EU Commission Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis awaits anything but an easy start to the week at the trade dialogue in Beijing this Monday. The agenda is riddled with delicate issues: EU-China relations were already strained before another sticking point was added with the anti-dumping investigations into Chinese EVs. The high trade deficit will also be a topic, Dombrovskis calls it “very unbalanced.” Amelie Richter takes a closer look at the difficult talks.
Sigmar Gabriel has a clear opinion on the EU’s anti-dumping investigations – as well as on the diplomatic skills of his successor in the post of German Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock. “If you kick the Chinese in the shins from Monday to Friday like Ms Baerbock, you won’t get far,” he says in an in-depth interview with Michael Radunski and Stefan Braun. The conversation also focuses on Germany’s role in the Indo-Pacific and a potential Chinese assault on Taiwan.
Professor Bjoern Alpermann from the University of Wuerzburg has been researching China’s minority policy in Tibet and Xinjiang for years. In light of the debate about the controversial Xinjiang opinion piece by two China researchers, he takes a critical look at German sinology. The field struggles with a lack of new talent, yet China expertise is currently in greater demand than ever before. In his opinion piece, Alpermann proposes how the discipline can gain more credibility.
Mr Gabriel, Annalena Baerbock is adopting a new tone towards Beijing. Some say that frank words are finally being used. Others warn that this will achieve nothing. As a former foreign minister, what is your take on how we should behave towards China?
You don’t have to have studied politics to know: If you only criticize and castigate a country in every interview, in every conversation, in every public appearance, then you cannot expect a pleasant conversational atmosphere when meeting face to face. How do we want to strengthen international climate action without China?
What way would be better?
We should follow the example of the United States and recognize that you face a difficult dilemma with China: On the one hand, China is a strategic rival; on the other hand, there are issues that we solve in the world without China. However, if you kick the Chinese in the shins from Monday to Friday like Mrs Baerbock, you won’t get far. The art of diplomacy is to remain in dialogue with those who have completely different values from our own. You don’t have to refrain from criticism in the process. But if Willy Brandt or Helmut Kohl had talked about the Soviet Union like that, achieving the unification of Germany would probably have been more difficult or would not have happened at all.
So, was Ms. Baerbock wrong to call the Chinese party and state leader Xi Jinping a dictator?
The Foreign Minister shows off herself and her values with this characterization. She is free to do that. But the question must be allowed: Does this labeling, which China perceives as an insult, help? Does it change anything in China? No. Does it make us interesting interlocutors? No. Do we represent German interests with it? Only if we understand our interests exclusively in normative terms.
So what should we do?
We are currently seeing China attempting to become the voice of the Global South. I would do all I can to make offers to the countries of the Global South. Without lecturing them normatively, by the way. The German Chancellor is actually showing how it can be done. I think that’s right. And as far as China is concerned, I would follow the examples of the Australians, the Japanese and the South Koreans. They are in a harsh security policy confrontation with China, yet they share the world’s largest free trade zone.
But the German ministers are all holding talks – including Ms. Baerbock.
Surely. But it seems we take the direct talks less seriously than interviews, where we actually speak to our voters. Once again, I would refer to the US: Take a clear line, but also do everything possible to establish a solid foundation for dialogue with the Chinese. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and his Chinese counterpart have spoken for 16 hours without much mention in the newspapers. Foreign policy with a megaphone tends to have only a domestic reach.
Is this the different accentuation between values- and interest-driven foreign policy?
I think the debate about values or interests is nonsense. It is always about both. You must not lose your compass and know that you must treat democracies and dictatorships differently. But we also have interests. The French and the British say: values apply internally, interests externally.
Isn’t that a bit too easy?
Of course, you can’t make it that simple for yourself. But we must learn to express our interests in the world and not be ashamed of them. In our country, many people live from the automobile industry. A large part of our prosperity has to do with it. However, representing the needs of this industry is slandered in the German media as lobbying, in a way that no other country in the world would do. To constantly defame the struggle to ensure that the Chinese car market is maintained as lobbying for the car industry shows a relatively limited knowledge about where Germany’s prosperity comes from. And also, by the way, what the prosperity of many Eastern European neighbors is based on.
