When it comes to de-risking, the questions we ask ourselves are always the same: Do we want to leave the development of critical infrastructure to Chinese companies? Do we want to make our digital or green transformation dependent on Chinese companies?
The cleantech risk analysis by the European Council on Foreign Relations, which is available to Christiane Kuehl, is no different. The author trio, headed by German sinologist Janka Oertel, answers this question with a “No, but…“, which means ‘we need it anyway, and the risk would be manageable.’
The study shows, above all, the growing awareness of the problem. Whereas risk analyses used to focus primarily on assessing economic ramifications, questions of security and sovereignty in Germany and Europe are now taking center stage – a practice that has been common in China for decades.
And because the People’s Republic is increasingly perceived as a threat to sovereignty and security, the country’s activities in space are also a source of growing speculation.
At the end of last year, China launched a reusable test spacecraft. It would carry out “scientific experiments” in order to provide “support for the peaceful utilization of space,” state media reported at the time. However, as Joern Petring writes, defense experts are alarmed: The spacecraft could be used to harvest data from the satellites of military rivals. Or disable them outright.
Is China now planning a large-scale attack on Western satellites? The answer is probably no, but… Here, too, perceptions have changed to China’s disadvantage.
Dependencies and de-risking involve risks to the competitiveness of the EU economy, supply chain security in the event of crises and conflicts, as well as risks arising from the products themselves. Cleantech adds another aspect: The risk to climate action resulting from possible political responses to the other three risks.
This is why a precise risk analysis in the cleantech sector is especially urgent, above all for China’s “New Three,” which Beijing is currently turning into export industries:
China already dominates the global solar market with an 80 percent share – in many parts of the supply chain, it is over 90 percent. In the solar sector, an oversupply of Chinese solar modules triggered an unprecedented price collapse in 2023, which still severely impacts the European photovoltaic industry today.
The high market share, in turn, raises concerns about dependencies. Indeed, there is currently no alternative to China when it comes to solar systems. Affordable imports from the People’s Republic are needed for the rapid energy transition that Brussels is striving for: The EU solar strategy aims to increase Europe’s total installed photovoltaic capacity from 263 gigawatts (GW) to almost 600 GW by 2030.
This makes solar energy increasingly important in Europe – as well as China’s significance for the energy mix. According to a recent study on de-risking options for the “New Three,” the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank warns that China could use this dependency as a weapon, increasing the risks to energy security and climate security. “In terms of the wider national security risk, including for cybersecurity, Chinese solar panels pose no greater problem than European modules.” Only the inverters for photovoltaic systems connected to the power grid could pose a certain risk in the future.
A central question in the cleantech risk analysis is: “Do we trust Chinese companies (…) to form the backbone of our green and digital transitions?” The answer to this question of trust is probably a sophisticated “No, but …,” the three ECFR authors, led by German sinologist Janka Oertel, believe, whose study runs through various answers and scenarios.
The ‘but’ roughly stands for ‘we need them anyway, and the risk would be manageable.’ According to the logic of this ‘no, but,’ the EU would presumably take the middle path in de-risking and decide to trust Chinese companies enough to allow them to play a role in less security-relevant areas such as solar modules or currently available EV batteries.
The ECFR authors expect the following strategy for this case: “Instead of trying to completely reshore the solar supply chain to the EU through an expensive subsidy programme, they focus on working with friendly third countries to diversify imports of intermediate inputs and finished solar panels. They also build up a strategic domestic stockpile of solar photovoltaic modules.” Over the next 15 years, the EU could focus on investing in technological innovation and creating several solar production hubs around the world. India, for example, is also rapidly developing a solar industry. However, it, too, is dependent on Chinese upstream products.
The industry itself is also looking for solutions. Since Europe has so far failed to provide generous subsidies for the sector – unlike in the USA – they need alternatives in order to survive. One option that comes close to the middle way outlined by the ECFR would be forming joint ventures with Chinese companies that manufacture in Europe. “The idea is to locate the core technologies of photovoltaics with large production capacities in Europe,” explains Henning Rath, Chief Supply Chain Manager of the solar company Enpal, who recently visited China with Economy Minister Habeck. The company has been in talks with technology partners in China for about a year.
