The Chinese Foreign Ministry called in the German ambassador in Beijing for a lecture – or, as it is called in diplomatic jargon, “summoned.” The reason was a statement by her boss, Annalena Baerbock, who called Xi Jinping a dictator in a half-sentence. After Joe Biden used this term, China is thin-skinned.
Sinologists Thomas Heberer and Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer have been accused of a lack of distance from the Chinese party state. This is relevant because the two emeritus professors have helped shape German China research for decades.
Many of their colleagues wonder what led them to write an op-ed for the NZZ on the situation in Xinjiang, claiming “normalization” and recommending the swift lifting of EU sanctions against Xinjiang officials. China.Table asked the authors and received a response, which we publish today as an opinion piece. The article will generate further discussion. We will continue to report on the dispute among German sinologists and let other voices speak.
The growing military presence of the Chinese navy and air force in the Taiwan Strait is also a source of growing debate. Isn’t it contradicting the Chinese reunification plan through economic integration, which was relaunched last week?
Michael Radunski spoke about this with sinologist Josie-Marie Perkuhn, who currently resides in Taiwan. Perkuhn does not believe in an open escalation in the near future: China plays Go and not chess. This means that Beijing focuses more on indirect influence instead of direct confrontation.
In fact, Chinese soft power is incessantly pouring over Taiwan – via social media, technology or language. Nevertheless, Perkuhn perceives a growing alienation between Chinese and Taiwanese society. Whether this increases the chances of long-term peace without reunification is doubtful.
Ms. Perkuhn, Beijing has presented a new Taiwan plan. With the “construction of a demonstration zone for integrated development across the Taiwan Strait,” it wants to solve the Taiwan issue through economic interdependence. You are in Taiwan right now. What is the reception of the proposal there?
This may surprise you, but this plan is hardly noticed on the streets of Taipei. It also plays virtually no role in the official news.
This is indeed surprising because more than 60 Chinese warships and fighter jets have been spotted in the waters around Taiwan.
That’s true. However, the mood here in Taipei is completely different. You wouldn’t notice any increasing sense of threat among ordinary Taiwanese. There is a significant disparity in perception between expert circles and the general population.
What is the reason for this?
For one, Beijing’s proposal is not significant enough. The ideas are not particularly new. Bridges between the mainland and the offshore islands have been discussed for years. On the other hand, I notice a certain resilience among the population towards the People’s Republic.
What do you mean by that?
By this, I mean a certain defiance and defensive stance against the existing threat situation. People don’t want to let Beijing dictate their daily lives. This kind of resilience is also intended to protect against Chinese influence on the upcoming presidential election this fall.
If Beijing’s new unification plan is not dominating the discussions, and neither are the warships, what are the issues in the election campaign?
The election campaign seems to focus more on the people running for office and their integrity than on substantive issues. Digitization, minority and language policy, or even topics such as climate action and the green energy transition seem to have been pushed into the background. What is remarkable here is that young people have so far been almost silent in forming political opinions.
And the relationship with Beijing?
The relationship with Beijing already plays an essential role in the election campaign. The KMT is following former President Ma Ying-jeou’s line of economic cooperation and is focusing on improved relations with the mainland, closer economic ties, more trade. But this does not imply selling out Taiwan. The KMT is not a party that promotes annexation. They only expect less confrontational waters and increased economic gains by maintaining the status quo.
They describe the mood in Taiwan as “do not let them dictate” and “protect them from Chinese influence,” In contrast, Beijing speaks of “brothers and sisters” and “one family on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.” Does that fit together?
Hardly. There is a big estrangement between the mainland and Taiwan. I have spoken with many Taiwanese who are now traveling back to the mainland after the Covid pandemic. Most of them have a very queasy feeling. Particularly, emotions among former exchange partners have changed.
Why is that?
Take the use of new technology: On the mainland, innovative technology is used to increase control over people, and everyone is tracked. However, in Taiwan, new technologies are used to facilitate more democratic participation. This difference between autocracy and democracy profoundly impacts societies and creates progressive alienation.
Do you think Beijing is not aware of this? Why do they still speak of a family?
