The visit of a group of sinologists to Xinjiang continues to cause uproar among German sinologists. In an opinion piece for Table.Media on Monday, emeritus professors Thomas Heberer and Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer explained their motivations and the circumstances of their trip to the region, and how their controversial article in the NZZ, in which they noted a “normalization” of life in Xinjiang, came about.
But this attempt at explanation does not stop the discussion, Marcel Grzanna notes. Many sinologists continue to discern contradictions in the attempted justification of the two authors. Some fear that Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer are precisely reinforcing the impression that sinology is trying to counteract: Namely, that they are following the line of China’s Communist Party. The debate is certainly far from over, even if Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer refuse to comment further for the time being.
Meanwhile, the EU Chamber of Commerce in China presented its annual position paper a day earlier than planned. A media company – not Table.Media, of course – had disregarded the embargo deadline, and so everyone already received the paper on Tuesday. Its contents continue to be sobering. Companies miss confidence and predictability in China. Investments are declining, and some companies now prefer to expand elsewhere. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk analyzes the Chamber’s recommendations to the Chinese government.
The vehement criticism of sinologists Thomas Heberer and Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer does not diminish even after they justified the controversial opinion piece about their trip to Xinjiang. The pair ranks among the founders of German sinology, who have helped shape China discourse in Germany for many decades. With their text in Tuesday’s edition of China.Table, they aimed to explain their article for the Neue Zuercher Zeitung (NZZ) regarding the current situation in Xinjiang, published last week.
But other renowned sinologists do not stop criticizing the field’s grandees. In their opinion, the two emeritus professors are entangled in numerous contradictions. For instance, Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer emphasized that their core interest in their trip to Xinjiang was not to “investigate the indisputable allegations about the human rights situation.”
However, they based their conclusion and recommendation to lift EU sanctions against Chinese officials precisely on the fact that the human rights situation had improved in the meantime. “The authors thus admit that they have not gathered any new insights into the human rights situation. They thus reduce their conclusion in the NZZ article to absurdity,” says Xinjiang researcher Bjoern Alpermann.
Sinologist Sascha Klotzbuecher of the East Asian Institute at the University of Bratislava accuses the authors of using their article to try and twist an “obvious lobbying attempt in the NZZ” into a “clandestine call for more understanding.” Furthermore, Klotzbuecher expresses astonishment that Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer stated that they had at first been surprised by the closure of numerous Uyghur internment camps.
Yet, their NZZ article explicitly referred to Adrian Zenz and his research, which long ago came to the same conclusions. “Had they actually read Zenz, they would not have been surprised,” says Klotzbuecher, who accuses the duo of “confirmatory name-dropping.” And Alpermann also concludes, “This surprise can only be explained by ignorance of the reports from Xinjiang.”
Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer explained some of the statements in their original article by claiming that they were subject to editorial constraints on the part of the NZZ and could not substantiate their arguments due to a lack of space. Sinologist Marina Rudyak of the University of Goettingen has little sympathy for this. “Finally, I am surprised that the authors blame the NZZ editors for the criticism of their article. Perhaps they intended an aggravation. But the two are not rookies, they are seasoned researchers. In that case, they would retract it,” she writes on LinkedIn.
Some sinologists suspect that Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer did not expect such severe backlash to their NZZ article. According to their own statements to China.Table, the two emeritus professors merely wanted to “go in search of changes in Xinjiang policy between the years 2017 to 2022.” “Apparently, even this actually meaningful and necessary question is immediately emotionalized and stigmatized by some,” Heberer wrote in an email last week.
None of the critics doubts that the question is reasonable. Instead, the emotionality stems from the fact that all camps agree that Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer have tarnished the reputation of their field. “German Sinology is currently attempting to explain that it does not distinguish itself by echoing the Chinese Communist Party. And then this article,” says Sabrina Habich-Sobiegalla, sinologist at the FU Berlin. It was “absolutely contradictory” what the authors had written about Xinjiang, who “now simultaneously claim that they had no reliable data” at their disposal.
Habich-Sobiegalla suspects that the content of their opinion may have resulted from the enormous pressure that Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer have been under since last week. The duo refuses to comment further for the time being, and instead refers to future publications.