Up to four partners from the EU and China are involved in the plans for each production step – polysilicon, ingots, wafers, cells and modules. According to Rath, the European partners will hold the majority of shares in the respective joint ventures. He did not initially name the companies involved. Such joint ventures would provide more direct access to cutting-edge Chinese solar technology than pure imports – a kind of technology transfer from China to Europe. This means “not only new product technology, but clearly also new production technology,” Rath told Table.Briefings. After all, China dominates the production machinery for the solar industry.
However, rebuilding the European supply chain would be a monumental task, as hardly any manufacturers of preliminary products such as ingots, i.e., silicon ingots, and wafers, the baseplates for solar cells, are left. According to ECFR, Wacker Chemie is the only remaining European company among the world’s five largest polysilicon companies.
This means that the planned joint ventures would not be able to do without subsidies. However, it would only require investment subsidies over a limited period, especially for the costly development of component production, Rath says. Subsidies are less important for producing solar modules due to the high degree of automation. “The Chinese partners are also very open to investing in modules themselves.”
Their partners are already in talks with politicians about potential forms of support. “Now it’s a matter of getting down to business – and getting clear statements from the government about what is welcome and what is not,” says Rath, who is aware that politics has reservations about the involvement of Chinese companies. He says that politicians need to set clear guidelines on where the industry should be in 2040. “So far, there is still no such perspective.” A concrete risk analysis by the EU would be essential for the decisions. The ECFR study has now provided some important pointers.
China’s space agency has just announced another major success. For the first time, the lunar probe “Chang’e-6” was able to retrieve rock samples from the far side of the moon. The news went around the world. In contrast, another mysterious Chinese spacecraft, which has been orbiting Earth for around 200 days, has received almost no attention. Defense experts, however, are alarmed: The space glider is capable of gathering data from the satellites of military rivals. Or to disable them outright.
Late last year, the Xinhua news agency published only a brief report on the spacecraft launch, whose capabilities were largely kept secret. On December 14, a reusable test spacecraft successfully launched from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center with the Long March 2F carrier rocket. It will carry out “scientific experiments” to aid “the peaceful use of space.” Since then, there has been no further official word.
China’s experimental spacecraft has apparently been in test operation since 2020. One thing is clear: The flying object is fully computer-controlled and lands on a runway like an airplane after its mission. Based on the term used in the state media for reusable experimental spacecraft – “Kě-chóngfù shǐyòng shìyàn hángtiān qì” (可重复使用试验航↩↪LoHan_8天器) – it has since become known under the abbreviation CSSHQ.
The Americans are apparently keeping a close eye on the Chinese ship. The Space Force, the space division of the US military, announced in May that the spacecraft had deployed an object in orbit. The agency did not provide any details. Renowned US space expert Jonathan McDowell speculated that the object could be a small satellite.
But even experts do not know the exact details. They have already speculated about the Chinese ship’s first two launches. The first flight in 2020 lasted two days, while the second, launched in 2022, lasted 276 days. Both orbital visits included the deployment of an object. The glider then returned to Earth.
China has not published any pictures or descriptions of the spacecraft. However, experts suspect it is a mini space shuttle operating autonomously without a crew. The ship is seen as China’s attempt to develop capabilities similar to those of the X-37B. The X-37B is an experimental US Air Force spacecraft that has been under development by Boeing since 1999. NASA initially spearheaded the project and later handed it over to the Pentagon.
Since its first flight in 2010, the X-37B has completed six missions, with the longest mission spending over 900 days in orbit. The seventh mission is ongoing. What is striking is that there was a kind of race between the two ships during the last launch.
The X-37B last lifted off on December 28, 2023 – just two weeks after the last Chinese launch. The launch was originally scheduled for December 10, 2023, but was postponed several times due to weather conditions and technical problems. Now, both ships orbit the Earth simultaneously.
Although the Americans are not giving much detail about their spaceship, the Space Force has at least provided pictures and some basic information. The photos show the shuttle-like shape with wings and a tail fin that allows the spacecraft to land like an airplane.
According to the specifications, the American space glider is around nine meters long, three meters tall and has a wingspan of 4.6 meters. The primary task of the X-37B is to test new technologies and carry out various experiments in space. According to the Space Force, this includes tests on the effects of long-term radiation on materials and seeds as well as demonstrations of new technologies for space exploration and satellite maintenance.
