Table.Briefing: China

Russia, the difficult friend + GTAI report on BRI

  • One year of war: Russia remains an important partner
  • GTAI Silk Road report
  • BASF executive Dubourg resigns over China dispute
  • EU bans TikTok from staff phones
  • TSMC apparently delays Europe projects
  • US reveals photo of spy balloon
  • Mining accident leaves dozens dead
  • China Perspective: The case of Hu Xinyu
Dear reader,

One year of war in Ukraine – one year of Chinese support for the aggressor Russia. From Xi Jinping’s point of view, it made sense at the time to get behind Vladimir Putin’s project of a great empire. A strong Russia, but one ostracized by the West, would be the perfect partner to create an anti-Western, authoritarian world order. Putin would also have sounded out for him how the U.S. would behave toward the incorporation of a supposedly “very own territory.”

As is well known, the precedent Xi hoped for in taking Taiwan turned into the opposite: a cautionary tale. A strong and stable Russia remains all the more in China’s interest. The new authoritarian bloc would be decisively weakened by a collapse of its big neighbor. This makes rumors of more material support for Russia’s war effort seem increasingly realistic and makes successful mediation less likely, analyzes Michael Radunski.

And trade between China and Russia is also flourishing. The largest contracts currently go into oil deliveries and pipeline construction. This is also one of the findings of the annual report on China’s activities along the Silk Road by the investment promotion agency GTAI.

The bulk of China’s foreign investment accordingly goes into the energy sector. In pure numbers, this makes Russia and Saudi Arabia the most important partners along the Silk Road. The Silk Road Initiative generally supports many autocratic countries. As a partner of GTAI, China.Table publishes the report. We will continue to regularly take a look at the Belt and Road activities.

Your
Finn Mayer-Kuckuk
Image of Finn  Mayer-Kuckuk

Feature

China tends to stay on Russia’s side

Neutral? Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in September 2022.

In February 2022, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin pledged “boundless friendship” between China and Russia. It is no coincidence that Putin began the invasion of Ukraine only a few days later.

Putin has been forcing his friend Xi to walk a tricky balancing act ever since: Officially, China remains neutral, not least to avoid losing Europe as a partner altogether. But a closer look reveals plenty of evidence proving just how firmly China stands by Russia – rhetorically, economically and also politically.

  • The US is to blame: China does not condemn Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. On the contrary, Beijing is convinced that the USA and NATO are responsible. The West disregarded Russia’s legitimate security interests, it claims. With this, Beijing is adopting the Kremlin’s justification for the war. Another Kremlin narrative coming out of the mouths of Chinese politicians is NATO’s eastward expansion. At the Munich Security Conference last weekend, Wang Yi cryptically murmured that some forces apparently had no interest in peace.
  • Putin Xi – Zelenskiy: While Xi and Putin have directly spoken at least twice in the past twelve months, there is complete silence between Xi and Volodymyr Zelenskiy. This hardly seems neutral. This culminated in a newspaper interview where the Ukrainian President asked Xi to contact him.
  • No war: The word “war” does not cross the lips of Chinese cadres, even 12 months later. But Beijing is flexible: In the beginning, they used the Russian description of a “special military operation” (特别军事行动). They have since moved away from this, but even calling it a “crisis” is a mocking trivialization of the gruesome battles.

China’s pro-Russian neutrality

While all are rather pointing to close ties between the two nations, China has attempted to demonstrate its neutrality over the past twelve months and successfully managed to confuse observers more than once. Speaking to Chancellor Scholz, Xi emphasized that he apparently dissuaded Putin from using nuclear weapons.

He also claimed to have demoted Vice Minister Le Yucheng 乐玉成 because the latter had misjudged Russia’s intentions. Le was supposed to succeed Wang Yi as foreign minister, but the post went to Qin Gang instead. But all this is so hard to believe that a sarcastic term for China’s attitude has been born: pro-Russian neutrality.

China gladly takes the oil

Despite Western warnings against “any support” for Russia, China has continued to trade with the country. It even posted a record high last year. From 2021 to 2022, Chinese imports from Russia increased by 43 percent and exports to Russia by 13 percent. Since Putin could no longer sell Russian crude oil to the West, China stepped in – and took full advantage of the low friendship prices.

Also in the focus: The trade of dual-use goods, in other words, civilian products that can also be used for military purposes. According to an investigation by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, Chinese companies have sold electronic parts to Russia on a large scale. The China Poly Group Corporation, for example, has supplied components that are used in the radars of Russian anti-aircraft missiles.

Red line: arms deliveries

At the Munich Security Conference, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that there was evidence that China would now also consider supplying “lethal aid” to Russia. The US announced that it would soon present evidence of this to its allies.

Rumors of Chinese military aid via covert cargo transports from Zhengzhou to Russia were already circulating last November. Qin Gang – at that time ambassador in Washington and now China’s foreign minister – rejected the rumors, saying that humanitarian aid such as food, medicine, sleeping bags and baby food was being provided to Russia. No weapons and no ammunition to any party, Qin said.

Close ties to Russia damage reputation

Experts are already certain that the material aid is real, but so far it is limited in scale. “China supports Russia economically, financially, technologically and at the international level,” Yurii Poita, head of the Asia-Pacific group of the Kyiv-based think tank New Geopolitics Research Network, told Table.Media.

Nevertheless, he said there has been no significant military aid to Russia so far. To ensure that this does not change, Poita has a clear demand: “Europe must make it clear that such a step would completely ruin economic and political relations. This is the only way to prevent China from crossing this red line.”

This is because China seems certainly willing to pay a certain price for its ties to Russia. Above all, the relationship between Europe and China suffered tremendously in recent months. Wang Yi also experienced this at the Security Conference in Munich: China’s attempts at dividing America and Europe are proving futile at the moment.

