Table.Briefing: China

Shadow bank debt + Xiaomi car

Dear reader,

Germany’s car manufacturers again need to be strong when looking to China. Mobile phone manufacturer Xiaomi plans to launch its SU7 saloon in early 2024. Who cares about panel gaps when the new car looks good, has 663 HP, and presumably also a long range – at an absolutely competitive price? Although the vehicle data published by the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Technology does not yet include any exact details about the battery, the more expensive version is expected to have a Qilin battery from CATL, which promises particularly long ranges and very fast charging. Christian Domke-Seidel analyzes the new player’s chances of success in China’s car market. Xiaomi apparently rates them as very high – annual production capacities for 200,000 cars are available.

Positive news from the car market meets concerns about the financial sector. Zhongzhi is insolvent, the wealth manager can no longer repay much of the money entrusted to it. Investors are out of luck. After banks stopped lending money to property developers, Zhongzhi provided them with billions from its own portfolio to keep them solvent, reports Marcel Grzanna. Beijing tolerates this so-called shadow banking, but it could cause the crisis in the property sector to spread. Because if property companies are unable to repay their debts to the financial managers, there is a risk of a domino effect.

Another concerning report comes from the health sector: Respiratory diseases and, in northern China, pneumonia in children are being diagnosed very frequently. Hospitals are at capacity, and the WHO has already requested data from China. It is unclear whether China is simply catching up on its waves of colds after the years of lockdown, or whether something more serious is going on.

Your
Julia Fiedler
Image of Julia  Fiedler

Feature

Next payment default fuels concerns about China’s financial system

Evergrande residential complex in Nanjing: The property developer’s bankruptcy has shaken China’s self-perception of its economic strength to its very core.

The news about the insolvency of Chinese financial conglomerate Zhongzhi probably came as a shock to many customers. Since Thursday, the wealth management company has officially been unable to repay large parts of its entrusted money.

“The resources available for debt repayment in the short term are much lower than the group’s overall debt scale,” it said. “The Zhongzhi group deeply apologizes for the losses caused to investors.” Zhongzhi’s almost 60 billion euros liabilities are offset by around 25 billion euros on the credit side.

Customers who closely followed the financial news could have realized a few months ago that the air was getting thin for Zhongzhi and, consequently, for their own capital. In the summer, one of the group’s trust fund providers missed payment deadlines. An alarm signal that heralded disaster for investors.

Shadow banking as a kind of self-deception

While customers mourn their lost investments, the supervisory authorities look at the financial group’s most recent default with growing concern. After all, it is closely linked to the property sector. Zhongzhi has provided developers with billions from its own portfolio to keep them solvent after the banks have stopped lending them money.

This practice is called shadow banking and is tolerated by Beijing. It is a kind of self-deception to avoid having to look the real risks directly in the eye. The fear that the crisis in the property sector will spill over into the stability of the financial system is correspondingly high. This is because the use of wealth managers as shadow bankers – in the true sense of the word – leaves much in the shadows. A domino effect could tear a deep hole in the state banking system if property companies cannot service their debts to fiscal authorities.

Set of measures to prop up the sector

It was probably no coincidence that news leaked out on Thursday that Chinese banks are now allowed to issue unsecured short-term loans to property developers. Bloomberg reported this. The measure is part of a package to prop up the ailing property sector and prevent it from spreading to the banks.

“The finance sector’s fortunes are closely related to the property sector due to the big developers’ high gearing ratio,” said Ding Haifeng, a consultant at Shanghai financial advisory firm Integrity. “A collapse of the real estate sector will absolutely lead to a wave of bad assets in banks, trust firms and insurers,” Ding predicts.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress has warned against false data published by small and medium-sized financial institutions. They could conceal potential problems when official figures do not “truly reflect the actual situation,” according to the minutes of the meeting published on Wednesday, which took place back in October. The Committee was concerned that the data could be “inflated.” The financial supervisory authority was asked to identify the existing risks immediately.

Zhongzhi insolvency is the next warning

The cracks in the foundations grow ever wider. Last year, Beijing already identified the “prevention and resolution of financial risks” as a key priority at the Central Economic Work Conference. The insolvency of property developer Evergrande has shaken China’s self-image of its economic strength to its very foundation. The country is plagued by the fear of the consequences of a collapsing property market, as Japan experienced in the 1980s.

China’s financial regulator is well aware of the problem and has been counteracting it for years. In 2020, the central bank defined three “red lines” for the property sector. These defined the leverage ratio, net gearing and the ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities. So far, with limited success. Many developers continue to overstep the lines. The Zhongzhi case is now the next warning that things must change fast before the financial sector reaches a tipping point.

Xiaomi’s EV rolls up the car market

Visitors to the World Robot Conference in Beijing at the booth of the smartphone manufacturer, which is now making a big push into electromobility.

Xiaomi is the next billion-dollar manufacturer to enter China’s car market. The tech giant has big plans and is willing to invest a lot of money.

Xiaomi will launch its first EV, the SU7, in spring 2024. The vehicle’s key data and design show that (at least in China) car manufacturing is no longer an exclusive art that only OEMs can master. This is also because electric mobility is changing the demands on cars. However, this alone is no guarantee of success for tech giants with billions in their coffers. With its countless manufacturers and enormous overcapacity, the Chinese car market is facing consolidation.

Solid EV Xiaomi SU7

The Chinese Ministry of Industry and Technology has published documents revealing Xiaomi’s first electric car. It is called the Beijing Xiaomi SU7 and will be manufactured by the state-owned Beijing Automotive Group (BAIC). What sounds like a leak to European ears is part of the approval process and likely part of the marketing strategy. After all, the documents came with professional photos.