The vague description provided by the Space Force reads: “The X-37B continues to push the boundaries of experimentation, enabled by an elite government and industry team behind the scenes.” The Space Force said the ability to conduct experiments in orbit and return them safely to Earth for detailed analysis is a valuable tool for both the Department of Defense and the scientific community.
So, while China speaks purely of “peaceful use,” the USA at least admits that its experimental spacecraft also has military value. Observers see a whole range of potential applications. The two ships could be used for surveillance and reconnaissance.
By using high-resolution cameras and other sensors, they might be able to collect detailed images and data from the Earth’s surface and other countries’ satellites. A small, reusable spacecraft could also be used to maintain or repair its own satellites in orbit. However, this also implies that it could disrupt, damage or destroy enemy satellites.
The cultural events marking the 27th anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover to the People’s Republic of China have met with little response from the city’s citizens. A four-day event in the centrally located Victoria Park registered low visitor numbers.
For the first time since the Covid pandemic, Victoria Park was once again permitted as a venue for the July 1 celebrations. Up to and including 2019, the park had been the scene of protests against Beijing’s growing influence on the city’s politics. However, instead of taking advantage of the events in the city, many residents left the metropolis over the weekend. The immigration authorities reported that more than half a million Hong Kong citizens were crossing the border out of the city on Saturday alone.
Human rights organizations and exiled Hong Kongers lament an atmosphere of fear in the city, which has become even greater since the introduction of Hong Kong’s own security law. Previously, only a Beijing version of the law had been in force since 2020. Critics say the stricter law has once again narrowed the corridor for freedom of expression and freedom of the press.
One example of this was the arrest of a dentist over the weekend. She was the first Hong Kong citizen to be arrested by the authorities for violating Article 23 because she had commemorated the victims of June 4. grz
Kaja Kallas copes well with the stigma of being the “Iron Lady” attached to her. When asked about the comparison that is often drawn between her and former British Prime Minister Maggie Thatcher, she retorts: Wasn’t Thatcher a successful woman? The reply radiates the self-confidence with which Kallas has endorsed herself in the political arena for the post of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs. She was nominated last week.
Even without this office, the liberal head of government of the small country of Estonia is one of the most renowned female politicians in Northern Europe. Like Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen or Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, she represents a new generation of women in politics: smart, urbane and power-conscious. What sets Kallas apart is that she likes to speak her mind – especially when it comes to Russia.
Even before Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, she warned of an invasion and urged more arms deliveries. “Russia is the biggest threat to us Europeans.” At the 2023 Munich Security Conference, she openly pressured German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and called for ammunition supplies for Ukraine across Europe. She not only increased her own country’s defense spending. She called on the other EU states to invest more in their security. She considers the widespread fear of a Russian nuclear strike, especially in Germany, to be absurd: “The aim is intimidation, and that works in some countries.”
Kallas speaks with the newfound self-confidence of the small Nordic countries. Even against the EU heavyweight Germany. “I have the feeling that we have been listened to more in recent years than ever before.” In an interview with Table.Briefings, she explained that people had long had a completely different impression. “The Germans know very little about the 50 years we were occupied. They didn’t miss us, but we missed them! We need to talk about that.”
And she does. And very clearly when she talks to Germans. She repeatedly mentions that people in Estonia have not forgotten Germany’s longstanding Russia policy. The head of government of a country with 1.3 million people wraps up her criticism with a smug smile: “We know how Russia operates and where that can lead.”
Her stance towards Moscow has already put her on Russia’s wanted list. It remains unclear what her alleged crime is. But Putin’s regime stated that she was one of the people “who carry out hostile acts against historical memory and against our country.”
As Estonia’s Prime Minister, she also took a clear and critical stance towards Russia’s ally China. Kallas’ China policy is marked by a mix of strategic caution and an emphasis on European values and security interests. When Beijing imposed a de facto trade embargo against Lithuania in the dispute over a Taiwan office, the Estonian government in Tallinn expressed its outrage. Together with Latvia, the three Baltic States had also left China’s 16+1 platform shortly beforehand.
Kaja Kallas has repeatedly emphasized that she views China’s growing influence in Europe with skepticism. She sees the economic activities of the People’s Republic, such as the New Silk Road, as a potential threat to European sovereignty and security. As early as 2021, she said that Europe must make an even greater effort to respond to the BRI.