Columnist Alex Lo, who is in charge of rebuttal for the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post whenever China’s government comes under criticism outside the People’s Republic, used the initial article in the NZZ as the perfect opportunity to discredit the use of the term “genocide” in connection with Xinjiang. In the West, the term is regularly used in connection with minority policies in Xinjiang. For example, the US government speaks of genocide against the Uyghurs. German researchers tend to call it “cultural genocide.”
Thus, Heberer’s and Schmidt-Glintzer’s assessments create precisely the impression that German sinologists wish to oppose: That they are echoing the CCP. Christian Goebel, a former doctoral student of Heberer’s and now chair of the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of Vienna, speculates whether the two authors perhaps wanted to contribute to preventing further alienation. “That’s certainly not how it works,” says Goebel.
Sinologist Anna Lisa Ahlers from the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin would have preferred Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer to keep their opinions under wraps anyway. “I would expect them to publish the impressions and data they collected on their trip in a scientific format and have them debated by their peers before an opinion piece on this important topic is published,” Ahlers said.
For the first time, Denmark’s Jens Eskelund, who succeeded Joerg Wuttke as President of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China, will present the business representation’s position paper in Beijing today, Wednesday. The annual report packs a punch this year: For the first time, there are more than 1,000 “recommendations,” as the chamber calls its complaints about market conditions in China.
The chamber represents 1,700 companies doing business in China. “After the turbulent past three years, many have reevaluated their basic assumptions about the Chinese market,” Eskelund says. Predictability and trustworthiness have eroded.
As a result, many companies are diversifying their supply chains to reduce China dependence, Eskelund observes. But it wasn’t European business that started the de-risking, he says: “China was the original de-risker.” He says the country has long talked about economic self-reliance and sought it in practical policy. The chamber has long complained about the resulting market barriers.
The uncertainty runs deep. “What relationship does China seek with international companies?“. This question is at the top of the list of questions, according to Eskelund. He believes it is now essential for China to regain the trust of companies. Not only has the EU economy been instrumental in lifting China to the level of technology it enjoys today, he said. Today, European investments in China are declining. Regardless, the EU economy is still available as a partner for further development.
The Chamber draws the following recommendations for the Chinese leadership from this situation:
The position paper focuses, in particular, on transparency issues. For example, current economic data is hardly available at present. “We need to be able to understand the fundamentals of this country,” Eskelund says. But the government currently even has statements from economists and bloggers on the economic situation suppressed.
Another issue is the incompatibility between China’s and the EU’s demands on companies. The EU expects progressively high ethical standards along the supply chain. China, on the other hand, refuses any audits in regions such as Xinjiang. Companies thus find themselves caught between the fronts.
Sinolytics is a European research-based consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
Niclas Kvarnstrom succeeds Gunnar Wiegand as the new director of the Asia Department of the European External Action Service (EEAS). This is not an easy job. Wiegand had helped shape the European Union’s policy for the region for over 30 years. His successor, Niclas Kvarnström, however, comes with the diplomatic skills necessary to fill Wiegand’s role – and give EU policy an even stronger Indo-Pacific flavor.
The native Swede has been the head of the Asia-Pacific department in his home country’s foreign ministry since August 2021 and is thus already in the thick of the issue. At a Sinopsis event in Prague last October, he stressed that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine had highlighted the importance of bridges and partnerships in the region. The EU should not be underestimated when it comes to the Indo-Pacific, Kvarnstrom said. With these statements, he follows a similar line as his predecessor Wiegand, who consistently insisted on a self-confident EU and closer relations with the Indo-Pacific states.
Kvarnstrom has also already gained experience with EU operations. During the Swedish EU presidency in the first half of the year, he played a key role in organizing a ministerial meeting with European and Asian representatives. This is one of the ways in which Kvarnstrom has already built up a standing with the foreign ministers of the Indo-Pacific states.
He already acquired his deep expertise for the region during his education: After attending an international school in the UK, he studied Chinese at Oxford University from 1993 to 1997. As part of his studies, he spent a semester at Taiwan Normal University attending language courses. At Oxford, he chose an economics focus, and wrote his thesis on China’s financial markets.