The EU wants to investigate suspected subsidies to the Chinese car industry. A mistake? Some say that liberal rules apply and that China must abide by them. On the other hand, the German car industry fears that Brussels will destroy its business in China.
Investigating this suspicion is the right thing to do. Depending on the outcome, negotiations with the Chinese side may be necessary. My experience is that attempts to tackle economic difficulties with China through anti-dumping duties usually backfire. Germany is a popular country for Chinese countermeasures. The danger of such measures is that we end up in a spiral of protectionist measures. And a country like Germany always faces bigger problems than other parts of Europe.
What would be the right approach?
It is certainly necessary to remind China to comply with WTO standards and, if necessary, to take legal action. But this will probably not help in the long run. Europe and Germany have always fared well when we relied on our own strengths: expanding the internal market, improving investment conditions, especially for research and technology, implementing the Capital Markets Union, driving forward the single energy market. And we need to reform our planning and licensing laws. We have significantly expanded the individual appeals rights against planned infrastructure measures and thus narrowed the scope for political action considerably. Today, complaints are lodged against everything: from bicycle paths to railway lines to wind farms. We need to bring this back into balance.
Let’s go back to dealing with China. Its Minister of Defense has just been ousted. Before that, the foreign minister and important generals had to go. How to deal with such a country?
We do not know the reasons. Often, it’s accusations of corruption. We should focus on our concerns, for example, that German companies in China retain their intellectual property rights.
Here, Beijing replies: You want and want but offer nothing.
Oh, we have offered quite a lot and continue to do so. The liberalization of global markets, international division of labor, everything we mean by the term globalization, is what enabled China’s rise in the first place. What matters is that everyone plays by the same rules. That’s not too much to ask for.
And now China feels so strong that it is demanding more.
On the contrary, I believe that China is currently in a weak phase. Not only because of the mistakes of the zero-Covid strategy, but, above all, because of the massive demographic change in China. China is aging before it gets rich. However, possible social tensions also harbor risks.
Why?
Countries that are economically weak and where people grow dissatisfied often look for a foreign enemy.
At this point, many fear that Xi Jinping could now make a foreign policy move against Taiwan due to internal weakness. How great is the risk?
You have to know that in the early 1970s, we all accepted that the People’s Republic of China represented the whole of China, including Taiwan. Before 1971, it was the other way round: up to then, the Republic of China, i.e., Taiwan, represented the whole of China. Thus, the so-called One-China policy is not an invention of the People’s Republic. This results in the bizarre situation that Taiwan actually belongs to China under international law. However, de facto Taiwan is a vibrant and diverse democracy that is prospering economically and has less and less to do with the mainland. In the past, we have done well by maintaining this paradoxical status. Any attempt to change it makes the situation more volatile.
But isn’t China threatening to change this status quo with warships and military exercises?
Yes, of course. Still, I am more concerned about the emergence of so-called unintended conflicts than about an actual attack by China on Taiwan. The People’s Republic is still too weak for that. But there are simply many warships sailing around there, and unlike during the Cold War in Europe, there are practically no conflict management systems. The Australians, who are much closer to this conflict than we are, therefore propose to set up such conflict management structures to prevent military escalations in cases of conflict. I think that is a wise suggestion.
For instance?
Above all, it is about quick information and transparency. But both sides have to be willing to do this. The situation in Europe during the Cold War was good insofar as both sides accepted that the other side existed on their own doorstep and, therefore, had to come to terms with it. This is not the case in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. China does not accept the presence of the United States. That is why the US is strengthening its alliances with Australia, South Korea, Japan and others. Many countries in the region do not want Chinese dominance.
So, does it make sense for Germany to step up its security involvement in Asia and dispatch its frigate Bavaria?
I believe the US would rather expect us to ease the pressure in Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa, and not in the Indo-Pacific. That is not our turf.