China’s new vassal

The benefits of pro-Russian neutrality are obvious. Economically, the People’s Republic can satisfy its gigantic energy hunger from Russia – at prices below the global market level. Overall, trade between China and Russia increased by an astonishing 34.3 percent in 2022 to a record 190 billion US dollars.

In the meantime, Putin’s aggressive military incursion is also driving Russia also politically deeper and deeper into dependence on China. China can now count on having a deeply grateful partner at its side: a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Be it on Xinjiang, Tibet or the South China Sea – the “boundless partnership” between Russia and China repeatedly pushes the Security Council and other international bodies on the verge of becoming inoperable. The renowned China-Russia expert Alexander Gabuev from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace calls Russia “China’s new vassal”.

Destabilization as a horror scenario

Here, other reasons for China’s behavior can be found. One is in the realm of geography. “You have to take into account that Russia is China’s largest neighbor. So we have to ensure that our relations with Russia are good and sustainable,” explains military expert Zhou Bo.

It is important to remember that Russia and China used to be bitter enemies for decades, not only ideologically vying for leadership in global communism, but even waging war on each other. The last border disputes were only settled in 2008. And while there is growing talk in the West of Russia’s defeat, Beijing fears a lasting destabilization of Russia.

Mediating role remains unlikely

The scenario of Russia’s destabilization seems increasingly likely in China’s eyes, which is why Beijing is now taking action: Both arms deliveries and a quick cease-fire would avert the danger. Only, of course, peace would be far more beneficial to Beijing’s propaganda.

Xi Jinping will presumably present China’s proposal in a document – or a speech – on Friday. The details are eagerly anticipated. On Thursday, Zelenskiy stated that he had not yet seen a plan. But he stressed that talks are welcome. But not too much hope should be placed in this initiative.

  • Geopolitics
  • Russland
  • Ukraine
  • Vladimir Putin
  • Xi Jinping

BRI funds flow primarily into energy contracts

China expanded its economic cooperation last year, particularly with Russia and Saudi Arabia. This is the finding of the annual evaluation of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) data by the economic development agency Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI). The report’s results are available to China.Table. “Energy projects continue to set the direction,” says study author Marcus Hernig. He is an expert for China and Asia in the Connectivity Project at GTAI.

  • In 2022, Russia signed supply contracts with China worth 15 billion US dollars, primarily for oil and gas via the “Power of Siberia” pipeline. This means that around 64 percent more gas flowed from Russia to China than in the previous year.
  • Saudi Arabia and China have signed 34 memoranda of understanding and contracts with a total value of over 30 billion US dollars.

Business worth billions with Russia

The big deals with Russia have not been signed by China as part of BRI projects. Nevertheless, the oil and gas contracts show that China places great value on this strategic partnership along the new Silk Road, says GTAI expert Hernig. The meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in September 2022 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Samarkand reaffirmed the economic partnership.

In the meantime, an official membership is losing its meaning in the Silk Road Initiative. Whether the partner country in question is one of the 151 states that have officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative or not is increasingly irrelevant. “The content of the new Silk Road increasingly coincides with China’s global foreign construction activities,” writes study author Hernig. China already includes projects in its BRI statistics if Chinese companies have merely received a contract for them.

Saudi Arabia becomes a showcase partner

Saudi Arabia, unlike Russia, acts as a full Silk Road partner. It does not simply receive Chinese loans, but uses the BRI as a framework to invest capital in other participating countries. This is how China envisioned it from the beginning.

For example, the Saudi energy company ACWA Power is investing in Central Asia under BRI. Tencent and Alibaba are participating in the expansion of digitalization on the Arabian Peninsula. This is how Saudi Arabia intends to use the BRI as a tool for its own “Vision 2030” strategy. The China-Arabia summit in Riyadh was considered particularly successful in this regard for getting new projects underway.

China leaves the field to other lenders

Saudi Arabia is a typical case in that China has long since ceased to be the sole funder. In the early phase of the BRI between 2013 and the pandemic, it was mainly Chinese banks that pumped money into the initiative. Now, international development banks and other investors are stepping in, while China is gradually withdrawing. The reason: Funding foreign projects alone became too risky and expensive.

Between 2013 and 2018, the China Development Bank (CDB) and the export-import branch of the Bank of China (Exim) still provided financing for almost 60 percent of all BRI projects. For the past year, GTAI estimates that their total share was only one percent. According to the GTAI data, three-quarters of all registered projects no longer receive Chinese funding.

An example of the move away from China is the planned financing for the modernization of the state railway in Nigeria. Originally, Exim Bank provided the necessary funding. Now, international development banks such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are stepping in. Germany’s KfW is also involved. “The Chinese started, are out, the others are continuing,” says Hernig. He welcomes this development: It allows important projects to continue operating internationally.

Focus on Asia and Africa

It appeared as if things had gone quiet around Belt and Road in recent years. But appearances can be deceiving. Despite massive lockdowns and restricted travel in China as a result of zero-Covid, more projects with Chinese participation have been launched under the new Silk Road in 2022. The GTAI counted 1,000 individual projects that are part of the Belt and Road Initiative. In the previous year, it was 917.

With a total of 491 projects, Asia remains the most important continent for the new Silk Road from the Chinese perspective, including 236 projects in Southeast Asia alone. With 300 new projects, Africa is the second most important continent, while there are 114 projects in Latin America.

