If a country does basically the same with a law as it did without it – does it make a difference? Yes. This is now the case with China’s new foreign policy law. Like other important resolutions of the People’s Congress, it contains colorful expressions and promises, for example, China’s commitment to world peace. But it also has thorns. Should China’s interests be threatened, it gives Xi Jinping the authority to take swift countermeasures.
The existence of such highly political laws (the anti-espionage law also falls into this category) allows the leadership to act just as harshly as before and still call it the rule of law. But this is far from it. Authoritarian rule merely protects itself with tailored laws. Michael Radunski analyzes what this means for the EU and Germany.
Spain will have to deal with China’s foreign policy particularly intensively in the near future. After Covid, Pedro Sanchez hurried to be one of the first heads of government to present himself to Xi again. Now Spain will be taking over the EU council presidency. Does this mean that China will be on the agenda in the EU? Not necessarily, writes Amelie Richter. On the one hand, Prime Minister Sanchez will soon have to face an election. On the other hand, the EU has plans underway that aim for greater independence from China – and even Sanchez will not be able to stop them.
Xi is not only making his mark in legislation and foreign policy, but also in architecture. Today, Johnny Erling writes about the monumental buildings with which the ruler wants to cement his perception of history.
China has passed a new legal basis for its foreign policy. The “Law on Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China” (中华人民共和国对外关系法) aims to strengthen China’s national and economic security. It consists of six chapters, was passed by the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress on Wednesday and will come into force on Saturday.
The law further cements the control of party and state leader Xi Jinping over China’s foreign policy. It gives Xi a legal basis for “countermeasures” against Western threats.
It is China’s first foreign policy law of this magnitude, peppered with many benign-sounding formulations. There is talk of equality and inclusion, fairness, development and world peace, and even universal human rights. And yet an undertone of perceived encirclement, necessary and justified defense shimmers through repeatedly.
Aptly, the state-run newspaper Global Times puts it bluntly. The law is the “legal basis for the diplomatic struggle against sanctions” and a “warning and deterrence against Western hegemony”.
Chapter I outlines the general purposes of the law:
Chapter II details the functions and powers. The central position of Xi Jinping becomes clear here, as President, as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and not least, as General Secretary of the Communist Party. Because Article 5 states: The conduct of foreign relations by the People’s Republic of China is under the centralized and general leadership of the Communist Party of China.
Chapter III covers the aims and mission of foreign relations. It states: The People’s Republic of China shall maintain its external relations in order to uphold its socialist system with Chinese characteristics, safeguard its sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity, and promote its economic and social development.
In Chinese texts, the order is also always important. And so it is striking that even before the international UN system is mentioned, there is a call for implementing China’s Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative. Foreign experts see the Global Security Initiative, in particular, as a long-term challenge to the US-led order.
Again and again, colorful expressions appear, which, however, often have little to do with reality. Just three examples.
Chapter IV covers the system of foreign relations. Articles 32 and 33 contain the objective of the law:
Chapter V (Support for the Conduct of Foreign Relations) and Chapter VI (Supplementary Provision) complete the legislative text.
Essentially, there are no new initiatives listed in this text. It is a list of known initiatives, goals and Chinese formulations. Rather, it is about further consolidating and deepening Xi Jinping’s grip on power.
Whereas it was previously an unwritten agreement, it is now enshrined in law: Not the government, but the party determines China’s foreign policy. And the party, for the foreseeable future, is Xi Jinping. The basis is Xi’s initiatives, Xi’s thoughts and Xi’s goals.
Equally important is the timing. The law comes at a time when Xi Jinping is increasingly asserting China’s power and influence on the international stage, and other nations – most notably the US – are expressing concern and opposition to these ambitions.
Accordingly, the law emphasizes China’s right to take “measures to counter or take restrictive measures against acts that endanger its sovereignty, national security and development interests”. China’s right to pursue its own interests and goals are beyond dispute. The problem with these formulations is the ambiguity of the chosen terminology.
This does not bode well for the already strained relations with China, as Beijing sees its sovereignty, security and development interests threatened by foreign countries on many levels: Be it the Taiwan question, Europe’s trade de-risking strategies or international consultancies in China.
Spain will take over the EU Council presidency from Sweden on July 1. As in the past six months, the Russian aggression against Ukraine will dominate the agenda of the upcoming presidency, keeping an eye on China and its relationship with Moscow.
