Reshuffling at the CCP + Taiwan’s language centers
Generational discord in Party leadership
Taiwan to compete with Confucius Institutes
Xi warns against expansion of military alliances
Another Tibetan activist arrested
Sri Lanka hopes for financial aid
No Hong Kong ads on Brussels streetcar
Tiktok to broadcast 2022 soccer World Cup
Profile: Human rights activist Wang Yaqiu
Dear reader,
According to the old rule, a change of power would follow at the National Party Congress of the CP at the end of the year. This is what the great reformer Deng Xiaoping once dictated: To avoid a second Mao dictatorship, the baton was supposed to be passed on at least every ten years. And those who have reached retirement age should also step down. Xi Jinping has revoked this limit for himself.
Still, it is going to be an exciting one. After all, it is still completely unclear who will be part of the future leadership apart from him. Will Xi also hold on to other cadres from his networks in the seat of power? And won’t this deprive an entire generation of future top cadres of their careers? To kick off our Party Congress coverage, Christiane Kuehl looks at who has a chance of being part of the new leadership. And who does not.
Confucius Institutes around the globe have fallen into disrepute for being too close to the Chinese state leadership. So it was only natural that Taiwan sensed an opportunity to promote itself internationally. Mandarin language centers with a “Taiwanese touch” and a bit of cultural education – that is what the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is promising.
Most Western countries will probably gratefully accept it. Taiwan’s offer is certainly motivated by more than mere altruism. But the exchange and transfer of knowledge with Asia’s model democracy will not hurt anyone here, either.
Your Felix Lee
Feature
The sixth generation: stalled for the CP leadership
One of the most prominent of the sixth generation of CP officials: Chongqing’s Party Chief Chen Min’er (left) in 2018 during a visit to Tunisia.
Like every five years in the early summer, the great speculation begins: Who will take which post at the upcoming Party Congress of China’s communists? Technically, the old guard around Party leader Xi Jinping would have to step down at the 20th Party Congress in October – everyone who is 68 years or older. Xi himself has just turned 69. But since Xi abolished term limits for the presidency, there is virtually no doubt that China’s strongman will secure a third term at least. So will other over-68 cadres also remain in their chairs?
“The personnel changes at the upcoming congress are simultaneously more anticipated and less predictable than most previous congresses,” believes Cheng Li, Director of the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center in Washington and one of the most experienced observers of the CP leadership circles. More anticipated, because Xi’s protégés will fill more leadership positions. Less predictable because some norms and rules established in the post-Deng era no longer apply – the mandatory retirement age and term limits for top offices.
Nevertheless, Cheng Li believes that the majority of the older generation will retire. He expects that after the Party Congress, the new “sixth-generation” of those born after 1960 will make up about two-thirds of the new Central Committee with its 376 members and the majority of the 25-member Politburo. Accordingly, four or five younger members will ascend to the Politburo Standing Committee, which currently has seven members, Li predicts. Only Xi (born in 1953) and a few loyalists are likely to remain there, Li believes.
Xi Jinping stays, but who will become Premier?
At lower ranks and administrative levels, this generational shift has already taken place, Li writes. “Among China’s 31 provinces and four municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing), all but one of the governors or mayors were born in the 1960s, with 94 percent appointed in the past couple of years.”
The problem: This cohort should now provide the Party leader. But Xi’s continued claim to power has prevented them from taking the top office: If Xi remains in office for another ten years, this generation would also be at retirement age by the end of his rule, at least according to the customs of the pre-Xi era. So far, there are no indications that a crown prince will be installed this fall for a possible succession to power in 2027.
Which position can the younger ones secure?
It is uncertain how much frustration this will cause among the cadres – and it will certainly depend on which offices the sixth generation can now claim. One opportunity is the office of Prime Minister. Incumbent Li Keqiang (born 1955) stressed in March that he was now serving his last year in office. It is also considered certain that Vice President Wang Qishan will retire in March 2023 – he is over 70. No clear favorites are emerging for either position.
It is not clear how the newcomers will position themselves politically. “Each generation of leaders carries a distinct blend of experiences in terms of collective memory, personal socialization, political networking, career paths, educational and professional credentials, and administrative background,” Cheng Li says. The 6G cadres were between 9 and 18 years old when Deng Xiaoping launched economic reforms in 1978 – and between 20 and 29 when hopes for political reform were literally crushed during the Tiananmen massacre. Many of their predecessors – including Xi himself – had been sent to work the land in the countryside in their youth during the Cultural Revolution. The impression left could hardly be more different.
CP China: candidates for political rise
But who of the 6G politicians, aged between 53 and 62, will make it to the top? The selection process is even more opaque than it used to be, when there were different factions within the Party – such as the Youth League – which were known to produce certain representatives destined to move up, explains Nis Gruenberg, who researches the Party elite at Merics’ China Institute. For example, Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao, as well as current Premier Li Keqiang, all came from the Youth League faction. “Nowadays, there is really only one big Xi faction. Those who belong to other factions have fewer chances to move up,” Gruenberg says.
