German foreign policy expert Norbert Roettgen (CDU) does not believe that China is a viable mediator in the Ukraine war. On the contrary: In an interview with Table.Media, he downright warns that the Europeans could regret calling on China to influence Moscow: “A country that we see as a systemic rival is supposed to become part of security in Europe? I think that is fundamentally wrong and dangerous.” Europe cannot have any interest in an order in which the most powerful rules, Roettgen told Felix Lee and Michael Radunski. “Because that is what China wants.” Moreover, all this would be incompatible with the principles of a European security and peace order.
One example of Beijing pursuing this path is provided by China’s top diplomat in Paris. Lu Shaye, considered a blueprint of the incited and overzealous wolf warrior in Europe, caused irritation with a remark concerning the sovereignty of states of the former Soviet Union. Specifically, the interview on French television was about Ukraine. When asked, however, Lu then explained that former Soviet Union countries had “actual status in international law because there is no international agreement to materialize their sovereign status”. For the Baltic EU countries, also former Soviet countries, this was proof that Beijing cannot be trusted to play a mediating role in the Ukraine war. Lu’s remarks are also to be addressed at the EU Council of Foreign Ministers today in Brussels .
Frank Sieren looked at how European companies in China deal with local research and development. The EU Chamber of Commerce and Merics surveyed European companies on the matter. The study shows: Although the sheer size of the Chinese market speaks for more than a third of the companies surveyed to expand R&D in China, a lack of intellectual property protection apparently deter them from doing so. The study also found that the Covid pandemic had a negative impact on the expansion plans of local companies.
Mr. Roettgen, France’s President Emmanuel Macron wants China to broker peace in Ukraine. Will China actually be able to play such a role?
No, I don’t think so.
Why not?
There are other, more important interests for China than peace in Ukraine. But I also wonder whether those politicians in Europe really know what they are calling for when they invite China to become part of our European security architecture. A country that we consider a systematic rival is supposed to become part of security in Europe? I would consider that fundamentally wrong and dangerous.
But Beijing has even presented a paper for a political solution in Ukraine.
That is true. But China does not even abide by the first point of this paper, which emphasizes the sovereignty of states. Otherwise, the Russian war of aggression should have been clearly condemned. This paper is not a peace paper, but an expression of Chinese interests.
Which are?
China’s power-political interests are to exploit the situation for its own benefit. This means: For Beijing, it is a satisfaction, firstly, that Russia is weaker in relation to China than ever before in its history. Economically, China benefits enormously from this because it can buy oil and gas from Russia very cheaply. Secondly, China wants to present itself publicly as a peace broker and thus portray itself in an advantageous contrast to the USA. And thirdly, China wants to divide the Europeans and above all Europe and the USA. This – and not peace in Europe – is the Chinese interest.
But we Europeans have not managed to bring peace for more than a year. Why not get outside help?
China is a repressive dictatorship with claims to global power and the goal of fundamentally changing the international order. We Europeans cannot have any interest in the international order based on the principle of law, which China actively undermines and harms repeatedly, being replaced by an order in which the most powerful rules. Because that is what China wants. All this is incompatible with the principles of a European security and peace order.
But we Europeans have no influence on Putin at the moment. China does.
That’s true, but I think it’s naive to believe that we can use this influence to our own advantage and therefore need to get on particularly well with Xi Jinping now. First of all, no one from Europe is needed to explain to Xi how he should behave towards Russia. The Chinese president knows exactly what he is doing. Secondly, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that China would do us any favors in the current global situation. And thirdly, which is probably the most dangerous naivety, we should not believe that we can outsource the solution to our problems. The reality is that the question of what happens next in Ukraine and whether there will be peace has a military prerequisite that cannot be ceded either.
What do you mean by that exactly?
If Russia gains the military upper hand, it will have consequences for Europe for decades to come. Europe would then be divided again. If, however, Ukraine prevails militarily, this will open up political opportunities. Anything else is denying reality.
Do you believe, conversely, that China is supplying Russia with weapons?
No. As long as Russia does not come under massive military pressure, I don’t think so, because it would completely counteract the international reputation and role that China is seeking for itself.
What role is China seeking?
Beijing wants to present itself as a mediator, as a conflict resolver – not as an arms supplier. This is working quite well at the moment and is having an impact on many countries.
Was it right what the German Foreign Minister did in China: Clear words to the point of an open exchange of blows?