The documents also reveal the key data of the Beijing Xiaomi SU7. The sporty-looking saloon will measure just under five meters in length. Depending on the variant – the “Pro” and “Max” versions are already known – it will have between 299 and 663 horsepower. The SU7 has an 800-volt on-board electrical system and an LFP battery from BYD for the cheaper versions, while the more expensive models have an NMC battery from CATL. There is still no concrete information about its capacity (market observers speculate around 100 kilowatt-hours) or range.

The data clearly shows that electromobility is turning the car market upside down. Just a few years ago, a company from outside the industry presenting realistic technical data that would also look good on an established manufacturer would have been unthinkable. Even Tesla had to spend years on research and invest enormous amounts of money to develop a car suitable for everyday use for mass production.

Perfect timing for Xiaomi

But that is precisely what Xiaomi has done. A plant with an annual capacity of 200,000 vehicles is already on standby in Beijing. Production will commence in December 2023, and 100,000 vehicles are expected to be sold by 2024. The fact that Xiaomi has received approval for all of this is at least a vote of confidence from the government. After all, the authorities have become more cautious. China’s car plants have a total annual capacity of around 43 million vehicles. However, last year, they were only operating at half capacity. Tesla, for instance, was not allowed to expand its Shanghai plant this year.

Xiaomi is currently in a strong position. Profits of China’s largest smartphone manufacturer soared by 183 percent in the third quarter of 2023 compared to the – admittedly difficult – previous year. Xiaomi plans on investing ten billion US dollars in the automotive business over the next ten years. Some analysts are enthusiastic. For example, the Japanese financial company Daiwa expects the share price to rise to around 15 Hong Kong dollars in the coming months – a 58 percent increase.

Discount battle – a sign of overcapacity

And the Chinese car market also appears to be slowly recovering. October 2023 was the third month in a row with growing sales figures. An increase of 10 percent compared to the previous year meant total sales of two million vehicles in October. An increase of 20 percent is even expected for November. This is because many manufacturers are trying to achieve their annual sales targets as the year nears its end.

However, many manufacturers are bogged down in a discount battle, highlighting problems in the Chinese car market, such as the aforementioned overcapacity. “The automotive sector was already in a very miserable state, with profit margins at a historic low of just 4.5 percent in September,” the German Manager Magazin quotes Cui Dongshu from the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA) as saying.

Xiaomi is by no means the first gold digger from outside the sector to hit the car market. Huawei cooperates with Chery to make money in the booming EV growth market. Baidu has founded a joint brand with Geely, and Alibaba is involved in a joint venture with SAIC. Start-ups such as NIO, Xpeng and BYD also focus on EVs. Around 100 brands are vying for customers – market consolidation is inevitable and politically desired. This does not even take European OEMs into account, who are making considerable efforts to catch up on electromobility.

  • Electromobility
  • Smartphone
  • Xiaomi

Events

Nov. 27, 2023 1 p.m. CET (8 p.m. CST)
Mercator Institute for China Studies, Future China Lecture with Professor Xiang Biao: The self and the world: Changing worldviews among Chinese youths More

Nov. 28, 2023 3 p.m. CST
Dezan Shira & Associates, Event (in Nanjing) Managing Costs: Optimizing Your Workforce and Tax Avoidance in China More

Nov. 28, 2023 4 p.m. CST
German Chamber of Commerce in China, Symposium (in Chengdu): Intellectual Property Protection in China: Key Issues & Current Developments More

Nov. 28, 2023 10 a.m. CET (5 p.m. CST)
German-Chinese Business Association e.V., Webinar: Digital Marketing in China: How to Reach Chinese Consumers Online More

Nov. 28, 2023 5:30 p.m. CET (Nov. 29, 12:30 a.m. CST)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Book Event: The Autocrat’s Predicament: The Political Peril of Economic Upgrade in Single Party, Authoritarian Regimes More

Nov. 23, 2023
Nanjing Fair, Fair (in Nanjing): Business Delegation: 2023 Innovation Fair More

Nov. 23, 2023 a.m. CET
ASEAC and ECAA, lecture (in Duesseldorf): A new Dawn of Arbitration in Asia? Digitization – Supply Chain Risks – Rethinking of Arbitration clauses and venues – Enforcement Challenges More

Nov. 29, 2023; 2 p.m. CST
German Chamber of Commerce in China, GCC Automotive Salon (in Shanghai): Rethinking the Future of the Automotive Ecosystem More

Nov. 29, 2023; 3:30 p.m. CST
Rödl & Partner, Roadshow: Navigating Through A Day Of A Manager In China More

Nov. 29, 2023; 6 p.m. CET (Nov. 30, 1 a.m. CST)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Critical Issues Confronting China Series: China’s Long March: From Politics to Economics and From Economics to Politics More

Nov. 30, 2023; 11 a.m. CET (6 p.m. CST)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Global China Conversations #26: The Chinese Anti-espionage Law: What Risks for Companies and the Scientific Community? More

Nov. 30, 2023; 9 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
EU SME Center, Webinar: Open Innovation: Opportunities and Challenges in China More

Nov. 30, 2023; 4:30 p.m. CET (11:30 p.m. CST)
EU SME Center, Webinar: China’s Outbound Tourism: Opportunities for Service Providers & Destinations More

News

Beijing: No unusual pathogens found

In response to a request from the World Health Organization (WHO), the Chinese authorities announced on Thursday that no unusual or novel pathogens or unusual clinical manifestations had been found, including in Beijing and the north-eastern province of Liaoning. The World Health Organization (WHO) has requested more detailed information from China on the rising number of respiratory diseases and reports of increasing cases of pneumonia in children. This was announced in a press release. According to Reuters, the Chinese WHO office described the request as a “routine check.” China’s National Health Commission did not initially respond to a request for comment.