Among the younger up-and-coming politicians in the Xi faction is Chen Min’er, Party Chief of Chongqing and, as such, also a member of the Politburo. He has been associated with leadership posts for some time. But it remains unclear where Chen’s journey will take him. “The Xi faction is also not necessarily homogeneous. As long as you loyally follow Xi Jinping’s policies, you are part of the family,” Gruenberg says.
It is also not entirely clear how the criteria for promotion have changed. “The criteria that someone must have been Vice President to move up to the top has been abolished by Xi for the time being,” Gruenberg says. Xi appointed Wang Qishan, a Vice President who was actually already scraping the age limit at the time. Other conditions, however, remain similar. “Does someone have provincial experience, central government experience, such as in ministries, or – even better – central Party functions?” says Gruenberg. “Until now, it was also important to have already been in the Politburo for at least one legislative term.”
Selection process for the Party’s leadership
In addition to Chen Min’er, the candidates frequently mentioned for the Standing Committee include Vice Premier Hu Chunhua (1963) and Ding Xuexiang, Director of the CP General Office (1962). Until recently, Shanghai Party leader Li Qiang (1959) had also been considered a contender. But then came the chaotic lockdown in his city. Gruenberg believes the Party will now hash out whether Li still has any chances. “Until the Beidaihe meeting and consultations in August, the horse-trading for posts will continue. While the Party may blame the mayor of Shanghai or the director of the health authority for the lockdown’s mistakes, the lockdown likely cost Li Qiang political capital, in part because the lockdown has lasted so long.”
Women will continue to be underrepresented at the top. The current Central Committee has just ten women as full members. They represent 4.9 percent of the membership. With Chen Yiqin in Guizhou, there is only one female provincial Party leader. Chen (1959) is the only serious candidate for the Politburo – to replace the only woman currently serving there, Vice Premier Sun Chunlan (born 1950). Thus, there will be no woman on the Standing Committee even 100 years after the Party was founded.
Chinese Communist Party
Domestic policy of the CP China
Xi Jinping
Chinese lessons made in Taiwan
The People’s Republic of China is still at the forefront when it comes to offering “Chinese as a foreign language”. However, due to ongoing censorship and propaganda accusations, the Chinese Confucius Institutes have come under blanket suspicion in Europe and the USA. Just last week, German Minister of Education Bettina Stark-Watzinger expressed concerns that Confucius Institutes are being politically instrumentalized by the Chinese Communist Party.
Taiwan sees the growing skepticism toward China as an opportunity to expand its influence in the West. In August 2021, the government’s own Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC) announced plans to establish 100 Taiwan Centers for Mandarin Learning (TCML) within the next four years. A total of over NT$440 million (more than €14 million) is to be provided for this purpose.
USA and Taiwan cooperate on language training
The main impetus for this new education initiative came from Washington. With a clause in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Trump administration had forced schools and universities to choose between funding from the Department of Defense or cooperation with Confucius Institutes. The State Department also used its scholarship program to draw attention to Chinese language learning opportunities outside the People’s Republic. Then, in December 2020, the United States and Taiwan signed a memorandum of understanding to further expand their bilateral cooperation in language education.
Officially, Taiwan’s government emphasizes that it has no intention of competing with the Chinese Confucius Institutes. OCAC Minister Tung Chen-yuan, however, never tires of pointing out the differences between the Chinese and Taiwanese language centers. “Our democratic system guarantees freedom of speech,” Tung states. A direct swipe at the censorship allegations against the Confucius Institutes.
Unlike Confucius Institutes, Taiwanese language centers are not located at universities. Taiwan’s initiative relies entirely on the support of Taiwanese communities abroad and their private Chinese schools. The first Taiwan Center for Mandarin Learning in Germany was founded in September 2021 by the Chinesischer Verein Hamburg, which has operated a Chinese language school in the Hanseatic city since 1961. A total of 45 TCMLs have been opened across the globe to date, 35 of which are in the United States. There are two each in Germany, France, and the UK.
The second language center in Germany was opened in Heidelberg at the start of the year. Its activities have been suspended since #MeToo allegations against the Deputy Director Thomas W. surfaced in May. As a result, a debate is simmering in Taiwan about the extent to which government agencies have fulfilled their oversight obligations for awarding funding to the language center and how victims abroad can be better supported. The Taiwanese representative in Germany, Shieh Jhy-wey, explained that no public funds had flowed to Heidelberg so far. In addition, Thomas W. resigned from his post shortly after the allegations became public.
Language institutes are not centralized
Taiwan’s government wants to make a big difference quickly, with relatively limited resources. The initiative is not centralized. It only offers funding and support to local actors who want to set up such a center at their existing Chinese school. Thus, the authorities have little influence on the teacher selection and the quality of the curriculum. Of the teachers listed in the Heidelberg Language Center’s project application, only one individual possessed an official certification as a teacher of “Chinese as a foreign language”.
Speaking with China.Table, the chairwoman of Taiwan’s Association of Teaching Chinese as a Second Language, Peng Ni-se, confirms that it would be almost impossible to verify the qualifications of all teachers abroad. “Some are very experienced teachers, and for others, we don’t know how they got into teaching. It’s very mixed,” Peng said. But the OCAC is aware of this, and published the “Let’s Learn Mandarin” textbook last year and produced accompanying instructional videos to provide didactic support for teachers on the ground.
