Leapmotor is still largely unknown in Europe, but the car company is now set to serve as a strong shoulder for the Stellantis Group. After Volkswagen, which will cooperate with XPeng in China, Stellantis is also joining forces with a Chinese car manufacturer. At a press conference immediately after the announcement, Stellantis CEO Carlos Tavares made it clear that he does not think much of the EU’s subsidy investigations.
The deal with Leapmotor also entails dealing with a moral dilemma. Zhu Jiangming, the car manufacturer’s founder, earned his fortune with the surveillance company Dahua Technology, which develops cameras with facial recognition software. The software can also distinguish between Uyghurs and Han Chinese, reports Fabian Kretschmer.
Companies in China and overseas eagerly await the most important Party meeting in years, the Third Plenum. They hope for answers on China’s long-term economic policy direction. Although the date is unknown, the conference is usually held at the end of October or in the first half of November.
“The Third Plenum is likely to offer the clearest indication yet of the economic reforms that China will embark on under President Xi and the new leadership,” predicts Zhouchen Mao, chief analyst at think tank Asia House. Depending on the outcome, the summit could spread a sense of optimism and regain lost trust. In the past, the Third Plenum has triggered major upheavals – five years ago, however, it disappointed. Joern Petring gives an insight into this Chinese political institution.
On Thursday, the Portuguese car executive Carlos Tavares made a spectacular U-turn. Just last year, Stellantis’ boss warned of the dangers posed by China’s industrial policy and gradually withdrew from this market. Now, however, the 65-year-old unveiled a 1.5 billion euro deal: The multinational automotive manufacturing company acquires a 21 percent stake in the Chinese EV manufacturer Leapmotor and launches a joint venture. “the Chinese offensive has already started, and we do not want to be a victim, but a leader,” the French daily Le Figaro quoted Tavares.
A fundamental paradigm shift is taking place in the car market lately: Chinese brands, which have always played a minor role in the combustion engine car market, have taken pole position in the electric segment – partly thanks to the Chinese government’s consistent industrial policy. One in two EVs is already on Chinese roads, and the dominance of BYD, NIO and Li Auto in the domestic market is overwhelming. And these companies are also likely to start their triumphant march in Europe in the future.
However, Germany’s top dogs are already catching up. After initially suffering painful setbacks, they had to realize that they could not succeed alone: Just like Stellantis, Volkswagen already acquired a stake in the Chinese competition in July. For around 700 million dollars, the Wolfsburg-based company gained just under five percent of Xpeng. The industry interpreted the deal as a kind of “Sputnik moment”: The former market leader in China now risks being sidelined.
On Thursday, Volkswagen’s German CFO Arno Antlitz predicted more difficult years in the Chinese market. Volkswagen remains the market leader for combustion cars in China, but in the meantime, Chinese manufacturers such as BYD have overtaken the Germans in the EV segment. Volkswagen’s EV market share is expected to continue to shrink in the next one to two years. After that, Antlitz hopes the situation will improve thanks to the cooperation with Xpeng: “Then we will catch up from 2026 onwards with full competitiveness,” Antlitz said.
Competition in the EV market is fierce; Chinese manufacturers have higher-quality entertainment systems and more powerful electric batteries – at lower prices. However, the competitive advantages are also built on market-distorting state subsidies. In September, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced an “anti-subsidy investigation” that could possibly result in punitive tariffs against Chinese car brands. As justification, von der Leyen also cited the solar industry as an example – an industry that European companies initially dominated before Chinese state-owned enterprises drove out the competition through illegal price dumping.
The criticism may be justified at its core. But German carmakers are by no means welcoming Brussels’ rhetoric. They already fear the retaliatory measures of the Chinese government. According to Volkswagen, Daimler and BMW, the problems could better be solved in a face-saving and subtle way instead of going for an open confrontation. They are too dependent on the Chinese market to alienate Beijing.
Stellantis’ deal with Leapmotor also bluntly reveals that moral dilemmas often accompany business in the Far East. Zhu Jiangming, Leapmotor’s founder, made his fortune with the surveillance company Dahua Technology. The United States blacklisted the company because of its role in helping the Chinese state repress the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Among other things, Dahua has developed cameras with facial recognition software that can identify people by ethnicity – and specifically filter Uyghurs and Tibetans from Han Chinese. Fabian Kretschmer
The Third Plenum is just around the corner – the key meeting of the party leadership, held only every five years, where the economic course is discussed above all. Most observers expect it to take place this year in late October or, at the latest, in the first half of November. This has usually been the case in the past.