On Thursday, the National Health Commission urged hospitals to ramp up their treatment capacity for common infections and serious illnesses, Nikkei Asia reports. It also recommended that patients with mild symptoms visit primary healthcare facilities – doctors in private practice – and avoid hospitals already swamped with patients with longer waiting times and a high risk of cross-infection.

Footage shows overcrowded hospitals

In its request, the WHO refers to a press conference held by the Chinese authorities on 13 November, at which they reported an increase in respiratory diseases in China. The increase was attributed to the end of COVID-19 restrictions and the spread of known pathogens such as influenza, and mycoplasma pneumoniae – a bacterial infection that mostly affects younger children – the RSV and SARS-CoV-2 viruses. In other words, well-known pathogens, albeit in clusters.

The organization also cited media reports and a report from the public reporting system Promed, according to which cases of undiagnosed pneumonia in children are increasing in northern China. Media in Xi’an in the north-west, for example, shared videos of hospitals overcrowded with parents and children. It is unclear to what extent the two developments are connected.

Many other countries have seen a similar surge in respiratory illnesses after the pandemic measures were lifted. “It is just a relatively large seasonal surge, perhaps partly due to chance and partly because there’s a bit of ‘immunity debt’ from the lesser winter surges in the last three years,” said Ben Cowling, an epidemiologist at Hong Kong University.” rtr/cyb

  • Coronavirus
  • WHO

Taiwan election: Chaos engulfs Taiwan’s opposition

The united front of Taiwan’s opposition parties will probably not happen. Instead of challenging the government with a worthy joint candidate, an embarrassing dispute broke out on Thursday. Candidates for the presidential election next January must register by Friday. The chances of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) getting their act together by the deadline are incredibly slim.

Last week, the KMT and TPP agreed to field a joint candidate to boost their chances significantly. The members of both parties were supposed to decide on a candidate in a vote. The candidates are:

  • Ko Wen-je from the TPP, a doctor, and
  • Hou Yu-ih from the KMT, a former police officer.

Terry Gou, the billionaire founder of electronics manufacturer Foxconn, wanted to act as a mediator. On Thursday, however, a meeting between Gou and the two candidates went terribly wrong. The top politicians engaged in a verbal clash – in front of journalists and TV crews.

Among other things, Hou read out private mobile phone messages from Ko. A KMT spokesperson said in the evening that the KMT had been humiliated, but was sticking to the idea of a joint candidate. However, all indications point to Hou definitely planning to run in the election. In turn, the TPP announced that Ko would declare his candidacy this Friday. fin

  • Taiwan

Greek officials urged to avoid Taiwan events

EU Taiwan

Greek officials have apparently been urged in and outside the country to refrain from attending events hosted by Taiwan. Nikkei Asia reports this, citing an email from October 4 in which the Greek Foreign Ministry urges diplomats and officials to avoid a reception in Athens on the occasion of Taiwan’s National Day.

The memo from October 4 states, among other things, that “the participation of ministers, members of parliament and civil officials in receptions or events of the Representative Office must be avoided.” This would be “perceived as an indirect recognition of Taiwan’s independence” and could cause “serious problems” for relations between Greece and China. The memo, labeled “urgent” and signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandra Papadopoulou, also warned against meetings with Taiwanese officials in Greek government buildings or de facto embassies, so-called Taipei Representative Offices.

The Greek Foreign Ministry and the Taipei Representative Office in Athens declined to comment. China is Greece’s largest trading partner after the EU and is economically highly active in the EU country. During a recent visit to Beijing, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis spoke out in favor of further expanding business relations and said that Greece could play a bridging role in EU-China relations.

The EU is divided in its stance towards Taiwan. Some countries openly support Taiwan, including Lithuania, which China has exerted enormous pressure on since it opened a Taiwan office in the country over two years ago. Countries such as Greece and Hungary are much more cautious to avoid angering Beijing. jul

  • EU
  • Greece
  • Taiwan

Carbon footprint planned for 50 products

China has committed itself to setting up a carbon footprint database by 2025 and introducing the option of calculating the carbon footprint of 50 products. This could be expanded to 200 products by 2030. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planner, published a document to this effect on its website on Wednesday. In doing so, the country is once again aiming to fulfill Xi Jinping’s promise to achieve the emissions peak before 2030. This was reported by the South China Morning Post.

The announcement was published on Wednesday, but dates back to November 13, before the summit between Xi and US President Joe Biden. Observers commented that China, the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, intends to use its methods for calculating its carbon footprint to catch up with other countries, especially since the European Union’s new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism came into force last month. A 2021 study by Tsinghua University concluded that the EU law would put China, the world’s largest producer of industrial raw materials such as cement and steel, under the most pressure. cyb

  • Climate
  • Emissions
  • EU

China Perspective

Semantic criticism after diplomatic gaffe

Following a meeting with his counterpart Xi Jinping on November 15 in San Francisco, US President Joe Biden once again referred to him as a “dictator” at a press conference. Both Biden and the Chinese side played down this gaffe. This showed an unmistakable desire on both sides to maintain the somewhat improved relations between China and the US. At a fund-raiser in June, Biden made this claim once before, which China indignantly rejected at the time.

Biden made the comment in June unprompted. This time, however, he was responding to a journalist asking him whether he would stand by it. Of course, he would say yes, but he qualified it to dilute its offensiveness. “He is a dictator in the sense that he’s a guy who runs a country that is a communist country that’s based on a form of government totally different than ours,” Biden said. 

