The situation in Sri Lanka is dramatic. The country is suffering the deepest economic crisis in its history. Unemployment and rising prices are driving people onto the streets, while a huge mountain of debt is crushing the national budget. On the weekend, insurgents even stormed the President’s palace.
But who is to blame for this state of affairs? Many point to China. In their opinion, it is a prime example of China’s alleged debt trap. Frank Sieren has taken a closer look at the complicated mix of loan agreements, fixed interest rates, and feasibility studies for the port project and comes to the conclusion that it was not China’s alleged debt trap that snapped shut in Sri Lanka. Instead, the reasons can also be found in Europe and the USA.
In our second analysis today, we look at Japan. There, the former party of assassinated Ex-Prime Minister Shinzō Abe won the election to the upper house of parliament on the weekend. Now, unexpectedly, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and their coalition partners have an opportunity to implement a decades-old concern: Japan’s conservatives could finally amend the pacifist constitution. For China, that would probably be an unacceptable act. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk has analyzed the new post-election situation. He shows why Japan’s incumbent Prime Minister Kishida is unlikely to seek a constitutional amendment after all, despite his election victory.
Sri Lanka is in the midst of the biggest economic crisis in its history. The island nation has more than $50 billion in foreign debt. Inflation is around 60 percent. Over the weekend, insurgents stormed the presidential palace. This Tuesday, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and his government team plan to resign unanimously.
Many people immediately think of China when it comes to Sri Lanka’s debt. More specifically, of the alleged Chinese debt trap into which Beijing is driving the countries of the Belt and Road Initiative – “Chinese neocolonialism,” as it is called in Washington. President Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe did indeed maintain close relations with China for a long time. Now they have to face the accusation of having been cheated by China.
Hambantota is considered a prime example of Beijing’s debt trap, Sri Lanka’s second-largest but newest deep-sea port. The port is located on the most important shipping route between Europe and Asia and is also of military interest. So far, so true.
But taking a closer look at the accusation of the debt trap, it quickly turns out to be a geopolitical myth. It reads as follows: Beijing has lent Sri Lanka money at high-interest rates for a new port, which basically cannot be profitable, only to force Sri Lanka to give China the strategically important port on India’s doorstep for 99 years – because that was the guarantee for the original loan.
However, the story of China as a loan shark has a fundamental problem: it is not true. This is proven by the latest research conducted by the top US university Johns Hopkins in the context of the economic crisis: “It’s a lie, a powerful one at that,” says Professor Deborah Bräutigam, summarizing the results as succinctly as they are provocative. They were even recently published as a major piece in “The Atlantic” magazine, one of the most renowned American journals.
The feasibility study on which the expansion of the port is based was not financed by Beijing. 75 percent was paid by the Canadian government for $1.5 million, prepared by SNC-Lavalin, one of Canada’s leading construction companies. The result: The port is economically viable if an international consortium builds, operates, and later hands over the port in a joint venture. Accordingly, Colombo will not have to shoulder the investment costs of $1.7 billion on its own. A second study by the renowned Danish consulting firm Ramboll, which implements many EU projects, comes to the same conclusion.
With these studies, the government of Sri Lanka advertised the project in Canada, the USA, and India – but no one was interested. Nor was anyone from the EU. For the investors, the political situation after 30 years of civil war and a tsunami was (and still is) simply too risky.
The only ones who did not shy away from entrepreneurial risk were the Chinese. China Exim Bank offered Sri Lanka a $307 million, 15-year loan, including a choice between fixed interest rates of 6.3 percent or flexible rates. The government chose the latter, riskier option. That Beijing’s interest rates are reasonable, has been evidenced by an international bond that Colombo issued simultaneously. Sri Lanka must offer 8.3 percent interest to borrow money on the international market.
However, the Sri Lankan government decided to operate the port itself. It was ceremoniously opened in 2010. But it quickly became clear that this would not work. What’s more, instead of waiting for the first phase to become profitable, as the Western consultants had suggested, Colombo also built the second expansion phase in 2012 – with a new $757 million loan at now only two percent. This was because interest rates had dropped in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
In 2016, when the port was still not making enough profit, Colombo asked China Harbor and Merchants Group to operate the port for 35 years, as it was already successfully managing the capital’s port. But before the Chinese operators could get a foothold, Sri Lanka was so over-indebted that growth eventually collapsed entirely.