Beijing is, of course, aware of this alienation. But those in power are constructing their own narrative. And their narrative is not so much directed at the Taiwanese themselves, at least not at the current Taiwanese government. Instead, Beijing wants to show the international community that it is not aggressive towards Taiwan at all. China presents itself as a supposed power of peace.
In contrast, the West hotly discusses a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. One theory is that Xi Jinping will soon strike because China’s ruler fears missing a one-time opportunity. As a Taiwan expert, what is your take on this?
Xi Jinping is indeed in a dilemma of his own making. After all, he wants to realize unification with Taiwan as his political legacy. But I don’t expect anything to happen in Taiwan before the election. This statement may sound bold, given Vladimir Putin’s surprise attack on Ukraine. But in the end, the decision is ultimately made in Beijing. They will decide whether there is a perfect window of opportunity for an attack.
What would be possible catalysts?
If, for instance, the United States’ foreign policy continues to destabilize further for some reason. If Beijing decides that no decision-maker in Washington would intervene in the event of a conflict. If this is not the case, Beijing will prefer to rely on the time factor.
Despite China’s military build-up, the ever-larger exercises and war simulations, and Xi’s harsh rhetoric towards Taiwan?
Yes. I think we misjudge Beijing’s power politics. China plays Go, not chess. Beijing relies more on indirect influence rather than direct confrontation.
What does indirect influence look like?
I’m talking about subtle measures such as influencing the upcoming election through manipulation or through information campaigns and cyber-attacks. And Taiwan is well aware of this danger.
So, if Beijing is not planning a direct attack, are delegation trips to Taiwan from the West and Germany an unnecessary provocation? Beijing always reacts very strongly and talks about deteriorating the security situation.
No. Building networks and contacts makes sense. This is important for us in terms of diversifying away from China. The appropriate keyword here is reducing economic dependence.
And for Taiwan?
It is also essential for Taiwan to know that if there is an attack, there are partners and allies. Germany enjoys an excellent reputation in Taiwan. We should make use of that.
Josie-Marie Perkuhn leads the joint postdoc research project Taiwan as Pioneer (TAP) at Trier University and is a non-resident-fellow at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK).
A draft law under which people could soon be punished for their choice of clothing has been causing heated debate in China in recent days. It concerns a new passage in the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which came into force in 2006. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress presented a draft with numerous amendments to this law earlier this month.
This is not unusual in itself. In some cases, the changes are, for instance, due to technological progress. For example, the law aims to regulate how unauthorized drone flights will be penalized in the future.
However, paragraph 34 of the amended law is causing trouble. According to it, pieces of clothing and symbols that offend the “feelings of the Chinese nation” are to be banned. For example, imagine T-shirts with “Free Tibet” printed on them. The draft also aims to increase penalties for insults against revolutionary heroes, such as graffiti on their tombstones.
The wording of hurt feelings is familiar. In the past, the Chinese leadership has been particularly fond of using this phrase when responding to perceived insults made by foreign states and companies.
The list of those who have been accused of this is long. For example, the US fashion company Gap was forced to apologize in 2018 for selling T-shirts with a map of China that was missing Taiwan. US actor and wrestler John Cena also apologized two years ago (even in more or less fluent Mandarin) for “accidentally” referring to Taiwan as a nation. Beijing uses the phrase about hurt feelings so often, that it even has its own Wikipedia article.
The term has often been criticized abroad, and rightly so. After all, it appears questionable whether there are circumstances in which an entire people feel insulted. Above all, no government should claim to decide this for its own people.
This is precisely what many Chinese seem to realize. Because they now run the risk of becoming victims of the controversial phrase themselves. According to the draft law, anyone who hurts the nation’s feelings with their clothing could face up to 15 days in prison or a fine of up to 5,000 yuan (681 dollars).
In the meantime, thousands of negative comments on the draft can be found on social networks. And lawyers have also long since joined in the debate. “Who determines what is the ‘spirit of the Chinese nation’ and what procedures are followed?” criticizes Tong Zhiwei, professor of constitutional law at the East China University of Political Science and Law in Shanghai, on Weibo. Local law enforcement agencies will misuse the law for arbitrary arrests, Tong said.
