Being able to move in a market with legal certainty is essential for companies and investors. This applies to domestic markets and is even more important when it comes to commitments in countries with a high degree of political influence on the market.
For some time now, Beijing has been establishing a so-called Social Credit System that makes the behavior of companies the subject of public evaluation. Nico Beckert asked academics about the dangers of this regulatory instrument for foreign companies and affected companies about their experiences. And although the instrument itself is still in its formative stages, it is already becoming clear that anyone who wants to do business in China must deal with the regulations at an early stage.
The abrupt cancellation of the IPO of Alibaba’s financial subsidiary has been the subject of much speculation since last year. While at first, it seemed to be about questions of financial market regulation and also the curtailing of the influence of a politically disliked company boss Ma, there are now increasing indications that the Chinese government also wants to access the group’s media holdings. Joern Petring and Gregor Koppenburg analyze the background.
Adidas is accused of violating fire safety regulations and blocking escape routes and safety exits. A BMW subsidiary allegedly used terms such as “national”, “highest”, and “best” in its advertising, violating China’s advertising law, according to the Beijing Municipal Administration of Industry and Commerce. And a subsidiary of SAP is alleged to have violated China’s Work Safety Law. These allegations come from one of China’s Social Credit System databases. It does not list many violations by German companies, and the number of positive reports far exceeds the number of alleged violations. And yet: The Social Credit System is a sensitive issue.
With the social credit system, China is currently building a regulatory system that is fundamentally different from Western law enforcement mechanisms. It is based on the publication of misconduct and aims to encourage compliance with rules and laws through public exposure. “Although foreign companies have had to abide by legal rules in the past, the system with its public exposure mechanisms increases the risks that misconduct without intent can pose,” says sinologist Doris Fischer, who is leading a research project on the social credit system. In addition to reputational risks, the system includes sanctions for more severe offenses. In addition to regulation, the system serves to collect data “that enables an assessment of the creditworthiness and trustworthiness of small companies in particular,” Fischer says.
The social credit system is set to become a defining feature of Beijing’s data-driven governance in the coming decades, according to a recent analysis by Merics. But the system is not primarily intended to monitor individual behavior, according to Merics. There are plenty of other systems for that, he says.
So far, the Social Credit System is very fragmented. According to Merics, it is currently being tested in 28 model cities. There are also black and red lists on which companies appear that have either been proven to have committed grave breaches of the rules (black) or have behaved in a particularly compliant manner (red).
The German Chamber of Commerce in China sees the Social Credit System as a “regulatory challenge“. It leads to new “administrative and bureaucratic hurdles”. According to an AHK survey of German companies, 40 percent of 408 firms have set up internal management and monitoring systems within the last 12 months to keep track of Social Credit System databases and “ensure that only correct company information is displayed in public”.
The Social Credit System does not follow uniform standards, according to Merics analysts. At the local level, the system is implemented very differently, and there is a “wide scope for local decision-making”, which offers opportunities “for personal influence and abuse of power“.
A total of 47 institutions are involved in the implementation and design of the social credit system: From financial regulators to food safety and environmental protection supervisors, to pandemic prevention officials. The State Council, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the Central Bank of China have leadership roles in the design. Local decision-making is also taking place: At the end of last year, the State Council stated that local authorities have the power to formulate supplementary regulations.
In its current form, the system is a “regulatory jungle“, according to Merics analysts. Thousands of regulatory documents are scattered across the websites of ministries and provincial and local governments. There is a lack of uniform standards.
Moreover, the system in its current form seems hardly predictable. What leads to blacklisting in one city results in less severe punishments in others, Merics says. In some cities, he said, failing to pay a small fine is enough to get blacklisted, which includes companies that have failed to repay loans worth millions. “Many categories of regulatory violations and encouraged behavior are murky,” Merics analysts write.
Business representatives and academics, however, also name positive consequences of the Social Credit System. The system is “geared towards Chinese private companies, as they often go ‘sideways’ with local authorities or obfuscate the true state of their company,” says Jörg Wuttke, President of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China. The social credit system is expected to bring “more transparency in the business environment about the situation with competitors, suppliers, and customers”. The system allows an additional assessment of business partners, says Wuttke. Doris Fischer reports of service providers who “compile company data from the Social Credit System in a way that is suitable for customers”. However, this cannot replace trusting relationships and due diligence.