He then worked for Goldman Sachs as a banker in London and New York for three years before joining the Swedish diplomatic service. After receiving diplomatic training, he spent a year at the China desk of the Swedish Foreign Office. “As diplomats we are generalists, and I have worked with EU, Eastern European, Asian and UN issues during my career. My first foreign posting was at the Swedish Embassy in Beijing, a great city where my Chinese improved quite a bit,” Kvarnstrom writes in a post on his former school’s website.
After his stay in Beijing, he held various positions for the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the office of the director general for political affairs in the EU department, where he was involved in the preparation of the EU meetings of foreign ministers.
Kvarnstrom went on to work for four years as a political advisor to the Swedish Mission to the United Nations in New York before becoming deputy director of the department for Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012. After a brief stint at the Wallenberg Foundation, Kvarnstrom returned to the diplomatic service in 2016 to become head of the department for Eastern Europe and Asia.
In 2018, Kvarnstrom finally became Sweden’s ambassador to Singapore: “a wonderful post from which to observe dynamic, growing Asia.” In a video message marking the end of his post, Kvarnstrom called security developments in the region “very dynamic.” He remained loyal to the region – returning to Stockholm in 2021 to take up the post as head of the Asia-Pacific Department.
For his new position, Kvarnstrom will now move to the Belgian capital and EU headquarters with his wife and four children. It is not yet clear when exactly his assignment at the EEAS will begin. However, it is very likely that he will take up the post before the planned EU-China summit. Amelie Richter
These Vietnamese vendors are selling durian fruits at the 20th China-ASEAN Expo – scorned in the West as stinky or even vomit fruits. The reason is that when opened, they emit an intense odor reminiscent of fermented eggs. However, its bad reputation is undeserved: Many gourmets appreciate its multi-layered flavors. And they are willing to pay up to 45 euros for one fruit in the off-season. Some stores in China and Singapore even tend to charge several hundred euros per piece.
The visit of a group of sinologists to Xinjiang continues to cause uproar among German sinologists. In an opinion piece for Table.Media on Monday, emeritus professors Thomas Heberer and Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer explained their motivations and the circumstances of their trip to the region, and how their controversial article in the NZZ, in which they noted a “normalization” of life in Xinjiang, came about.
But this attempt at explanation does not stop the discussion, Marcel Grzanna notes. Many sinologists continue to discern contradictions in the attempted justification of the two authors. Some fear that Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer are precisely reinforcing the impression that sinology is trying to counteract: Namely, that they are following the line of China’s Communist Party. The debate is certainly far from over, even if Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer refuse to comment further for the time being.
Meanwhile, the EU Chamber of Commerce in China presented its annual position paper a day earlier than planned. A media company – not Table.Media, of course – had disregarded the embargo deadline, and so everyone already received the paper on Tuesday. Its contents continue to be sobering. Companies miss confidence and predictability in China. Investments are declining, and some companies now prefer to expand elsewhere. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk analyzes the Chamber’s recommendations to the Chinese government.
The vehement criticism of sinologists Thomas Heberer and Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer does not diminish even after they justified the controversial opinion piece about their trip to Xinjiang. The pair ranks among the founders of German sinology, who have helped shape China discourse in Germany for many decades. With their text in Tuesday’s edition of China.Table, they aimed to explain their article for the Neue Zuercher Zeitung (NZZ) regarding the current situation in Xinjiang, published last week.
But other renowned sinologists do not stop criticizing the field’s grandees. In their opinion, the two emeritus professors are entangled in numerous contradictions. For instance, Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer emphasized that their core interest in their trip to Xinjiang was not to “investigate the indisputable allegations about the human rights situation.”
However, they based their conclusion and recommendation to lift EU sanctions against Chinese officials precisely on the fact that the human rights situation had improved in the meantime. “The authors thus admit that they have not gathered any new insights into the human rights situation. They thus reduce their conclusion in the NZZ article to absurdity,” says Xinjiang researcher Bjoern Alpermann.