Madrid’s left-wing government, composed of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and Unidas Podemos, led by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, was initially seen as a facilitator for China and perceived as having a favorable approach towards the country. Sánchez had met with President Xi in March, adopting a cooperative tone. However, this may change during the ongoing EU Council presidency as the Spanish government could undergo a reshuffle at the end of the following month.
Spanish parliamentary elections will be held on July 23. According to recent polls, the conservative People’s Party (PP) is leading with 34.2 percent. Together with the right-wing populist Vox party, it could potentially reach the absolute majority required for forming a government. The center-left PSOE, led by Sánchez, is polling at 26.7 percent. Sánchez will try to motivate his voters to prevent the formation of the first nationwide government involving right-wing populists.
However, PP and Vox have good chances of forming the new government in Madrid, which could also shift the stance on China. Representatives of both parties visited Taiwan in January and expressed support for closer ties with Taipei. The extent to which the relationship with the People’s Republic will become a topic in the ongoing election campaign remains unclear. Traditionally, foreign policy plays a relatively minor role in national parliamentary elections.
Relations between Spain and China have already cooled in recent years, according to Mario Esteban, a researcher for Asia and the Pacific at the Madrid-based think tank Real Elcano Institute. Spanish exports to China nearly doubled between 2011 and 2018 when President Xi visited Madrid, reaching a value of 6.6 billion dollars. However, Chinese investments are no longer as attractive for Spain as they were after the 2008 financial crisis, explains Esteban.
China has found other EU countries, such as Greece and Hungary, which give more support to the Chinese position on issues like the South China Sea disputes and human rights abuses in China, providing them with more backing. Prime Minister Sánchez also refused to sign a memorandum of understanding on Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative during Xi’s visit to Spain in 2018.
This marked the beginning of a “more differentiated and selective” approach by Spain to its relations with China, writes Esteban. “All of this has initiated an era in which Spanish-Chinese relations are increasingly influenced by geopolitical considerations and third parties, especially the EU and the US.” The current Spanish government is also trying to reduce economic dependence on China.
During the Council presidency, Madrid will push forward essential EU agreements aimed at increasing independence from the People’s Republic, regardless of whether it is led by the PP/Vox or the PSOE. This includes the ongoing Mercosur deal, which, if concluded, would boost the EU economy. Spain also aims to strengthen the EU’s political relationships with all Latin American countries, particularly Brazil.
The Latin American country of Chile could also play a role in another EU objective during Spain’s presidency: the Critical Raw Materials Act. Brussels needs critical raw materials such as lithium, cobalt, and rare earths to become climate-neutral by 2050. Currently, the EU relies significantly on China for the supply and processing of these materials, with 98 percent of rare earths coming from the People’s Republic.
The Critical Raw Materials Act proposed in March aims to support domestic extraction, processing, and recycling, as well as diversify the imports of these key materials, including a focus on Chile, which has significant lithium reserves. Spain aims to achieve an agreement within the EU institutions (trilogue) during its EU Council presidency.
Scientific cooperation has shifted into the focus of risk minimization efforts. They will also form an important aspect of Germany’s national China strategy currently in the works. Researchers who work specifically on this topic have also attached a new urgency to the issue. The main reason is the ongoing reassessment of Chinese motives and strategies.
On Thursday, Matthias Stepan from Ruhr University Bochum and Sascha Klotzbucher from Comenius University Bratislava discussed this at the online event “German Research Cooperation: Creating Knowledge for or with China?” at the IfW Kiel. There was a broad consensus that future cooperation should under no circumstances be approached naively – be it in the natural sciences, the humanities or sinology itself. “We also have to examine in each individual case whether the German side is gaining a benefit from the cooperation or merely subsidizing research for China,” said Stepan.
In recent decades, China has also evolved from a developing country to a leading science nation. For this reason, Stepan also highlighted the great importance of China as a location for cooperation, from which Germany can certainly benefit. The prerequisite is the proper framework.
Klotzbucher, however, argued for the utmost caution here. “What is ‘only basic research’ from our point of view, the CP sees as ruling knowledge,” says Klotzbucher. It is a well-known strategy of the Chinese side to offer a partnership for mutual benefit, from which the other side, however, ultimately emerges weakened.