Tacit understanding

China took the cue. Asked to comment on Biden’s words in a routine briefing the next day, foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning only protested perfunctorily. “The statement is extremely wrong and irresponsible political manipulation, which China resolutely opposes,” she said. 

However, she only made her central point afterward. There are always “some people with ulterior motives who are trying to sow discord and destroy relations between China and the US,” but this will not succeed, Mao added. Although she did not elaborate on who these people were, she seemed to be referring to the two journalists who had directed the questions to Biden and herself, respectively. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who grimaced at the dictator question in San Francisco, should now be relieved.

The magic of naming

     In CCP language, Xi Jinping has the “supreme determining authority (定于一尊 dìng yú yì zūn).” The term, introduced in 2018 for Xi’s status shortly after the abolishment of the Chinese presidency’s term limit, effectively pronounced the abandonment of the Politburo Standing Committee’s “collective leadership,” a key device of power-sharing in the one-party rule, which had been in place since the late 1970s. 

“Supreme determining authority” was actually first used for the Qin Dynasty’s First Emperor. Though elegantly expressed in classical Chinese, it bears the same meaning as dictator. The people of an old civilization know the magic of naming. In a well-known legend from the Qin Dynasty (221 – 207 B.C.), entourage members of a powerful man were punished for calling a deer deer after he already called it a horse.

As written in its constitution, China claims it is a democracy. In 2019, Xi Jinping coined a new beautiful term, “whole-process democracy” (全过程民主 quán guò chéng mín zhǔ), to describe China’s political system, whatever it means. 

Dictatorship from the party’s perspective

      A one-man rule is in Chinese独裁 (dú cái); a dictator is 独裁者 (dú cái zhě) or 独夫 (dú fū). 

In the CCP narrative of Chinese history for the past century, the only person qualifying as 独裁者 was Chiang Kai-shek, who ruled China between 1927 and 1949. During the 1930s and 1940s, Mao and his fellow rebels kept calling for real democracy and accused Chiang of being a dictator. Chiang was indeed a dictator. But after Mao and his fellow communists defeated him and drove his Nationalist government to Taiwan, Mao became a more brutal, more effective dictator. Officially, he is, of course, apotheosized as a great leader, helmsman and THE founding father of the New China.  

 The Chinese government seldom called any contemporary foreigner a dictator. After all, people from Nicolae Ceaușescu to Saddam Hussein, Fidel Castro to Robert Mugabe, and Vladimir Putin to Kim Jong-un were or are all China’s friends, or at least, friends in name.  

Democracy ‘with Chinese characteristics’

 Totalitarianism (极权jí quán) and authoritarianism (专制zhuān zhì) are also negative words in Chinese. Chinese officials and most Chinese citizens with some basic real knowledge of politics know they actually live under dictatorship, autocracy, totalitarianism, authoritarianism, or whatever it is called.  

But they wouldn’t say so, either for fear of the consequences of labeling the regime so or because of the pain of admitting to be living under such a terrible name. In the end, most would resort to the official cliché: China has a democracy “with Chinese characteristics” or a political system that best fits the country.  

And it is not only about the moniker. After decades of brainwashing, the Chinese public tends to accept the argument that Western democracy won’t work in a country as big and complicated as China. Just look at India, what a country of failure, some would say. By contrast, China could mobilize resources much more efficiently to become a real global power. 

However, personal experiences overseas and, particularly, the Xi regime’s governance blunders in the past few years have made many skeptical, estranged or even antagonized to the regime, although it’s difficult to estimate how much of the population has ditched the official narrative in their hearts. 

China’s ‘good dictatorship’

The San Francisco – Beijing dictator episode unleashed a binge of semantic analysis on news media outside China, both in English and Chinese. Some commentators said dictatorship is not necessarily a bad word in China. After all, it is something the communist regime uses to define itself. Article one of China’s constitution reads: “The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state governed by a people’s democratic dictatorship….”  Dictatorship, in a sense, is 专政(zhuān zhèng) in Chinese. 

The wording in the constitution’s version during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) was more in line with orthodox Marxism-Leninism terminology, calling China a “dictatorship of the proletariat.” It was much more frequently cited back then than the “people’s democratic dictatorship” is now and was often paired with “iron fist.” Whenever “the iron fist of the dictatorship of the proletariat” was uttered, some “class enemy” would be verbally or physically abused, put into prison, or even executed.

In Xi’s youth, this was an everyday expression. It would probably make him nostalgic if he heard it today. After all, he belongs to the Red Guard generation.

Executive Moves

Serhan Kurt is now Head of Purchasing for the EU division at the Chinese battery manufacturer SVOLT in Frankfurt am Main. He joined from Diehl Metall, where he was responsible for supply chain processes.

Bertil Abel from EU Asia Consulting has joined the China Netzwerk Baden-Württemberg e.V. (CNBW). Abel is an expert in supply chain organization and procurement in China.

Is something changing in your organization? Let us know at heads@table.media!

Dessert

Who wouldn’t want to find a centuries-old rhinoceros horn mug worth several thousand euros in a garage? British TV personality Charles Hanson does this sort of thing for a living, on camera, of course. He is particularly proud of his latest find: He calls the drinking vessel from the late 17th or early 18th century, which a couple had deposited in his garage, a “magical object.” In ancient Chinese mythology, the rhinoceros horn was said to have an aphrodisiac effect, and it was also believed to be able to detect poison and change color to warn of danger. The cup is now being auctioned off.