  • Energy
  • Geopolitics
  • GTAI
  • New Silk Road
  • Trade

Events

Feb. 25, 2023; 9:00 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
journalists.network e.V., Webinar: Open Source Analysis of Chinese Politics by Manoj Kewalraman More

Feb. 25, 2023; 3:00 p.m. CET (10 p.m. CST)
journalists.network e.V. and German-Chinese Media Network, Webinar: Outside looking in: What increasing restrictions mean for international reporting on China More

Feb. 28, 2023; 9:00 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
EU SME Centre, Workshop: One Year After the Beijing Olympics – Opportunities in China’s Winter Sports Sector for EU SMEs More

Feb. 28, 2023; 6:00 p.m. CET (Mar. 1, 2023 1 a.m. CST)
Dezan Shira & Associates, Webinar: Exploring Southeast Asia’s 2023 Outlook – Opportunities and Trends More

Feb. 28, 2023; 6:00 p.m. CET (Mar. 1, 2023 1 a.m. CST)
European Guanxi, Panel Discussion: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: A year in review More

Feb. 28, 2023; 6:00 p.m. CET (Mar. 1, 2023 1 a.m. CST)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Critical Issues Confronting China Series: China’s Overseas Infrastructure: Bumps Along the Road to Global Influence? More

Mar. 2, 2023; 8:30 a.m. CET (3:30 p.m. CST)
China Network Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hybrid Seminar: What is new in Chinese law – Topics which may concern you in 2023 More

Mar. 2, 2023; 9 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
China Team, Webinar: Chinese Energy Storage Solutions for DE – Impact of EU Supply Chain Laws More

Mar. 2, 2023; 10 p.m. CET (Mar. 3, 2023 5 a.m. CST)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Webinar: “Friends with No Limits?” The Future of China-Russia Relations More

Mar. 3, 2023; 7:30 a.m. CET (2:30 p.m. CST)
AHK China and German Chamber of Commerce in China: Innovation Dialogue: Innovation from China Going Global & ReConnecting Hong Kong with GBA More

News

Dubourg leaves BASF board

BASF board member Saori Dubourg is leaving the company unexpectedly at the end of the month – apparently over a dispute about the company’s China strategy. Dubourg had been a member of the Board since 2017 and was expected to become the first female chairwoman of the Board. During her career at the Ludwigshafen-based chemical company, she has headed major regions such as Asia and important segments like the agricultural business. The group calls her departure to have been “on the best of terms,” reports the German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

Her post will be filled by Stephan Kothrade. The chemist is considered an expert on China with almost ten years of experience in various positions in Asia. Dubourg is known internally at BASF as the biggest critic of CEO Martin Brudermueller’s involvement in China. Under his leadership, BASF decided last year to make a huge investment in a new site in the southern Chinese industrial metropolis of Zhanjiang. Up to 10 billion euros are to be invested. Dubourg probably considers this too risky in light of the strained relationship with China, which has led many other corporations to already plan a diversification of their production sites. jul

  • BASF
  • Chemistry
  • Industry

EU Commission bans TikTok from staff phones

The EU Commission has prohibited the use of the Chinese video app TikTok on business cell phones of EU officials and MEPs for the time being. Staff received instructions to that effect on Thursday, Commission spokeswoman Sonya Gospodinova confirmed. The ban is said to be temporary. However, Gospodinova did not explain under what conditions the ban would be lifted. It also remained unclear whether new findings about data protection and cybersecurity issues at TikTok led to the decision. It is the first time that EU officials have ever been told not to use an app on their devices. When asked, Commission spokesman Eric Mamer stressed that there had been no pressure from the US to take this step.

The matter was first reported by Euractiv. EU employees and deputies were asked in an email to delete the app, which is owned by the Chinese ByteDance group, from their service devices. Those who do not comply will be blocked from services such as the EU Commission’s internal email service beginning in mid-March.

“To protect the Commission’s data and increase its cybersecurity, the European Commission Corporate Management Board has decided to suspend the TikTok application on corporate devices and personal devices enrolled in the Commission mobile device services,” the email is quoted. TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew recently campaigned in Brussels for more trust in the app. In the United States, the use of TikTok on work phones is already forbidden for federal agency employees and government workers.

German government uncertain on how to deal with TikTok

TikTok said the move caught it by surprise, as the company had not been contacted nor offered an explanation. “We are disappointed with this decision, which we believe to be misguided and based on fundamental misconceptions.” The company said it requested a meeting to clarify how TikTok would protect the data of its EU users.

The use of TikTok on staff telephones is not regulated by the German government. The respective IT security officers of each ministry are responsible for ensuring that software can only be used if it complies with official guidelines and confidentiality regulations.

Upon inquiry, the Federal Ministry of the Interior did not disclose whether this is the case with TikTok in general. However, a spokesperson explained that all TikTok calls are blocked in the ministry’s internal networkthe app cannot be downloaded from the ministry’s smartphones in general. “The administrator receives a notification about the possible installation attempt,” the BMI spokesperson said. Yet at the same time, some parts of the German government also use TikTok as a platform, such as the Ministry of Health, which has almost 150,000 followers. fst/ari

  • BSI
  • Cybersecurity
  • Data
  • Technologie
  • Tiktok

TSMC’s Europe plans rumored to be delayed

According to rumors in Taiwanese media, the semiconductor company TSMC is delaying its investment plans for Europe. This could affect a possible investment in the German city of Dresden, which China.Table has previously reported. The project would thus be delayed by two years. However, there has been neither an official timeframe nor a confirmation for the Dresden site so far.

The reason for the delay is said to be the considerable investments of competitors such as Infineon, Renesas, Intel or Wolfspeed, according to the Taiwanese Jingji Ribao 經濟日報 (Economic Times).

In Germany, Heise.de first reported on the rumors. The chip industry is currently in its cyclical downturn. A global shortage during the pandemic is now being followed by an oversupply. fin

  • Industry
  • Technology
  • TSMC

At least five dead after mining accident

A collapse of a large coal mine in Inner Mongolia has killed at least 5 people and buried 48. This was reported by state media on Thursday. Nearly 300 rescue workers are on the scene with search dogs and heavy equipment. At least six injured people have already been rescued.

The collapse occurred at an open pit mine in the administrative district of Alxa operated by Xinjing Coal Mining Co.. Inner Mongolia is one of the country’s largest coal producers and, like other Chinese regions, has ramped up production in the past year to increase supply and stabilize prices.