In recent years, Kallas’ government has taken measures to screen and regulate Chinese investments in Estonia’s critical infrastructure. Diplomatic tensions arose in October when the Hong Kong freighter Newnew Polar Bear cut a data cable between Estonia and Finland and was suspected of damaging two gas pipelines – whether by accident or intentionally remained unclear. At the time, Kallas warned against jumping to conclusions.
As head of government, Kallas has openly criticized China’s human rights violations, in particular, the oppression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the curtailment of political freedoms in Hong Kong. Kallas reiterated that economic interests should not be placed above fundamental European values. She spoke out in favor of restricting the use of Chinese technology in critical areas, such as the expansion of 5G networks – a sore point for Berlin.
When the lawyer and mother of three became the first woman to head the Estonian government in 2021, she was one of the most popular politicians. However, as popular as she is on the European stage today, her image has suffered at home. An incident involving her husband, who continued to do business with Russia through a logistics company after February 2022, permanently tarnished her reputation.
In the 2023 re-election, Kaja Kallas won a narrow victory with the liberal Reform Party. However, her approval ratings fell rapidly, partly due to rising energy prices and budget cuts that angered Estonians. However, this does not change the fact that her candidacy for a European office is widely supported in Estonia.
And it would probably not be wrong to say that the 47-year-old sees her future in Brussels rather than Tallinn. “Estonia is too small for her,” says Elisabeth Bauer, who has traveled the Nordic countries for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation for a long time: “She is a passionate European.” And one with experience: As a former MEP who sat in the European Parliament from 2014 to 2018, she knows Brussels’s inner workings. Nana Brink/Amelie Richter
Does China have a Jurassic Park? Social media users asked themselves this question last week when a video quickly went viral with millions of views. It shows a village whose residents seemingly managed to breed dinosaurs. As it turned out, the video was filmed to look like a TV report and was made solely with AI. In the end, many viewers were more baffled by the quality of the technology than by the possibility of a real dinosaur village. Others continued to insist that they must be real dinosaurs.
When it comes to de-risking, the questions we ask ourselves are always the same: Do we want to leave the development of critical infrastructure to Chinese companies? Do we want to make our digital or green transformation dependent on Chinese companies?
The cleantech risk analysis by the European Council on Foreign Relations, which is available to Christiane Kuehl, is no different. The author trio, headed by German sinologist Janka Oertel, answers this question with a “No, but…“, which means ‘we need it anyway, and the risk would be manageable.’
The study shows, above all, the growing awareness of the problem. Whereas risk analyses used to focus primarily on assessing economic ramifications, questions of security and sovereignty in Germany and Europe are now taking center stage – a practice that has been common in China for decades.
And because the People’s Republic is increasingly perceived as a threat to sovereignty and security, the country’s activities in space are also a source of growing speculation.
At the end of last year, China launched a reusable test spacecraft. It would carry out “scientific experiments” in order to provide “support for the peaceful utilization of space,” state media reported at the time. However, as Joern Petring writes, defense experts are alarmed: The spacecraft could be used to harvest data from the satellites of military rivals. Or disable them outright.
Is China now planning a large-scale attack on Western satellites? The answer is probably no, but… Here, too, perceptions have changed to China’s disadvantage.
Dependencies and de-risking involve risks to the competitiveness of the EU economy, supply chain security in the event of crises and conflicts, as well as risks arising from the products themselves. Cleantech adds another aspect: The risk to climate action resulting from possible political responses to the other three risks.
This is why a precise risk analysis in the cleantech sector is especially urgent, above all for China’s “New Three,” which Beijing is currently turning into export industries:
China already dominates the global solar market with an 80 percent share – in many parts of the supply chain, it is over 90 percent. In the solar sector, an oversupply of Chinese solar modules triggered an unprecedented price collapse in 2023, which still severely impacts the European photovoltaic industry today.
The high market share, in turn, raises concerns about dependencies. Indeed, there is currently no alternative to China when it comes to solar systems. Affordable imports from the People’s Republic are needed for the rapid energy transition that Brussels is striving for: The EU solar strategy aims to increase Europe’s total installed photovoltaic capacity from 263 gigawatts (GW) to almost 600 GW by 2030.
