuel and replenish their food supply. “It’s a port where China rearms and maintains their warships.” And it’s located just a few miles off U.S. Camp Lemonnier.
Yet China’s base covers only half a square kilometer – Camp Lemonnier of the US armed forces is four times as large. But China’s base is heavily defended, with 23,000 square meters of underground facilities and space for around 2,000 soldiers. It includes a tower, a runway, a hospital – and, most recently, a landing bridge that reaches far out into the sea. “This base is the military foundation of Beijing’s ambitions to become the patron of states in Africa and the Middle East,” as Timothy Heath of the US military-affiliated think tank Rand Cooperation analyzes. The base in Djibouti serves as a bridgehead, so to speak.
And indeed, China is not just pursuing military interests on the eastern continent, but also economic ones – and the area place is predestined for this endeavor: in addition to its geostrategically ideal location, it is the most stable and secure country in the region. It has a basic infrastructure on which the Chinese can build upon and offers room for expansion – into Djibouti and other parts of Africa.
In Djibouti alone, China has provided around USD 14 billion in investments and loans between years 2012 and 2020, including projects such as the USD 3,5 billion free trade area, arguably the largest in Africa. It created around 200,000 new jobs in its first phase and generated more than USD 7 billion in trade between 2018 and 2020. Beijing has bought shares of the capital’s port and wishes to expand its capacity. As part of a USD 4 billion project to extract natural gas in neighboring Ethiopia, China is building the drilling rig as well as the corresponding pipeline and a railway line to export the resource. And Chinese telecommunications supplier Huawei wants to lay undersea fiber-optic cable as far as Pakistan.
Moreover, Djibouti serves as China’s gateway to Africa. Chinese loans and investments span the entire continent, from ports and railways to overland roads and gas as well as oil pipelines. Huawei is in the process of building respective 5G networks in many African nations. While the U.S. commitment since the September 11 terrorist attacks has primarily revolved around anti-terrorism measures, the Chinese have been directing their focus and rhetoric toward infrastructure development and growth. That’s why it doesn’t come as a surprise that Beijing replaced Washington as Africa’s leading trading partner as early as 2009 – and has maintained its lead ever since.
Africa is both a huge market for China, where it sells its own products and procures raw materials and a crucial region in the struggle for geostrategic influence, as well as an important diplomatic pillar in international organizations. “The Chinese are in it for the long game. It is here from where they want to change the international order in their favor,” warns US General Townsend. The approach is always the same: first, establish economic dependence, and then convert it into political support. Among international organizations, China thus creates a broad front of supporters for its policy on African countries.
And the effort is paying off. Djibouti’s finance minister recently brusquely dismissed US warnings of a Chinese debt trap: “we are old enough to know what we need to do for our country.”
Hal Brands of the Hopkins University assigns the country a prominent role in the global competition between the US and China – and the West is lagging in this race. According to him, the US strategy looks like a relic of the past, when it was all about the war on terror. China’s strategy, on the other hand, is geared towards future generations striving for jobs and prosperity.
In Djibouti, the next step in Chinese influence can be observed: China’s growing economic and diplomatic power is being followed by a military component. Accordingly, more and more observers are certain that Djibouti will not remain the only Chinese military base abroad.
The current annual report of the US Department of Defense reads: “beyond the current base in Djibouti, the People’s Republic is very likely already surveying and planning additional military bases abroad for its air, sea and ground forces”. Among the possible candidates are Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Tanzania.
As early as 2016, the renowned Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong called for the People’s Republic to adopt a more brash foreign policy. Military bases outside of China should be a key component. “For its own sake, China should establish military bases in countries it considers allies,” Yan said.
Timothy Heath also sees this as a necessity for the Chinese. “Lack of bases is a big problem for China because it makes them very dependent on markets, energy and natural resources that are all far away, like the Middle East, Africa or Latin America.” Combined with the New Silk Road projects, this creates a fragile structure that could have devastating effects on the Chinese economy should problems arise. However, it would not necessarily always have to be military bases. “China will also gain military influence through dual-use facilities along the Indian Ocean, through partnerships with other countries’ armed forces, or by hiring Chinese security firms for the myriad of infrastructure projects along the New Silk Road.”
For Heath, at least, one thing is clear. The West should keep a close eye on China’s involvement in the Horn of Africa.“The actions of the People’s Liberation Army in Djibouti tell us a lot about how China plans to expand its forces and military presence on the African continent well into the Middle East.”
“In China, even clothing is political,” reads the headline of a Beijing magazine on its monthly cover story on fashion in the People’s Republic. This was also true for party leader Xi Jinping last week. On his speech on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, he wore the traditional party uniform, known abroad as the Mao suit. He chose a light gray as its color.