No clear course in the ruling party
Taiwan’s international situation continues to create new obstacles for sending language teachers, Peng said. For example, teachers often have to be replaced every two years because their residence permits would not be renewed. “We discussed this for a long time and came to the conclusion that the best solution is to train Chinese teachers locally. That way we don’t have to send someone new every two years.” It is a matter of staff continuity in teaching, Peng said.
In the meantime, Taiwan’s passive strategy even causes confusion within the government party. In October 2021, DPP MP Chiu Chih-wei urged OCAC Minister Tung in parliament to become more active in Eastern European countries friendly to Taiwan. “You need to set up targeted and planned language centers in these key countries to deepen the bilateral relationship through Chinese language teaching, not passively waiting for these countries to request,” Chiu said. Minister Tung replied that the government could only “encourage” local schools, but is unable to decide which countries would set up TCMLs.
Japanese news magazine Nikkei Asia recently reported that a third language center in Germany was already being planned in Berlin. However, upon further inquiry, representative Shieh told China.Table that the opening is not expected to take place this year. He did not rule out an application for an opening next year, however. “There are already experienced and dedicated Chinese schools in Berlin, but they use the premises of local schools for teaching and therefore can only teach on weekends.”
Similar initiative failed
Eleven years ago, the Ma Ying-Jeou government had already established a similar initiative. Under the direction of the Ministry of Culture, the so-called “Taiwan Academy” was supposed to spread a “Chinese culture of Taiwanese character”. Apart from three institutes in the United States, however, no other offshoots were founded and the program was not pursued further. When asked whether the TCMLs might meet the same fate as the Taiwan Academy, Peng was cautiously optimistic: “There is a clear plan this time, which includes textbooks and training for teachers. Last time, there were no textbooks, and teacher training was not as clearly regulated as it is now.” David Demes
Culture
Geopolitics
Language
Taiwan
News
Xi warns NATO
In a speech before the start of the BRICS economic summit, China’s state and party leader Xi Jinping warned against an expansion of international military alliances. The Ukraine crisis was a “wake-up call,” he said, according to Chinese state media, but directed his criticism not at Russia’s war of aggression but at the United States and its ally. He warned against “expanding military alliances and seeking one’s own security at the expense of other countries’ security”.
China has repeatedly refused to condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and instead blamed NATO for the escalation. A week ago, Xi pledged support on issues of “sovereignty and security” in a phone call with Russian leader Vladimir Putin. In his speech, Xi again also criticized sanctions against Russia imposed by the United States and the EU. Sanctions are “a boomerang,” he said.
The so-called BRICS group includes China, Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa. Together, they represent more than 40 percent of the global population and almost a quarter of the world’s gross domestic product. In addition to China, India and South Africa also abstained from voting on a UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China and India have also been purchasing more oil and gas from Russia since the outbreak of the war.
According to Putin, Russia is undergoing a fundamental change in its trade policy. Business is currently being directed toward other BRICS countries. Currently, a greater presence of Chinese carmakers on the Russian market is being discussed, as is the opening of branches of Indian supermarket chains. flee/rtr
Geopolitics
Nato
Russia
Trade
USA
Tibetan sentenced for translations
Chinese authorities continue their campaign against Tibetan intellectuals with another long prison sentence against an activist. In mid-June, a Sichuan court found a father of two guilty of alleged “separatist activities” and “creating social disorder”. He was sentenced to nearly four and a half years in prison.
The man identified as Thupten Lodoe had campaigned for the preservation of the Tibetan language. He used social media to spread his translations of English- or Chinese texts into Tibetan. Friends of the convict told Radio Free Asia that Lodoe was considered by authorities to be a threat to so-called national security, a euphemism for political dissent of any kind. He is said to have been in contact with Tibetan exiles.
Lodoe was arrested by provincial government officials last October. This is unusual and an expression of the urgency of the authorities’ action. Typically, officials from the relevant districts handle such arrests. Lodoe is from Shiqu in the Garzê Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.
According to Lodoe’s personal contacts, authorities had offered him a position in the administration with a monthly salary of ¥10,000, about €1,400. However, Lodoe reportedly declined the offer to devote himself further to the preservation of the Tibetan language.
As in similar cases, friends and relatives do not know where exactly the Tibetan is imprisoned. Often, Chinese authorities keep the whereabouts secret for years. At the beginning of the year, the United Nations drew attention to three cases (China.Table reported) and requested concrete information from the People’s Republic on prisons and prison conditions. The case of the teacher Rinchen Kyi was followed by her release a few weeks later (China.Table reported). grz
Civil Society
Human Rights
Tibet
Sri Lanka requests help from China, India and Japan
Bankrupt Sri Lanka is seeking financial support from China, India and Japan. The South Asian state plans to invite the three countries to a donor conference soon. Sri Lanka is currently experiencing its worst economic crisis of the past 70 years. The country’s foreign exchange reserves have been depleted. Essential imports such as food, medicine and fuel can no longer be paid for. The situation is compounded by rising inflation. As a result of the shortages, unrest has erupted in the population, Reuters reports. The country is now seeking a bailout program from the International Monetary Fund and help from friendly nations. “We will also ask the US for help,” said Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe.