Lao Dongyan, a criminal law professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, also warns that the law could violate civil rights. “State power directly interferes in the realm of citizens’ daily clothing, which is obviously overreaching,” she wrote on Weibo.
In fact, there have been incidents in China in the past where police officers have cracked down on traditional Japanese clothing in particular. Last August, for example, police arrested a Chinese anime fan. The woman had posed for photos in a kimono in the eastern city of Suzhou. Her case was discussed on Chinese social media, with some users calling her outfit unpatriotic.
A similar incident occurred in 2019: Security forces at a university were filmed assaulting a man wearing a kimono. This also sparked a heated online debate in China about the easily stoked anti-Japanese sentiment in the country.
Even the otherwise party-loyal state newspaper Global Times joined the debate with a critical report earlier this week. The draft does address issues such as the wearing of Japanese invasion force uniforms in sensitive locations. But the definition of the violation and the applicable scenarios are unclear, the paper writes. The public still has until Sept. 30 to provide feedback on the draft.
In response to the debate, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee has already assured that feedback from the people will be crucial, reports the South China Morning Post. Concerns would be sorted and examined to propose an appropriate way to deal with them on that basis. Given the criticism, it is not certain that the dress code paragraph will actually become law.
Swedish diplomat Niclas Kvarnstroem will be the new director of the Asia Department of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Kvarnstroem confirmed this to Table.Media on Monday. Politico first reported on the decision. According to Kvarnstroem, an exact date for the appointment has not yet been set.
Kvarnstroem currently heads the Department for Asia and the Pacific Region at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Previously, he served as Swedish Ambassador to Singapore from 2018 to 2021 and held other Asia-related positions within the ministry. Kvarnstroem brings some China expertise: He studied Chinese at University of Oxford and at Taiwan Normal University. Kvarnstroem will succeed Gunnar Wiegand. During Sweden’s EU presidency in the first half of the year, Kvarnstroem helped organize the ministerial meeting on the Indo-Pacific.
In addition to Kvarnstroem, Paola Pampaloni, current Deputy Director of the Department, and Latvian diplomat Baiba Braže, who was Deputy Secretary General at NATO until July, were also in the running for the post. ari
In May 2023, at the invitation of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, a self-funded exploratory academic trip took four German sinologists from different disciplines and with decades of experience in China, as well as an international law expert, to the regions of Kashgar (> 90 percent Uyghur population) and Urumqi. The core interest was not to investigate the indisputable allegations about the human rights situation. This would hardly have been possible independently.
Instead, we wanted to find out whether any changes have occurred in regional policy since the appointment of a new leadership in Xinjiang at the end of 2021 and – if so – in which direction these changes are going. The group set the following priorities: (1) local and regional development policy and development instruments; (2) employment and social policy (incl. employment measures/labor compensation/measures for women’s equality); (3) state institution building/legal system; (4) education, culture, religion and language.
In this context, the group suggested visiting the relevant institutions and conducting discussions, as well as talking to representatives of villages, communities and districts to deepen and classify what they witnessed. In Urumqi, discussions were held with academics, representatives of legal institutions, etc. Beforehand, informal, confidential talks were held in Beijing with academics from various disciplines, including long-time Xinjiang researchers.
First of all, it is important to note that Xinjiang is by no means a sealed-off region (anymore), but can be visited openly and without any problems. The suggestion for this trip was made by the group, which also suggested places, institutions and interlocutors. Since the intention was a scientific one, a scientific institution was to act as the partner organization. This was the Academy of Social Sciences of Xinjiang. We were well aware that it was a state institution and that the opportunities for obtaining information were generally limited.
Since the travel time was limited from both sides, we suggested the district of Kashgar in the south (one of the core regions of the Uyghur population) as well as the capital Urumqi, where we mainly sought to speak with legal institutions and academics about issues that the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner had already raised. In addition, we asked questions about the whereabouts of the two internationally renowned Uyghur scientists, Prof. Tashpolat Tiyip (塔 西 甫 拉 提 ・ 特 依 拜), geographer, former president of Xinjiang University and Prof. Rahile Dawut (热依 拉-达吾提), the world’s leading ethnologist in the field of Uyghur culture.