Sinologist Sascha Klotzbuecher of the East Asian Institute at the University of Bratislava accuses the authors of using their article to try and twist an “obvious lobbying attempt in the NZZ” into a “clandestine call for more understanding.” Furthermore, Klotzbuecher expresses astonishment that Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer stated that they had at first been surprised by the closure of numerous Uyghur internment camps.
Yet, their NZZ article explicitly referred to Adrian Zenz and his research, which long ago came to the same conclusions. “Had they actually read Zenz, they would not have been surprised,” says Klotzbuecher, who accuses the duo of “confirmatory name-dropping.” And Alpermann also concludes, “This surprise can only be explained by ignorance of the reports from Xinjiang.”
Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer explained some of the statements in their original article by claiming that they were subject to editorial constraints on the part of the NZZ and could not substantiate their arguments due to a lack of space. Sinologist Marina Rudyak of the University of Goettingen has little sympathy for this. “Finally, I am surprised that the authors blame the NZZ editors for the criticism of their article. Perhaps they intended an aggravation. But the two are not rookies, they are seasoned researchers. In that case, they would retract it,” she writes on LinkedIn.
Some sinologists suspect that Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer did not expect such severe backlash to their NZZ article. According to their own statements to China.Table, the two emeritus professors merely wanted to “go in search of changes in Xinjiang policy between the years 2017 to 2022.” “Apparently, even this actually meaningful and necessary question is immediately emotionalized and stigmatized by some,” Heberer wrote in an email last week.
None of the critics doubts that the question is reasonable. Instead, the emotionality stems from the fact that all camps agree that Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer have tarnished the reputation of their field. “German Sinology is currently attempting to explain that it does not distinguish itself by echoing the Chinese Communist Party. And then this article,” says Sabrina Habich-Sobiegalla, sinologist at the FU Berlin. It was “absolutely contradictory” what the authors had written about Xinjiang, who “now simultaneously claim that they had no reliable data” at their disposal.
Habich-Sobiegalla suspects that the content of their opinion may have resulted from the enormous pressure that Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer have been under since last week. The duo refuses to comment further for the time being, and instead refers to future publications.
Columnist Alex Lo, who is in charge of rebuttal for the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post whenever China’s government comes under criticism outside the People’s Republic, used the initial article in the NZZ as the perfect opportunity to discredit the use of the term “genocide” in connection with Xinjiang. In the West, the term is regularly used in connection with minority policies in Xinjiang. For example, the US government speaks of genocide against the Uyghurs. German researchers tend to call it “cultural genocide.”
Thus, Heberer’s and Schmidt-Glintzer’s assessments create precisely the impression that German sinologists wish to oppose: That they are echoing the CCP. Christian Goebel, a former doctoral student of Heberer’s and now chair of the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of Vienna, speculates whether the two authors perhaps wanted to contribute to preventing further alienation. “That’s certainly not how it works,” says Goebel.
Sinologist Anna Lisa Ahlers from the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin would have preferred Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer to keep their opinions under wraps anyway. “I would expect them to publish the impressions and data they collected on their trip in a scientific format and have them debated by their peers before an opinion piece on this important topic is published,” Ahlers said.
For the first time, Denmark’s Jens Eskelund, who succeeded Joerg Wuttke as President of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China, will present the business representation’s position paper in Beijing today, Wednesday. The annual report packs a punch this year: For the first time, there are more than 1,000 “recommendations,” as the chamber calls its complaints about market conditions in China.
The chamber represents 1,700 companies doing business in China. “After the turbulent past three years, many have reevaluated their basic assumptions about the Chinese market,” Eskelund says. Predictability and trustworthiness have eroded.
As a result, many companies are diversifying their supply chains to reduce China dependence, Eskelund observes. But it wasn’t European business that started the de-risking, he says: “China was the original de-risker.” He says the country has long talked about economic self-reliance and sought it in practical policy. The chamber has long complained about the resulting market barriers.