China’s President Xi Jinping ordered “comprehensive efforts in searching and rescuing the missing and treating the injured,” according to the Xinhua news agency. Premier Li Keqiang called for a swift investigation into the cause of the accident. rtr/fpe

  • Coal
  • Inner Mongolia
  • Raw materials

Selfie with spy balloon

Selfie China Ballon Pilot

The US Pentagon has released a photo showing the Chinese surveillance balloon before it was shot down – taken from the cockpit of a U-2 aircraft. The military said it had determined that the balloon was equipped with espionage devices from reconnaissance flights such as this one. U-2 aircraft are capable of traveling at extreme altitudes, so pilots must wear a full pressurized suit similar to those worn by astronauts. The photo was taken at an altitude of 18 kilometers. jul

  • Geopolitics
  • Monitoring
  • Spy

China Perspective

The death of a student and the distrust in the authorities

A 15-year-old boarding school student was reported missing on October 14, 2022. Both the school and local police in Qianshan in east China’s Jiangxi province said they tried everything they could in their search for him. In truth, the search was likely more perfunctorily. Three months later, Hu Xinyu was still nowhere to be found.

His parents had reported their son’s disappearance on the Internet early on and asked for help. But it was a conspiracy theory that helped attract national attention: Hu may have been abducted and killed by an underground network that harvests and sells organs to people who are in need of transplants. Local officials and even members of the school were rumored to have been involved.

No evidence was provided to support this terrifying hypothesis. But netizens kept spreading it.

This case is an example of a serious problem that the Chinese government has brought on itself: a lack of credibility.

Surveillance cameras are installed at every street corner all over China. The government seems to be able to find and catch anybody who the authorities deemed even remotely dangerous for the government. How could they not find a high school student, if they really wanted to? For the public, that could be either because the authorities did not want to put any effort into the search for an ordinary student from the countryside, or worse, because something truly evil is happening inside the government.  

Organ trade was real (or still is?)

China has indeed a dubious track record when it comes to the supervision of organ transplants. A former vice health minister, Huang Jiefu, admitted that the organs of criminals had been used for transplant without consent, but the practice had been stopped since 2015. All transplanted organs have been from voluntary donors, he said.

But this has not dispelled public concern that the practice still exists. Whenever there is news of a young man who went missing, somebody would say that the unfortunate guy might have been butchered for his liver or kidneys. 

While public attention to Hu’s case was increasing, an article commemorating a retired senior government official further fueled the rumor about organ harvest. Gao Zhanxiang, a former vice cultural minister, died in December at the age of 87 shortly after the country lifted Covid lockdowns. The article praised Gao for his optimism toward life “despite having received multiple transplants”. 

While discussion about Gao heated up, somebody dug out old social media posts about former finance minister Jin Renqing. Jin, who died in 2021 at 77, was said to have received a heart transplant. The organ reportedly came from a 28-year-old man. 

Party and government officials enjoying luxury medical service is an open secret in China. The bulk of the country’s public spending on health care goes to incumbent or retired politicians and bureaucrats, who claim to be the servants of the people.  

The people don’t believe the police

On January 28, Hu’s body was finally found in a yard not far from the campus. He was announced to have hung himself with a shoestring. The local government held a press conference, presenting the final investigation result: Depression resulting from academic pressure was most likely the reason for the suicide. Text and voice messages by Hu were presented as evidence.  

However, this conclusion did not silence the questions. Shortly after the conference, quite a few videos of experiments testing the strength of shoestrings emerged on social media, challenging the official narrative.

Also, Hu’s family members did not show up for the press conference. The press conference, like most government press conferences in China, had all the indications to be choreographed. All questions seemed to be pre-assigned to cooperative journalists.  

Li Lianying, Hu’s mother, has been the major voice for the family. After the press conference, all her social media posts were deleted, with no explanation. No more comments were heard from Hu’s family and classmates, prompting rumors that their communication with the outside world is tightly controlled and the family might even be living under house arrest.  

Hu’s family was silenced

This is also the typical way how China’s governments deal on all levels with any incident they deem negative: They exert control. Deep in their minds, they know chances are there is something in the government that could not stand up to scrutiny and investigation. So their instinct is to always cover things up, hoping to solve them without anyone noticing. When this is not possible, they would start to control information and control people who could speak out against the will of the government.  

The world has seen the practice in the government’s management or mismanagement of the information related to Covid, both at the beginning of the disease’s outbreak and at the end of the pandemic.  

The authorities assume that with time and a certain level of control, people will lose interest in any bad events will fade. In the best-case scenario, would erupt and divert public attention, such as a war or earthquake somewhere in the world. If this does not happen, a scandal involving a Chinese film star or entertainer could be trotted out on purpose to do the job.

This approach often works. Public debate over Hu’s case, for example, has indeed gradually diminished. But the tragedies and the government’s handling of them remain in the memory of some. Skepticism lingers. When the next big incident happens, the whole process will simply repeat itself.  

So the government’s credibility is always doubted, except in one specific area: nationalist propaganda over issues such as Taiwan or some malicious foreign countries.  

  • Education
  • Society

Executive Moves

Falk Hirdes has been General Manager at CPC Corporate Management for Mainland China since the beginning of the year. Hirdes previously served as Regional Manager at CPC, working from Beijing.

Wu Jianghao succeeds Kong Xuanyou as China’s ambassador to Tokyo. Wu has already served two five-year stints as a diplomat in Japan and most recently worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing.

Is something changing in your organization? Let us know at heads@table.media!

Dessert

It’s not first class, but at least the flight isn’t long. Lady panda Ouhin leaves Adventure World in Shirahama, Japan, in a cage. She will travel to Sichuan in China together with her twin sister Touhin and father Emei. The two eight-year-old females will find a partner there for reproduction. And for Emei, it’s time to retire. He is already 30 years old, which makes him a real old-timer. Pandas only live about 20 years in the wild; the oldest giant panda in captivity lived to be 36. China sends pandas to foreign countries as a gesture of friendship, however, the animals and their offspring remain the property of China.