Subtle mechanisms of influence were also discussed. Those who work with a Chinese partner may exclude critical topics out of consideration and thus import the CCP’s restrictions on thought into the German system, Klotzbucher explains. To solve such dilemmas, he suggests cooperations that involve several partners.
However, a better understanding of Chinese tactics currently increases the feeling of being in a bind– there are no simple solutions in sight. Stepan calls for continuing successful cooperations with transparent conditions and clear objectives. New projects should be examined by committees and experts before being signed.
On Thursday, a report in the German business daily Handelsblatt forced its way into the debate on scientific cooperation: The German government wants to banish the Confucius Institutes from Germany, the business paper reports. However, the quotes and arguments by Research Minister Bettina Stark-Watzinger (FDP) and Interior Minister Nancy Faeser (SPD) presented in the article reflect familiar positions.
According to Faeser’s ministry, the Chinese-funded educational institutions are to be “viewed extremely critically”. But instead of a ban, there is talk of “sensitizing” the German universities, which have incorporated the Confucius Institutes.
Stark-Watzinger, who, as an MP for the Free Democratic Party (FDP), tends to be more critical of China, insists on “consequences”, but she too does not speak of disbanding the institutes. Instead, she too talks about “questioning” them. The partner universities should “live up to their responsibility”. In reality, the Federal Minister shies away from giving direct instructions to the universities. She can only do this to a limited extent; after all, universities are the jurisdiction of individual federal states.
Germany currently has 19 Confucius Institutes. They are funded by Beijing but are affiliated with existing universities. The universities of Trier, Hamburg, Frankfurt and Dusseldorf have already parted ways with their Confucius Institutes. Faeser recommends the remaining universities to do the same.
This article is part of the event series Global China Conversations organized by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel). China.Table is the media partner of the event.
Absolutist rulers often see themselves as architects of their nation. They want to shape it and leave lasting memorials of their heritage for posterity. President Xi is no exception. Since the party elected him sole ruler in 2017, he has been on an architectural roll. Xi was recently able to mark the sixth anniversary of the groundbreaking for his mega-future city Xiong’an near Beijing. The “thousand-year project” of a super-modern, complementary high-tech and eco-capital is expected to be completed by 2035. By then, according to Xi’s own plans, the People’s Republic will have risen to become a fully-fledged superpower, 15 years ahead of the original schedule. The eternal party leader hopes to live to see 2035.
The first milestones of his new era pave the way. He had a monumental museum built for the CCP’s 100th anniversary in 2021. Not far from the CCP temple, the new halls and pavilions for Beijing’s first “Academy of Historical Research” 中国历史研究院 were opened in 2019. It aims to recreate China’s “glorious past” so that today’s socialist system can draw directly from it. In his welcoming speech at the opening on 3 January 2019, Xi said: “Today’s China is the continuity and development of historical China.”
To prove this, Beijing has had four museum-like exhibition palaces for collecting, storing and researching cultural heritage hammered into the mountains in all “four directions” in just three years since 2019 – also on Xi’s orders. They are supposed to be archives for the “golden seeds” of China’s cultural and civilizational history and are also called “cultural gene banks”.
The flagship of the four museums is the “China National Archives of Publications and Culture” 中国国家版本馆, built into Beijing’s Yanshan Mountains until July 2022. Three equally opulent branches can be found in Xian 西安分馆文济阁, Hangzhou 杭州分馆文润阁 and Canton 广州分馆文沁阁.
As Xi says, he intends to fuse the party’s previous Marxist ideology with China’s national traditional culture to give Chinese socialism a new unique characteristic. The essence of the old culture is to breathe new life into the party and ideology, to make China systemically attractive worldwide. He now speaks of the “two links” 两个结合.
Mao, who once set out to condemn feudal, reactionary and Confucian culture, who sought to tear down the old China and build a new socialist People’s Republic, would rotate in his grave.
In light of China’s supposedly uninterrupted cultural and civilizational history to this day, which would make it the oldest in the world, Xi is now dreaming of making fresh capital to renew his party. This is a highly political project. The China experts of the British Economist wrote last week: “Xi Jinping reaches into China’s ancient history for a new claim to rule.” This is because the party is stuck in a legitimacy trap. Its previous agreement of promising citizens the prospect of prosperity to achieve conformity and submission is no longer working.
So it was a carefully planned decision for Xi to spend more than two days in early June on a cultural trip inspecting the National Archives in Beijing’s mountains and the newly built history academy and to lay out his plans before cultural officials and researchers.