Another business representative says that the system will have more of an impact on the “less regulated Chinese business environment”. One regularly hears “from the government that you as a foreign company are acting in accordance with the rules” and that you hardly need to worry. Fischer adds: For international companies, the Social Credit System “proves to be an advantage in that they tend to perform better than Chinese companies in terms of compliance with rules“.
Even in its current fragmented state, the system has sporadic positive effects, according to a business voice from Beijing. As a company that complies with the rules, it receives faster clearance at customs and in financial matters.
According to the AHK, the social credit system is “very relevant for the future engagement of German business in China“. The system transforms control mechanisms of the market and the legal system into “an unprecedented meta-system”. According to the AHK, this could also have positive consequences by increasing confidence in the day-to-day business of companies. However, this will only work if the transparency of the system is increased, i.e., if it becomes clear how ratings are arrived at and what consequences certain ratings entail. If transparency is not increased, a business representative from Beijing fears that “a second punishment mechanism would be built up” alongside the legal system, which “could be used by the Chinese state or competitors to exert influence”. Likewise, the fear is expressed that ratings of suppliers could also be included in the evaluation of German companies, should the system be implemented in the future as it was once conceived.
Some of the DAX companies surveyed with a presence in China are very cautious, if at all, about the social credit system. The tenor: They are waiting to see how the system is developed further and hope for a constructive dialogue with politicians and more transparency.
Beijing is aware of the lack of uniform standards of the Social Credit System. The authorities have announced a Social Credit Law to unify standards. But legislative progress is slow, according to Merics analysts: “It will take years to improve legal certainty and transparency“. At the same time, Merics expects the responsible authorities to increase the scope of the social credit system “based on new policy priorities”. Accordingly, foreign companies will have to deal with an unclear but growing social credit system for some years to come.
China means to rush from victory to victory. So China’s rise does not seem far off. It has weathered the coronavirus pandemic better than the West and seamlessly picked up the old growth momentum. Last year, it signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest free trade area, with neighbors in the region and the controversial CAI agreement with the EU. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China is consistently spreading its influence into Europe.
Beijing has worked its way to the forefront of new technologies. It is investing ever greater sums in its military apparatus and increasingly using that power to advance its interests. Nations that oppose China are severely punished through economic sanctions and other measures. Australia and Canada are just the latest examples.
The notion that China is emerging as the leading power of the 21st century, while the West is past its prime, is gaining more and more adherents. President Xi is on a mission to bring about the “great renewal of the Chinese nation” and believes that history favors him. The Beijing government and its media are vigorously promoting the narrative of China’s inevitable rise because the more it is believed, the more likely it is to become reality.
Is China’s rise as unstoppable as it seems, or is this narrative an expression of Chinese hubris? Doesn’t it underplay undeniable weaknesses in the Chinese system? Are we naïve if we believe China?
In order to calibrate our China policy correctly, it is necessary to recognize and correctly assess the light and the shade. Otherwise, there is a danger that we will either fall into unnecessary alarmism or fail to face the Chinese challenge with sufficient competence and commitment.
In the past decade, a mixed situation has arisen in China that is quite explosive and to which the government is paying the utmost attention.
In foreign policy terms, China has become increasingly lonely. According to the latest survey by the Pew Research Center, China’s reputation has suffered considerably worldwide in recent years. The “democratic West” is preparing to devise joint strategies to counter the Chinese challenge. This will limit China’s room for maneuver in the world. In view of China’s geopolitical claims, there are increasingly loud warnings of the outbreak of military conflicts.
Insights into domestic political conditions are by their nature very limited, but widespread dissatisfaction with the government’s rigid course is repeatedly pointed out. The abolition of presidential term limits has not only surprised foreign countries. The consistent subordination of all sectors of society by the Chinese Communist Party takes back previously existing freedoms, and the harsh campaigns against enemies of the political leadership provoke resistance.
There is rampant overcapacity in key sectors of the economy. In the steel industry, capacities of 1.2 billion tons per year have been built up against an estimated sustainable demand of 400 million tons. Other sectors of the Chinese economy are also suffering from overcapacity. At the same time, debt across all sectors has risen to more than 300 percent of gross national product, prompting the IMF to warn of significant dislocation. The word “red Ponzi” is doing the rounds.
The real estate market, which directly and indirectly accounts for 30 percent of GNP, has been called the largest bubble in history. More than 100 million housing units are said to be vacant – housing for at least 300 million people of a rapidly shrinking population.