But staying out of Asia completely would probably also be wrong. How should Germany engage with the region instead?
First of all, it is probably about learning much more about this region and about the Indo-Pacific. We don’t really know that much. So I would advise working much more closely with Australia, Japan and South Korea. These countries have massive problems with China in terms of security policy. At the same time, they are all in the largest free trade zone in the world. That is astonishing. These countries are wise advisors when it comes to dealing with China.
Is all this also an indication of general geopolitical shifts?
They are in full swing already. Two-thirds of humanity lives in the Indo-Pacific, two-thirds of the national product is generated there, with five countries now having nuclear weapons. 600 years of Eurocentricity are over. The world’s center of gravity is no longer the Atlantic, but the Indo-Pacific. What has now come to an end, somewhat belatedly, is the post-war order of the Second World War. Many countries that are important today sat at the side table. Until recently, we called them the Third World. These countries now demand their rights and no longer want to subordinate themselves to Western leadership.
What exactly are you basing this on?
The “no” to the sanctions against Russia from many countries of the Global South is a very loud “no” against the USA and against what we proudly call the West, but which, in the eyes of many other countries of the Global South, is only a synonym for their old colonial masters. This opposition to the West’s, and especially the United States’, claim to leadership is what unites these countries. Otherwise, even the members of the BRICS are not exactly best friends, for example, just think of the conflicts between India and China.
And what new order will emerge?
If you ask these countries that, you will not get just one answer. What unites the BRICS countries and their new members are usually economic interests. Or the attempt to build up regional security structures of their own, because the USA is no longer available without restrictions. This can be observed, for example, in the Middle East. For us Europeans, the problem is that we don’t play a role anywhere. In view of these tectonic shifts in the world’s power axes, Europe faces the threat of provincialization.
So, what is your prognosis?
As Europeans, we have our fate in our own hands. Germany and France are still in a position to dare a fresh start. And as far as the international order is concerned, we are probably going through a decade of uncertainty and instability. Preparing our people for this is a necessary condition for passing through it. And internationally, I would be happy if we could at least manage to re-establish a rule-based order with minimum standards like: You don’t invade your neighbor with tanks. But I fear that we will not see a liberal world order again any time soon. Michael Radunski and Stefan Braun
EU trade chief Valdis Dombrovskis has criticized trade with the People’s Republic as “very unbalanced” before meeting with China’s Vice Premier He Lifeng. The EU’s trade deficit is currently almost 400 billion euros per year out of a total trade volume of 865 billion euros. The Latvian native said this in a speech in Shanghai on Saturday at the Bund Summit financial forum.
“The EU also needs to protect itself in situations when its openness is abused. Our recent strategy on economic security aims to maximize the benefits of openness, while minimizing our strategic dependences and vulnerabilities,” said the EU commissioner.
Dombrovskis thus sets a confident tone for the EU in the run-up to the trade dialogue meeting. “We welcome global competition. But it must be conducted fairly.” Brussels is not planning to completely decouple from China – but de-risking is still necessary, Dombrovskis said. “Let me stress: de-risking is not decoupling. And the EU has no intention of decoupling from China.”
The EU trade commissioner will attend the 10th EU-China Trade Dialogue in Beijing on Monday. It is the first meeting of its kind to be held offline once again. In July 2022, the trade dialogue was held as a video call, at that time, with Vice Premier Liu He. The agenda for the meeting is packed. Besides the trade deficit mentioned by Dombrovskis, other important topics include:
In his Shanghai speech, Dombrovskis stressed that the EU wants to minimize dependencies for “a select number of strategic products” to maintain the bloc’s “open strategic autonomy.” However, he emphasized that global crises such as climate change should be tackled together. He ended his speech by calling on China to alleviate the debt burden of developing countries. These would have suffered from the recent interest rate hikes.
The Chinese propaganda newspaper Global Times called Dombrovskis’ trip and the trade dialogue a “litmus test” for both sides to smooth out differences. Among other things, the newspaper cited the planned ban on Huawei and ZTE in Germany as an example of the current problems.