China.Table editorial team

CHINA.TABLE EDITORIAL OFFICE

Licenses:
    Dear reader,

    Germany’s car manufacturers again need to be strong when looking to China. Mobile phone manufacturer Xiaomi plans to launch its SU7 saloon in early 2024. Who cares about panel gaps when the new car looks good, has 663 HP, and presumably also a long range – at an absolutely competitive price? Although the vehicle data published by the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Technology does not yet include any exact details about the battery, the more expensive version is expected to have a Qilin battery from CATL, which promises particularly long ranges and very fast charging. Christian Domke-Seidel analyzes the new player’s chances of success in China’s car market. Xiaomi apparently rates them as very high – annual production capacities for 200,000 cars are available.

    Positive news from the car market meets concerns about the financial sector. Zhongzhi is insolvent, the wealth manager can no longer repay much of the money entrusted to it. Investors are out of luck. After banks stopped lending money to property developers, Zhongzhi provided them with billions from its own portfolio to keep them solvent, reports Marcel Grzanna. Beijing tolerates this so-called shadow banking, but it could cause the crisis in the property sector to spread. Because if property companies are unable to repay their debts to the financial managers, there is a risk of a domino effect.

    Another concerning report comes from the health sector: Respiratory diseases and, in northern China, pneumonia in children are being diagnosed very frequently. Hospitals are at capacity, and the WHO has already requested data from China. It is unclear whether China is simply catching up on its waves of colds after the years of lockdown, or whether something more serious is going on.

    Your
    Julia Fiedler
    Image of Julia  Fiedler

    Feature

    Next payment default fuels concerns about China’s financial system

    Evergrande residential complex in Nanjing: The property developer’s bankruptcy has shaken China’s self-perception of its economic strength to its very core.

    The news about the insolvency of Chinese financial conglomerate Zhongzhi probably came as a shock to many customers. Since Thursday, the wealth management company has officially been unable to repay large parts of its entrusted money.

    “The resources available for debt repayment in the short term are much lower than the group’s overall debt scale,” it said. “The Zhongzhi group deeply apologizes for the losses caused to investors.” Zhongzhi’s almost 60 billion euros liabilities are offset by around 25 billion euros on the credit side.

    Customers who closely followed the financial news could have realized a few months ago that the air was getting thin for Zhongzhi and, consequently, for their own capital. In the summer, one of the group’s trust fund providers missed payment deadlines. An alarm signal that heralded disaster for investors.

    Shadow banking as a kind of self-deception

    While customers mourn their lost investments, the supervisory authorities look at the financial group’s most recent default with growing concern. After all, it is closely linked to the property sector. Zhongzhi has provided developers with billions from its own portfolio to keep them solvent after the banks have stopped lending them money.

    This practice is called shadow banking and is tolerated by Beijing. It is a kind of self-deception to avoid having to look the real risks directly in the eye. The fear that the crisis in the property sector will spill over into the stability of the financial system is correspondingly high. This is because the use of wealth managers as shadow bankers – in the true sense of the word – leaves much in the shadows. A domino effect could tear a deep hole in the state banking system if property companies cannot service their debts to fiscal authorities.

    Set of measures to prop up the sector

    It was probably no coincidence that news leaked out on Thursday that Chinese banks are now allowed to issue unsecured short-term loans to property developers. Bloomberg reported this. The measure is part of a package to prop up the ailing property sector and prevent it from spreading to the banks.

    “The finance sector’s fortunes are closely related to the property sector due to the big developers’ high gearing ratio,” said Ding Haifeng, a consultant at Shanghai financial advisory firm Integrity. “A collapse of the real estate sector will absolutely lead to a wave of bad assets in banks, trust firms and insurers,” Ding predicts.

    The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress has warned against false data published by small and medium-sized financial institutions. They could conceal potential problems when official figures do not “truly reflect the actual situation,” according to the minutes of the meeting published on Wednesday, which took place back in October. The Committee was concerned that the data could be “inflated.” The financial supervisory authority was asked to identify the existing risks immediately.

    Zhongzhi insolvency is the next warning

    The cracks in the foundations grow ever wider. Last year, Beijing already identified the “prevention and resolution of financial risks” as a key priority at the Central Economic Work Conference. The insolvency of property developer Evergrande has shaken China’s self-image of its economic strength to its very foundation. The country is plagued by the fear of the consequences of a collapsing property market, as Japan experienced in the 1980s.

    China’s financial regulator is well aware of the problem and has been counteracting it for years. In 2020, the central bank defined three “red lines” for the property sector. These defined the leverage ratio, net gearing and the ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities. So far, with limited success. Many developers continue to overstep the lines. The Zhongzhi case is now the next warning that things must change fast before the financial sector reaches a tipping point.

    Xiaomi’s EV rolls up the car market

    Visitors to the World Robot Conference in Beijing at the booth of the smartphone manufacturer, which is now making a big push into electromobility.

    Xiaomi is the next billion-dollar manufacturer to enter China’s car market. The tech giant has big plans and is willing to invest a lot of money.

    Xiaomi will launch its first EV, the SU7, in spring 2024. The vehicle’s key data and design show that (at least in China) car manufacturing is no longer an exclusive art that only OEMs can master. This is also because electric mobility is changing the demands on cars. However, this alone is no guarantee of success for tech giants with billions in their coffers. With its countless manufacturers and enormous overcapacity, the Chinese car market is facing consolidation.

    Solid EV Xiaomi SU7

    The Chinese Ministry of Industry and Technology has published documents revealing Xiaomi’s first electric car. It is called the Beijing Xiaomi SU7 and will be manufactured by the state-owned Beijing Automotive Group (BAIC). What sounds like a leak to European ears is part of the approval process and likely part of the marketing strategy. After all, the documents came with professional photos.