Furthermore, our proposal included the following: The participants will self-funded the trip; no restrictions on the institutions we propose, the questions we raise, and the places and interlocutors we suggest. However, at the same time, we were aware that this trip would be limited in time, place and institution and that we would ultimately only see a fragment.
We initially assumed that we might encounter a situation like the one that existed until 2021: omnipresent controls, army and police posts everywhere, an oppressive atmosphere. We were stunned that all this no longer existed and that “normality” seemed to prevail. The interlocutors were also relatively open. In preparation, talks were held in Beijing with various academics and Xinjiang researchers, self-arranged and on an informal basis. These interlocutors were assured that they would remain confidential.
The article in the NZZ, which initially consisted of 18,000 characters, had to be shortened to 9,000 at the request of the editor in charge. The editor-in-chief ultimately only wanted to accept 5,000, preferably “harder theses,” so we had to largely abandon the underpinning of our arguments. Only after a lengthy discussion did we decide to publish the short article to spark a discussion. In the coming months, those involved will put their findings on paper in detailed articles and publish them together. We would ask all questioners to be patient. Until then, we will not respond to any further questions and ask for your understanding.
The fact that there have been changes in Xinjiang with the tendency we have identified has been independently noted by other visitors to the region. We are aware that the overall Xinjiang discourse in the Western media cannot be separated from the general policy towards China, which is intensely and controversially debated, especially in the United States. Our article should also be seen in this broader context, although we have deliberately focused on the issues outlined above and relating to questions concerning conditions in Xinjiang itself, and we will also concentrate on these in our planned publication.
As already indicated at the end of the NZZ article, we recommend intensifying the exchange with Xinjiang as well as further intensive engagement with this region as well as with China as a whole.
Sport with a view: Two ladies practice yoga exercises in Qiandongnan in Guizhou province last Sunday afternoon.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry called in the German ambassador in Beijing for a lecture – or, as it is called in diplomatic jargon, “summoned.” The reason was a statement by her boss, Annalena Baerbock, who called Xi Jinping a dictator in a half-sentence. After Joe Biden used this term, China is thin-skinned.
Sinologists Thomas Heberer and Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer have been accused of a lack of distance from the Chinese party state. This is relevant because the two emeritus professors have helped shape German China research for decades.
Many of their colleagues wonder what led them to write an op-ed for the NZZ on the situation in Xinjiang, claiming “normalization” and recommending the swift lifting of EU sanctions against Xinjiang officials. China.Table asked the authors and received a response, which we publish today as an opinion piece. The article will generate further discussion. We will continue to report on the dispute among German sinologists and let other voices speak.
The growing military presence of the Chinese navy and air force in the Taiwan Strait is also a source of growing debate. Isn’t it contradicting the Chinese reunification plan through economic integration, which was relaunched last week?
Michael Radunski spoke about this with sinologist Josie-Marie Perkuhn, who currently resides in Taiwan. Perkuhn does not believe in an open escalation in the near future: China plays Go and not chess. This means that Beijing focuses more on indirect influence instead of direct confrontation.
In fact, Chinese soft power is incessantly pouring over Taiwan – via social media, technology or language. Nevertheless, Perkuhn perceives a growing alienation between Chinese and Taiwanese society. Whether this increases the chances of long-term peace without reunification is doubtful.
Ms. Perkuhn, Beijing has presented a new Taiwan plan. With the “construction of a demonstration zone for integrated development across the Taiwan Strait,” it wants to solve the Taiwan issue through economic interdependence. You are in Taiwan right now. What is the reception of the proposal there?
This may surprise you, but this plan is hardly noticed on the streets of Taipei. It also plays virtually no role in the official news.
This is indeed surprising because more than 60 Chinese warships and fighter jets have been spotted in the waters around Taiwan.