This makes solar energy increasingly important in Europe – as well as China’s significance for the energy mix. According to a recent study on de-risking options for the “New Three,” the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank warns that China could use this dependency as a weapon, increasing the risks to energy security and climate security. “In terms of the wider national security risk, including for cybersecurity, Chinese solar panels pose no greater problem than European modules.” Only the inverters for photovoltaic systems connected to the power grid could pose a certain risk in the future.
A central question in the cleantech risk analysis is: “Do we trust Chinese companies (…) to form the backbone of our green and digital transitions?” The answer to this question of trust is probably a sophisticated “No, but …,” the three ECFR authors, led by German sinologist Janka Oertel, believe, whose study runs through various answers and scenarios.
The ‘but’ roughly stands for ‘we need them anyway, and the risk would be manageable.’ According to the logic of this ‘no, but,’ the EU would presumably take the middle path in de-risking and decide to trust Chinese companies enough to allow them to play a role in less security-relevant areas such as solar modules or currently available EV batteries.
The ECFR authors expect the following strategy for this case: “Instead of trying to completely reshore the solar supply chain to the EU through an expensive subsidy programme, they focus on working with friendly third countries to diversify imports of intermediate inputs and finished solar panels. They also build up a strategic domestic stockpile of solar photovoltaic modules.” Over the next 15 years, the EU could focus on investing in technological innovation and creating several solar production hubs around the world. India, for example, is also rapidly developing a solar industry. However, it, too, is dependent on Chinese upstream products.
The industry itself is also looking for solutions. Since Europe has so far failed to provide generous subsidies for the sector – unlike in the USA – they need alternatives in order to survive. One option that comes close to the middle way outlined by the ECFR would be forming joint ventures with Chinese companies that manufacture in Europe. “The idea is to locate the core technologies of photovoltaics with large production capacities in Europe,” explains Henning Rath, Chief Supply Chain Manager of the solar company Enpal, who recently visited China with Economy Minister Habeck. The company has been in talks with technology partners in China for about a year.
Up to four partners from the EU and China are involved in the plans for each production step – polysilicon, ingots, wafers, cells and modules. According to Rath, the European partners will hold the majority of shares in the respective joint ventures. He did not initially name the companies involved. Such joint ventures would provide more direct access to cutting-edge Chinese solar technology than pure imports – a kind of technology transfer from China to Europe. This means “not only new product technology, but clearly also new production technology,” Rath told Table.Briefings. After all, China dominates the production machinery for the solar industry.
However, rebuilding the European supply chain would be a monumental task, as hardly any manufacturers of preliminary products such as ingots, i.e., silicon ingots, and wafers, the baseplates for solar cells, are left. According to ECFR, Wacker Chemie is the only remaining European company among the world’s five largest polysilicon companies.
This means that the planned joint ventures would not be able to do without subsidies. However, it would only require investment subsidies over a limited period, especially for the costly development of component production, Rath says. Subsidies are less important for producing solar modules due to the high degree of automation. “The Chinese partners are also very open to investing in modules themselves.”
Their partners are already in talks with politicians about potential forms of support. “Now it’s a matter of getting down to business – and getting clear statements from the government about what is welcome and what is not,” says Rath, who is aware that politics has reservations about the involvement of Chinese companies. He says that politicians need to set clear guidelines on where the industry should be in 2040. “So far, there is still no such perspective.” A concrete risk analysis by the EU would be essential for the decisions. The ECFR study has now provided some important pointers.
China’s space agency has just announced another major success. For the first time, the lunar probe “Chang’e-6” was able to retrieve rock samples from the far side of the moon. The news went around the world. In contrast, another mysterious Chinese spacecraft, which has been orbiting Earth for around 200 days, has received almost no attention. Defense experts, however, are alarmed: The space glider is capable of gathering data from the satellites of military rivals. Or to disable them outright.
Late last year, the Xinhua news agency published only a brief report on the spacecraft launch, whose capabilities were largely kept secret. On December 14, a reusable test spacecraft successfully launched from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center with the Long March 2F carrier rocket. It will carry out “scientific experiments” to aid “the peaceful use of space.” Since then, there has been no further official word.