According to CCP reporters who accompanied Xi, the new cultural archives (foreigners were apparently not yet allowed to visit them) contain exhibits numbering in the millions, including precious collections of oracular writings from ancient times, ancient tomes of historical annals and Confucian classics, bronzes with inscriptions, and even the colorful (red) People’s Republic history of civilization and revolution. Because the culture from ancient times to the present day is of a single mold. During his visit, Xi was overcome with nostalgic memories of his childhood when he came to the section of comic books from the 1950s: Picture books about traditional heroes. He claims that as a boy, he could never get enough of the “books for little people” (小人书).
Xi still knew all the titles, including a 15-volume edition about Song-era patriot soldier Yue Fei, whose mother tattooed four characters about loyalty and fidelity on his back so her son would not forget them. The booklets were “educationally significant and masterfully drawn” 很有教育意义，画小人书的人功夫也深，都是大家.
Xi also knew his way around in the revolutionary novels and movies section. He grew up with books such as “Red Rock, Red Sun”, “Red Flag” (红岩, 红日, 红旗谱). “Such excellent old works and films should be brought out, read and shown again today.”
Ideological education of the youth, usually a constant pursuit of the 70-year-old party leader, was not the actual reason for his visit this time. “I’ve wanted to come here for two years. … Now I’m coming to look around for two and a half days.” The new National Archives “is a project personally approved by me” with the purpose of preserving and protecting classical collections from ancient times “for the world’s only never-interrupted culture” 亲自批准的项目，把世界上唯一没有中断的文明继续传承下去.
He says the party and revolution succeeded because they combined Marxism with China’s realities and created a socialism with Chinese characteristics. The time in its new era of socialism would require a second fusion – with China’s culture and its more than 5000 years old civilization.
The problem is constantly on his mind. For years, he has urged archaeologists and historians to dig for evidence of the more than 5,000 years of history. He even added the issue to the agenda of his Politburo meetings. “If China’s civilization is not 5000 years old, how can we talk about Chinese characteristics? If it doesn’t exist, how could we take a socialist road with Chinese characteristics that we are so successful with today?”
It is imperative to merge Chinese Marxism with Chinese culture: “Marxism and China’s excellent traditional culture come from different sources, but they are very compatible with each other … To combine them is not a simple side-by-side, not a simple physical reaction, but a profound chemical reaction that creates a new organic and unified, cultural living body.” In this way, China’s socialism would last for generations and gain worldwide popularity.
Xi does not say how this is supposed to be achieved. But he has been calling for a return to China’s traditional culture and Confucianism since 2014. He was the first CCP leader to visit Confucius’ homeland of Qufu.
Now he goes even further: “The Chinese nation … is the only civilization in the world that has existed uninterrupted since ancient times. It has formed a unique and profound value concept and civilization system. … Some concepts summarized by Laozi, Confucius, Mencius, Zhuangzi and other philosophers have endured to this day. … If China is not understood by its long historical continuity, it is impossible to understand ancient China, modern China and future China.”
This is how he hopes to re-explain everything: China’s perceived expansive foreign policy is actually a contribution of traditional Chinese wisdom to building a peaceful global community. Says Xi: Even the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative (the new Silk Road) stems from the classical concept of the “Great Community under Heaven“.
Xi’s look into China’s ancient culture and civilization has nothing to do with more opening. In 2019, for instance, the Architectural Design and Research Institute of Tsinghua University (清华大学建筑设计研究院有限公司) won the tender for the new Beijing National Archives by the Central Propaganda Department (中宣部) “after three bidding rounds against top domestic design rivals.”
Foreign companies were not involved and were apparently not invited to other Xi construction projects either. This was once different. The German architect Meinhard von Gerkan (gmp) from Hamburg was able to design the Beijing National Museum, completed in 2011, and other international architects designed Beijing’s National Library, National Theater, the Olympic buildings, and the CCTV television building.
China is once again a world apart. Its leaders intend to keep it that way in their new era.
On the 102nd anniversary of the first National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, interest focuses on the place in Shanghai where the eleven delegates met: in a simple Shikumen courtyard house, which was turned into a museum in 1961. The French Concession police broke up the Communists’ meeting at that time. Today it is a place of pilgrimage and a must-see destination for school trips and tourists.