Both Chinese and foreign companies eagerly anticipate the date. Recently, many economic indicators pointed to a stabilization of the Chinese economy after a weaker-than-expected first half of the year.
Nevertheless, many decision-makers remain hesitant. In the best case, the leadership’s decisions at the symbolic plenary session could spread a spirit of optimism and win back lost trust. The recovery could then gain further momentum towards the end of the year. Above all, however, answers concerning China’s long-term economic policy must be provided.
The Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Party refers to the third meeting of the Central Committee held after a Party Congress. These meetings have often marked important policy shifts in CCP history.
Historically, the best known is the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in 1978, where far-reaching reforms were introduced under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, which are considered the beginning of China’s reform and opening-up policy. These reforms introduced elements of a market economy and opened the country to foreign investment.
These were the key decisions of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee in 2013, the first Third Plenum under Xi Jinping:
But five years later, disillusionment set in at the next Third Plenum in 2018. The meeting was held earlier than usual, not in the fall but in spring. And the main news had nothing to do with the economy. The head of state and party, now firmly in the saddle, used the meeting to consolidate his power further.
The plenary paved the way for lifting presidential term limits, for example. “It has been a decade since a comprehensive economic reform programme was presented,” writes Professor Bert Hofman, former World Bank Country Director for China, in an analysis for Asia Society.
The upcoming plenum is, therefore, “an opportunity to present a program of structural reforms that could address some of the country’s economic challenges,” Hofman continues. The plenum is also the first opportunity for Xi’s new economic team to present an integrated vision for the Chinese economy.
Other analysts also expect an economically oriented program. “The Third Plenum is likely to offer the clearest indication yet of the economic reforms that China will embark on under President Xi and the new leadership,” says Zhouchen Mao, chief analyst at think tank Asia House.
Mao believes that the “New Development Pattern,” in particular, first mentioned by Xi in 2020, will play a prominent role in the plenum’s communiqué. The goal is to lead China to the top of the world in scientific and technological innovation.
This is not least a consequence of the growing tensions with the US over the years. For Xi, independence from foreign technologies is a matter of national security. “Decisions made at the Third Plenum should provide further insights into how Beijing intends to achieve this,” writes Mao.
A balancing act is emerging: On the one hand, Beijing is likely to be keen to raise the depressed economic mood in the short term. On the other hand, it is expected to emphasize that the economy should be driven by sectors that are in line with national strategic goals. This includes, above all, the high-tech sector. Beijing no longer seeks growth at all costs.
After four years of absence, Beijing celebrated its participation in this year’s Frankfurt Book Fair with a special brochure displayed in every exhibition hall. It proclaimed: “China’s publishers return to Frankfurt.” Covid-19 was in the past. Although the pandemic had been particularly hard on the book trade in 2022, the downturn had slowed.
But there are other reasons for the slow demand. The highly politicized culture industry has become increasingly unattractive, and China’s book supply has to be careful of the party’s ubiquitous censorship. In October, it hit the reprint of a sold-out 2016 dynasty history by renowned historian Chen Wutong about the last Ming emperor Chongzhen (崇祯), who hanged himself in 1644 after he brought ruin to his dynasty. The new edition would have been a bestseller, but Beijing’s ideology watchdogs emptied the shelves and deleted all online advertising along with it.
They took offense at the book’s new cover: On it, the emperor’s name character “Chong” dangles from a noose. The book’s sleeve advertises, “Chong Zhen: With an overzealous rule, he brought down the empire.” (崇祯：勤政的亡国君) The regent ruled for 16 years and had high officials prosecuted whom he accused of not loyally serving him. He kept the nation on edge with haphazard actions, which led to the fall of his Ming Empire. Politically astute readers immediately thought of the omnipotent party leader Xi Jinping.
China’s exhibitors claimed they had never heard of the book, which was hotly debated in online chats. Yet they were represented by “around 100 participating publishers,” the state broadcaster CRI reported, praising how the fair was being enriched: “Chinese publishing institutions bring vitality to Frankfurt Book Fair.”