The demographic development poses another enormous challenge. The population is no longer growing. While 70 percent of the population was still of working age in 2010, this figure will fall to 54 percent by 2050. One working Chinese will then have to care for one “dependent” – in 2010, there were still two working people. The proportion of people over 60 will have tripled by 2050 to more than 30 percent of the population. China runs the risk of being old before it becomes rich.
To be sure, the government has so far demonstrated a high capacity to tackle upcoming problems, and it would be a mistake to underestimate China. However, China’s inevitable rise to the top of the world is fraught with significant question marks, and we need not be blinded by the ever-changing success headlines. Indeed, historically there are few countries that have managed to escape the “middle income trap”, and whether China will be one of them remains to be seen (China.Table reported).
The vision of China as the new power of the 21st century may sound forward-looking. It is certain that we take China seriously as a competitor and systemic rival and that we will have to confront it with increased competence and attention in the future. At the same time, however, our encounters with the country give us every reason for good courage and self-confidence. Despite all the criticism, it is the societies of the Western community of values that have produced the unique civilizational achievements of modern times. It will not be easy for today’s China to establish itself as a suitable alternative.
Dr. Gerhard Hinterhaeuser is a partner at the management consulting firm Bingmann Pflüger International. He lives in Asia and Germany and was a member of the management board of the state-owned company PICC Asset Management Co. Ltd. in Shanghai from 2006 to 2014.
For more than 30 years, the Goethe-Institut has enriched cultural life in Beijing and other Chinese cities. In 2015, in addition to the main building, it opened a versatile cultural venue for performance and theatre performances, exhibitions, and film evenings in Beijing’s art district 798, of which the institute’s director Dr. Clemens Treter is audibly proud. “We show experimental but also thematic works on contemporary issues,” says the 49-year-old. “Through the cultural agreement, we enjoy a certain protection and are independent of an approval process in our own spaces. So we have more freedom than the rest of the cultural scene in China, and it gives local artists the opportunity to show their work away from commercial and political pressures.”
Since 2016, the sinologist has headed the Goethe-Institut in China. He was already interested in cultures, film, and languages during his Abitur and civilian service. The book “China and the Hope for Happiness” by Wolfgang Bauer made a lasting impression on him so that he studied with the renowned China expert in Munich. There he also met his wife, who comes from Nanjing and was in Germany to study.
After professional positions at the university and at a consulting firm, Clemens Treter started at the Goethe-Institut at the end of 2004. “For me, my work is an interesting combination of cultural issues and practical implementation,” he says. From 2005 to 2010, he had been at the Goethe-Institut in Beijing as deputy director and had returned there after assignments in Munich and Taipei. Even during the pandemic, he stayed in the metropolis with his wife and two children. Christmas 2019 was Clemens Treter’s last time in Germany.
The pandemic also means a digitalization boost for the Goethe-Institut in China. “Our German courses still run online,” explains Clemens Treter. Even if face-to-face courses are possible again, this option will be retained, he is convinced. It has also proven its worth in cultural exchange.
A good 80 percent of the learners are students who need German for their professional careers. “But there is also another group of people who want to learn a second or third foreign language,” knows Clemens Treter. In its language work, too, the Goethe-Institut is concerned with conveying a contemporary image of Germany.
Management positions at the Goethe-Institut are usually awarded for four to six years. “That’s also important,” says Clemens Treter. “Because everyone brings back new impulses when it comes to cultural work.” Clemens Treter doesn’t yet know what will come after Beijing. But he would definitely like to stay at the Goethe-Institut, even if that would mean saying goodbye to China. Judith Jenner
Xie Xiaozhen, a 76-year-old US Chinese grandmother who fought off a racist attack, is being celebrated online for her courage – and is donating money raised for her to the US Asian community to fund anti-racism projects.
According to media reports, Xie was attacked by a man in San Francisco last week. The 76-year-old defended herself and hit the attacker with a wooden stick. According to the report, the man had called Xie racist names before the attack. Xie suffered injuries to her face. A video that went viral on social media showed the woman wearing an ice pack to cool her injuries shortly after the attack.
Xie’s family raised money to pay for her medical treatment – but the GoFundMe campaign has seen so much support that it has now raised almost US$1 million. The family explained that the money would be donated to the US Asian community to fight racism on the campaign’s homepage. The 76-year-old is now feeling better: “She is now optimistic again and in a better mood. She said we must not give in to racism,” Xie’s grandson wrote.