India and China have struggled for influence over Sri Lanka in the past. India has so far provided aid worth $4 billion. China is considering Sri Lanka’s request to renegotiate the terms of a so-called currency swap worth the equivalent of $1.5 billion. Currency swaps involve countries exchanging two different currencies. In this case, Sri Lanka has received yuan in order to pay for imports denominated in yuan. nib
Finance
Geopolitics
India
Japan
Sri Lanka
USA
Brussels bans Hong Kong ad
Following complaints from customers, the City of Brussels has canceled advertisements on several streetcars commemorating the 25th anniversary of the transfer of Hong Kong. The two streetcars with the slogan “A New Era – Stability. Prosperity. Opportunity.” were supposed to have been running in the Belgian capital until August 29, according to the South China Morning Post. However, following complaints from passengers, the ads have now been withdrawn, said a spokeswoman for Brussels transport operator STIB. Complaints about the campaign have also surfaced on social media, the spokeswoman said.
“”STIB has a publicity charter which stipulates, among other things, that no publicity may be disseminated with political connotations,” the spokeswoman said, according to the report. Hong Kong’s representation in Brussels expressed disappointment over the decision. The ad was reportedly approved by STIB before the start of the campaign. Streetcars with the ad for the handover of Hong Kong also run on the streets of Istanbul, Lisbon and Milan.
Resistance is also mounting in Italy. Politicians in Milan filed a complaint with the mayor, according to local media reports. They said the message on the streetcars was “a symbol of Chinese oppression”. However, the respective streetcars have not yet been removed from service. ari
Belgium
Geopolitics
Hongkong
Soccer World Cup 2022 live on TikTok
The video app Douyin (also known as TikTok in the West) will broadcast the 2022 World Cup live in China. Its parent company ByteDance was chosen as a partner by the China Media Group, which owns the state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV), among others, as business portal Caixin reported. The China Media Group wants to create an interactive program about the World Cup in Qatar together with Douyin.
Along with Douyin, ByteDance-backed newsfeed app Toutiao and video-sharing platform Xigua are also allowed to broadcast clips from the 2022 World Cup. ari
ByteDance
Soccer
Sports
Technology
Tiktok
Profile
Yaqiu Wang – a voice for justice
Yaqiu Wang, Senior Researcher China at Human Rights Watch
When asked about the motivation behind her human rights activism in China, Yaqiu Wang, Senior China Researcher at Human Rights Watch, frowns slightly: “My birth was already a human rights issue.” As the third-born at the time of the one-child policy, she quickly learned what it meant to live under state control and repression.
She learned early on that her mother had to hide with relatives during her pregnancy to avoid forced abortion. Luckily, this was successful, but led to Wang growing up in poverty, as her family was fined for not having an abortion.
On top of that, she was largely alone with her problems and her shame. Because at school, she couldn’t reveal anything about her family situation for fear of stigmatization and ostracism. “I felt so voiceless, I felt unfree. But because of state indoctrination, I didn’t even have the language to express that.”
During her college years in China, she realized that this situation did not have to be permanent when she discovered the depths of the Internet – for her at the time a “historical treasure trove” that held such finds like a critical account of the Tiananmen massacre.
Defender of freedom of expression
In 2012, Wang returned to the People’s Republic from the USA after earning her master’s degree. She was confident that she would be able to support China’s path toward a constitutional democracy on the ground. But immediately upon arrival, she was detained: “I was literally a nobody! That spoke volumes about the extensive surveillance that all Chinese around the world are subjected to.”
Consequently, for her own safety, she couldn’t work in this China. However, she has not abandoned her ideals to this day. She has just pursued them since 2017 from New York, where the headquarters of Human Rights Watch China is located.
At the moment, Wang’s work focuses on censorship, the protection of human rights activists and women’s rights. She primarily works on current issues, but also deals with people who are in immediate danger.
But she also has her sights on longer-term trends: “We’re all about making effective change, so we have to be adaptable.” Because even if there’s no prominent place in the news cycle for the fact that men are explicitly favored in many job postings, it’s vital to also address such injustices. After all, no fewer than several hundred million women are affected.
Those with a voice have a responsibility
Although Wang conducts most of her research online in New York, she is globally connected through Human Rights Watch’s many offices and contacts. Naturally, also to China.
But when it comes to matters such as reports of forced labor in the factories of German companies in Xinjiang, she can ask the Berlin office to get her an appointment with the German government or the companies in question. Whether she then brings these requests to a wider audience through her confidants in the media depends on the situation, because “greater publicity does not necessarily equate to greater effectiveness”.
She is well aware that her mostly harsh criticism of China could be picked up and distorted by some to stir up racist resentment. However, Wang knows no intimidation: “But at least I have a voice here, the Uyghurs have none. I would never hold my tongue regarding China for fear of being instrumentalized.” Julius Schwarzwaelder
Civil Society
Human Rights Watch
Xinjiang
Executive Moves
Stefan Mecha will be the new CEO of the Volkswagen Passenger Cars brand in China and Head of Group Sales at Volkswagen Group China.