Dombrovskis also met with Shanghai Mayor Gong Zheng over the weekend. Foreign companies contribute to the metropolis’ success, generating a quarter of GDP and accounting for eleven percent of jobs, the EU commissioner wrote on X, formerly Twitter. “With a more predictable and open business environment, we can do even better.”
In addition, Dombrovskis visited the German brake systems manufacturer Knorr-Bremse in Suzhou. The EU Commissioner is expected to make a press appearance after the trade dialogue on Monday. In Beijing, he is also scheduled to address students at Tsinghua University, the alma mater of China’s leader Xi Jinping.
Many sinologists may have thought, “Not that, too!” when the debate about the controversial Xinjiang opinion piece by renowned experts Thomas Heberer and Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer erupted last week.
The field has recently been going through a difficult phase. On the one hand, it is plagued by concerns about new talent, which can be blamed primarily on the political leadership in Beijing. Regardless of its actions against various democracy movements in Hong Kong since 2014, the persecution of ethnic minorities, threats against democratic Taiwan, territorial claims against neighbors, or the stifled economy due to “zero COVID,” negative reporting always decreases interest in China among new students.
Instead of learning Chinese, young East Asian enthusiasts prefer to turn to Korea and Japan, which offer more attractive cultural exports in the form of K-pop and manga. The fact that China almost completely closed itself off to visitors during the three years of the pandemic was equally fatal.
Yet, China expertise is in higher demand than ever in politics and the media, which is not surprising given the increasing economic and global political significance of the People’s Republic of China. Everyone involved in the discussion agrees that more China expertise is needed, although the consensus reaches its end when it comes to defining it.
Sinology thus faces an unbalanced demand situation that requires difficult adjustments. Conflicting goals have to be pursued. On the one hand, attempts are being made to attract more attention to China in schools – not only in order to recruit young students, but also because knowledge of the “Global South” is generally poor in Germany. On the other hand, academic sinology should position itself more strongly for political consulting and media work, but not neglect its important basic research. In view of low staffing numbers, this is an extremely difficult mission.
In addition to all this, there is the credibility problem of sinology in the eyes of its critics (often China sinologists themselves, who, however, exclude themselves when they speak of “German sinology”). It is precisely those who have been dealing with the country for the longest time, who have the best contacts and can therefore gather a wide range of information, who these critics accuse of having conflicts of interest. They claim to have made themselves susceptible to blackmail, to be fed honorary titles and positions, invitations and privileged field access, in order to then engage in scientific “whitewashing” of CP positions.
In fact, individual representatives of this group (but by no means all of them) repeatedly stand out in the media with relativizing statements. Other social scientists insist that serious research on China should, wherever possible, rely on field research. Otherwise, it would depend solely on written sources, which are notoriously censored in China. They, too, are now often quickly placed in the corner of the “China apologists.”
The vast majority of social science researchers on China reflect very carefully on which field approaches involve which compromises, where “red lines” are, where there are blind spots and how to compensate for them, or how China’s new laws on data security and against espionage affect their empirical work. All these topics are regularly discussed in panels at symposia and in special workshops, and are picked up in publications on research ethics.
It is this kind of serious and objective discussion that needs to continue, even if Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer’s Xinjiang travelogue seems to confirm the fears of critics regarding a pro-Beijing sinology. The reactions show that it does not represent the discipline as a whole. The swift objection that they reaped was important. But Sinology should be careful not to increasingly indulge in self-flagellation instead of constructively dealing with its challenges. Otherwise, it will fail to make the necessary adjustments to meet the challenges.
Bjoern Alpermann was born in 1972. He studied Modern Chinese Studies, Economics and Political Science at the University of Cologne and Nankai University, Tianjin. After a junior professorship at the University of Wuerzburg, Alpermann took over the chair of Contemporary Chinese Studies in 2013. One of his main areas of work deals with minority politics of the PRC in Xinjiang and Tibet. He regularly travels to the PRC for research visits.