China.Table editorial office

CHINA.TABLE EDITORIAL OFFICE

  • One year of war: Russia remains an important partner
  • GTAI Silk Road report
  • BASF executive Dubourg resigns over China dispute
  • EU bans TikTok from staff phones
  • TSMC apparently delays Europe projects
  • US reveals photo of spy balloon
  • Mining accident leaves dozens dead
  • China Perspective: The case of Hu Xinyu
Dear reader,

One year of war in Ukraine – one year of Chinese support for the aggressor Russia. From Xi Jinping’s point of view, it made sense at the time to get behind Vladimir Putin’s project of a great empire. A strong Russia, but one ostracized by the West, would be the perfect partner to create an anti-Western, authoritarian world order. Putin would also have sounded out for him how the U.S. would behave toward the incorporation of a supposedly “very own territory.”

As is well known, the precedent Xi hoped for in taking Taiwan turned into the opposite: a cautionary tale. A strong and stable Russia remains all the more in China’s interest. The new authoritarian bloc would be decisively weakened by a collapse of its big neighbor. This makes rumors of more material support for Russia’s war effort seem increasingly realistic and makes successful mediation less likely, analyzes Michael Radunski.

And trade between China and Russia is also flourishing. The largest contracts currently go into oil deliveries and pipeline construction. This is also one of the findings of the annual report on China’s activities along the Silk Road by the investment promotion agency GTAI.

The bulk of China’s foreign investment accordingly goes into the energy sector. In pure numbers, this makes Russia and Saudi Arabia the most important partners along the Silk Road. The Silk Road Initiative generally supports many autocratic countries. As a partner of GTAI, China.Table publishes the report. We will continue to regularly take a look at the Belt and Road activities.

Your
Finn Mayer-Kuckuk
Image of Finn  Mayer-Kuckuk

Feature

China tends to stay on Russia’s side

Neutral? Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in September 2022.

In February 2022, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin pledged “boundless friendship” between China and Russia. It is no coincidence that Putin began the invasion of Ukraine only a few days later.

Putin has been forcing his friend Xi to walk a tricky balancing act ever since: Officially, China remains neutral, not least to avoid losing Europe as a partner altogether. But a closer look reveals plenty of evidence proving just how firmly China stands by Russia – rhetorically, economically and also politically.

  • The US is to blame: China does not condemn Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. On the contrary, Beijing is convinced that the USA and NATO are responsible. The West disregarded Russia’s legitimate security interests, it claims. With this, Beijing is adopting the Kremlin’s justification for the war. Another Kremlin narrative coming out of the mouths of Chinese politicians is NATO’s eastward expansion. At the Munich Security Conference last weekend, Wang Yi cryptically murmured that some forces apparently had no interest in peace.
  • Putin Xi – Zelenskiy: While Xi and Putin have directly spoken at least twice in the past twelve months, there is complete silence between Xi and Volodymyr Zelenskiy. This hardly seems neutral. This culminated in a newspaper interview where the Ukrainian President asked Xi to contact him.
  • No war: The word “war” does not cross the lips of Chinese cadres, even 12 months later. But Beijing is flexible: In the beginning, they used the Russian description of a “special military operation” (特别军事行动). They have since moved away from this, but even calling it a “crisis” is a mocking trivialization of the gruesome battles.

China’s pro-Russian neutrality

While all are rather pointing to close ties between the two nations, China has attempted to demonstrate its neutrality over the past twelve months and successfully managed to confuse observers more than once. Speaking to Chancellor Scholz, Xi emphasized that he apparently dissuaded Putin from using nuclear weapons.

He also claimed to have demoted Vice Minister Le Yucheng 乐玉成 because the latter had misjudged Russia’s intentions. Le was supposed to succeed Wang Yi as foreign minister, but the post went to Qin Gang instead. But all this is so hard to believe that a sarcastic term for China’s attitude has been born: pro-Russian neutrality.

China gladly takes the oil

Despite Western warnings against “any support” for Russia, China has continued to trade with the country. It even posted a record high last year. From 2021 to 2022, Chinese imports from Russia increased by 43 percent and exports to Russia by 13 percent. Since Putin could no longer sell Russian crude oil to the West, China stepped in – and took full advantage of the low friendship prices.

Also in the focus: The trade of dual-use goods, in other words, civilian products that can also be used for military purposes. According to an investigation by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, Chinese companies have sold electronic parts to Russia on a large scale. The China Poly Group Corporation, for example, has supplied components that are used in the radars of Russian anti-aircraft missiles.

Red line: arms deliveries

At the Munich Security Conference, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that there was evidence that China would now also consider supplying “lethal aid” to Russia. The US announced that it would soon present evidence of this to its allies.

Rumors of Chinese military aid via covert cargo transports from Zhengzhou to Russia were already circulating last November. Qin Gang – at that time ambassador in Washington and now China’s foreign minister – rejected the rumors, saying that humanitarian aid such as food, medicine, sleeping bags and baby food was being provided to Russia. No weapons and no ammunition to any party, Qin said.

Close ties to Russia damage reputation

Experts are already certain that the material aid is real, but so far it is limited in scale. “China supports Russia economically, financially, technologically and at the international level,” Yurii Poita, head of the Asia-Pacific group of the Kyiv-based think tank New Geopolitics Research Network, told Table.Media.

Nevertheless, he said there has been no significant military aid to Russia so far. To ensure that this does not change, Poita has a clear demand: “Europe must make it clear that such a step would completely ruin economic and political relations. This is the only way to prevent China from crossing this red line.”

This is because China seems certainly willing to pay a certain price for its ties to Russia. Above all, the relationship between Europe and China suffered tremendously in recent months. Wang Yi also experienced this at the Security Conference in Munich: China’s attempts at dividing America and Europe are proving futile at the moment.

China’s new vassal

The benefits of pro-Russian neutrality are obvious. Economically, the People’s Republic can satisfy its gigantic energy hunger from Russia – at prices below the global market level. Overall, trade between China and Russia increased by an astonishing 34.3 percent in 2022 to a record 190 billion US dollars.