There was little evidence of this at China’s book booths. In dull simplicity, they mainly exhibited speeches, writings, monographs or selected works by Xi, sometimes as a wall of books, sometimes set up in a circle.
I couldn’t help but think back to 2009. Frankfurt’s Book Fair had chosen China as its international partner country. Although the German public hotly debated their decision because of Beijing’s censorship, suppression of minorities and human rights, it also raised hopes for literary diversity. It was a time when China’s then Vice-President Xi Jinping still kept a low profile, although his reputation as crown prince designate and successor to the party and state leader Hu Jintao, who remained in office until 2012, already preceded him.
As head of the delegation, Xi opened the book fair together with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. He even modestly played the letter carrier for state and party leader Jiang Zemin, who retired in 2002. Upon meeting Chancellor Merkel, Xi handed over two non-fiction books on information technology and energy, signed by Jiang and translated into English, as a courtesy gift (论中国信息技术产业发展 and 中国能源问题研究).
What no one knew at the time was that Xi was flattering the old politician Jiang, who was still pulling all the strings in the background and who supported Xi’s election as party leader in late 2012 and as president in March 2013. Since then, Xi never gave away any books other than his own.
As head of state and party leader, Xi was a different man from the very first moment. His agenda was to bring about a new era for China – ideologically on the inside and globally on the outside. The New York Times noticed that Xi visited Vladimir Putin only eight days after being elected head of state. The latter turned it into a show, seated Xi next to him in one of the two gold-framed chairs in the Kremlin, and had tea served. In 2013, Xi met Putin two more times and even celebrated his 61st birthday.
So much pomp and protocol did not hide the fact that both autocrats had a hard time building a special relationship. Their glue consisted primarily of a shared desire to replace Western domination, especially that of the United States.
Ten years later, in these days of October, Xi returned the favor. He let himself and the tenth anniversary of China’s now global “Belt and Road” infrastructure network be celebrated. In 2013, he proposed it as his global Silk Road initiative. When the gold-colored double doors opened in October for the opening ceremony in the Great Hall of the People, Xi stepped in shoulder to shoulder with Putin.
He publicly proclaimed that he had met “my old friend” Putin 42 times since their first meeting in March 2013. Putin, who is wanted on an international arrest warrant for alleged war crimes, had to look up to Xi.
The glue for the paradigm shift has now hardened for China; the Zeitenwende that began ten years ago is real, while foreign countries continue to debate their Zeitenwende in relations with China. Only by looking back does it become clear how purposefully Xi acted. In the starting year of 2013, he slammed the reverse brake on the domestic front and stepped on the gas for a radical international expansion. It started with his proposal to always link China’s enterprises strictly bilaterally with dozens of countries (later more than 100), first along the Central Asian Silk Road and economic corridors. Then, they were allowed to expand infrastructure-wise via port, rail, and pipeline construction, technology, and foreign trade in all global directions. Simultaneously, Xi ordered the build-up of China’s army and navy into a military power capable of waging war and secretly had artificial islands filled up in the South China Sea to underpin Beijing’s claim over the sea.
One of the reasons Beijing got away with this development and expansion strategy so smoothly is China’s clever combination of major international conferences and summits in which it participated, as well as each strictly bilateral agreement, treaty and cooperation project it signed. By 2014, China had signed agreements with 58 countries; today, it is twice as many.
During the Beijing BRI Anniversary Conference in October and at the tenth anniversary China-Asia neighborhood conference this week, dozens of new and expanded bilateral cooperation agreements were signed with attending heads of state.
Xi chaired each meeting personally. The texts of the joint statements are available online in the Foreign Ministry’s archive. They document how meticulously Beijing wove its network of influence, painstakingly recording whether the cooperation was friendly, cooperative or strategic. Pakistan, which receives the bulk of billions in construction investment for ports, power plants, roads and railroads, became the first country Beijing elevated to its “All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partners.” Head of State Xi and Pakistan’s Premier Anwar Kakkar agreed in October to further elevate their relationship to “everlasting” and “unbreakable,” calling themselves “iron brothers” (中巴两国是全天候战略合作伙伴和 “铁杆 “兄弟，两国友谊历久弥坚、牢不可破).