EU Commission Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis awaits anything but an easy start to the week at the trade dialogue in Beijing this Monday. The agenda is riddled with delicate issues: EU-China relations were already strained before another sticking point was added with the anti-dumping investigations into Chinese EVs. The high trade deficit will also be a topic, Dombrovskis calls it “very unbalanced.” Amelie Richter takes a closer look at the difficult talks.
Sigmar Gabriel has a clear opinion on the EU’s anti-dumping investigations – as well as on the diplomatic skills of his successor in the post of German Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock. “If you kick the Chinese in the shins from Monday to Friday like Ms Baerbock, you won’t get far,” he says in an in-depth interview with Michael Radunski and Stefan Braun. The conversation also focuses on Germany’s role in the Indo-Pacific and a potential Chinese assault on Taiwan.
Professor Bjoern Alpermann from the University of Wuerzburg has been researching China’s minority policy in Tibet and Xinjiang for years. In light of the debate about the controversial Xinjiang opinion piece by two China researchers, he takes a critical look at German sinology. The field struggles with a lack of new talent, yet China expertise is currently in greater demand than ever before. In his opinion piece, Alpermann proposes how the discipline can gain more credibility.
Mr Gabriel, Annalena Baerbock is adopting a new tone towards Beijing. Some say that frank words are finally being used. Others warn that this will achieve nothing. As a former foreign minister, what is your take on how we should behave towards China?
You don’t have to have studied politics to know: If you only criticize and castigate a country in every interview, in every conversation, in every public appearance, then you cannot expect a pleasant conversational atmosphere when meeting face to face. How do we want to strengthen international climate action without China?
What way would be better?
We should follow the example of the United States and recognize that you face a difficult dilemma with China: On the one hand, China is a strategic rival; on the other hand, there are issues that we solve in the world without China. However, if you kick the Chinese in the shins from Monday to Friday like Mrs Baerbock, you won’t get far. The art of diplomacy is to remain in dialogue with those who have completely different values from our own. You don’t have to refrain from criticism in the process. But if Willy Brandt or Helmut Kohl had talked about the Soviet Union like that, achieving the unification of Germany would probably have been more difficult or would not have happened at all.
So, was Ms. Baerbock wrong to call the Chinese party and state leader Xi Jinping a dictator?
The Foreign Minister shows off herself and her values with this characterization. She is free to do that. But the question must be allowed: Does this labeling, which China perceives as an insult, help? Does it change anything in China? No. Does it make us interesting interlocutors? No. Do we represent German interests with it? Only if we understand our interests exclusively in normative terms.
So what should we do?
We are currently seeing China attempting to become the voice of the Global South. I would do all I can to make offers to the countries of the Global South. Without lecturing them normatively, by the way. The German Chancellor is actually showing how it can be done. I think that’s right. And as far as China is concerned, I would follow the examples of the Australians, the Japanese and the South Koreans. They are in a harsh security policy confrontation with China, yet they share the world’s largest free trade zone.
But the German ministers are all holding talks – including Ms. Baerbock.
Surely. But it seems we take the direct talks less seriously than interviews, where we actually speak to our voters. Once again, I would refer to the US: Take a clear line, but also do everything possible to establish a solid foundation for dialogue with the Chinese. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and his Chinese counterpart have spoken for 16 hours without much mention in the newspapers. Foreign policy with a megaphone tends to have only a domestic reach.
Is this the different accentuation between values- and interest-driven foreign policy?
I think the debate about values or interests is nonsense. It is always about both. You must not lose your compass and know that you must treat democracies and dictatorships differently. But we also have interests. The French and the British say: values apply internally, interests externally.
Isn’t that a bit too easy?
Of course, you can’t make it that simple for yourself. But we must learn to express our interests in the world and not be ashamed of them. In our country, many people live from the automobile industry. A large part of our prosperity has to do with it. However, representing the needs of this industry is slandered in the German media as lobbying, in a way that no other country in the world would do. To constantly defame the struggle to ensure that the Chinese car market is maintained as lobbying for the car industry shows a relatively limited knowledge about where Germany’s prosperity comes from. And also, by the way, what the prosperity of many Eastern European neighbors is based on.