In the meantime, Putin’s aggressive military incursion is also driving Russia also politically deeper and deeper into dependence on China. China can now count on having a deeply grateful partner at its side: a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Be it on Xinjiang, Tibet or the South China Sea – the “boundless partnership” between Russia and China repeatedly pushes the Security Council and other international bodies on the verge of becoming inoperable. The renowned China-Russia expert Alexander Gabuev from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace calls Russia “China’s new vassal”.

Destabilization as a horror scenario

Here, other reasons for China’s behavior can be found. One is in the realm of geography. “You have to take into account that Russia is China’s largest neighbor. So we have to ensure that our relations with Russia are good and sustainable,” explains military expert Zhou Bo.

It is important to remember that Russia and China used to be bitter enemies for decades, not only ideologically vying for leadership in global communism, but even waging war on each other. The last border disputes were only settled in 2008. And while there is growing talk in the West of Russia’s defeat, Beijing fears a lasting destabilization of Russia.

Mediating role remains unlikely

The scenario of Russia’s destabilization seems increasingly likely in China’s eyes, which is why Beijing is now taking action: Both arms deliveries and a quick cease-fire would avert the danger. Only, of course, peace would be far more beneficial to Beijing’s propaganda.

Xi Jinping will presumably present China’s proposal in a document – or a speech – on Friday. The details are eagerly anticipated. On Thursday, Zelenskiy stated that he had not yet seen a plan. But he stressed that talks are welcome. But not too much hope should be placed in this initiative.

  • Geopolitics
  • Russland
  • Ukraine
  • Vladimir Putin
  • Xi Jinping

BRI funds flow primarily into energy contracts

China expanded its economic cooperation last year, particularly with Russia and Saudi Arabia. This is the finding of the annual evaluation of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) data by the economic development agency Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI). The report’s results are available to China.Table. “Energy projects continue to set the direction,” says study author Marcus Hernig. He is an expert for China and Asia in the Connectivity Project at GTAI.

  • In 2022, Russia signed supply contracts with China worth 15 billion US dollars, primarily for oil and gas via the “Power of Siberia” pipeline. This means that around 64 percent more gas flowed from Russia to China than in the previous year.
  • Saudi Arabia and China have signed 34 memoranda of understanding and contracts with a total value of over 30 billion US dollars.

Business worth billions with Russia

The big deals with Russia have not been signed by China as part of BRI projects. Nevertheless, the oil and gas contracts show that China places great value on this strategic partnership along the new Silk Road, says GTAI expert Hernig. The meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in September 2022 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Samarkand reaffirmed the economic partnership.

In the meantime, an official membership is losing its meaning in the Silk Road Initiative. Whether the partner country in question is one of the 151 states that have officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative or not is increasingly irrelevant. “The content of the new Silk Road increasingly coincides with China’s global foreign construction activities,” writes study author Hernig. China already includes projects in its BRI statistics if Chinese companies have merely received a contract for them.

Saudi Arabia becomes a showcase partner

Saudi Arabia, unlike Russia, acts as a full Silk Road partner. It does not simply receive Chinese loans, but uses the BRI as a framework to invest capital in other participating countries. This is how China envisioned it from the beginning.

For example, the Saudi energy company ACWA Power is investing in Central Asia under BRI. Tencent and Alibaba are participating in the expansion of digitalization on the Arabian Peninsula. This is how Saudi Arabia intends to use the BRI as a tool for its own “Vision 2030” strategy. The China-Arabia summit in Riyadh was considered particularly successful in this regard for getting new projects underway.

China leaves the field to other lenders

Saudi Arabia is a typical case in that China has long since ceased to be the sole funder. In the early phase of the BRI between 2013 and the pandemic, it was mainly Chinese banks that pumped money into the initiative. Now, international development banks and other investors are stepping in, while China is gradually withdrawing. The reason: Funding foreign projects alone became too risky and expensive.

Between 2013 and 2018, the China Development Bank (CDB) and the export-import branch of the Bank of China (Exim) still provided financing for almost 60 percent of all BRI projects. For the past year, GTAI estimates that their total share was only one percent. According to the GTAI data, three-quarters of all registered projects no longer receive Chinese funding.

An example of the move away from China is the planned financing for the modernization of the state railway in Nigeria. Originally, Exim Bank provided the necessary funding. Now, international development banks such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are stepping in. Germany’s KfW is also involved. “The Chinese started, are out, the others are continuing,” says Hernig. He welcomes this development: It allows important projects to continue operating internationally.

Focus on Asia and Africa

It appeared as if things had gone quiet around Belt and Road in recent years. But appearances can be deceiving. Despite massive lockdowns and restricted travel in China as a result of zero-Covid, more projects with Chinese participation have been launched under the new Silk Road in 2022. The GTAI counted 1,000 individual projects that are part of the Belt and Road Initiative. In the previous year, it was 917.

With a total of 491 projects, Asia remains the most important continent for the new Silk Road from the Chinese perspective, including 236 projects in Southeast Asia alone. With 300 new projects, Africa is the second most important continent, while there are 114 projects in Latin America.