By now, however, Beijing has forged “all-weather” partnerships with half a dozen states, including Belarus and Ethiopia. The more colorful China’s formulas, the greater the dependence of the country in question on China, which, in the meantime, has also become known as the “debt trap.” In a recent agreement, Beijing has waived some of its debt claims for particularly battered Sri Lanka. In return, it will have to support China. Initially, Beijing wanted all partner states to merely respect its “core interests” and, above all, recognize its claim over Taiwan. Then, it demanded they support memoranda to China’s Silk Road initiative. Today, Xi wants more: Dozens of countries signed on for his new China Initiatives on Global Development (GDI), Global Security (GSI), and Global Civilization (GCI) (全球发展倡议、全球安全倡议、全球文明倡议).
In October, Beijing signed an agreement with Chile to enter a new “global data security” initiative with China (智方赞赏中方提出的《全球数据安全倡议》). Beijing always sets the standards – party leader Xi recently proposed another “Global AI Governance Initiative,” another one of Beijing’s attempts to subject the Internet to international control by invoking sovereignty clauses.
On Wednesday, Xi Jinping and Colombia’s Gustavo Petro caused a stir in Beijing by upgrading their relations to a “strategic partnership.” Colombia, which is heavily indebted in trade with China, was previously considered the oldest US ally in Latin America. “The upgrade of relations with Colombia means China now has strategic ties with 10 out of the 11 South American countries with which it has relations,” Reuters reported.
In this way, China crawls its way into Xi’s coveted role as a global power. Beijing’s plan to use the mass of its bilateral agreements to set the tone for future international affairs or to exert more influence on votes in the United Nations, is obviously part of its Chinese Zeitenwende.
Dramatic morning scene over the Emperor’s Canal: Parts of the world’s longest man-made waterway were already built more than 2,400 years ago. The canal is more than 1,800 kilometers long and connects Beijing with Hangzhou; it is also used for irrigation. Long barges transport goods like coal or building materials on it. However, the old structure is suffering from a lack of water. As a result, it is sometimes impassable and has thus lost at least its transregional significance.
Leapmotor is still largely unknown in Europe, but the car company is now set to serve as a strong shoulder for the Stellantis Group. After Volkswagen, which will cooperate with XPeng in China, Stellantis is also joining forces with a Chinese car manufacturer. At a press conference immediately after the announcement, Stellantis CEO Carlos Tavares made it clear that he does not think much of the EU’s subsidy investigations.
The deal with Leapmotor also entails dealing with a moral dilemma. Zhu Jiangming, the car manufacturer’s founder, earned his fortune with the surveillance company Dahua Technology, which develops cameras with facial recognition software. The software can also distinguish between Uyghurs and Han Chinese, reports Fabian Kretschmer.
Companies in China and overseas eagerly await the most important Party meeting in years, the Third Plenum. They hope for answers on China’s long-term economic policy direction. Although the date is unknown, the conference is usually held at the end of October or in the first half of November.
“The Third Plenum is likely to offer the clearest indication yet of the economic reforms that China will embark on under President Xi and the new leadership,” predicts Zhouchen Mao, chief analyst at think tank Asia House. Depending on the outcome, the summit could spread a sense of optimism and regain lost trust. In the past, the Third Plenum has triggered major upheavals – five years ago, however, it disappointed. Joern Petring gives an insight into this Chinese political institution.
On Thursday, the Portuguese car executive Carlos Tavares made a spectacular U-turn. Just last year, Stellantis’ boss warned of the dangers posed by China’s industrial policy and gradually withdrew from this market. Now, however, the 65-year-old unveiled a 1.5 billion euro deal: The multinational automotive manufacturing company acquires a 21 percent stake in the Chinese EV manufacturer Leapmotor and launches a joint venture. “the Chinese offensive has already started, and we do not want to be a victim, but a leader,” the French daily Le Figaro quoted Tavares.
A fundamental paradigm shift is taking place in the car market lately: Chinese brands, which have always played a minor role in the combustion engine car market, have taken pole position in the electric segment – partly thanks to the Chinese government’s consistent industrial policy. One in two EVs is already on Chinese roads, and the dominance of BYD, NIO and Li Auto in the domestic market is overwhelming. And these companies are also likely to start their triumphant march in Europe in the future.