However, with a share of 10 percent, the Chinese play only a marginal role in this debt. “Sri Lanka owed more to Japan, the World Bank, or the Asian Development Bank ADB than to China,” Bräutigam notes in her study. In any case, she says, Sri Lanka owes most of its debt to the private international capital market, where it was unable to repay around $4.3 billion in 2017.
Following the advice of the IMF, Colombo then attempted to privatize the port internationally to obtain US dollars. But only two Chinese companies were interested in the global bidding process. For $1.12 billion, China Merchants will get 70 percent of the port for 99 years.
However, this feat of strength was also wasted. An attack in 2019 that killed more than 200 people and the COVID pandemic in the following two years ultimately wiped out Sri Lanka’s economy. “Our economy has completely collapsed,” Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe recently had to admit to Parliament. Inflation in Sri Lanka is over 60 percent. Food prices have risen by more than 80 percent. And because of a shortage of foreign currency, the country is unable to import enough fuel.
“Sri Lanka’s debt trap was…mostly generated by internal policy decisions, aided by Western financiers,” the South China Morning Post newspaper also summarized.
But in the meantime, China has also become cautious. So cautious that Sri Lanka’s President Gotabaya Rajapaksa complained to Bloomberg that Beijing was denying his country substantial aid. Moreover, Sri Lanka could not access promised China loans of $1.5 billion. And the request for an aid package of $1 billion received no response at all.
Rajapaksa, of course, knows which narrative works well internationally: First eviscerated by China, then abandoned in the worst crisis. But this has not helped him. Because Beijing knows that the President will not remain in power, it is now limiting its aid to humanitarian measures. 10,000 tons of rice are being sent to Sri Lanka, as well as medicine. And two new port cranes were delivered as planned at the end of June.
But negotiations on the long-pending free trade agreement between China and Sri Lanka have stalled. Above all, Beijing hopes that Sri Lanka can make it without the US-dominated IMF.
And while Beijing has become cautious, India is trying to improve its position in Sri Lanka. This year alone, Delhi has extended loans totaling $376 million – making it the largest lender of the year. This compares with only $13 million last year. At the recent Quad Summit – the meeting of the major Asian democracies India, Japan, and Australia with the US – Delhi lobbied for the IMF to agree to bail out Sri Lanka. But with a new government in Colombo, the power game between India and China over Sri Lanka is open again.
In a parliamentary election on Sunday, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan was able to gain votes. This brings within reach a political project that has failed several times in recent decades: The amendment of a constitutional article that commits Japan to peacefulness. To this day, the country’s army is not officially designated as such. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida could now bring the legal framework into line with reality.
Even if there is still a long way to go before a concrete vote is held, the public debate about Peace Article 9 of the constitution is already relevant for China. The amendment of a constitutional article that obligates Japan to remain peaceful. Even though Japan has highly armed forces in practice, pacifism is part of its self-image. A departure from this stance would show that advocates of military solutions are gaining influence.
Conversely, the constitutional amendment would also be a pretext for China’s leadership to portray Japan as militaristic and to stir up sentiment against its neighbor. All these are among the reasons why Japan’s governments have so far been reluctant to put the constitutional amendment to a vote.
Japan has been in a curious situation since World War II. The US dictated a constitution that prohibited the defeated nation from rearming. But then came the Cold War, and the US suddenly insisted that Japan do its part in defending the region against the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China.
The country then established the “Self-Defense Forces” in 1954. Officially, not an army, but in practice, it looks just like one. This way, Japan was even faster than the other defeated nation, Germany. The Bundeswehr was not established until a year later. For both countries, this marked the end of the short phase of demilitarization.
But while the Bundeswehr was founded on a clear legal basis, Japan never adapted its constitution to reality. New generations of Japanese who had broken with the wartime generation’s way of thinking liked their peaceful constitution. They liked the idea of a more harmless, better Japan. In opinion polls, they traditionally opposed the amendment of Article 9. This was one of the reasons why a corresponding majority was never achieved in parliament.
Since Sunday, the LDP and three other parties leaning in favor of the amendment hold a two-thirds majority in parliament. This makes it possible, at least in theory, to amend Article 9.