Volkswagen
Dessert
Sometimes beauty only becomes visible from a bird’s eye view, as this huge water reservoir in the southeast of China’s Guizhou province impressively demonstrates.
According to the old rule, a change of power would follow at the National Party Congress of the CP at the end of the year. This is what the great reformer Deng Xiaoping once dictated: To avoid a second Mao dictatorship, the baton was supposed to be passed on at least every ten years. And those who have reached retirement age should also step down. Xi Jinping has revoked this limit for himself.
Still, it is going to be an exciting one. After all, it is still completely unclear who will be part of the future leadership apart from him. Will Xi also hold on to other cadres from his networks in the seat of power? And won’t this deprive an entire generation of future top cadres of their careers? To kick off our Party Congress coverage, Christiane Kuehl looks at who has a chance of being part of the new leadership. And who does not.
Confucius Institutes around the globe have fallen into disrepute for being too close to the Chinese state leadership. So it was only natural that Taiwan sensed an opportunity to promote itself internationally. Mandarin language centers with a “Taiwanese touch” and a bit of cultural education – that is what the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is promising.
Most Western countries will probably gratefully accept it. Taiwan’s offer is certainly motivated by more than mere altruism. But the exchange and transfer of knowledge with Asia’s model democracy will not hurt anyone here, either.
Your Felix Lee
Feature
The sixth generation: stalled for the CP leadership
One of the most prominent of the sixth generation of CP officials: Chongqing’s Party Chief Chen Min’er (left) in 2018 during a visit to Tunisia.
Like every five years in the early summer, the great speculation begins: Who will take which post at the upcoming Party Congress of China’s communists? Technically, the old guard around Party leader Xi Jinping would have to step down at the 20th Party Congress in October – everyone who is 68 years or older. Xi himself has just turned 69. But since Xi abolished term limits for the presidency, there is virtually no doubt that China’s strongman will secure a third term at least. So will other over-68 cadres also remain in their chairs?
“The personnel changes at the upcoming congress are simultaneously more anticipated and less predictable than most previous congresses,” believes Cheng Li, Director of the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center in Washington and one of the most experienced observers of the CP leadership circles. More anticipated, because Xi’s protégés will fill more leadership positions. Less predictable because some norms and rules established in the post-Deng era no longer apply – the mandatory retirement age and term limits for top offices.
Nevertheless, Cheng Li believes that the majority of the older generation will retire. He expects that after the Party Congress, the new “sixth-generation” of those born after 1960 will make up about two-thirds of the new Central Committee with its 376 members and the majority of the 25-member Politburo. Accordingly, four or five younger members will ascend to the Politburo Standing Committee, which currently has seven members, Li predicts. Only Xi (born in 1953) and a few loyalists are likely to remain there, Li believes.
Xi Jinping stays, but who will become Premier?
At lower ranks and administrative levels, this generational shift has already taken place, Li writes. “Among China’s 31 provinces and four municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing), all but one of the governors or mayors were born in the 1960s, with 94 percent appointed in the past couple of years.”
The problem: This cohort should now provide the Party leader. But Xi’s continued claim to power has prevented them from taking the top office: If Xi remains in office for another ten years, this generation would also be at retirement age by the end of his rule, at least according to the customs of the pre-Xi era. So far, there are no indications that a crown prince will be installed this fall for a possible succession to power in 2027.
Which position can the younger ones secure?
It is uncertain how much frustration this will cause among the cadres – and it will certainly depend on which offices the sixth generation can now claim. One opportunity is the office of Prime Minister. Incumbent Li Keqiang (born 1955) stressed in March that he was now serving his last year in office. It is also considered certain that Vice President Wang Qishan will retire in March 2023 – he is over 70. No clear favorites are emerging for either position.
It is not clear how the newcomers will position themselves politically. “Each generation of leaders carries a distinct blend of experiences in terms of collective memory, personal socialization, political networking, career paths, educational and professional credentials, and administrative background,” Cheng Li says. The 6G cadres were between 9 and 18 years old when Deng Xiaoping launched economic reforms in 1978 – and between 20 and 29 when hopes for political reform were literally crushed during the Tiananmen massacre. Many of their predecessors – including Xi himself – had been sent to work the land in the countryside in their youth during the Cultural Revolution. The impression left could hardly be more different.
CP China: candidates for political rise
But who of the 6G politicians, aged between 53 and 62, will make it to the top? The selection process is even more opaque than it used to be, when there were different factions within the Party – such as the Youth League – which were known to produce certain representatives destined to move up, explains Nis Gruenberg, who researches the Party elite at Merics’ China Institute. For example, Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao, as well as current Premier Li Keqiang, all came from the Youth League faction. “Nowadays, there is really only one big Xi faction. Those who belong to other factions have fewer chances to move up,” Gruenberg says.
Among the younger up-and-coming politicians in the Xi faction is Chen Min’er, Party Chief of Chongqing and, as such, also a member of the Politburo. He has been associated with leadership posts for some time. But it remains unclear where Chen’s journey will take him. “The Xi faction is also not necessarily homogeneous. As long as you loyally follow Xi Jinping’s policies, you are part of the family,” Gruenberg says.