However, Germany’s top dogs are already catching up. After initially suffering painful setbacks, they had to realize that they could not succeed alone: Just like Stellantis, Volkswagen already acquired a stake in the Chinese competition in July. For around 700 million dollars, the Wolfsburg-based company gained just under five percent of Xpeng. The industry interpreted the deal as a kind of “Sputnik moment”: The former market leader in China now risks being sidelined.
On Thursday, Volkswagen’s German CFO Arno Antlitz predicted more difficult years in the Chinese market. Volkswagen remains the market leader for combustion cars in China, but in the meantime, Chinese manufacturers such as BYD have overtaken the Germans in the EV segment. Volkswagen’s EV market share is expected to continue to shrink in the next one to two years. After that, Antlitz hopes the situation will improve thanks to the cooperation with Xpeng: “Then we will catch up from 2026 onwards with full competitiveness,” Antlitz said.
Competition in the EV market is fierce; Chinese manufacturers have higher-quality entertainment systems and more powerful electric batteries – at lower prices. However, the competitive advantages are also built on market-distorting state subsidies. In September, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced an “anti-subsidy investigation” that could possibly result in punitive tariffs against Chinese car brands. As justification, von der Leyen also cited the solar industry as an example – an industry that European companies initially dominated before Chinese state-owned enterprises drove out the competition through illegal price dumping.
The criticism may be justified at its core. But German carmakers are by no means welcoming Brussels’ rhetoric. They already fear the retaliatory measures of the Chinese government. According to Volkswagen, Daimler and BMW, the problems could better be solved in a face-saving and subtle way instead of going for an open confrontation. They are too dependent on the Chinese market to alienate Beijing.
Stellantis’ deal with Leapmotor also bluntly reveals that moral dilemmas often accompany business in the Far East. Zhu Jiangming, Leapmotor’s founder, made his fortune with the surveillance company Dahua Technology. The United States blacklisted the company because of its role in helping the Chinese state repress the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Among other things, Dahua has developed cameras with facial recognition software that can identify people by ethnicity – and specifically filter Uyghurs and Tibetans from Han Chinese. Fabian Kretschmer
The Third Plenum is just around the corner – the key meeting of the party leadership, held only every five years, where the economic course is discussed above all. Most observers expect it to take place this year in late October or, at the latest, in the first half of November. This has usually been the case in the past.
Both Chinese and foreign companies eagerly anticipate the date. Recently, many economic indicators pointed to a stabilization of the Chinese economy after a weaker-than-expected first half of the year.
Nevertheless, many decision-makers remain hesitant. In the best case, the leadership’s decisions at the symbolic plenary session could spread a spirit of optimism and win back lost trust. The recovery could then gain further momentum towards the end of the year. Above all, however, answers concerning China’s long-term economic policy must be provided.
The Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Party refers to the third meeting of the Central Committee held after a Party Congress. These meetings have often marked important policy shifts in CCP history.
Historically, the best known is the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in 1978, where far-reaching reforms were introduced under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, which are considered the beginning of China’s reform and opening-up policy. These reforms introduced elements of a market economy and opened the country to foreign investment.
These were the key decisions of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee in 2013, the first Third Plenum under Xi Jinping:
But five years later, disillusionment set in at the next Third Plenum in 2018. The meeting was held earlier than usual, not in the fall but in spring. And the main news had nothing to do with the economy. The head of state and party, now firmly in the saddle, used the meeting to consolidate his power further.
The plenary paved the way for lifting presidential term limits, for example. “It has been a decade since a comprehensive economic reform programme was presented,” writes Professor Bert Hofman, former World Bank Country Director for China, in an analysis for Asia Society.
The upcoming plenum is, therefore, “an opportunity to present a program of structural reforms that could address some of the country’s economic challenges,” Hofman continues. The plenum is also the first opportunity for Xi’s new economic team to present an integrated vision for the Chinese economy.
Other analysts also expect an economically oriented program. “The Third Plenum is likely to offer the clearest indication yet of the economic reforms that China will embark on under President Xi and the new leadership,” says Zhouchen Mao, chief analyst at think tank Asia House.