Being able to move in a market with legal certainty is essential for companies and investors. This applies to domestic markets and is even more important when it comes to commitments in countries with a high degree of political influence on the market.
For some time now, Beijing has been establishing a so-called Social Credit System that makes the behavior of companies the subject of public evaluation. Nico Beckert asked academics about the dangers of this regulatory instrument for foreign companies and affected companies about their experiences. And although the instrument itself is still in its formative stages, it is already becoming clear that anyone who wants to do business in China must deal with the regulations at an early stage.
The abrupt cancellation of the IPO of Alibaba’s financial subsidiary has been the subject of much speculation since last year. While at first, it seemed to be about questions of financial market regulation and also the curtailing of the influence of a politically disliked company boss Ma, there are now increasing indications that the Chinese government also wants to access the group’s media holdings. Joern Petring and Gregor Koppenburg analyze the background.
Adidas is accused of violating fire safety regulations and blocking escape routes and safety exits. A BMW subsidiary allegedly used terms such as “national”, “highest”, and “best” in its advertising, violating China’s advertising law, according to the Beijing Municipal Administration of Industry and Commerce. And a subsidiary of SAP is alleged to have violated China’s Work Safety Law. These allegations come from one of China’s Social Credit System databases. It does not list many violations by German companies, and the number of positive reports far exceeds the number of alleged violations. And yet: The Social Credit System is a sensitive issue.
With the social credit system, China is currently building a regulatory system that is fundamentally different from Western law enforcement mechanisms. It is based on the publication of misconduct and aims to encourage compliance with rules and laws through public exposure. “Although foreign companies have had to abide by legal rules in the past, the system with its public exposure mechanisms increases the risks that misconduct without intent can pose,” says sinologist Doris Fischer, who is leading a research project on the social credit system. In addition to reputational risks, the system includes sanctions for more severe offenses. In addition to regulation, the system serves to collect data “that enables an assessment of the creditworthiness and trustworthiness of small companies in particular,” Fischer says.
The social credit system is set to become a defining feature of Beijing’s data-driven governance in the coming decades, according to a recent analysis by Merics. But the system is not primarily intended to monitor individual behavior, according to Merics. There are plenty of other systems for that, he says.
So far, the Social Credit System is very fragmented. According to Merics, it is currently being tested in 28 model cities. There are also black and red lists on which companies appear that have either been proven to have committed grave breaches of the rules (black) or have behaved in a particularly compliant manner (red).
The German Chamber of Commerce in China sees the Social Credit System as a “regulatory challenge“. It leads to new “administrative and bureaucratic hurdles”. According to an AHK survey of German companies, 40 percent of 408 firms have set up internal management and monitoring systems within the last 12 months to keep track of Social Credit System databases and “ensure that only correct company information is displayed in public”.
The Social Credit System does not follow uniform standards, according to Merics analysts. At the local level, the system is implemented very differently, and there is a “wide scope for local decision-making”, which offers opportunities “for personal influence and abuse of power“.
A total of 47 institutions are involved in the implementation and design of the social credit system: From financial regulators to food safety and environmental protection supervisors, to pandemic prevention officials. The State Council, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the Central Bank of China have leadership roles in the design. Local decision-making is also taking place: At the end of last year, the State Council stated that local authorities have the power to formulate supplementary regulations.
In its current form, the system is a “regulatory jungle“, according to Merics analysts. Thousands of regulatory documents are scattered across the websites of ministries and provincial and local governments. There is a lack of uniform standards.
Moreover, the system in its current form seems hardly predictable. What leads to blacklisting in one city results in less severe punishments in others, Merics says. In some cities, he said, failing to pay a small fine is enough to get blacklisted, which includes companies that have failed to repay loans worth millions. “Many categories of regulatory violations and encouraged behavior are murky,” Merics analysts write.
Business representatives and academics, however, also name positive consequences of the Social Credit System. The system is “geared towards Chinese private companies, as they often go ‘sideways’ with local authorities or obfuscate the true state of their company,” says Jörg Wuttke, President of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China. The social credit system is expected to bring “more transparency in the business environment about the situation with competitors, suppliers, and customers”. The system allows an additional assessment of business partners, says Wuttke. Doris Fischer reports of service providers who “compile company data from the Social Credit System in a way that is suitable for customers”. However, this cannot replace trusting relationships and due diligence.