The EU wants to investigate suspected subsidies to the Chinese car industry. A mistake? Some say that liberal rules apply and that China must abide by them. On the other hand, the German car industry fears that Brussels will destroy its business in China.
Investigating this suspicion is the right thing to do. Depending on the outcome, negotiations with the Chinese side may be necessary. My experience is that attempts to tackle economic difficulties with China through anti-dumping duties usually backfire. Germany is a popular country for Chinese countermeasures. The danger of such measures is that we end up in a spiral of protectionist measures. And a country like Germany always faces bigger problems than other parts of Europe.
What would be the right approach?
It is certainly necessary to remind China to comply with WTO standards and, if necessary, to take legal action. But this will probably not help in the long run. Europe and Germany have always fared well when we relied on our own strengths: expanding the internal market, improving investment conditions, especially for research and technology, implementing the Capital Markets Union, driving forward the single energy market. And we need to reform our planning and licensing laws. We have significantly expanded the individual appeals rights against planned infrastructure measures and thus narrowed the scope for political action considerably. Today, complaints are lodged against everything: from bicycle paths to railway lines to wind farms. We need to bring this back into balance.
Let’s go back to dealing with China. Its Minister of Defense has just been ousted. Before that, the foreign minister and important generals had to go. How to deal with such a country?
We do not know the reasons. Often, it’s accusations of corruption. We should focus on our concerns, for example, that German companies in China retain their intellectual property rights.
Here, Beijing replies: You want and want but offer nothing.
Oh, we have offered quite a lot and continue to do so. The liberalization of global markets, international division of labor, everything we mean by the term globalization, is what enabled China’s rise in the first place. What matters is that everyone plays by the same rules. That’s not too much to ask for.
And now China feels so strong that it is demanding more.
On the contrary, I believe that China is currently in a weak phase. Not only because of the mistakes of the zero-Covid strategy, but, above all, because of the massive demographic change in China. China is aging before it gets rich. However, possible social tensions also harbor risks.
Why?
Countries that are economically weak and where people grow dissatisfied often look for a foreign enemy.
At this point, many fear that Xi Jinping could now make a foreign policy move against Taiwan due to internal weakness. How great is the risk?
You have to know that in the early 1970s, we all accepted that the People’s Republic of China represented the whole of China, including Taiwan. Before 1971, it was the other way round: up to then, the Republic of China, i.e., Taiwan, represented the whole of China. Thus, the so-called One-China policy is not an invention of the People’s Republic. This results in the bizarre situation that Taiwan actually belongs to China under international law. However, de facto Taiwan is a vibrant and diverse democracy that is prospering economically and has less and less to do with the mainland. In the past, we have done well by maintaining this paradoxical status. Any attempt to change it makes the situation more volatile.
But isn’t China threatening to change this status quo with warships and military exercises?
Yes, of course. Still, I am more concerned about the emergence of so-called unintended conflicts than about an actual attack by China on Taiwan. The People’s Republic is still too weak for that. But there are simply many warships sailing around there, and unlike during the Cold War in Europe, there are practically no conflict management systems. The Australians, who are much closer to this conflict than we are, therefore propose to set up such conflict management structures to prevent military escalations in cases of conflict. I think that is a wise suggestion.
For instance?
Above all, it is about quick information and transparency. But both sides have to be willing to do this. The situation in Europe during the Cold War was good insofar as both sides accepted that the other side existed on their own doorstep and, therefore, had to come to terms with it. This is not the case in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. China does not accept the presence of the United States. That is why the US is strengthening its alliances with Australia, South Korea, Japan and others. Many countries in the region do not want Chinese dominance.
So, does it make sense for Germany to step up its security involvement in Asia and dispatch its frigate Bavaria?
I believe the US would rather expect us to ease the pressure in Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa, and not in the Indo-Pacific. That is not our turf.