However, the peace article should not obscure the fact that the self-defense forces are excellently equipped. Japan has 260,000 soldiers under arms, compared with only 185,000 in Germany. The navy has sophisticated equipment such as helicopter carriers, which are currently being converted into aircraft carriers. A fleet of silent submarines that can also fire missiles constantly patrols the Japanese islands.
Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, who was gunned down on Friday, had worked hard to reconcile the constitution with the fact that Japan is actually heavily armed. He predicted that his country would continue to arm itself. Japan’s neighbors include North Korea, Russia, and China. Tensions are to be expected there in the long term. In the meantime, even a full-blown conflict seems possible.
Whether Abe’s death favors or hinders constitutional change is currently the subject of debate. After all, he was an advocate of the amendment. Kishida could now feel obligated to push the project forward for this very reason.
However, Prime Minister Kishida currently has quite different problems and priorities. In his press conference after the polls closed on Sunday, he cited inflation and debt as Japan’s main problems. He said he wanted to “let people discuss” the constitutional amendment. It is questionable whether he will now devote his political capital and energy to the entirely theoretical constitutional issue, or whether he will not rather stick to economic policy.
Kishida himself is not an agitator. Instead, he repeats his view that more dialogue would do the region well. At the same time, he warns against increasing Chinese military activity. He is referring in particular to the constant intrusions of Chinese fighter jets near Taiwan. Against this background, he is massively increasing defense spending. Which, of course, can be done without amending the constitution.
The amendment of Article 9 would be of little use to Kishida in his attempt to rely on dialogue on the one hand and inconspicuously upgrade the army on the other. A likely scenario, therefore, would be that he works toward this pro forma but lets the initiative fade away in quiet. Like so many governments did before him.
Wolfgang Ehmann, 62, sits in his office on the 19th floor of the Cofco Tower on Hong Kong’s Gloucester Road. When he looks up from his computer screen, he sees the metropolis as if on a postcard – sailing ships passing by, glittering skyscraper facades, and, in the background, the hazy outline of a mountain landscape. “The topography of Hong Kong is unique,” says Ehmann. He repeatedly notices this when he goes hiking in the country parks that surround the city.
Ehmann is the Head of the German Chamber of Commerce Abroad in Hong Kong. With his 13 colleagues, he strengthens bilateral relations between China and Germany. The members come primarily from Germany’s SME sector. From mechanical engineers to tech companies, everything is there. What exactly does he do? “Answer questions,” he says. His job is to take people by the hand and give them the best possible starting conditions in Hong Kong. He obtains credit reports, helps open accounts, or looks for suitable office space.
But above all, he makes connections. He knows his way around Hong Kong, the business world is his home. Although someone who does good business in Germany is not out of luck in Hong Kong, contacts are particularly important here. You need an intermediary to introduce you. “Cold calls” are not so welcome. “The shortest distance between two points here is often a sinuous line,” he says. You know someone who knows someone. Contact is usually never made directly, he says.
Ehmann should know. After all, he has lived in Hong Kong for 35 years. He was just 26 when he moved from Freiburg to the Chinese Special Administrative Region after completing his business studies. His father managed the Hong Kong office of the Heidenheim-based machine manufacturer Voith and had arranged his first job for him.
“Hong Kong has its own DNA. This variety, these contrasts, the fast-paced life – you either love it or you hate it,” says Ehmann. The climate, the many people, the crowds, the constant fight for space – all of it is exhausting, too, Ehmann finds. For balance, he jogs or rides his bike in the hilly surrounding countryside. “If it weren’t for that, I don’t know if I’d still be living here.”
Ehmann’s perception of the 2019 protests in the metropolis was rather negative. “In my opinion, the protests were completely misguided.” Public transport came to a standstill, and colleagues sometimes did not come home from work. “I have always been able to understand that the frustration was great. The government has long failed to address the concerns of the young population. But I was repulsed by this level of violence,” says Ehmann.
Ehmann still feels connected to his homeland. He once sat with a banker from Ulm. He immediately heard the Swabian tongue and became friends with him. They are now a small group of businessmen from Baden-Württemberg who either live in Hong Kong or spend most of the year here. They call themselves the “Spaetzle Connection.” Tim Winter
One last handshake, then it’s time to go: These students are waiting in Shanghai for admission to their Gaokao exam. Final exams didn’t start in Shanghai until this Monday. Due to the COVID lockdown, the Gaokao in the metropolis had been postponed by a month.