It is also not entirely clear how the criteria for promotion have changed. “The criteria that someone must have been Vice President to move up to the top has been abolished by Xi for the time being,” Gruenberg says. Xi appointed Wang Qishan, a Vice President who was actually already scraping the age limit at the time. Other conditions, however, remain similar. “Does someone have provincial experience, central government experience, such as in ministries, or – even better – central Party functions?” says Gruenberg. “Until now, it was also important to have already been in the Politburo for at least one legislative term.”
Selection process for the Party’s leadership
In addition to Chen Min’er, the candidates frequently mentioned for the Standing Committee include Vice Premier Hu Chunhua (1963) and Ding Xuexiang, Director of the CP General Office (1962). Until recently, Shanghai Party leader Li Qiang (1959) had also been considered a contender. But then came the chaotic lockdown in his city. Gruenberg believes the Party will now hash out whether Li still has any chances. “Until the Beidaihe meeting and consultations in August, the horse-trading for posts will continue. While the Party may blame the mayor of Shanghai or the director of the health authority for the lockdown’s mistakes, the lockdown likely cost Li Qiang political capital, in part because the lockdown has lasted so long.”
Women will continue to be underrepresented at the top. The current Central Committee has just ten women as full members. They represent 4.9 percent of the membership. With Chen Yiqin in Guizhou, there is only one female provincial Party leader. Chen (1959) is the only serious candidate for the Politburo – to replace the only woman currently serving there, Vice Premier Sun Chunlan (born 1950). Thus, there will be no woman on the Standing Committee even 100 years after the Party was founded.
Chinese Communist Party
Domestic policy of the CP China
Xi Jinping
Chinese lessons made in Taiwan
The People’s Republic of China is still at the forefront when it comes to offering “Chinese as a foreign language”. However, due to ongoing censorship and propaganda accusations, the Chinese Confucius Institutes have come under blanket suspicion in Europe and the USA. Just last week, German Minister of Education Bettina Stark-Watzinger expressed concerns that Confucius Institutes are being politically instrumentalized by the Chinese Communist Party.
Taiwan sees the growing skepticism toward China as an opportunity to expand its influence in the West. In August 2021, the government’s own Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC) announced plans to establish 100 Taiwan Centers for Mandarin Learning (TCML) within the next four years. A total of over NT$440 million (more than €14 million) is to be provided for this purpose.
USA and Taiwan cooperate on language training
The main impetus for this new education initiative came from Washington. With a clause in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Trump administration had forced schools and universities to choose between funding from the Department of Defense or cooperation with Confucius Institutes. The State Department also used its scholarship program to draw attention to Chinese language learning opportunities outside the People’s Republic. Then, in December 2020, the United States and Taiwan signed a memorandum of understanding to further expand their bilateral cooperation in language education.
Officially, Taiwan’s government emphasizes that it has no intention of competing with the Chinese Confucius Institutes. OCAC Minister Tung Chen-yuan, however, never tires of pointing out the differences between the Chinese and Taiwanese language centers. “Our democratic system guarantees freedom of speech,” Tung states. A direct swipe at the censorship allegations against the Confucius Institutes.
Unlike Confucius Institutes, Taiwanese language centers are not located at universities. Taiwan’s initiative relies entirely on the support of Taiwanese communities abroad and their private Chinese schools. The first Taiwan Center for Mandarin Learning in Germany was founded in September 2021 by the Chinesischer Verein Hamburg, which has operated a Chinese language school in the Hanseatic city since 1961. A total of 45 TCMLs have been opened across the globe to date, 35 of which are in the United States. There are two each in Germany, France, and the UK.
The second language center in Germany was opened in Heidelberg at the start of the year. Its activities have been suspended since #MeToo allegations against the Deputy Director Thomas W. surfaced in May. As a result, a debate is simmering in Taiwan about the extent to which government agencies have fulfilled their oversight obligations for awarding funding to the language center and how victims abroad can be better supported. The Taiwanese representative in Germany, Shieh Jhy-wey, explained that no public funds had flowed to Heidelberg so far. In addition, Thomas W. resigned from his post shortly after the allegations became public.
Language institutes are not centralized
Taiwan’s government wants to make a big difference quickly, with relatively limited resources. The initiative is not centralized. It only offers funding and support to local actors who want to set up such a center at their existing Chinese school. Thus, the authorities have little influence on the teacher selection and the quality of the curriculum. Of the teachers listed in the Heidelberg Language Center’s project application, only one individual possessed an official certification as a teacher of “Chinese as a foreign language”.
Speaking with China.Table, the chairwoman of Taiwan’s Association of Teaching Chinese as a Second Language, Peng Ni-se, confirms that it would be almost impossible to verify the qualifications of all teachers abroad. “Some are very experienced teachers, and for others, we don’t know how they got into teaching. It’s very mixed,” Peng said. But the OCAC is aware of this, and published the “Let’s Learn Mandarin” textbook last year and produced accompanying instructional videos to provide didactic support for teachers on the ground.