China’s experimental spacecraft has apparently been in test operation since 2020. One thing is clear: The flying object is fully computer-controlled and lands on a runway like an airplane after its mission. Based on the term used in the state media for reusable experimental spacecraft – “Kě-chóngfù shǐyòng shìyàn hángtiān qì” (可重复使用试验航↩↪LoHan_8天器) – it has since become known under the abbreviation CSSHQ.
The Americans are apparently keeping a close eye on the Chinese ship. The Space Force, the space division of the US military, announced in May that the spacecraft had deployed an object in orbit. The agency did not provide any details. Renowned US space expert Jonathan McDowell speculated that the object could be a small satellite.
But even experts do not know the exact details. They have already speculated about the Chinese ship’s first two launches. The first flight in 2020 lasted two days, while the second, launched in 2022, lasted 276 days. Both orbital visits included the deployment of an object. The glider then returned to Earth.
China has not published any pictures or descriptions of the spacecraft. However, experts suspect it is a mini space shuttle operating autonomously without a crew. The ship is seen as China’s attempt to develop capabilities similar to those of the X-37B. The X-37B is an experimental US Air Force spacecraft that has been under development by Boeing since 1999. NASA initially spearheaded the project and later handed it over to the Pentagon.
Since its first flight in 2010, the X-37B has completed six missions, with the longest mission spending over 900 days in orbit. The seventh mission is ongoing. What is striking is that there was a kind of race between the two ships during the last launch.
The X-37B last lifted off on December 28, 2023 – just two weeks after the last Chinese launch. The launch was originally scheduled for December 10, 2023, but was postponed several times due to weather conditions and technical problems. Now, both ships orbit the Earth simultaneously.
Although the Americans are not giving much detail about their spaceship, the Space Force has at least provided pictures and some basic information. The photos show the shuttle-like shape with wings and a tail fin that allows the spacecraft to land like an airplane.
According to the specifications, the American space glider is around nine meters long, three meters tall and has a wingspan of 4.6 meters. The primary task of the X-37B is to test new technologies and carry out various experiments in space. According to the Space Force, this includes tests on the effects of long-term radiation on materials and seeds as well as demonstrations of new technologies for space exploration and satellite maintenance.
The vague description provided by the Space Force reads: “The X-37B continues to push the boundaries of experimentation, enabled by an elite government and industry team behind the scenes.” The Space Force said the ability to conduct experiments in orbit and return them safely to Earth for detailed analysis is a valuable tool for both the Department of Defense and the scientific community.
So, while China speaks purely of “peaceful use,” the USA at least admits that its experimental spacecraft also has military value. Observers see a whole range of potential applications. The two ships could be used for surveillance and reconnaissance.
By using high-resolution cameras and other sensors, they might be able to collect detailed images and data from the Earth’s surface and other countries’ satellites. A small, reusable spacecraft could also be used to maintain or repair its own satellites in orbit. However, this also implies that it could disrupt, damage or destroy enemy satellites.
The cultural events marking the 27th anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover to the People’s Republic of China have met with little response from the city’s citizens. A four-day event in the centrally located Victoria Park registered low visitor numbers.
For the first time since the Covid pandemic, Victoria Park was once again permitted as a venue for the July 1 celebrations. Up to and including 2019, the park had been the scene of protests against Beijing’s growing influence on the city’s politics. However, instead of taking advantage of the events in the city, many residents left the metropolis over the weekend. The immigration authorities reported that more than half a million Hong Kong citizens were crossing the border out of the city on Saturday alone.
Human rights organizations and exiled Hong Kongers lament an atmosphere of fear in the city, which has become even greater since the introduction of Hong Kong’s own security law. Previously, only a Beijing version of the law had been in force since 2020. Critics say the stricter law has once again narrowed the corridor for freedom of expression and freedom of the press.
One example of this was the arrest of a dentist over the weekend. She was the first Hong Kong citizen to be arrested by the authorities for violating Article 23 because she had commemorated the victims of June 4. grz
Kaja Kallas copes well with the stigma of being the “Iron Lady” attached to her. When asked about the comparison that is often drawn between her and former British Prime Minister Maggie Thatcher, she retorts: Wasn’t Thatcher a successful woman? The reply radiates the self-confidence with which Kallas has endorsed herself in the political arena for the post of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs. She was nominated last week.