    The documents also reveal the key data of the Beijing Xiaomi SU7. The sporty-looking saloon will measure just under five meters in length. Depending on the variant – the “Pro” and “Max” versions are already known – it will have between 299 and 663 horsepower. The SU7 has an 800-volt on-board electrical system and an LFP battery from BYD for the cheaper versions, while the more expensive models have an NMC battery from CATL. There is still no concrete information about its capacity (market observers speculate around 100 kilowatt-hours) or range.

    The data clearly shows that electromobility is turning the car market upside down. Just a few years ago, a company from outside the industry presenting realistic technical data that would also look good on an established manufacturer would have been unthinkable. Even Tesla had to spend years on research and invest enormous amounts of money to develop a car suitable for everyday use for mass production.

    Perfect timing for Xiaomi

    But that is precisely what Xiaomi has done. A plant with an annual capacity of 200,000 vehicles is already on standby in Beijing. Production will commence in December 2023, and 100,000 vehicles are expected to be sold by 2024. The fact that Xiaomi has received approval for all of this is at least a vote of confidence from the government. After all, the authorities have become more cautious. China’s car plants have a total annual capacity of around 43 million vehicles. However, last year, they were only operating at half capacity. Tesla, for instance, was not allowed to expand its Shanghai plant this year.

    Xiaomi is currently in a strong position. Profits of China’s largest smartphone manufacturer soared by 183 percent in the third quarter of 2023 compared to the – admittedly difficult – previous year. Xiaomi plans on investing ten billion US dollars in the automotive business over the next ten years. Some analysts are enthusiastic. For example, the Japanese financial company Daiwa expects the share price to rise to around 15 Hong Kong dollars in the coming months – a 58 percent increase.

    Discount battle – a sign of overcapacity

    And the Chinese car market also appears to be slowly recovering. October 2023 was the third month in a row with growing sales figures. An increase of 10 percent compared to the previous year meant total sales of two million vehicles in October. An increase of 20 percent is even expected for November. This is because many manufacturers are trying to achieve their annual sales targets as the year nears its end.

    However, many manufacturers are bogged down in a discount battle, highlighting problems in the Chinese car market, such as the aforementioned overcapacity. “The automotive sector was already in a very miserable state, with profit margins at a historic low of just 4.5 percent in September,” the German Manager Magazin quotes Cui Dongshu from the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA) as saying.

    Xiaomi is by no means the first gold digger from outside the sector to hit the car market. Huawei cooperates with Chery to make money in the booming EV growth market. Baidu has founded a joint brand with Geely, and Alibaba is involved in a joint venture with SAIC. Start-ups such as NIO, Xpeng and BYD also focus on EVs. Around 100 brands are vying for customers – market consolidation is inevitable and politically desired. This does not even take European OEMs into account, who are making considerable efforts to catch up on electromobility.

    • Electromobility
    • Smartphone
    • Xiaomi

    Events

    Nov. 27, 2023 1 p.m. CET (8 p.m. CST)
    Mercator Institute for China Studies, Future China Lecture with Professor Xiang Biao: The self and the world: Changing worldviews among Chinese youths More

    Nov. 28, 2023 3 p.m. CST
    Dezan Shira & Associates, Event (in Nanjing) Managing Costs: Optimizing Your Workforce and Tax Avoidance in China More

    Nov. 28, 2023 4 p.m. CST
    German Chamber of Commerce in China, Symposium (in Chengdu): Intellectual Property Protection in China: Key Issues & Current Developments More

    Nov. 28, 2023 10 a.m. CET (5 p.m. CST)
    German-Chinese Business Association e.V., Webinar: Digital Marketing in China: How to Reach Chinese Consumers Online More

    Nov. 28, 2023 5:30 p.m. CET (Nov. 29, 12:30 a.m. CST)
    Center for Strategic & International Studies, Book Event: The Autocrat’s Predicament: The Political Peril of Economic Upgrade in Single Party, Authoritarian Regimes More

    Nov. 23, 2023
    Nanjing Fair, Fair (in Nanjing): Business Delegation: 2023 Innovation Fair More

    Nov. 23, 2023 a.m. CET
    ASEAC and ECAA, lecture (in Duesseldorf): A new Dawn of Arbitration in Asia? Digitization – Supply Chain Risks – Rethinking of Arbitration clauses and venues – Enforcement Challenges More

    Nov. 29, 2023; 2 p.m. CST
    German Chamber of Commerce in China, GCC Automotive Salon (in Shanghai): Rethinking the Future of the Automotive Ecosystem More

    Nov. 29, 2023; 3:30 p.m. CST
    Rödl & Partner, Roadshow: Navigating Through A Day Of A Manager In China More

    Nov. 29, 2023; 6 p.m. CET (Nov. 30, 1 a.m. CST)
    Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Critical Issues Confronting China Series: China’s Long March: From Politics to Economics and From Economics to Politics More

    Nov. 30, 2023; 11 a.m. CET (6 p.m. CST)
    Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Global China Conversations #26: The Chinese Anti-espionage Law: What Risks for Companies and the Scientific Community? More

    Nov. 30, 2023; 9 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
    EU SME Center, Webinar: Open Innovation: Opportunities and Challenges in China More

    Nov. 30, 2023; 4:30 p.m. CET (11:30 p.m. CST)
    EU SME Center, Webinar: China’s Outbound Tourism: Opportunities for Service Providers & Destinations More

    News

    Beijing: No unusual pathogens found

    In response to a request from the World Health Organization (WHO), the Chinese authorities announced on Thursday that no unusual or novel pathogens or unusual clinical manifestations had been found, including in Beijing and the north-eastern province of Liaoning. The World Health Organization (WHO) has requested more detailed information from China on the rising number of respiratory diseases and reports of increasing cases of pneumonia in children. This was announced in a press release. According to Reuters, the Chinese WHO office described the request as a “routine check.” China’s National Health Commission did not initially respond to a request for comment.