The situation in Sri Lanka is dramatic. The country is suffering the deepest economic crisis in its history. Unemployment and rising prices are driving people onto the streets, while a huge mountain of debt is crushing the national budget. On the weekend, insurgents even stormed the President’s palace.
But who is to blame for this state of affairs? Many point to China. In their opinion, it is a prime example of China’s alleged debt trap. Frank Sieren has taken a closer look at the complicated mix of loan agreements, fixed interest rates, and feasibility studies for the port project and comes to the conclusion that it was not China’s alleged debt trap that snapped shut in Sri Lanka. Instead, the reasons can also be found in Europe and the USA.
In our second analysis today, we look at Japan. There, the former party of assassinated Ex-Prime Minister Shinzō Abe won the election to the upper house of parliament on the weekend. Now, unexpectedly, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and their coalition partners have an opportunity to implement a decades-old concern: Japan’s conservatives could finally amend the pacifist constitution. For China, that would probably be an unacceptable act. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk has analyzed the new post-election situation. He shows why Japan’s incumbent Prime Minister Kishida is unlikely to seek a constitutional amendment after all, despite his election victory.
Sri Lanka is in the midst of the biggest economic crisis in its history. The island nation has more than $50 billion in foreign debt. Inflation is around 60 percent. Over the weekend, insurgents stormed the presidential palace. This Tuesday, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and his government team plan to resign unanimously.
Many people immediately think of China when it comes to Sri Lanka’s debt. More specifically, of the alleged Chinese debt trap into which Beijing is driving the countries of the Belt and Road Initiative – “Chinese neocolonialism,” as it is called in Washington. President Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe did indeed maintain close relations with China for a long time. Now they have to face the accusation of having been cheated by China.
Hambantota is considered a prime example of Beijing’s debt trap, Sri Lanka’s second-largest but newest deep-sea port. The port is located on the most important shipping route between Europe and Asia and is also of military interest. So far, so true.
But taking a closer look at the accusation of the debt trap, it quickly turns out to be a geopolitical myth. It reads as follows: Beijing has lent Sri Lanka money at high-interest rates for a new port, which basically cannot be profitable, only to force Sri Lanka to give China the strategically important port on India’s doorstep for 99 years – because that was the guarantee for the original loan.
However, the story of China as a loan shark has a fundamental problem: it is not true. This is proven by the latest research conducted by the top US university Johns Hopkins in the context of the economic crisis: “It’s a lie, a powerful one at that,” says Professor Deborah Bräutigam, summarizing the results as succinctly as they are provocative. They were even recently published as a major piece in “The Atlantic” magazine, one of the most renowned American journals.
The feasibility study on which the expansion of the port is based was not financed by Beijing. 75 percent was paid by the Canadian government for $1.5 million, prepared by SNC-Lavalin, one of Canada’s leading construction companies. The result: The port is economically viable if an international consortium builds, operates, and later hands over the port in a joint venture. Accordingly, Colombo will not have to shoulder the investment costs of $1.7 billion on its own. A second study by the renowned Danish consulting firm Ramboll, which implements many EU projects, comes to the same conclusion.
With these studies, the government of Sri Lanka advertised the project in Canada, the USA, and India – but no one was interested. Nor was anyone from the EU. For the investors, the political situation after 30 years of civil war and a tsunami was (and still is) simply too risky.
The only ones who did not shy away from entrepreneurial risk were the Chinese. China Exim Bank offered Sri Lanka a $307 million, 15-year loan, including a choice between fixed interest rates of 6.3 percent or flexible rates. The government chose the latter, riskier option. That Beijing’s interest rates are reasonable, has been evidenced by an international bond that Colombo issued simultaneously. Sri Lanka must offer 8.3 percent interest to borrow money on the international market.
However, the Sri Lankan government decided to operate the port itself. It was ceremoniously opened in 2010. But it quickly became clear that this would not work. What’s more, instead of waiting for the first phase to become profitable, as the Western consultants had suggested, Colombo also built the second expansion phase in 2012 – with a new $757 million loan at now only two percent. This was because interest rates had dropped in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
In 2016, when the port was still not making enough profit, Colombo asked China Harbor and Merchants Group to operate the port for 35 years, as it was already successfully managing the capital’s port. But before the Chinese operators could get a foothold, Sri Lanka was so over-indebted that growth eventually collapsed entirely.