Xi’s outfit made him stand out from the group of senior officials who flanked him in Western-style suits, white shirts and red ties. TV cameras broadcast his appearance from the balcony of Tiananmen Gate. But they deliberately avoided making a shot of the six-meter-sized portrait of Mao Zedong hanging on the gate below him. It depicts the dictator in a light gray Mao suit. The similarity of clothing and color apparently seemed too obvious even to the propagandists.
“Grey was Mao’s favorite color,”. This is what Gao Limin, chief couturier at Beijing tailor Hongdu 红都, (Red Capital), based not far from Tiananmen Square, once told me. The state-owned manufactory is a court supplier to China’s leadership. Gao specializes in tailoring Mao suits. He learned his craft from legendary master Tian Atong (田阿桐), who cut all the suits for Mao since 1956. “The chairman wore them on all occasions. Gray was the color he requested, a light gray in summer and a darker shade in winter,” recalls Ma Baofeng, former chief of protocol at China’s Foreign Ministry.
Xi’s impersonation stood out. With his message of being a second Mao he “made a political statement”, commented the website “Duowei News”. At the same time, he demonstrated that he distinguished himself from the Western world.
The founder of the first republic Sun Yatsen (1866-1925, another name: Zhongshan) had already demonstrated this 100 years prior – but inwards. Of course the term “Mao suit” is not used in China, instead, it is called Zhongshan clothing, (中山装) named after the bourgeois revolutionary, was co-designed it.
Sun wanted China’s men and women to also rid themselves of their flowing robes, their braids and bound feet as an outward sign of the end of feudal imperial rule. According to his ideas, the first new evening gown is said to have been created around 1912, with four outside pockets and a modern stand-up collar, which was later turned inside out. Japan’s cadet clothing and Prussian uniforms served as inspiration.
Its design holds symbolic meaning, or so the myth goes. After all, the new frock coat with its pockets and buttons was supposed to remind state employees of who, how and for what they served the republic as soon as they put it on.
The three cufflinks symbolize Sun’s program of the three people’s principles: People’s Welfare, People’s National State, and People’s Rule. The four pockets on the jacket are said to recall Confucian state virtues. The five centered buttons and the inside pocket would represent constitutional rights, separation of powers and prevent abuse of power.
In 1929, Kuomintang President Chiang Kai-shek made the suit his official dress. Mao, who saw himself as the successor of Sun’s revolution, also donned it when he founded the People’s Republic in 1949. While Sun saw the suit as a symbol of diversity and democratic self-determination, Mao transformed it into the uniform garb of Chinese communism, soon to be called “Renminfu” (people’s clothing).
Xi has also worn the Mao suit on special occasions. In 2019, for example, he wore it to celebrate the 70th founding anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. The president and his wife Peng Liyuan presented themselves much more elegantly at the state banquet as guests of the Dutch royal family in 2014. Xi had his suit tailored, the stand-up collar turned down and only three pockets sewn instead of four. The gala attire caused a big sensation in China.
It takes tailor Gao about 20 days to tailor a Mao suit in around 60 work steps. He sews the four pockets first from the inside and then from the outside. The lining of the suit is the most expensive part because only imported, fine cloth with special elasticity is suitable for the luxury version. Technically, the most difficult part is cutting the sleeves and collar.
Among court tailors who come and go in the seat of power, a political joke circulates, “Lingxiu hen bu hao zuo.” (领袖很不好做) Literally, “It’s very difficult to tailor collars and sleeves.” Pronounced the same way, but written in different characters, the saying means, “To be a leader is very difficult.”
Gao came up with several innovations for former party leader Hu Jintao, who ordered a special suit in 2009 to mark the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic. He used a waist cut, tightened the collar and rounded the jacket pockets. “After Hu’s performance, our house put out a special collector’s edition with 100 copies in different sizes.” Made of silk fabrics and with buttons made of Hetian jade, the suits, which cost more than 2200 Euros, quickly sold out.
For the manufactory, “Red Capital” in 2009 such publicity came at the right moment. Its reputation faded after China’s fashion market opened up to foreign masters and boomed. Luxury brands Pierre Cardin and Yves Saint-Laurent were followed by Hugo Boss, Ralph Lauren, Brioni and then followed by Japanese brands. Today, China Daily reported, that at the end of June, China’s textile and footwear production accounts for a quarter of the world market. But at present, China’s consumers are returning to domestic brands. “Patriotism plays an important role in this,” claims China Daily, pointing to the boycotts of Western companies from H&M to Nike, which no longer procure cotton from Xinjiang due to allegations of forced labor.
Thanks to Xi Jinping’s demonstrative fondness for the Mao suit and tricks of Chinese propaganda, Beijing’s policy is now trying to gain a new foothold in the fashion market.
Small steps for the giant panda: The number of giant pandas in China’s wilderness has reached more than 1,800 specimens, according to government agencies – the status of the bears has therefore been downgraded from “endangered” to “threatened”. In addition to the wild giant pandas, living conditions have also improved for other rare and endangered species, such as the Tibetan antelope and Père David’s deer, also known as milu.