That’s true. However, the mood here in Taipei is completely different. You wouldn’t notice any increasing sense of threat among ordinary Taiwanese. There is a significant disparity in perception between expert circles and the general population.
What is the reason for this?
For one, Beijing’s proposal is not significant enough. The ideas are not particularly new. Bridges between the mainland and the offshore islands have been discussed for years. On the other hand, I notice a certain resilience among the population towards the People’s Republic.
What do you mean by that?
By this, I mean a certain defiance and defensive stance against the existing threat situation. People don’t want to let Beijing dictate their daily lives. This kind of resilience is also intended to protect against Chinese influence on the upcoming presidential election this fall.
If Beijing’s new unification plan is not dominating the discussions, and neither are the warships, what are the issues in the election campaign?
The election campaign seems to focus more on the people running for office and their integrity than on substantive issues. Digitization, minority and language policy, or even topics such as climate action and the green energy transition seem to have been pushed into the background. What is remarkable here is that young people have so far been almost silent in forming political opinions.
And the relationship with Beijing?
The relationship with Beijing already plays an essential role in the election campaign. The KMT is following former President Ma Ying-jeou’s line of economic cooperation and is focusing on improved relations with the mainland, closer economic ties, more trade. But this does not imply selling out Taiwan. The KMT is not a party that promotes annexation. They only expect less confrontational waters and increased economic gains by maintaining the status quo.
They describe the mood in Taiwan as “do not let them dictate” and “protect them from Chinese influence,” In contrast, Beijing speaks of “brothers and sisters” and “one family on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.” Does that fit together?
Hardly. There is a big estrangement between the mainland and Taiwan. I have spoken with many Taiwanese who are now traveling back to the mainland after the Covid pandemic. Most of them have a very queasy feeling. Particularly, emotions among former exchange partners have changed.
Why is that?
Take the use of new technology: On the mainland, innovative technology is used to increase control over people, and everyone is tracked. However, in Taiwan, new technologies are used to facilitate more democratic participation. This difference between autocracy and democracy profoundly impacts societies and creates progressive alienation.
Do you think Beijing is not aware of this? Why do they still speak of a family?
Beijing is, of course, aware of this alienation. But those in power are constructing their own narrative. And their narrative is not so much directed at the Taiwanese themselves, at least not at the current Taiwanese government. Instead, Beijing wants to show the international community that it is not aggressive towards Taiwan at all. China presents itself as a supposed power of peace.
In contrast, the West hotly discusses a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. One theory is that Xi Jinping will soon strike because China’s ruler fears missing a one-time opportunity. As a Taiwan expert, what is your take on this?
Xi Jinping is indeed in a dilemma of his own making. After all, he wants to realize unification with Taiwan as his political legacy. But I don’t expect anything to happen in Taiwan before the election. This statement may sound bold, given Vladimir Putin’s surprise attack on Ukraine. But in the end, the decision is ultimately made in Beijing. They will decide whether there is a perfect window of opportunity for an attack.
What would be possible catalysts?
If, for instance, the United States’ foreign policy continues to destabilize further for some reason. If Beijing decides that no decision-maker in Washington would intervene in the event of a conflict. If this is not the case, Beijing will prefer to rely on the time factor.
Despite China’s military build-up, the ever-larger exercises and war simulations, and Xi’s harsh rhetoric towards Taiwan?
Yes. I think we misjudge Beijing’s power politics. China plays Go, not chess. Beijing relies more on indirect influence rather than direct confrontation.
What does indirect influence look like?
I’m talking about subtle measures such as influencing the upcoming election through manipulation or through information campaigns and cyber-attacks. And Taiwan is well aware of this danger.
So, if Beijing is not planning a direct attack, are delegation trips to Taiwan from the West and Germany an unnecessary provocation? Beijing always reacts very strongly and talks about deteriorating the security situation.
No. Building networks and contacts makes sense. This is important for us in terms of diversifying away from China. The appropriate keyword here is reducing economic dependence.
And for Taiwan?
It is also essential for Taiwan to know that if there is an attack, there are partners and allies. Germany enjoys an excellent reputation in Taiwan. We should make use of that.