If a country does basically the same with a law as it did without it – does it make a difference? Yes. This is now the case with China’s new foreign policy law. Like other important resolutions of the People’s Congress, it contains colorful expressions and promises, for example, China’s commitment to world peace. But it also has thorns. Should China’s interests be threatened, it gives Xi Jinping the authority to take swift countermeasures.
The existence of such highly political laws (the anti-espionage law also falls into this category) allows the leadership to act just as harshly as before and still call it the rule of law. But this is far from it. Authoritarian rule merely protects itself with tailored laws. Michael Radunski analyzes what this means for the EU and Germany.
Spain will have to deal with China’s foreign policy particularly intensively in the near future. After Covid, Pedro Sanchez hurried to be one of the first heads of government to present himself to Xi again. Now Spain will be taking over the EU council presidency. Does this mean that China will be on the agenda in the EU? Not necessarily, writes Amelie Richter. On the one hand, Prime Minister Sanchez will soon have to face an election. On the other hand, the EU has plans underway that aim for greater independence from China – and even Sanchez will not be able to stop them.
Xi is not only making his mark in legislation and foreign policy, but also in architecture. Today, Johnny Erling writes about the monumental buildings with which the ruler wants to cement his perception of history.
China has passed a new legal basis for its foreign policy. The “Law on Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China” (中华人民共和国对外关系法) aims to strengthen China’s national and economic security. It consists of six chapters, was passed by the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress on Wednesday and will come into force on Saturday.
The law further cements the control of party and state leader Xi Jinping over China’s foreign policy. It gives Xi a legal basis for “countermeasures” against Western threats.
It is China’s first foreign policy law of this magnitude, peppered with many benign-sounding formulations. There is talk of equality and inclusion, fairness, development and world peace, and even universal human rights. And yet an undertone of perceived encirclement, necessary and justified defense shimmers through repeatedly.
Aptly, the state-run newspaper Global Times puts it bluntly. The law is the “legal basis for the diplomatic struggle against sanctions” and a “warning and deterrence against Western hegemony”.
Chapter I outlines the general purposes of the law:
Chapter II details the functions and powers. The central position of Xi Jinping becomes clear here, as President, as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and not least, as General Secretary of the Communist Party. Because Article 5 states: The conduct of foreign relations by the People’s Republic of China is under the centralized and general leadership of the Communist Party of China.
Chapter III covers the aims and mission of foreign relations. It states: The People’s Republic of China shall maintain its external relations in order to uphold its socialist system with Chinese characteristics, safeguard its sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity, and promote its economic and social development.
In Chinese texts, the order is also always important. And so it is striking that even before the international UN system is mentioned, there is a call for implementing China’s Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative. Foreign experts see the Global Security Initiative, in particular, as a long-term challenge to the US-led order.
Again and again, colorful expressions appear, which, however, often have little to do with reality. Just three examples.
Chapter IV covers the system of foreign relations. Articles 32 and 33 contain the objective of the law:
Chapter V (Support for the Conduct of Foreign Relations) and Chapter VI (Supplementary Provision) complete the legislative text.
Essentially, there are no new initiatives listed in this text. It is a list of known initiatives, goals and Chinese formulations. Rather, it is about further consolidating and deepening Xi Jinping’s grip on power.
Whereas it was previously an unwritten agreement, it is now enshrined in law: Not the government, but the party determines China’s foreign policy. And the party, for the foreseeable future, is Xi Jinping. The basis is Xi’s initiatives, Xi’s thoughts and Xi’s goals.
Equally important is the timing. The law comes at a time when Xi Jinping is increasingly asserting China’s power and influence on the international stage, and other nations – most notably the US – are expressing concern and opposition to these ambitions.
Accordingly, the law emphasizes China’s right to take “measures to counter or take restrictive measures against acts that endanger its sovereignty, national security and development interests”. China’s right to pursue its own interests and goals are beyond dispute. The problem with these formulations is the ambiguity of the chosen terminology.
This does not bode well for the already strained relations with China, as Beijing sees its sovereignty, security and development interests threatened by foreign countries on many levels: Be it the Taiwan question, Europe’s trade de-risking strategies or international consultancies in China.
Spain will take over the EU Council presidency from Sweden on July 1. As in the past six months, the Russian aggression against Ukraine will dominate the agenda of the upcoming presidency, keeping an eye on China and its relationship with Moscow.