However, with a share of 10 percent, the Chinese play only a marginal role in this debt. “Sri Lanka owed more to Japan, the World Bank, or the Asian Development Bank ADB than to China,” Bräutigam notes in her study. In any case, she says, Sri Lanka owes most of its debt to the private international capital market, where it was unable to repay around $4.3 billion in 2017.
Following the advice of the IMF, Colombo then attempted to privatize the port internationally to obtain US dollars. But only two Chinese companies were interested in the global bidding process. For $1.12 billion, China Merchants will get 70 percent of the port for 99 years.
However, this feat of strength was also wasted. An attack in 2019 that killed more than 200 people and the COVID pandemic in the following two years ultimately wiped out Sri Lanka’s economy. “Our economy has completely collapsed,” Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe recently had to admit to Parliament. Inflation in Sri Lanka is over 60 percent. Food prices have risen by more than 80 percent. And because of a shortage of foreign currency, the country is unable to import enough fuel.
“Sri Lanka’s debt trap was…mostly generated by internal policy decisions, aided by Western financiers,” the South China Morning Post newspaper also summarized.
But in the meantime, China has also become cautious. So cautious that Sri Lanka’s President Gotabaya Rajapaksa complained to Bloomberg that Beijing was denying his country substantial aid. Moreover, Sri Lanka could not access promised China loans of $1.5 billion. And the request for an aid package of $1 billion received no response at all.
Rajapaksa, of course, knows which narrative works well internationally: First eviscerated by China, then abandoned in the worst crisis. But this has not helped him. Because Beijing knows that the President will not remain in power, it is now limiting its aid to humanitarian measures. 10,000 tons of rice are being sent to Sri Lanka, as well as medicine. And two new port cranes were delivered as planned at the end of June.
But negotiations on the long-pending free trade agreement between China and Sri Lanka have stalled. Above all, Beijing hopes that Sri Lanka can make it without the US-dominated IMF.
And while Beijing has become cautious, India is trying to improve its position in Sri Lanka. This year alone, Delhi has extended loans totaling $376 million – making it the largest lender of the year. This compares with only $13 million last year. At the recent Quad Summit – the meeting of the major Asian democracies India, Japan, and Australia with the US – Delhi lobbied for the IMF to agree to bail out Sri Lanka. But with a new government in Colombo, the power game between India and China over Sri Lanka is open again.
In a parliamentary election on Sunday, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan was able to gain votes. This brings within reach a political project that has failed several times in recent decades: The amendment of a constitutional article that commits Japan to peacefulness. To this day, the country’s army is not officially designated as such. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida could now bring the legal framework into line with reality.
Even if there is still a long way to go before a concrete vote is held, the public debate about Peace Article 9 of the constitution is already relevant for China. The amendment of a constitutional article that obligates Japan to remain peaceful. Even though Japan has highly armed forces in practice, pacifism is part of its self-image. A departure from this stance would show that advocates of military solutions are gaining influence.
Conversely, the constitutional amendment would also be a pretext for China’s leadership to portray Japan as militaristic and to stir up sentiment against its neighbor. All these are among the reasons why Japan’s governments have so far been reluctant to put the constitutional amendment to a vote.
Japan has been in a curious situation since World War II. The US dictated a constitution that prohibited the defeated nation from rearming. But then came the Cold War, and the US suddenly insisted that Japan do its part in defending the region against the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China.
The country then established the “Self-Defense Forces” in 1954. Officially, not an army, but in practice, it looks just like one. This way, Japan was even faster than the other defeated nation, Germany. The Bundeswehr was not established until a year later. For both countries, this marked the end of the short phase of demilitarization.
But while the Bundeswehr was founded on a clear legal basis, Japan never adapted its constitution to reality. New generations of Japanese who had broken with the wartime generation’s way of thinking liked their peaceful constitution. They liked the idea of a more harmless, better Japan. In opinion polls, they traditionally opposed the amendment of Article 9. This was one of the reasons why a corresponding majority was never achieved in parliament.
Since Sunday, the LDP and three other parties leaning in favor of the amendment hold a two-thirds majority in parliament. This makes it possible, at least in theory, to amend Article 9.