Josie-Marie Perkuhn leads the joint postdoc research project Taiwan as Pioneer (TAP) at Trier University and is a non-resident-fellow at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK).
A draft law under which people could soon be punished for their choice of clothing has been causing heated debate in China in recent days. It concerns a new passage in the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which came into force in 2006. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress presented a draft with numerous amendments to this law earlier this month.
This is not unusual in itself. In some cases, the changes are, for instance, due to technological progress. For example, the law aims to regulate how unauthorized drone flights will be penalized in the future.
However, paragraph 34 of the amended law is causing trouble. According to it, pieces of clothing and symbols that offend the “feelings of the Chinese nation” are to be banned. For example, imagine T-shirts with “Free Tibet” printed on them. The draft also aims to increase penalties for insults against revolutionary heroes, such as graffiti on their tombstones.
The wording of hurt feelings is familiar. In the past, the Chinese leadership has been particularly fond of using this phrase when responding to perceived insults made by foreign states and companies.
The list of those who have been accused of this is long. For example, the US fashion company Gap was forced to apologize in 2018 for selling T-shirts with a map of China that was missing Taiwan. US actor and wrestler John Cena also apologized two years ago (even in more or less fluent Mandarin) for “accidentally” referring to Taiwan as a nation. Beijing uses the phrase about hurt feelings so often, that it even has its own Wikipedia article.
The term has often been criticized abroad, and rightly so. After all, it appears questionable whether there are circumstances in which an entire people feel insulted. Above all, no government should claim to decide this for its own people.
This is precisely what many Chinese seem to realize. Because they now run the risk of becoming victims of the controversial phrase themselves. According to the draft law, anyone who hurts the nation’s feelings with their clothing could face up to 15 days in prison or a fine of up to 5,000 yuan (681 dollars).
In the meantime, thousands of negative comments on the draft can be found on social networks. And lawyers have also long since joined in the debate. “Who determines what is the ‘spirit of the Chinese nation’ and what procedures are followed?” criticizes Tong Zhiwei, professor of constitutional law at the East China University of Political Science and Law in Shanghai, on Weibo. Local law enforcement agencies will misuse the law for arbitrary arrests, Tong said.
Lao Dongyan, a criminal law professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, also warns that the law could violate civil rights. “State power directly interferes in the realm of citizens’ daily clothing, which is obviously overreaching,” she wrote on Weibo.
In fact, there have been incidents in China in the past where police officers have cracked down on traditional Japanese clothing in particular. Last August, for example, police arrested a Chinese anime fan. The woman had posed for photos in a kimono in the eastern city of Suzhou. Her case was discussed on Chinese social media, with some users calling her outfit unpatriotic.
A similar incident occurred in 2019: Security forces at a university were filmed assaulting a man wearing a kimono. This also sparked a heated online debate in China about the easily stoked anti-Japanese sentiment in the country.
Even the otherwise party-loyal state newspaper Global Times joined the debate with a critical report earlier this week. The draft does address issues such as the wearing of Japanese invasion force uniforms in sensitive locations. But the definition of the violation and the applicable scenarios are unclear, the paper writes. The public still has until Sept. 30 to provide feedback on the draft.
In response to the debate, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee has already assured that feedback from the people will be crucial, reports the South China Morning Post. Concerns would be sorted and examined to propose an appropriate way to deal with them on that basis. Given the criticism, it is not certain that the dress code paragraph will actually become law.
Swedish diplomat Niclas Kvarnstroem will be the new director of the Asia Department of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Kvarnstroem confirmed this to Table.Media on Monday. Politico first reported on the decision. According to Kvarnstroem, an exact date for the appointment has not yet been set.
Kvarnstroem currently heads the Department for Asia and the Pacific Region at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Previously, he served as Swedish Ambassador to Singapore from 2018 to 2021 and held other Asia-related positions within the ministry. Kvarnstroem brings some China expertise: He studied Chinese at University of Oxford and at Taiwan Normal University. Kvarnstroem will succeed Gunnar Wiegand. During Sweden’s EU presidency in the first half of the year, Kvarnstroem helped organize the ministerial meeting on the Indo-Pacific.