Another business representative says that the system will have more of an impact on the “less regulated Chinese business environment”. One regularly hears “from the government that you as a foreign company are acting in accordance with the rules” and that you hardly need to worry. Fischer adds: For international companies, the Social Credit System “proves to be an advantage in that they tend to perform better than Chinese companies in terms of compliance with rules“.
Even in its current fragmented state, the system has sporadic positive effects, according to a business voice from Beijing. As a company that complies with the rules, it receives faster clearance at customs and in financial matters.
According to the AHK, the social credit system is “very relevant for the future engagement of German business in China“. The system transforms control mechanisms of the market and the legal system into “an unprecedented meta-system”. According to the AHK, this could also have positive consequences by increasing confidence in the day-to-day business of companies. However, this will only work if the transparency of the system is increased, i.e., if it becomes clear how ratings are arrived at and what consequences certain ratings entail. If transparency is not increased, a business representative from Beijing fears that “a second punishment mechanism would be built up” alongside the legal system, which “could be used by the Chinese state or competitors to exert influence”. Likewise, the fear is expressed that ratings of suppliers could also be included in the evaluation of German companies, should the system be implemented in the future as it was once conceived.
Some of the DAX companies surveyed with a presence in China are very cautious, if at all, about the social credit system. The tenor: They are waiting to see how the system is developed further and hope for a constructive dialogue with politicians and more transparency.
Beijing is aware of the lack of uniform standards of the Social Credit System. The authorities have announced a Social Credit Law to unify standards. But legislative progress is slow, according to Merics analysts: “It will take years to improve legal certainty and transparency“. At the same time, Merics expects the responsible authorities to increase the scope of the social credit system “based on new policy priorities”. Accordingly, foreign companies will have to deal with an unclear but growing social credit system for some years to come.
China means to rush from victory to victory. So China’s rise does not seem far off. It has weathered the coronavirus pandemic better than the West and seamlessly picked up the old growth momentum. Last year, it signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest free trade area, with neighbors in the region and the controversial CAI agreement with the EU. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China is consistently spreading its influence into Europe.
Beijing has worked its way to the forefront of new technologies. It is investing ever greater sums in its military apparatus and increasingly using that power to advance its interests. Nations that oppose China are severely punished through economic sanctions and other measures. Australia and Canada are just the latest examples.
The notion that China is emerging as the leading power of the 21st century, while the West is past its prime, is gaining more and more adherents. President Xi is on a mission to bring about the “great renewal of the Chinese nation” and believes that history favors him. The Beijing government and its media are vigorously promoting the narrative of China’s inevitable rise because the more it is believed, the more likely it is to become reality.
Is China’s rise as unstoppable as it seems, or is this narrative an expression of Chinese hubris? Doesn’t it underplay undeniable weaknesses in the Chinese system? Are we naïve if we believe China?
In order to calibrate our China policy correctly, it is necessary to recognize and correctly assess the light and the shade. Otherwise, there is a danger that we will either fall into unnecessary alarmism or fail to face the Chinese challenge with sufficient competence and commitment.
In the past decade, a mixed situation has arisen in China that is quite explosive and to which the government is paying the utmost attention.
In foreign policy terms, China has become increasingly lonely. According to the latest survey by the Pew Research Center, China’s reputation has suffered considerably worldwide in recent years. The “democratic West” is preparing to devise joint strategies to counter the Chinese challenge. This will limit China’s room for maneuver in the world. In view of China’s geopolitical claims, there are increasingly loud warnings of the outbreak of military conflicts.
Insights into domestic political conditions are by their nature very limited, but widespread dissatisfaction with the government’s rigid course is repeatedly pointed out. The abolition of presidential term limits has not only surprised foreign countries. The consistent subordination of all sectors of society by the Chinese Communist Party takes back previously existing freedoms, and the harsh campaigns against enemies of the political leadership provoke resistance.
There is rampant overcapacity in key sectors of the economy. In the steel industry, capacities of 1.2 billion tons per year have been built up against an estimated sustainable demand of 400 million tons. Other sectors of the Chinese economy are also suffering from overcapacity. At the same time, debt across all sectors has risen to more than 300 percent of gross national product, prompting the IMF to warn of significant dislocation. The word “red Ponzi” is doing the rounds.
The real estate market, which directly and indirectly accounts for 30 percent of GNP, has been called the largest bubble in history. More than 100 million housing units are said to be vacant – housing for at least 300 million people of a rapidly shrinking population.