Even without this office, the liberal head of government of the small country of Estonia is one of the most renowned female politicians in Northern Europe. Like Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen or Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, she represents a new generation of women in politics: smart, urbane and power-conscious. What sets Kallas apart is that she likes to speak her mind – especially when it comes to Russia.
Even before Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, she warned of an invasion and urged more arms deliveries. “Russia is the biggest threat to us Europeans.” At the 2023 Munich Security Conference, she openly pressured German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and called for ammunition supplies for Ukraine across Europe. She not only increased her own country’s defense spending. She called on the other EU states to invest more in their security. She considers the widespread fear of a Russian nuclear strike, especially in Germany, to be absurd: “The aim is intimidation, and that works in some countries.”
Kallas speaks with the newfound self-confidence of the small Nordic countries. Even against the EU heavyweight Germany. “I have the feeling that we have been listened to more in recent years than ever before.” In an interview with Table.Briefings, she explained that people had long had a completely different impression. “The Germans know very little about the 50 years we were occupied. They didn’t miss us, but we missed them! We need to talk about that.”
And she does. And very clearly when she talks to Germans. She repeatedly mentions that people in Estonia have not forgotten Germany’s longstanding Russia policy. The head of government of a country with 1.3 million people wraps up her criticism with a smug smile: “We know how Russia operates and where that can lead.”
Her stance towards Moscow has already put her on Russia’s wanted list. It remains unclear what her alleged crime is. But Putin’s regime stated that she was one of the people “who carry out hostile acts against historical memory and against our country.”
As Estonia’s Prime Minister, she also took a clear and critical stance towards Russia’s ally China. Kallas’ China policy is marked by a mix of strategic caution and an emphasis on European values and security interests. When Beijing imposed a de facto trade embargo against Lithuania in the dispute over a Taiwan office, the Estonian government in Tallinn expressed its outrage. Together with Latvia, the three Baltic States had also left China’s 16+1 platform shortly beforehand.
Kaja Kallas has repeatedly emphasized that she views China’s growing influence in Europe with skepticism. She sees the economic activities of the People’s Republic, such as the New Silk Road, as a potential threat to European sovereignty and security. As early as 2021, she said that Europe must make an even greater effort to respond to the BRI.
In recent years, Kallas’ government has taken measures to screen and regulate Chinese investments in Estonia’s critical infrastructure. Diplomatic tensions arose in October when the Hong Kong freighter Newnew Polar Bear cut a data cable between Estonia and Finland and was suspected of damaging two gas pipelines – whether by accident or intentionally remained unclear. At the time, Kallas warned against jumping to conclusions.
As head of government, Kallas has openly criticized China’s human rights violations, in particular, the oppression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the curtailment of political freedoms in Hong Kong. Kallas reiterated that economic interests should not be placed above fundamental European values. She spoke out in favor of restricting the use of Chinese technology in critical areas, such as the expansion of 5G networks – a sore point for Berlin.
When the lawyer and mother of three became the first woman to head the Estonian government in 2021, she was one of the most popular politicians. However, as popular as she is on the European stage today, her image has suffered at home. An incident involving her husband, who continued to do business with Russia through a logistics company after February 2022, permanently tarnished her reputation.
In the 2023 re-election, Kaja Kallas won a narrow victory with the liberal Reform Party. However, her approval ratings fell rapidly, partly due to rising energy prices and budget cuts that angered Estonians. However, this does not change the fact that her candidacy for a European office is widely supported in Estonia.
And it would probably not be wrong to say that the 47-year-old sees her future in Brussels rather than Tallinn. “Estonia is too small for her,” says Elisabeth Bauer, who has traveled the Nordic countries for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation for a long time: “She is a passionate European.” And one with experience: As a former MEP who sat in the European Parliament from 2014 to 2018, she knows Brussels’s inner workings. Nana Brink/Amelie Richter
Does China have a Jurassic Park? Social media users asked themselves this question last week when a video quickly went viral with millions of views. It shows a village whose residents seemingly managed to breed dinosaurs. As it turned out, the video was filmed to look like a TV report and was made solely with AI. In the end, many viewers were more baffled by the quality of the technology than by the possibility of a real dinosaur village. Others continued to insist that they must be real dinosaurs.