The uncertainty runs deep. “What relationship does China seek with international companies?“. This question is at the top of the list of questions, according to Eskelund. He believes it is now essential for China to regain the trust of companies. Not only has the EU economy been instrumental in lifting China to the level of technology it enjoys today, he said. Today, European investments in China are declining. Regardless, the EU economy is still available as a partner for further development.
The Chamber draws the following recommendations for the Chinese leadership from this situation:
The position paper focuses, in particular, on transparency issues. For example, current economic data is hardly available at present. “We need to be able to understand the fundamentals of this country,” Eskelund says. But the government currently even has statements from economists and bloggers on the economic situation suppressed.
Another issue is the incompatibility between China’s and the EU’s demands on companies. The EU expects progressively high ethical standards along the supply chain. China, on the other hand, refuses any audits in regions such as Xinjiang. Companies thus find themselves caught between the fronts.
Sinolytics is a European research-based consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
Niclas Kvarnstrom succeeds Gunnar Wiegand as the new director of the Asia Department of the European External Action Service (EEAS). This is not an easy job. Wiegand had helped shape the European Union’s policy for the region for over 30 years. His successor, Niclas Kvarnström, however, comes with the diplomatic skills necessary to fill Wiegand’s role – and give EU policy an even stronger Indo-Pacific flavor.
The native Swede has been the head of the Asia-Pacific department in his home country’s foreign ministry since August 2021 and is thus already in the thick of the issue. At a Sinopsis event in Prague last October, he stressed that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine had highlighted the importance of bridges and partnerships in the region. The EU should not be underestimated when it comes to the Indo-Pacific, Kvarnstrom said. With these statements, he follows a similar line as his predecessor Wiegand, who consistently insisted on a self-confident EU and closer relations with the Indo-Pacific states.
Kvarnstrom has also already gained experience with EU operations. During the Swedish EU presidency in the first half of the year, he played a key role in organizing a ministerial meeting with European and Asian representatives. This is one of the ways in which Kvarnstrom has already built up a standing with the foreign ministers of the Indo-Pacific states.
He already acquired his deep expertise for the region during his education: After attending an international school in the UK, he studied Chinese at Oxford University from 1993 to 1997. As part of his studies, he spent a semester at Taiwan Normal University attending language courses. At Oxford, he chose an economics focus, and wrote his thesis on China’s financial markets.
He then worked for Goldman Sachs as a banker in London and New York for three years before joining the Swedish diplomatic service. After receiving diplomatic training, he spent a year at the China desk of the Swedish Foreign Office. “As diplomats we are generalists, and I have worked with EU, Eastern European, Asian and UN issues during my career. My first foreign posting was at the Swedish Embassy in Beijing, a great city where my Chinese improved quite a bit,” Kvarnstrom writes in a post on his former school’s website.
After his stay in Beijing, he held various positions for the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the office of the director general for political affairs in the EU department, where he was involved in the preparation of the EU meetings of foreign ministers.
Kvarnstrom went on to work for four years as a political advisor to the Swedish Mission to the United Nations in New York before becoming deputy director of the department for Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012. After a brief stint at the Wallenberg Foundation, Kvarnstrom returned to the diplomatic service in 2016 to become head of the department for Eastern Europe and Asia.
In 2018, Kvarnstrom finally became Sweden’s ambassador to Singapore: “a wonderful post from which to observe dynamic, growing Asia.” In a video message marking the end of his post, Kvarnstrom called security developments in the region “very dynamic.” He remained loyal to the region – returning to Stockholm in 2021 to take up the post as head of the Asia-Pacific Department.
For his new position, Kvarnstrom will now move to the Belgian capital and EU headquarters with his wife and four children. It is not yet clear when exactly his assignment at the EEAS will begin. However, it is very likely that he will take up the post before the planned EU-China summit. Amelie Richter
These Vietnamese vendors are selling durian fruits at the 20th China-ASEAN Expo – scorned in the West as stinky or even vomit fruits. The reason is that when opened, they emit an intense odor reminiscent of fermented eggs. However, its bad reputation is undeserved: Many gourmets appreciate its multi-layered flavors. And they are willing to pay up to 45 euros for one fruit in the off-season. Some stores in China and Singapore even tend to charge several hundred euros per piece.