  • Energy
  • Geopolitics
  • GTAI
  • New Silk Road
  • Trade

Events

Feb. 25, 2023; 9:00 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
journalists.network e.V., Webinar: Open Source Analysis of Chinese Politics by Manoj Kewalraman More

Feb. 25, 2023; 3:00 p.m. CET (10 p.m. CST)
journalists.network e.V. and German-Chinese Media Network, Webinar: Outside looking in: What increasing restrictions mean for international reporting on China More

Feb. 28, 2023; 9:00 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
EU SME Centre, Workshop: One Year After the Beijing Olympics – Opportunities in China’s Winter Sports Sector for EU SMEs More

Feb. 28, 2023; 6:00 p.m. CET (Mar. 1, 2023 1 a.m. CST)
Dezan Shira & Associates, Webinar: Exploring Southeast Asia’s 2023 Outlook – Opportunities and Trends More

Feb. 28, 2023; 6:00 p.m. CET (Mar. 1, 2023 1 a.m. CST)
European Guanxi, Panel Discussion: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: A year in review More

Feb. 28, 2023; 6:00 p.m. CET (Mar. 1, 2023 1 a.m. CST)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Critical Issues Confronting China Series: China’s Overseas Infrastructure: Bumps Along the Road to Global Influence? More

Mar. 2, 2023; 8:30 a.m. CET (3:30 p.m. CST)
China Network Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hybrid Seminar: What is new in Chinese law – Topics which may concern you in 2023 More

Mar. 2, 2023; 9 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
China Team, Webinar: Chinese Energy Storage Solutions for DE – Impact of EU Supply Chain Laws More

Mar. 2, 2023; 10 p.m. CET (Mar. 3, 2023 5 a.m. CST)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Webinar: “Friends with No Limits?” The Future of China-Russia Relations More

Mar. 3, 2023; 7:30 a.m. CET (2:30 p.m. CST)
AHK China and German Chamber of Commerce in China: Innovation Dialogue: Innovation from China Going Global & ReConnecting Hong Kong with GBA More

News

Dubourg leaves BASF board

BASF board member Saori Dubourg is leaving the company unexpectedly at the end of the month – apparently over a dispute about the company’s China strategy. Dubourg had been a member of the Board since 2017 and was expected to become the first female chairwoman of the Board. During her career at the Ludwigshafen-based chemical company, she has headed major regions such as Asia and important segments like the agricultural business. The group calls her departure to have been “on the best of terms,” reports the German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

Her post will be filled by Stephan Kothrade. The chemist is considered an expert on China with almost ten years of experience in various positions in Asia. Dubourg is known internally at BASF as the biggest critic of CEO Martin Brudermueller’s involvement in China. Under his leadership, BASF decided last year to make a huge investment in a new site in the southern Chinese industrial metropolis of Zhanjiang. Up to 10 billion euros are to be invested. Dubourg probably considers this too risky in light of the strained relationship with China, which has led many other corporations to already plan a diversification of their production sites. jul

  • BASF
  • Chemistry
  • Industry

EU Commission bans TikTok from staff phones

The EU Commission has prohibited the use of the Chinese video app TikTok on business cell phones of EU officials and MEPs for the time being. Staff received instructions to that effect on Thursday, Commission spokeswoman Sonya Gospodinova confirmed. The ban is said to be temporary. However, Gospodinova did not explain under what conditions the ban would be lifted. It also remained unclear whether new findings about data protection and cybersecurity issues at TikTok led to the decision. It is the first time that EU officials have ever been told not to use an app on their devices. When asked, Commission spokesman Eric Mamer stressed that there had been no pressure from the US to take this step.

The matter was first reported by Euractiv. EU employees and deputies were asked in an email to delete the app, which is owned by the Chinese ByteDance group, from their service devices. Those who do not comply will be blocked from services such as the EU Commission’s internal email service beginning in mid-March.

“To protect the Commission’s data and increase its cybersecurity, the European Commission Corporate Management Board has decided to suspend the TikTok application on corporate devices and personal devices enrolled in the Commission mobile device services,” the email is quoted. TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew recently campaigned in Brussels for more trust in the app. In the United States, the use of TikTok on work phones is already forbidden for federal agency employees and government workers.

German government uncertain on how to deal with TikTok

TikTok said the move caught it by surprise, as the company had not been contacted nor offered an explanation. “We are disappointed with this decision, which we believe to be misguided and based on fundamental misconceptions.” The company said it requested a meeting to clarify how TikTok would protect the data of its EU users.

The use of TikTok on staff telephones is not regulated by the German government. The respective IT security officers of each ministry are responsible for ensuring that software can only be used if it complies with official guidelines and confidentiality regulations.

Upon inquiry, the Federal Ministry of the Interior did not disclose whether this is the case with TikTok in general. However, a spokesperson explained that all TikTok calls are blocked in the ministry’s internal networkthe app cannot be downloaded from the ministry’s smartphones in general. “The administrator receives a notification about the possible installation attempt,” the BMI spokesperson said. Yet at the same time, some parts of the German government also use TikTok as a platform, such as the Ministry of Health, which has almost 150,000 followers. fst/ari

  • BSI
  • Cybersecurity
  • Data
  • Technologie
  • Tiktok

TSMC’s Europe plans rumored to be delayed

According to rumors in Taiwanese media, the semiconductor company TSMC is delaying its investment plans for Europe. This could affect a possible investment in the German city of Dresden, which China.Table has previously reported. The project would thus be delayed by two years. However, there has been neither an official timeframe nor a confirmation for the Dresden site so far.

The reason for the delay is said to be the considerable investments of competitors such as Infineon, Renesas, Intel or Wolfspeed, according to the Taiwanese Jingji Ribao 經濟日報 (Economic Times).

In Germany, Heise.de first reported on the rumors. The chip industry is currently in its cyclical downturn. A global shortage during the pandemic is now being followed by an oversupply. fin

  • Industry
  • Technology
  • TSMC

At least five dead after mining accident

A collapse of a large coal mine in Inner Mongolia has killed at least 5 people and buried 48. This was reported by state media on Thursday. Nearly 300 rescue workers are on the scene with search dogs and heavy equipment. At least six injured people have already been rescued.

The collapse occurred at an open pit mine in the administrative district of Alxa operated by Xinjing Coal Mining Co.. Inner Mongolia is one of the country’s largest coal producers and, like other Chinese regions, has ramped up production in the past year to increase supply and stabilize prices.