Madrid’s left-wing government, composed of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and Unidas Podemos, led by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, was initially seen as a facilitator for China and perceived as having a favorable approach towards the country. Sánchez had met with President Xi in March, adopting a cooperative tone. However, this may change during the ongoing EU Council presidency as the Spanish government could undergo a reshuffle at the end of the following month.
Spanish parliamentary elections will be held on July 23. According to recent polls, the conservative People’s Party (PP) is leading with 34.2 percent. Together with the right-wing populist Vox party, it could potentially reach the absolute majority required for forming a government. The center-left PSOE, led by Sánchez, is polling at 26.7 percent. Sánchez will try to motivate his voters to prevent the formation of the first nationwide government involving right-wing populists.
However, PP and Vox have good chances of forming the new government in Madrid, which could also shift the stance on China. Representatives of both parties visited Taiwan in January and expressed support for closer ties with Taipei. The extent to which the relationship with the People’s Republic will become a topic in the ongoing election campaign remains unclear. Traditionally, foreign policy plays a relatively minor role in national parliamentary elections.
Relations between Spain and China have already cooled in recent years, according to Mario Esteban, a researcher for Asia and the Pacific at the Madrid-based think tank Real Elcano Institute. Spanish exports to China nearly doubled between 2011 and 2018 when President Xi visited Madrid, reaching a value of 6.6 billion dollars. However, Chinese investments are no longer as attractive for Spain as they were after the 2008 financial crisis, explains Esteban.
China has found other EU countries, such as Greece and Hungary, which give more support to the Chinese position on issues like the South China Sea disputes and human rights abuses in China, providing them with more backing. Prime Minister Sánchez also refused to sign a memorandum of understanding on Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative during Xi’s visit to Spain in 2018.
This marked the beginning of a “more differentiated and selective” approach by Spain to its relations with China, writes Esteban. “All of this has initiated an era in which Spanish-Chinese relations are increasingly influenced by geopolitical considerations and third parties, especially the EU and the US.” The current Spanish government is also trying to reduce economic dependence on China.
During the Council presidency, Madrid will push forward essential EU agreements aimed at increasing independence from the People’s Republic, regardless of whether it is led by the PP/Vox or the PSOE. This includes the ongoing Mercosur deal, which, if concluded, would boost the EU economy. Spain also aims to strengthen the EU’s political relationships with all Latin American countries, particularly Brazil.
The Latin American country of Chile could also play a role in another EU objective during Spain’s presidency: the Critical Raw Materials Act. Brussels needs critical raw materials such as lithium, cobalt, and rare earths to become climate-neutral by 2050. Currently, the EU relies significantly on China for the supply and processing of these materials, with 98 percent of rare earths coming from the People’s Republic.
The Critical Raw Materials Act proposed in March aims to support domestic extraction, processing, and recycling, as well as diversify the imports of these key materials, including a focus on Chile, which has significant lithium reserves. Spain aims to achieve an agreement within the EU institutions (trilogue) during its EU Council presidency.
Scientific cooperation has shifted into the focus of risk minimization efforts. They will also form an important aspect of Germany’s national China strategy currently in the works. Researchers who work specifically on this topic have also attached a new urgency to the issue. The main reason is the ongoing reassessment of Chinese motives and strategies.
On Thursday, Matthias Stepan from Ruhr University Bochum and Sascha Klotzbucher from Comenius University Bratislava discussed this at the online event “German Research Cooperation: Creating Knowledge for or with China?” at the IfW Kiel. There was a broad consensus that future cooperation should under no circumstances be approached naively – be it in the natural sciences, the humanities or sinology itself. “We also have to examine in each individual case whether the German side is gaining a benefit from the cooperation or merely subsidizing research for China,” said Stepan.
In recent decades, China has also evolved from a developing country to a leading science nation. For this reason, Stepan also highlighted the great importance of China as a location for cooperation, from which Germany can certainly benefit. The prerequisite is the proper framework.
Klotzbucher, however, argued for the utmost caution here. “What is ‘only basic research’ from our point of view, the CP sees as ruling knowledge,” says Klotzbucher. It is a well-known strategy of the Chinese side to offer a partnership for mutual benefit, from which the other side, however, ultimately emerges weakened.