Mao believes that the “New Development Pattern,” in particular, first mentioned by Xi in 2020, will play a prominent role in the plenum’s communiqué. The goal is to lead China to the top of the world in scientific and technological innovation.
This is not least a consequence of the growing tensions with the US over the years. For Xi, independence from foreign technologies is a matter of national security. “Decisions made at the Third Plenum should provide further insights into how Beijing intends to achieve this,” writes Mao.
A balancing act is emerging: On the one hand, Beijing is likely to be keen to raise the depressed economic mood in the short term. On the other hand, it is expected to emphasize that the economy should be driven by sectors that are in line with national strategic goals. This includes, above all, the high-tech sector. Beijing no longer seeks growth at all costs.
After four years of absence, Beijing celebrated its participation in this year’s Frankfurt Book Fair with a special brochure displayed in every exhibition hall. It proclaimed: “China’s publishers return to Frankfurt.” Covid-19 was in the past. Although the pandemic had been particularly hard on the book trade in 2022, the downturn had slowed.
But there are other reasons for the slow demand. The highly politicized culture industry has become increasingly unattractive, and China’s book supply has to be careful of the party’s ubiquitous censorship. In October, it hit the reprint of a sold-out 2016 dynasty history by renowned historian Chen Wutong about the last Ming emperor Chongzhen (崇祯), who hanged himself in 1644 after he brought ruin to his dynasty. The new edition would have been a bestseller, but Beijing’s ideology watchdogs emptied the shelves and deleted all online advertising along with it.
They took offense at the book’s new cover: On it, the emperor’s name character “Chong” dangles from a noose. The book’s sleeve advertises, “Chong Zhen: With an overzealous rule, he brought down the empire.” (崇祯：勤政的亡国君) The regent ruled for 16 years and had high officials prosecuted whom he accused of not loyally serving him. He kept the nation on edge with haphazard actions, which led to the fall of his Ming Empire. Politically astute readers immediately thought of the omnipotent party leader Xi Jinping.
China’s exhibitors claimed they had never heard of the book, which was hotly debated in online chats. Yet they were represented by “around 100 participating publishers,” the state broadcaster CRI reported, praising how the fair was being enriched: “Chinese publishing institutions bring vitality to Frankfurt Book Fair.”
There was little evidence of this at China’s book booths. In dull simplicity, they mainly exhibited speeches, writings, monographs or selected works by Xi, sometimes as a wall of books, sometimes set up in a circle.
I couldn’t help but think back to 2009. Frankfurt’s Book Fair had chosen China as its international partner country. Although the German public hotly debated their decision because of Beijing’s censorship, suppression of minorities and human rights, it also raised hopes for literary diversity. It was a time when China’s then Vice-President Xi Jinping still kept a low profile, although his reputation as crown prince designate and successor to the party and state leader Hu Jintao, who remained in office until 2012, already preceded him.
As head of the delegation, Xi opened the book fair together with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. He even modestly played the letter carrier for state and party leader Jiang Zemin, who retired in 2002. Upon meeting Chancellor Merkel, Xi handed over two non-fiction books on information technology and energy, signed by Jiang and translated into English, as a courtesy gift (论中国信息技术产业发展 and 中国能源问题研究).
What no one knew at the time was that Xi was flattering the old politician Jiang, who was still pulling all the strings in the background and who supported Xi’s election as party leader in late 2012 and as president in March 2013. Since then, Xi never gave away any books other than his own.
As head of state and party leader, Xi was a different man from the very first moment. His agenda was to bring about a new era for China – ideologically on the inside and globally on the outside. The New York Times noticed that Xi visited Vladimir Putin only eight days after being elected head of state. The latter turned it into a show, seated Xi next to him in one of the two gold-framed chairs in the Kremlin, and had tea served. In 2013, Xi met Putin two more times and even celebrated his 61st birthday.
So much pomp and protocol did not hide the fact that both autocrats had a hard time building a special relationship. Their glue consisted primarily of a shared desire to replace Western domination, especially that of the United States.
Ten years later, in these days of October, Xi returned the favor. He let himself and the tenth anniversary of China’s now global “Belt and Road” infrastructure network be celebrated. In 2013, he proposed it as his global Silk Road initiative. When the gold-colored double doors opened in October for the opening ceremony in the Great Hall of the People, Xi stepped in shoulder to shoulder with Putin.