China’s President Xi Jinping ordered “comprehensive efforts in searching and rescuing the missing and treating the injured,” according to the Xinhua news agency. Premier Li Keqiang called for a swift investigation into the cause of the accident. rtr/fpe

  • Coal
  • Inner Mongolia
  • Raw materials

Selfie with spy balloon

Selfie China Ballon Pilot

The US Pentagon has released a photo showing the Chinese surveillance balloon before it was shot down – taken from the cockpit of a U-2 aircraft. The military said it had determined that the balloon was equipped with espionage devices from reconnaissance flights such as this one. U-2 aircraft are capable of traveling at extreme altitudes, so pilots must wear a full pressurized suit similar to those worn by astronauts. The photo was taken at an altitude of 18 kilometers. jul

  • Geopolitics
  • Monitoring
  • Spy

China Perspective

The death of a student and the distrust in the authorities

A 15-year-old boarding school student was reported missing on October 14, 2022. Both the school and local police in Qianshan in east China’s Jiangxi province said they tried everything they could in their search for him. In truth, the search was likely more perfunctorily. Three months later, Hu Xinyu was still nowhere to be found.

His parents had reported their son’s disappearance on the Internet early on and asked for help. But it was a conspiracy theory that helped attract national attention: Hu may have been abducted and killed by an underground network that harvests and sells organs to people who are in need of transplants. Local officials and even members of the school were rumored to have been involved.

No evidence was provided to support this terrifying hypothesis. But netizens kept spreading it.

This case is an example of a serious problem that the Chinese government has brought on itself: a lack of credibility.

Surveillance cameras are installed at every street corner all over China. The government seems to be able to find and catch anybody who the authorities deemed even remotely dangerous for the government. How could they not find a high school student, if they really wanted to? For the public, that could be either because the authorities did not want to put any effort into the search for an ordinary student from the countryside, or worse, because something truly evil is happening inside the government.  

Organ trade was real (or still is?)

China has indeed a dubious track record when it comes to the supervision of organ transplants. A former vice health minister, Huang Jiefu, admitted that the organs of criminals had been used for transplant without consent, but the practice had been stopped since 2015. All transplanted organs have been from voluntary donors, he said.

But this has not dispelled public concern that the practice still exists. Whenever there is news of a young man who went missing, somebody would say that the unfortunate guy might have been butchered for his liver or kidneys. 

While public attention to Hu’s case was increasing, an article commemorating a retired senior government official further fueled the rumor about organ harvest. Gao Zhanxiang, a former vice cultural minister, died in December at the age of 87 shortly after the country lifted Covid lockdowns. The article praised Gao for his optimism toward life “despite having received multiple transplants”. 

While discussion about Gao heated up, somebody dug out old social media posts about former finance minister Jin Renqing. Jin, who died in 2021 at 77, was said to have received a heart transplant. The organ reportedly came from a 28-year-old man. 

Party and government officials enjoying luxury medical service is an open secret in China. The bulk of the country’s public spending on health care goes to incumbent or retired politicians and bureaucrats, who claim to be the servants of the people.  

The people don’t believe the police

On January 28, Hu’s body was finally found in a yard not far from the campus. He was announced to have hung himself with a shoestring. The local government held a press conference, presenting the final investigation result: Depression resulting from academic pressure was most likely the reason for the suicide. Text and voice messages by Hu were presented as evidence.  

However, this conclusion did not silence the questions. Shortly after the conference, quite a few videos of experiments testing the strength of shoestrings emerged on social media, challenging the official narrative.

Also, Hu’s family members did not show up for the press conference. The press conference, like most government press conferences in China, had all the indications to be choreographed. All questions seemed to be pre-assigned to cooperative journalists.  

Li Lianying, Hu’s mother, has been the major voice for the family. After the press conference, all her social media posts were deleted, with no explanation. No more comments were heard from Hu’s family and classmates, prompting rumors that their communication with the outside world is tightly controlled and the family might even be living under house arrest.  

Hu’s family was silenced

This is also the typical way how China’s governments deal on all levels with any incident they deem negative: They exert control. Deep in their minds, they know chances are there is something in the government that could not stand up to scrutiny and investigation. So their instinct is to always cover things up, hoping to solve them without anyone noticing. When this is not possible, they would start to control information and control people who could speak out against the will of the government.  

The world has seen the practice in the government’s management or mismanagement of the information related to Covid, both at the beginning of the disease’s outbreak and at the end of the pandemic.  

The authorities assume that with time and a certain level of control, people will lose interest in any bad events will fade. In the best-case scenario, would erupt and divert public attention, such as a war or earthquake somewhere in the world. If this does not happen, a scandal involving a Chinese film star or entertainer could be trotted out on purpose to do the job.

This approach often works. Public debate over Hu’s case, for example, has indeed gradually diminished. But the tragedies and the government’s handling of them remain in the memory of some. Skepticism lingers. When the next big incident happens, the whole process will simply repeat itself.  

So the government’s credibility is always doubted, except in one specific area: nationalist propaganda over issues such as Taiwan or some malicious foreign countries.  

  • Education
  • Society

Executive Moves

Falk Hirdes has been General Manager at CPC Corporate Management for Mainland China since the beginning of the year. Hirdes previously served as Regional Manager at CPC, working from Beijing.

Wu Jianghao succeeds Kong Xuanyou as China’s ambassador to Tokyo. Wu has already served two five-year stints as a diplomat in Japan and most recently worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing.

Is something changing in your organization? Let us know at heads@table.media!

Dessert

It’s not first class, but at least the flight isn’t long. Lady panda Ouhin leaves Adventure World in Shirahama, Japan, in a cage. She will travel to Sichuan in China together with her twin sister Touhin and father Emei. The two eight-year-old females will find a partner there for reproduction. And for Emei, it’s time to retire. He is already 30 years old, which makes him a real old-timer. Pandas only live about 20 years in the wild; the oldest giant panda in captivity lived to be 36. China sends pandas to foreign countries as a gesture of friendship, however, the animals and their offspring remain the property of China.

China.Table editorial office

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