    On Thursday, the National Health Commission urged hospitals to ramp up their treatment capacity for common infections and serious illnesses, Nikkei Asia reports. It also recommended that patients with mild symptoms visit primary healthcare facilities – doctors in private practice – and avoid hospitals already swamped with patients with longer waiting times and a high risk of cross-infection.

    Footage shows overcrowded hospitals

    In its request, the WHO refers to a press conference held by the Chinese authorities on 13 November, at which they reported an increase in respiratory diseases in China. The increase was attributed to the end of COVID-19 restrictions and the spread of known pathogens such as influenza, and mycoplasma pneumoniae – a bacterial infection that mostly affects younger children – the RSV and SARS-CoV-2 viruses. In other words, well-known pathogens, albeit in clusters.

    The organization also cited media reports and a report from the public reporting system Promed, according to which cases of undiagnosed pneumonia in children are increasing in northern China. Media in Xi’an in the north-west, for example, shared videos of hospitals overcrowded with parents and children. It is unclear to what extent the two developments are connected.

    Many other countries have seen a similar surge in respiratory illnesses after the pandemic measures were lifted. “It is just a relatively large seasonal surge, perhaps partly due to chance and partly because there’s a bit of ‘immunity debt’ from the lesser winter surges in the last three years,” said Ben Cowling, an epidemiologist at Hong Kong University.” rtr/cyb

    • Coronavirus
    • WHO

    Taiwan election: Chaos engulfs Taiwan’s opposition

    The united front of Taiwan’s opposition parties will probably not happen. Instead of challenging the government with a worthy joint candidate, an embarrassing dispute broke out on Thursday. Candidates for the presidential election next January must register by Friday. The chances of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) getting their act together by the deadline are incredibly slim.

    Last week, the KMT and TPP agreed to field a joint candidate to boost their chances significantly. The members of both parties were supposed to decide on a candidate in a vote. The candidates are:

    • Ko Wen-je from the TPP, a doctor, and
    • Hou Yu-ih from the KMT, a former police officer.

    Terry Gou, the billionaire founder of electronics manufacturer Foxconn, wanted to act as a mediator. On Thursday, however, a meeting between Gou and the two candidates went terribly wrong. The top politicians engaged in a verbal clash – in front of journalists and TV crews.

    Among other things, Hou read out private mobile phone messages from Ko. A KMT spokesperson said in the evening that the KMT had been humiliated, but was sticking to the idea of a joint candidate. However, all indications point to Hou definitely planning to run in the election. In turn, the TPP announced that Ko would declare his candidacy this Friday. fin

    • Taiwan

    Greek officials urged to avoid Taiwan events

    EU Taiwan

    Greek officials have apparently been urged in and outside the country to refrain from attending events hosted by Taiwan. Nikkei Asia reports this, citing an email from October 4 in which the Greek Foreign Ministry urges diplomats and officials to avoid a reception in Athens on the occasion of Taiwan’s National Day.

    The memo from October 4 states, among other things, that “the participation of ministers, members of parliament and civil officials in receptions or events of the Representative Office must be avoided.” This would be “perceived as an indirect recognition of Taiwan’s independence” and could cause “serious problems” for relations between Greece and China. The memo, labeled “urgent” and signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandra Papadopoulou, also warned against meetings with Taiwanese officials in Greek government buildings or de facto embassies, so-called Taipei Representative Offices.

    The Greek Foreign Ministry and the Taipei Representative Office in Athens declined to comment. China is Greece’s largest trading partner after the EU and is economically highly active in the EU country. During a recent visit to Beijing, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis spoke out in favor of further expanding business relations and said that Greece could play a bridging role in EU-China relations.

    The EU is divided in its stance towards Taiwan. Some countries openly support Taiwan, including Lithuania, which China has exerted enormous pressure on since it opened a Taiwan office in the country over two years ago. Countries such as Greece and Hungary are much more cautious to avoid angering Beijing. jul

    • EU
    • Greece
    • Taiwan

    Carbon footprint planned for 50 products

    China has committed itself to setting up a carbon footprint database by 2025 and introducing the option of calculating the carbon footprint of 50 products. This could be expanded to 200 products by 2030. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planner, published a document to this effect on its website on Wednesday. In doing so, the country is once again aiming to fulfill Xi Jinping’s promise to achieve the emissions peak before 2030. This was reported by the South China Morning Post.

    The announcement was published on Wednesday, but dates back to November 13, before the summit between Xi and US President Joe Biden. Observers commented that China, the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, intends to use its methods for calculating its carbon footprint to catch up with other countries, especially since the European Union’s new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism came into force last month. A 2021 study by Tsinghua University concluded that the EU law would put China, the world’s largest producer of industrial raw materials such as cement and steel, under the most pressure. cyb

    • Climate
    • Emissions
    • EU

    China Perspective

    Semantic criticism after diplomatic gaffe

    Following a meeting with his counterpart Xi Jinping on November 15 in San Francisco, US President Joe Biden once again referred to him as a “dictator” at a press conference. Both Biden and the Chinese side played down this gaffe. This showed an unmistakable desire on both sides to maintain the somewhat improved relations between China and the US. At a fund-raiser in June, Biden made this claim once before, which China indignantly rejected at the time.

    Biden made the comment in June unprompted. This time, however, he was responding to a journalist asking him whether he would stand by it. Of course, he would say yes, but he qualified it to dilute its offensiveness. “He is a dictator in the sense that he’s a guy who runs a country that is a communist country that’s based on a form of government totally different than ours,” Biden said. 