But staying out of Asia completely would probably also be wrong. How should Germany engage with the region instead?
First of all, it is probably about learning much more about this region and about the Indo-Pacific. We don’t really know that much. So I would advise working much more closely with Australia, Japan and South Korea. These countries have massive problems with China in terms of security policy. At the same time, they are all in the largest free trade zone in the world. That is astonishing. These countries are wise advisors when it comes to dealing with China.
Is all this also an indication of general geopolitical shifts?
They are in full swing already. Two-thirds of humanity lives in the Indo-Pacific, two-thirds of the national product is generated there, with five countries now having nuclear weapons. 600 years of Eurocentricity are over. The world’s center of gravity is no longer the Atlantic, but the Indo-Pacific. What has now come to an end, somewhat belatedly, is the post-war order of the Second World War. Many countries that are important today sat at the side table. Until recently, we called them the Third World. These countries now demand their rights and no longer want to subordinate themselves to Western leadership.
What exactly are you basing this on?
The “no” to the sanctions against Russia from many countries of the Global South is a very loud “no” against the USA and against what we proudly call the West, but which, in the eyes of many other countries of the Global South, is only a synonym for their old colonial masters. This opposition to the West’s, and especially the United States’, claim to leadership is what unites these countries. Otherwise, even the members of the BRICS are not exactly best friends, for example, just think of the conflicts between India and China.
And what new order will emerge?
If you ask these countries that, you will not get just one answer. What unites the BRICS countries and their new members are usually economic interests. Or the attempt to build up regional security structures of their own, because the USA is no longer available without restrictions. This can be observed, for example, in the Middle East. For us Europeans, the problem is that we don’t play a role anywhere. In view of these tectonic shifts in the world’s power axes, Europe faces the threat of provincialization.
So, what is your prognosis?
As Europeans, we have our fate in our own hands. Germany and France are still in a position to dare a fresh start. And as far as the international order is concerned, we are probably going through a decade of uncertainty and instability. Preparing our people for this is a necessary condition for passing through it. And internationally, I would be happy if we could at least manage to re-establish a rule-based order with minimum standards like: You don’t invade your neighbor with tanks. But I fear that we will not see a liberal world order again any time soon. Michael Radunski and Stefan Braun
EU trade chief Valdis Dombrovskis has criticized trade with the People’s Republic as “very unbalanced” before meeting with China’s Vice Premier He Lifeng. The EU’s trade deficit is currently almost 400 billion euros per year out of a total trade volume of 865 billion euros. The Latvian native said this in a speech in Shanghai on Saturday at the Bund Summit financial forum.
“The EU also needs to protect itself in situations when its openness is abused. Our recent strategy on economic security aims to maximize the benefits of openness, while minimizing our strategic dependences and vulnerabilities,” said the EU commissioner.
Dombrovskis thus sets a confident tone for the EU in the run-up to the trade dialogue meeting. “We welcome global competition. But it must be conducted fairly.” Brussels is not planning to completely decouple from China – but de-risking is still necessary, Dombrovskis said. “Let me stress: de-risking is not decoupling. And the EU has no intention of decoupling from China.”
The EU trade commissioner will attend the 10th EU-China Trade Dialogue in Beijing on Monday. It is the first meeting of its kind to be held offline once again. In July 2022, the trade dialogue was held as a video call, at that time, with Vice Premier Liu He. The agenda for the meeting is packed. Besides the trade deficit mentioned by Dombrovskis, other important topics include:
In his Shanghai speech, Dombrovskis stressed that the EU wants to minimize dependencies for “a select number of strategic products” to maintain the bloc’s “open strategic autonomy.” However, he emphasized that global crises such as climate change should be tackled together. He ended his speech by calling on China to alleviate the debt burden of developing countries. These would have suffered from the recent interest rate hikes.
The Chinese propaganda newspaper Global Times called Dombrovskis’ trip and the trade dialogue a “litmus test” for both sides to smooth out differences. Among other things, the newspaper cited the planned ban on Huawei and ZTE in Germany as an example of the current problems.