However, the peace article should not obscure the fact that the self-defense forces are excellently equipped. Japan has 260,000 soldiers under arms, compared with only 185,000 in Germany. The navy has sophisticated equipment such as helicopter carriers, which are currently being converted into aircraft carriers. A fleet of silent submarines that can also fire missiles constantly patrols the Japanese islands.
Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, who was gunned down on Friday, had worked hard to reconcile the constitution with the fact that Japan is actually heavily armed. He predicted that his country would continue to arm itself. Japan’s neighbors include North Korea, Russia, and China. Tensions are to be expected there in the long term. In the meantime, even a full-blown conflict seems possible.
Whether Abe’s death favors or hinders constitutional change is currently the subject of debate. After all, he was an advocate of the amendment. Kishida could now feel obligated to push the project forward for this very reason.
However, Prime Minister Kishida currently has quite different problems and priorities. In his press conference after the polls closed on Sunday, he cited inflation and debt as Japan’s main problems. He said he wanted to “let people discuss” the constitutional amendment. It is questionable whether he will now devote his political capital and energy to the entirely theoretical constitutional issue, or whether he will not rather stick to economic policy.
Kishida himself is not an agitator. Instead, he repeats his view that more dialogue would do the region well. At the same time, he warns against increasing Chinese military activity. He is referring in particular to the constant intrusions of Chinese fighter jets near Taiwan. Against this background, he is massively increasing defense spending. Which, of course, can be done without amending the constitution.
The amendment of Article 9 would be of little use to Kishida in his attempt to rely on dialogue on the one hand and inconspicuously upgrade the army on the other. A likely scenario, therefore, would be that he works toward this pro forma but lets the initiative fade away in quiet. Like so many governments did before him.
Wolfgang Ehmann, 62, sits in his office on the 19th floor of the Cofco Tower on Hong Kong’s Gloucester Road. When he looks up from his computer screen, he sees the metropolis as if on a postcard – sailing ships passing by, glittering skyscraper facades, and, in the background, the hazy outline of a mountain landscape. “The topography of Hong Kong is unique,” says Ehmann. He repeatedly notices this when he goes hiking in the country parks that surround the city.
Ehmann is the Head of the German Chamber of Commerce Abroad in Hong Kong. With his 13 colleagues, he strengthens bilateral relations between China and Germany. The members come primarily from Germany’s SME sector. From mechanical engineers to tech companies, everything is there. What exactly does he do? “Answer questions,” he says. His job is to take people by the hand and give them the best possible starting conditions in Hong Kong. He obtains credit reports, helps open accounts, or looks for suitable office space.
But above all, he makes connections. He knows his way around Hong Kong, the business world is his home. Although someone who does good business in Germany is not out of luck in Hong Kong, contacts are particularly important here. You need an intermediary to introduce you. “Cold calls” are not so welcome. “The shortest distance between two points here is often a sinuous line,” he says. You know someone who knows someone. Contact is usually never made directly, he says.
Ehmann should know. After all, he has lived in Hong Kong for 35 years. He was just 26 when he moved from Freiburg to the Chinese Special Administrative Region after completing his business studies. His father managed the Hong Kong office of the Heidenheim-based machine manufacturer Voith and had arranged his first job for him.
“Hong Kong has its own DNA. This variety, these contrasts, the fast-paced life – you either love it or you hate it,” says Ehmann. The climate, the many people, the crowds, the constant fight for space – all of it is exhausting, too, Ehmann finds. For balance, he jogs or rides his bike in the hilly surrounding countryside. “If it weren’t for that, I don’t know if I’d still be living here.”
Ehmann’s perception of the 2019 protests in the metropolis was rather negative. “In my opinion, the protests were completely misguided.” Public transport came to a standstill, and colleagues sometimes did not come home from work. “I have always been able to understand that the frustration was great. The government has long failed to address the concerns of the young population. But I was repulsed by this level of violence,” says Ehmann.
Ehmann still feels connected to his homeland. He once sat with a banker from Ulm. He immediately heard the Swabian tongue and became friends with him. They are now a small group of businessmen from Baden-Württemberg who either live in Hong Kong or spend most of the year here. They call themselves the “Spaetzle Connection.” Tim Winter
One last handshake, then it’s time to go: These students are waiting in Shanghai for admission to their Gaokao exam. Final exams didn’t start in Shanghai until this Monday. Due to the COVID lockdown, the Gaokao in the metropolis had been postponed by a month.