Subtle mechanisms of influence were also discussed. Those who work with a Chinese partner may exclude critical topics out of consideration and thus import the CCP’s restrictions on thought into the German system, Klotzbucher explains. To solve such dilemmas, he suggests cooperations that involve several partners.
However, a better understanding of Chinese tactics currently increases the feeling of being in a bind– there are no simple solutions in sight. Stepan calls for continuing successful cooperations with transparent conditions and clear objectives. New projects should be examined by committees and experts before being signed.
On Thursday, a report in the German business daily Handelsblatt forced its way into the debate on scientific cooperation: The German government wants to banish the Confucius Institutes from Germany, the business paper reports. However, the quotes and arguments by Research Minister Bettina Stark-Watzinger (FDP) and Interior Minister Nancy Faeser (SPD) presented in the article reflect familiar positions.
According to Faeser’s ministry, the Chinese-funded educational institutions are to be “viewed extremely critically”. But instead of a ban, there is talk of “sensitizing” the German universities, which have incorporated the Confucius Institutes.
Stark-Watzinger, who, as an MP for the Free Democratic Party (FDP), tends to be more critical of China, insists on “consequences”, but she too does not speak of disbanding the institutes. Instead, she too talks about “questioning” them. The partner universities should “live up to their responsibility”. In reality, the Federal Minister shies away from giving direct instructions to the universities. She can only do this to a limited extent; after all, universities are the jurisdiction of individual federal states.
Germany currently has 19 Confucius Institutes. They are funded by Beijing but are affiliated with existing universities. The universities of Trier, Hamburg, Frankfurt and Dusseldorf have already parted ways with their Confucius Institutes. Faeser recommends the remaining universities to do the same.
This article is part of the event series Global China Conversations organized by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel). China.Table is the media partner of the event.
Absolutist rulers often see themselves as architects of their nation. They want to shape it and leave lasting memorials of their heritage for posterity. President Xi is no exception. Since the party elected him sole ruler in 2017, he has been on an architectural roll. Xi was recently able to mark the sixth anniversary of the groundbreaking for his mega-future city Xiong’an near Beijing. The “thousand-year project” of a super-modern, complementary high-tech and eco-capital is expected to be completed by 2035. By then, according to Xi’s own plans, the People’s Republic will have risen to become a fully-fledged superpower, 15 years ahead of the original schedule. The eternal party leader hopes to live to see 2035.
The first milestones of his new era pave the way. He had a monumental museum built for the CCP’s 100th anniversary in 2021. Not far from the CCP temple, the new halls and pavilions for Beijing’s first “Academy of Historical Research” 中国历史研究院 were opened in 2019. It aims to recreate China’s “glorious past” so that today’s socialist system can draw directly from it. In his welcoming speech at the opening on 3 January 2019, Xi said: “Today’s China is the continuity and development of historical China.”
To prove this, Beijing has had four museum-like exhibition palaces for collecting, storing and researching cultural heritage hammered into the mountains in all “four directions” in just three years since 2019 – also on Xi’s orders. They are supposed to be archives for the “golden seeds” of China’s cultural and civilizational history and are also called “cultural gene banks”.
The flagship of the four museums is the “China National Archives of Publications and Culture” 中国国家版本馆, built into Beijing’s Yanshan Mountains until July 2022. Three equally opulent branches can be found in Xian 西安分馆文济阁, Hangzhou 杭州分馆文润阁 and Canton 广州分馆文沁阁.
As Xi says, he intends to fuse the party’s previous Marxist ideology with China’s national traditional culture to give Chinese socialism a new unique characteristic. The essence of the old culture is to breathe new life into the party and ideology, to make China systemically attractive worldwide. He now speaks of the “two links” 两个结合.
Mao, who once set out to condemn feudal, reactionary and Confucian culture, who sought to tear down the old China and build a new socialist People’s Republic, would rotate in his grave.
In light of China’s supposedly uninterrupted cultural and civilizational history to this day, which would make it the oldest in the world, Xi is now dreaming of making fresh capital to renew his party. This is a highly political project. The China experts of the British Economist wrote last week: “Xi Jinping reaches into China’s ancient history for a new claim to rule.” This is because the party is stuck in a legitimacy trap. Its previous agreement of promising citizens the prospect of prosperity to achieve conformity and submission is no longer working.
So it was a carefully planned decision for Xi to spend more than two days in early June on a cultural trip inspecting the National Archives in Beijing’s mountains and the newly built history academy and to lay out his plans before cultural officials and researchers.