The demographic development poses another enormous challenge. The population is no longer growing. While 70 percent of the population was still of working age in 2010, this figure will fall to 54 percent by 2050. One working Chinese will then have to care for one “dependent” – in 2010, there were still two working people. The proportion of people over 60 will have tripled by 2050 to more than 30 percent of the population. China runs the risk of being old before it becomes rich.
To be sure, the government has so far demonstrated a high capacity to tackle upcoming problems, and it would be a mistake to underestimate China. However, China’s inevitable rise to the top of the world is fraught with significant question marks, and we need not be blinded by the ever-changing success headlines. Indeed, historically there are few countries that have managed to escape the “middle income trap”, and whether China will be one of them remains to be seen (China.Table reported).
The vision of China as the new power of the 21st century may sound forward-looking. It is certain that we take China seriously as a competitor and systemic rival and that we will have to confront it with increased competence and attention in the future. At the same time, however, our encounters with the country give us every reason for good courage and self-confidence. Despite all the criticism, it is the societies of the Western community of values that have produced the unique civilizational achievements of modern times. It will not be easy for today’s China to establish itself as a suitable alternative.
Dr. Gerhard Hinterhaeuser is a partner at the management consulting firm Bingmann Pflüger International. He lives in Asia and Germany and was a member of the management board of the state-owned company PICC Asset Management Co. Ltd. in Shanghai from 2006 to 2014.
For more than 30 years, the Goethe-Institut has enriched cultural life in Beijing and other Chinese cities. In 2015, in addition to the main building, it opened a versatile cultural venue for performance and theatre performances, exhibitions, and film evenings in Beijing’s art district 798, of which the institute’s director Dr. Clemens Treter is audibly proud. “We show experimental but also thematic works on contemporary issues,” says the 49-year-old. “Through the cultural agreement, we enjoy a certain protection and are independent of an approval process in our own spaces. So we have more freedom than the rest of the cultural scene in China, and it gives local artists the opportunity to show their work away from commercial and political pressures.”
Since 2016, the sinologist has headed the Goethe-Institut in China. He was already interested in cultures, film, and languages during his Abitur and civilian service. The book “China and the Hope for Happiness” by Wolfgang Bauer made a lasting impression on him so that he studied with the renowned China expert in Munich. There he also met his wife, who comes from Nanjing and was in Germany to study.
After professional positions at the university and at a consulting firm, Clemens Treter started at the Goethe-Institut at the end of 2004. “For me, my work is an interesting combination of cultural issues and practical implementation,” he says. From 2005 to 2010, he had been at the Goethe-Institut in Beijing as deputy director and had returned there after assignments in Munich and Taipei. Even during the pandemic, he stayed in the metropolis with his wife and two children. Christmas 2019 was Clemens Treter’s last time in Germany.
The pandemic also means a digitalization boost for the Goethe-Institut in China. “Our German courses still run online,” explains Clemens Treter. Even if face-to-face courses are possible again, this option will be retained, he is convinced. It has also proven its worth in cultural exchange.
A good 80 percent of the learners are students who need German for their professional careers. “But there is also another group of people who want to learn a second or third foreign language,” knows Clemens Treter. In its language work, too, the Goethe-Institut is concerned with conveying a contemporary image of Germany.
Management positions at the Goethe-Institut are usually awarded for four to six years. “That’s also important,” says Clemens Treter. “Because everyone brings back new impulses when it comes to cultural work.” Clemens Treter doesn’t yet know what will come after Beijing. But he would definitely like to stay at the Goethe-Institut, even if that would mean saying goodbye to China. Judith Jenner
Xie Xiaozhen, a 76-year-old US Chinese grandmother who fought off a racist attack, is being celebrated online for her courage – and is donating money raised for her to the US Asian community to fund anti-racism projects.
According to media reports, Xie was attacked by a man in San Francisco last week. The 76-year-old defended herself and hit the attacker with a wooden stick. According to the report, the man had called Xie racist names before the attack. Xie suffered injuries to her face. A video that went viral on social media showed the woman wearing an ice pack to cool her injuries shortly after the attack.
Xie’s family raised money to pay for her medical treatment – but the GoFundMe campaign has seen so much support that it has now raised almost US$1 million. The family explained that the money would be donated to the US Asian community to fight racism on the campaign’s homepage. The 76-year-old is now feeling better: “She is now optimistic again and in a better mood. She said we must not give in to racism,” Xie’s grandson wrote.