No clear course in the ruling party
Taiwan’s international situation continues to create new obstacles for sending language teachers, Peng said. For example, teachers often have to be replaced every two years because their residence permits would not be renewed. “We discussed this for a long time and came to the conclusion that the best solution is to train Chinese teachers locally. That way we don’t have to send someone new every two years.” It is a matter of staff continuity in teaching, Peng said.
In the meantime, Taiwan’s passive strategy even causes confusion within the government party. In October 2021, DPP MP Chiu Chih-wei urged OCAC Minister Tung in parliament to become more active in Eastern European countries friendly to Taiwan. “You need to set up targeted and planned language centers in these key countries to deepen the bilateral relationship through Chinese language teaching, not passively waiting for these countries to request,” Chiu said. Minister Tung replied that the government could only “encourage” local schools, but is unable to decide which countries would set up TCMLs.
Japanese news magazine Nikkei Asia recently reported that a third language center in Germany was already being planned in Berlin. However, upon further inquiry, representative Shieh told China.Table that the opening is not expected to take place this year. He did not rule out an application for an opening next year, however. “There are already experienced and dedicated Chinese schools in Berlin, but they use the premises of local schools for teaching and therefore can only teach on weekends.”
Similar initiative failed
Eleven years ago, the Ma Ying-Jeou government had already established a similar initiative. Under the direction of the Ministry of Culture, the so-called “Taiwan Academy” was supposed to spread a “Chinese culture of Taiwanese character”. Apart from three institutes in the United States, however, no other offshoots were founded and the program was not pursued further. When asked whether the TCMLs might meet the same fate as the Taiwan Academy, Peng was cautiously optimistic: “There is a clear plan this time, which includes textbooks and training for teachers. Last time, there were no textbooks, and teacher training was not as clearly regulated as it is now.” David Demes
Culture
Geopolitics
Language
Taiwan
News
Xi warns NATO
In a speech before the start of the BRICS economic summit, China’s state and party leader Xi Jinping warned against an expansion of international military alliances. The Ukraine crisis was a “wake-up call,” he said, according to Chinese state media, but directed his criticism not at Russia’s war of aggression but at the United States and its ally. He warned against “expanding military alliances and seeking one’s own security at the expense of other countries’ security”.
China has repeatedly refused to condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and instead blamed NATO for the escalation. A week ago, Xi pledged support on issues of “sovereignty and security” in a phone call with Russian leader Vladimir Putin. In his speech, Xi again also criticized sanctions against Russia imposed by the United States and the EU. Sanctions are “a boomerang,” he said.
The so-called BRICS group includes China, Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa. Together, they represent more than 40 percent of the global population and almost a quarter of the world’s gross domestic product. In addition to China, India and South Africa also abstained from voting on a UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China and India have also been purchasing more oil and gas from Russia since the outbreak of the war.
According to Putin, Russia is undergoing a fundamental change in its trade policy. Business is currently being directed toward other BRICS countries. Currently, a greater presence of Chinese carmakers on the Russian market is being discussed, as is the opening of branches of Indian supermarket chains. flee/rtr
Geopolitics
Nato
Russia
Trade
USA
Tibetan sentenced for translations
Chinese authorities continue their campaign against Tibetan intellectuals with another long prison sentence against an activist. In mid-June, a Sichuan court found a father of two guilty of alleged “separatist activities” and “creating social disorder”. He was sentenced to nearly four and a half years in prison.
The man identified as Thupten Lodoe had campaigned for the preservation of the Tibetan language. He used social media to spread his translations of English- or Chinese texts into Tibetan. Friends of the convict told Radio Free Asia that Lodoe was considered by authorities to be a threat to so-called national security, a euphemism for political dissent of any kind. He is said to have been in contact with Tibetan exiles.
Lodoe was arrested by provincial government officials last October. This is unusual and an expression of the urgency of the authorities’ action. Typically, officials from the relevant districts handle such arrests. Lodoe is from Shiqu in the Garzê Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.
According to Lodoe’s personal contacts, authorities had offered him a position in the administration with a monthly salary of ¥10,000, about €1,400. However, Lodoe reportedly declined the offer to devote himself further to the preservation of the Tibetan language.
As in similar cases, friends and relatives do not know where exactly the Tibetan is imprisoned. Often, Chinese authorities keep the whereabouts secret for years. At the beginning of the year, the United Nations drew attention to three cases (China.Table reported) and requested concrete information from the People’s Republic on prisons and prison conditions. The case of the teacher Rinchen Kyi was followed by her release a few weeks later (China.Table reported). grz
Civil Society
Human Rights
Tibet
Sri Lanka requests help from China, India and Japan
Bankrupt Sri Lanka is seeking financial support from China, India and Japan. The South Asian state plans to invite the three countries to a donor conference soon. Sri Lanka is currently experiencing its worst economic crisis of the past 70 years. The country’s foreign exchange reserves have been depleted. Essential imports such as food, medicine and fuel can no longer be paid for. The situation is compounded by rising inflation. As a result of the shortages, unrest has erupted in the population, Reuters reports. The country is now seeking a bailout program from the International Monetary Fund and help from friendly nations. “We will also ask the US for help,” said Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe.