According to CCP reporters who accompanied Xi, the new cultural archives (foreigners were apparently not yet allowed to visit them) contain exhibits numbering in the millions, including precious collections of oracular writings from ancient times, ancient tomes of historical annals and Confucian classics, bronzes with inscriptions, and even the colorful (red) People’s Republic history of civilization and revolution. Because the culture from ancient times to the present day is of a single mold. During his visit, Xi was overcome with nostalgic memories of his childhood when he came to the section of comic books from the 1950s: Picture books about traditional heroes. He claims that as a boy, he could never get enough of the “books for little people” (小人书).
Xi still knew all the titles, including a 15-volume edition about Song-era patriot soldier Yue Fei, whose mother tattooed four characters about loyalty and fidelity on his back so her son would not forget them. The booklets were “educationally significant and masterfully drawn” 很有教育意义，画小人书的人功夫也深，都是大家.
Xi also knew his way around in the revolutionary novels and movies section. He grew up with books such as “Red Rock, Red Sun”, “Red Flag” (红岩, 红日, 红旗谱). “Such excellent old works and films should be brought out, read and shown again today.”
Ideological education of the youth, usually a constant pursuit of the 70-year-old party leader, was not the actual reason for his visit this time. “I’ve wanted to come here for two years. … Now I’m coming to look around for two and a half days.” The new National Archives “is a project personally approved by me” with the purpose of preserving and protecting classical collections from ancient times “for the world’s only never-interrupted culture” 亲自批准的项目，把世界上唯一没有中断的文明继续传承下去.
He says the party and revolution succeeded because they combined Marxism with China’s realities and created a socialism with Chinese characteristics. The time in its new era of socialism would require a second fusion – with China’s culture and its more than 5000 years old civilization.
The problem is constantly on his mind. For years, he has urged archaeologists and historians to dig for evidence of the more than 5,000 years of history. He even added the issue to the agenda of his Politburo meetings. “If China’s civilization is not 5000 years old, how can we talk about Chinese characteristics? If it doesn’t exist, how could we take a socialist road with Chinese characteristics that we are so successful with today?”
It is imperative to merge Chinese Marxism with Chinese culture: “Marxism and China’s excellent traditional culture come from different sources, but they are very compatible with each other … To combine them is not a simple side-by-side, not a simple physical reaction, but a profound chemical reaction that creates a new organic and unified, cultural living body.” In this way, China’s socialism would last for generations and gain worldwide popularity.
Xi does not say how this is supposed to be achieved. But he has been calling for a return to China’s traditional culture and Confucianism since 2014. He was the first CCP leader to visit Confucius’ homeland of Qufu.
Now he goes even further: “The Chinese nation … is the only civilization in the world that has existed uninterrupted since ancient times. It has formed a unique and profound value concept and civilization system. … Some concepts summarized by Laozi, Confucius, Mencius, Zhuangzi and other philosophers have endured to this day. … If China is not understood by its long historical continuity, it is impossible to understand ancient China, modern China and future China.”
This is how he hopes to re-explain everything: China’s perceived expansive foreign policy is actually a contribution of traditional Chinese wisdom to building a peaceful global community. Says Xi: Even the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative (the new Silk Road) stems from the classical concept of the “Great Community under Heaven“.
Xi’s look into China’s ancient culture and civilization has nothing to do with more opening. In 2019, for instance, the Architectural Design and Research Institute of Tsinghua University (清华大学建筑设计研究院有限公司) won the tender for the new Beijing National Archives by the Central Propaganda Department (中宣部) “after three bidding rounds against top domestic design rivals.”
Foreign companies were not involved and were apparently not invited to other Xi construction projects either. This was once different. The German architect Meinhard von Gerkan (gmp) from Hamburg was able to design the Beijing National Museum, completed in 2011, and other international architects designed Beijing’s National Library, National Theater, the Olympic buildings, and the CCTV television building.
China is once again a world apart. Its leaders intend to keep it that way in their new era.
On the 102nd anniversary of the first National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, interest focuses on the place in Shanghai where the eleven delegates met: in a simple Shikumen courtyard house, which was turned into a museum in 1961. The French Concession police broke up the Communists’ meeting at that time. Today it is a place of pilgrimage and a must-see destination for school trips and tourists.