    Tacit understanding

    China took the cue. Asked to comment on Biden’s words in a routine briefing the next day, foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning only protested perfunctorily. “The statement is extremely wrong and irresponsible political manipulation, which China resolutely opposes,” she said. 

    However, she only made her central point afterward. There are always “some people with ulterior motives who are trying to sow discord and destroy relations between China and the US,” but this will not succeed, Mao added. Although she did not elaborate on who these people were, she seemed to be referring to the two journalists who had directed the questions to Biden and herself, respectively. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who grimaced at the dictator question in San Francisco, should now be relieved.

    The magic of naming

         In CCP language, Xi Jinping has the “supreme determining authority (定于一尊 dìng yú yì zūn).” The term, introduced in 2018 for Xi’s status shortly after the abolishment of the Chinese presidency’s term limit, effectively pronounced the abandonment of the Politburo Standing Committee’s “collective leadership,” a key device of power-sharing in the one-party rule, which had been in place since the late 1970s. 

    “Supreme determining authority” was actually first used for the Qin Dynasty’s First Emperor. Though elegantly expressed in classical Chinese, it bears the same meaning as dictator. The people of an old civilization know the magic of naming. In a well-known legend from the Qin Dynasty (221 – 207 B.C.), entourage members of a powerful man were punished for calling a deer deer after he already called it a horse.

    As written in its constitution, China claims it is a democracy. In 2019, Xi Jinping coined a new beautiful term, “whole-process democracy” (全过程民主 quán guò chéng mín zhǔ), to describe China’s political system, whatever it means. 

    Dictatorship from the party’s perspective

          A one-man rule is in Chinese独裁 (dú cái); a dictator is 独裁者 (dú cái zhě) or 独夫 (dú fū). 

    In the CCP narrative of Chinese history for the past century, the only person qualifying as 独裁者 was Chiang Kai-shek, who ruled China between 1927 and 1949. During the 1930s and 1940s, Mao and his fellow rebels kept calling for real democracy and accused Chiang of being a dictator. Chiang was indeed a dictator. But after Mao and his fellow communists defeated him and drove his Nationalist government to Taiwan, Mao became a more brutal, more effective dictator. Officially, he is, of course, apotheosized as a great leader, helmsman and THE founding father of the New China.  

     The Chinese government seldom called any contemporary foreigner a dictator. After all, people from Nicolae Ceaușescu to Saddam Hussein, Fidel Castro to Robert Mugabe, and Vladimir Putin to Kim Jong-un were or are all China’s friends, or at least, friends in name.  

    Democracy ‘with Chinese characteristics’

     Totalitarianism (极权jí quán) and authoritarianism (专制zhuān zhì) are also negative words in Chinese. Chinese officials and most Chinese citizens with some basic real knowledge of politics know they actually live under dictatorship, autocracy, totalitarianism, authoritarianism, or whatever it is called.  

    But they wouldn’t say so, either for fear of the consequences of labeling the regime so or because of the pain of admitting to be living under such a terrible name. In the end, most would resort to the official cliché: China has a democracy “with Chinese characteristics” or a political system that best fits the country.  

    And it is not only about the moniker. After decades of brainwashing, the Chinese public tends to accept the argument that Western democracy won’t work in a country as big and complicated as China. Just look at India, what a country of failure, some would say. By contrast, China could mobilize resources much more efficiently to become a real global power. 

    However, personal experiences overseas and, particularly, the Xi regime’s governance blunders in the past few years have made many skeptical, estranged or even antagonized to the regime, although it’s difficult to estimate how much of the population has ditched the official narrative in their hearts. 

    China’s ‘good dictatorship’

    The San Francisco – Beijing dictator episode unleashed a binge of semantic analysis on news media outside China, both in English and Chinese. Some commentators said dictatorship is not necessarily a bad word in China. After all, it is something the communist regime uses to define itself. Article one of China’s constitution reads: “The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state governed by a people’s democratic dictatorship….”  Dictatorship, in a sense, is 专政(zhuān zhèng) in Chinese. 

    The wording in the constitution’s version during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) was more in line with orthodox Marxism-Leninism terminology, calling China a “dictatorship of the proletariat.” It was much more frequently cited back then than the “people’s democratic dictatorship” is now and was often paired with “iron fist.” Whenever “the iron fist of the dictatorship of the proletariat” was uttered, some “class enemy” would be verbally or physically abused, put into prison, or even executed.

    In Xi’s youth, this was an everyday expression. It would probably make him nostalgic if he heard it today. After all, he belongs to the Red Guard generation.

    Executive Moves

    Serhan Kurt is now Head of Purchasing for the EU division at the Chinese battery manufacturer SVOLT in Frankfurt am Main. He joined from Diehl Metall, where he was responsible for supply chain processes.

    Bertil Abel from EU Asia Consulting has joined the China Netzwerk Baden-Württemberg e.V. (CNBW). Abel is an expert in supply chain organization and procurement in China.

    Is something changing in your organization? Let us know at heads@table.media!

    Dessert

    Who wouldn’t want to find a centuries-old rhinoceros horn mug worth several thousand euros in a garage? British TV personality Charles Hanson does this sort of thing for a living, on camera, of course. He is particularly proud of his latest find: He calls the drinking vessel from the late 17th or early 18th century, which a couple had deposited in his garage, a “magical object.” In ancient Chinese mythology, the rhinoceros horn was said to have an aphrodisiac effect, and it was also believed to be able to detect poison and change color to warn of danger. The cup is now being auctioned off.

    China.Table editorial team

    CHINA.TABLE EDITORIAL OFFICE

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