India and China have struggled for influence over Sri Lanka in the past. India has so far provided aid worth $4 billion. China is considering Sri Lanka’s request to renegotiate the terms of a so-called currency swap worth the equivalent of $1.5 billion. Currency swaps involve countries exchanging two different currencies. In this case, Sri Lanka has received yuan in order to pay for imports denominated in yuan. nib
Finance
Geopolitics
India
Japan
Sri Lanka
USA
Brussels bans Hong Kong ad
Following complaints from customers, the City of Brussels has canceled advertisements on several streetcars commemorating the 25th anniversary of the transfer of Hong Kong. The two streetcars with the slogan “A New Era – Stability. Prosperity. Opportunity.” were supposed to have been running in the Belgian capital until August 29, according to the South China Morning Post. However, following complaints from passengers, the ads have now been withdrawn, said a spokeswoman for Brussels transport operator STIB. Complaints about the campaign have also surfaced on social media, the spokeswoman said.
“”STIB has a publicity charter which stipulates, among other things, that no publicity may be disseminated with political connotations,” the spokeswoman said, according to the report. Hong Kong’s representation in Brussels expressed disappointment over the decision. The ad was reportedly approved by STIB before the start of the campaign. Streetcars with the ad for the handover of Hong Kong also run on the streets of Istanbul, Lisbon and Milan.
Resistance is also mounting in Italy. Politicians in Milan filed a complaint with the mayor, according to local media reports. They said the message on the streetcars was “a symbol of Chinese oppression”. However, the respective streetcars have not yet been removed from service. ari
Belgium
Geopolitics
Hongkong
Soccer World Cup 2022 live on TikTok
The video app Douyin (also known as TikTok in the West) will broadcast the 2022 World Cup live in China. Its parent company ByteDance was chosen as a partner by the China Media Group, which owns the state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV), among others, as business portal Caixin reported. The China Media Group wants to create an interactive program about the World Cup in Qatar together with Douyin.
Along with Douyin, ByteDance-backed newsfeed app Toutiao and video-sharing platform Xigua are also allowed to broadcast clips from the 2022 World Cup. ari
ByteDance
Soccer
Sports
Technology
Tiktok
Profile
Yaqiu Wang – a voice for justice
Yaqiu Wang, Senior Researcher China at Human Rights Watch
When asked about the motivation behind her human rights activism in China, Yaqiu Wang, Senior China Researcher at Human Rights Watch, frowns slightly: “My birth was already a human rights issue.” As the third-born at the time of the one-child policy, she quickly learned what it meant to live under state control and repression.
She learned early on that her mother had to hide with relatives during her pregnancy to avoid forced abortion. Luckily, this was successful, but led to Wang growing up in poverty, as her family was fined for not having an abortion.
On top of that, she was largely alone with her problems and her shame. Because at school, she couldn’t reveal anything about her family situation for fear of stigmatization and ostracism. “I felt so voiceless, I felt unfree. But because of state indoctrination, I didn’t even have the language to express that.”
During her college years in China, she realized that this situation did not have to be permanent when she discovered the depths of the Internet – for her at the time a “historical treasure trove” that held such finds like a critical account of the Tiananmen massacre.
Defender of freedom of expression
In 2012, Wang returned to the People’s Republic from the USA after earning her master’s degree. She was confident that she would be able to support China’s path toward a constitutional democracy on the ground. But immediately upon arrival, she was detained: “I was literally a nobody! That spoke volumes about the extensive surveillance that all Chinese around the world are subjected to.”
Consequently, for her own safety, she couldn’t work in this China. However, she has not abandoned her ideals to this day. She has just pursued them since 2017 from New York, where the headquarters of Human Rights Watch China is located.
At the moment, Wang’s work focuses on censorship, the protection of human rights activists and women’s rights. She primarily works on current issues, but also deals with people who are in immediate danger.
But she also has her sights on longer-term trends: “We’re all about making effective change, so we have to be adaptable.” Because even if there’s no prominent place in the news cycle for the fact that men are explicitly favored in many job postings, it’s vital to also address such injustices. After all, no fewer than several hundred million women are affected.
Those with a voice have a responsibility
Although Wang conducts most of her research online in New York, she is globally connected through Human Rights Watch’s many offices and contacts. Naturally, also to China.
But when it comes to matters such as reports of forced labor in the factories of German companies in Xinjiang, she can ask the Berlin office to get her an appointment with the German government or the companies in question. Whether she then brings these requests to a wider audience through her confidants in the media depends on the situation, because “greater publicity does not necessarily equate to greater effectiveness”.
She is well aware that her mostly harsh criticism of China could be picked up and distorted by some to stir up racist resentment. However, Wang knows no intimidation: “But at least I have a voice here, the Uyghurs have none. I would never hold my tongue regarding China for fear of being instrumentalized.” Julius Schwarzwaelder
Civil Society
Human Rights Watch
Xinjiang
Executive Moves
Stefan Mecha will be the new CEO of the Volkswagen Passenger Cars brand in China and Head of Group Sales at Volkswagen Group China.
Volkswagen
Dessert
Sometimes beauty only becomes visible from a bird’s eye view, as this huge water reservoir in the southeast of China’s Guizhou province impressively demonstrates.