He publicly proclaimed that he had met “my old friend” Putin 42 times since their first meeting in March 2013. Putin, who is wanted on an international arrest warrant for alleged war crimes, had to look up to Xi.
The glue for the paradigm shift has now hardened for China; the Zeitenwende that began ten years ago is real, while foreign countries continue to debate their Zeitenwende in relations with China. Only by looking back does it become clear how purposefully Xi acted. In the starting year of 2013, he slammed the reverse brake on the domestic front and stepped on the gas for a radical international expansion. It started with his proposal to always link China’s enterprises strictly bilaterally with dozens of countries (later more than 100), first along the Central Asian Silk Road and economic corridors. Then, they were allowed to expand infrastructure-wise via port, rail, and pipeline construction, technology, and foreign trade in all global directions. Simultaneously, Xi ordered the build-up of China’s army and navy into a military power capable of waging war and secretly had artificial islands filled up in the South China Sea to underpin Beijing’s claim over the sea.
One of the reasons Beijing got away with this development and expansion strategy so smoothly is China’s clever combination of major international conferences and summits in which it participated, as well as each strictly bilateral agreement, treaty and cooperation project it signed. By 2014, China had signed agreements with 58 countries; today, it is twice as many.
During the Beijing BRI Anniversary Conference in October and at the tenth anniversary China-Asia neighborhood conference this week, dozens of new and expanded bilateral cooperation agreements were signed with attending heads of state.
Xi chaired each meeting personally. The texts of the joint statements are available online in the Foreign Ministry’s archive. They document how meticulously Beijing wove its network of influence, painstakingly recording whether the cooperation was friendly, cooperative or strategic. Pakistan, which receives the bulk of billions in construction investment for ports, power plants, roads and railroads, became the first country Beijing elevated to its “All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partners.” Head of State Xi and Pakistan’s Premier Anwar Kakkar agreed in October to further elevate their relationship to “everlasting” and “unbreakable,” calling themselves “iron brothers” (中巴两国是全天候战略合作伙伴和 “铁杆 “兄弟，两国友谊历久弥坚、牢不可破).
By now, however, Beijing has forged “all-weather” partnerships with half a dozen states, including Belarus and Ethiopia. The more colorful China’s formulas, the greater the dependence of the country in question on China, which, in the meantime, has also become known as the “debt trap.” In a recent agreement, Beijing has waived some of its debt claims for particularly battered Sri Lanka. In return, it will have to support China. Initially, Beijing wanted all partner states to merely respect its “core interests” and, above all, recognize its claim over Taiwan. Then, it demanded they support memoranda to China’s Silk Road initiative. Today, Xi wants more: Dozens of countries signed on for his new China Initiatives on Global Development (GDI), Global Security (GSI), and Global Civilization (GCI) (全球发展倡议、全球安全倡议、全球文明倡议).
In October, Beijing signed an agreement with Chile to enter a new “global data security” initiative with China (智方赞赏中方提出的《全球数据安全倡议》). Beijing always sets the standards – party leader Xi recently proposed another “Global AI Governance Initiative,” another one of Beijing’s attempts to subject the Internet to international control by invoking sovereignty clauses.
On Wednesday, Xi Jinping and Colombia’s Gustavo Petro caused a stir in Beijing by upgrading their relations to a “strategic partnership.” Colombia, which is heavily indebted in trade with China, was previously considered the oldest US ally in Latin America. “The upgrade of relations with Colombia means China now has strategic ties with 10 out of the 11 South American countries with which it has relations,” Reuters reported.
In this way, China crawls its way into Xi’s coveted role as a global power. Beijing’s plan to use the mass of its bilateral agreements to set the tone for future international affairs or to exert more influence on votes in the United Nations, is obviously part of its Chinese Zeitenwende.
Dramatic morning scene over the Emperor’s Canal: Parts of the world’s longest man-made waterway were already built more than 2,400 years ago. The canal is more than 1,800 kilometers long and connects Beijing with Hangzhou; it is also used for irrigation. Long barges transport goods like coal or building materials on it. However, the old structure is suffering from a lack of water. As a result, it is sometimes impassable and has thus lost at least its transregional significance.