Dombrovskis also met with Shanghai Mayor Gong Zheng over the weekend. Foreign companies contribute to the metropolis’ success, generating a quarter of GDP and accounting for eleven percent of jobs, the EU commissioner wrote on X, formerly Twitter. “With a more predictable and open business environment, we can do even better.”
In addition, Dombrovskis visited the German brake systems manufacturer Knorr-Bremse in Suzhou. The EU Commissioner is expected to make a press appearance after the trade dialogue on Monday. In Beijing, he is also scheduled to address students at Tsinghua University, the alma mater of China’s leader Xi Jinping.
Many sinologists may have thought, “Not that, too!” when the debate about the controversial Xinjiang opinion piece by renowned experts Thomas Heberer and Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer erupted last week.
The field has recently been going through a difficult phase. On the one hand, it is plagued by concerns about new talent, which can be blamed primarily on the political leadership in Beijing. Regardless of its actions against various democracy movements in Hong Kong since 2014, the persecution of ethnic minorities, threats against democratic Taiwan, territorial claims against neighbors, or the stifled economy due to “zero COVID,” negative reporting always decreases interest in China among new students.
Instead of learning Chinese, young East Asian enthusiasts prefer to turn to Korea and Japan, which offer more attractive cultural exports in the form of K-pop and manga. The fact that China almost completely closed itself off to visitors during the three years of the pandemic was equally fatal.
Yet, China expertise is in higher demand than ever in politics and the media, which is not surprising given the increasing economic and global political significance of the People’s Republic of China. Everyone involved in the discussion agrees that more China expertise is needed, although the consensus reaches its end when it comes to defining it.
Sinology thus faces an unbalanced demand situation that requires difficult adjustments. Conflicting goals have to be pursued. On the one hand, attempts are being made to attract more attention to China in schools – not only in order to recruit young students, but also because knowledge of the “Global South” is generally poor in Germany. On the other hand, academic sinology should position itself more strongly for political consulting and media work, but not neglect its important basic research. In view of low staffing numbers, this is an extremely difficult mission.
In addition to all this, there is the credibility problem of sinology in the eyes of its critics (often China sinologists themselves, who, however, exclude themselves when they speak of “German sinology”). It is precisely those who have been dealing with the country for the longest time, who have the best contacts and can therefore gather a wide range of information, who these critics accuse of having conflicts of interest. They claim to have made themselves susceptible to blackmail, to be fed honorary titles and positions, invitations and privileged field access, in order to then engage in scientific “whitewashing” of CP positions.
In fact, individual representatives of this group (but by no means all of them) repeatedly stand out in the media with relativizing statements. Other social scientists insist that serious research on China should, wherever possible, rely on field research. Otherwise, it would depend solely on written sources, which are notoriously censored in China. They, too, are now often quickly placed in the corner of the “China apologists.”
The vast majority of social science researchers on China reflect very carefully on which field approaches involve which compromises, where “red lines” are, where there are blind spots and how to compensate for them, or how China’s new laws on data security and against espionage affect their empirical work. All these topics are regularly discussed in panels at symposia and in special workshops, and are picked up in publications on research ethics.
It is this kind of serious and objective discussion that needs to continue, even if Heberer and Schmidt-Glintzer’s Xinjiang travelogue seems to confirm the fears of critics regarding a pro-Beijing sinology. The reactions show that it does not represent the discipline as a whole. The swift objection that they reaped was important. But Sinology should be careful not to increasingly indulge in self-flagellation instead of constructively dealing with its challenges. Otherwise, it will fail to make the necessary adjustments to meet the challenges.
Bjoern Alpermann was born in 1972. He studied Modern Chinese Studies, Economics and Political Science at the University of Cologne and Nankai University, Tianjin. After a junior professorship at the University of Wuerzburg, Alpermann took over the chair of Contemporary Chinese Studies in 2013. One of his main areas of work deals with minority politics of the PRC in Xinjiang and Tibet. He regularly travels to the PRC for research visits.