In addition to Kvarnstroem, Paola Pampaloni, current Deputy Director of the Department, and Latvian diplomat Baiba Braže, who was Deputy Secretary General at NATO until July, were also in the running for the post. ari
In May 2023, at the invitation of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, a self-funded exploratory academic trip took four German sinologists from different disciplines and with decades of experience in China, as well as an international law expert, to the regions of Kashgar (> 90 percent Uyghur population) and Urumqi. The core interest was not to investigate the indisputable allegations about the human rights situation. This would hardly have been possible independently.
Instead, we wanted to find out whether any changes have occurred in regional policy since the appointment of a new leadership in Xinjiang at the end of 2021 and – if so – in which direction these changes are going. The group set the following priorities: (1) local and regional development policy and development instruments; (2) employment and social policy (incl. employment measures/labor compensation/measures for women’s equality); (3) state institution building/legal system; (4) education, culture, religion and language.
In this context, the group suggested visiting the relevant institutions and conducting discussions, as well as talking to representatives of villages, communities and districts to deepen and classify what they witnessed. In Urumqi, discussions were held with academics, representatives of legal institutions, etc. Beforehand, informal, confidential talks were held in Beijing with academics from various disciplines, including long-time Xinjiang researchers.
First of all, it is important to note that Xinjiang is by no means a sealed-off region (anymore), but can be visited openly and without any problems. The suggestion for this trip was made by the group, which also suggested places, institutions and interlocutors. Since the intention was a scientific one, a scientific institution was to act as the partner organization. This was the Academy of Social Sciences of Xinjiang. We were well aware that it was a state institution and that the opportunities for obtaining information were generally limited.
Since the travel time was limited from both sides, we suggested the district of Kashgar in the south (one of the core regions of the Uyghur population) as well as the capital Urumqi, where we mainly sought to speak with legal institutions and academics about issues that the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner had already raised. In addition, we asked questions about the whereabouts of the two internationally renowned Uyghur scientists, Prof. Tashpolat Tiyip (塔 西 甫 拉 提 ・ 特 依 拜), geographer, former president of Xinjiang University and Prof. Rahile Dawut (热依 拉-达吾提), the world’s leading ethnologist in the field of Uyghur culture.
Furthermore, our proposal included the following: The participants will self-funded the trip; no restrictions on the institutions we propose, the questions we raise, and the places and interlocutors we suggest. However, at the same time, we were aware that this trip would be limited in time, place and institution and that we would ultimately only see a fragment.
We initially assumed that we might encounter a situation like the one that existed until 2021: omnipresent controls, army and police posts everywhere, an oppressive atmosphere. We were stunned that all this no longer existed and that “normality” seemed to prevail. The interlocutors were also relatively open. In preparation, talks were held in Beijing with various academics and Xinjiang researchers, self-arranged and on an informal basis. These interlocutors were assured that they would remain confidential.
The article in the NZZ, which initially consisted of 18,000 characters, had to be shortened to 9,000 at the request of the editor in charge. The editor-in-chief ultimately only wanted to accept 5,000, preferably “harder theses,” so we had to largely abandon the underpinning of our arguments. Only after a lengthy discussion did we decide to publish the short article to spark a discussion. In the coming months, those involved will put their findings on paper in detailed articles and publish them together. We would ask all questioners to be patient. Until then, we will not respond to any further questions and ask for your understanding.
The fact that there have been changes in Xinjiang with the tendency we have identified has been independently noted by other visitors to the region. We are aware that the overall Xinjiang discourse in the Western media cannot be separated from the general policy towards China, which is intensely and controversially debated, especially in the United States. Our article should also be seen in this broader context, although we have deliberately focused on the issues outlined above and relating to questions concerning conditions in Xinjiang itself, and we will also concentrate on these in our planned publication.
As already indicated at the end of the NZZ article, we recommend intensifying the exchange with Xinjiang as well as further intensive engagement with this region as well as with China as a whole.
Sport with a view: Two ladies practice yoga exercises in Qiandongnan in Guizhou province last Sunday afternoon.