Mrs. Baerbock had one task above all: Namely to make it clear that the German position lies with Mrs von der Leyen and not with Emmanuel Macron. A war over Taiwan would also affect Europe and would have massive repercussions for our relationship with China. In that respect, it was unavoidable that she had to be very clear. Otherwise, the international bewilderment about Europe would have become even greater.
But it is not only Europe that has the problem of not speaking with the same voice. The German government coalition has been promising a China strategy now for months. Proposals have already been leaked from the Green-led ministries. The Chancellery under Olaf Scholz, on the other hand, is stonewalling. Why does the Social Democratic Party (SPD) find it so difficult to take a clear stance on China?
It is not surprising that the Greens are constantly being pulled back by the Chancellery and the SPD. The Chancellery sees above all the domestically inconvenient consequences of a new China policy. What surprises me, on the other hand, is how much the Greens are willing to take. They could actually formulate their positions much more confidently. Especially in foreign policy, where there are snags everywhere.
Europe has reached a consensus on categorizing China as a systemic rival, as a competitor in economic matters, and as a partner when it comes to climate policy and other areas.
But what does that mean exactly? Nobody is seriously calling for de-coupling from China. Agreeing not to do something that no one is proposing anyway is not that hard. But when we talk about de-risking, that is, reducing the risks when dealing with China, the question arises: What are the concrete measures? This is precisely where there is a fundamental disagreement. The German Chancellor essentially stands for the continuity of a mercantilist China policy and wants to rely on bilateral relations with other countries in order to achieve diversification in this way. The Greens, on the other hand, want a fundamental reassessment of how to deal with China.
And where do the German Christian Democrats stand?
For a fundamental reassessment, because China has changed massively under Xi Jinping.
The political constellation is interesting: Chancellor Scholz is basically continuing what was the case for 16 years under Chancellor Merkel, so under your party, with regard to China. And now you seem to be much closer to the position of the Greens.
I already formulated my criticism of China and Germany’s China policy when Angela Merkel was still Chancellor. So it is not new. However, I agree with your observation. The Greens are maintaining their position, which unfortunately has not yet been translated into government action.
Reducing business relations with China would mean rising costs, for example, if we stopped sourcing pharmaceuticals from China and instead brought production back to Europe. Is the German population prepared to bear these higher costs?
I am sure that people will give their approval to a sensible policy that explains things step by step. That is what politics is for. And that is why it is the responsibility of a government to fight for these goals and not to sit there like a coward and ask: Oh, what will it cost us? On top of that, the pandemic and the war have given people an idea of what it means to be dependent. Our security and independence are very high goods that need to be protected. That comes at a price.
87 percent of all photovoltaic systems come from China, as do the majority of wind turbines and batteries for electric cars. We want the energy transition, but we are dependent on Chinese technology. A dilemma?
We would be in a dilemma if war broke out over Taiwan in six months’ time and we no longer had any options. That would be a disaster. But we are not yet in that situation, but in a phase in which we can still talk about considerations and costs. We need time to make ourselves less dependent on China. It is clear that this cannot be done abruptly. That’s why we need to carefully define our biggest security risks now. And if we find that dependence is a major security risk in certain areas, we need to act and reduce that dependence.
Last week, your political group in the Bundestag presented its own strategy paper on China. Now you are making it very concrete: Which dependencies on China do we have to address now?
First of all, we must prevent creating new dependencies. That’s why we need a policy shift regarding the roll-out of the 5G network. And that is also possible. If the old government’s draft law had remained in place, Huawei and ZTE, which are all massively subsidized by Beijing and controlled by the CCP, would have won all the tenders. We would have had a Chinese 5G here in Germany. We fought in the Bundestag for changing the law in the interest of the security of our networks and formulating clear requirements for the trustworthiness of providers that can lead to exclusion. Since the government change, the law was practically not applied until the Federal Ministry of the Interior announced a 180-degree turnaround a month ago. I very much welcome this. However, I have my doubts that this change of course was solely conceived in Berlin and the Chancellery.
But what about VW and BASF? They say: We can no longer leave China. That would mean certain ruin. That’s why they are investing even more billions in the People’s Republic.
BASF’s recent 10 billion investment, the largest in its corporate history, would not have been necessary. That is an additional risk. But at Volkswagen in particular, I see hardly any options for breaking out of the dependency. The company generates more than 50 percent of its profits in China. We must not fool ourselves: If there is a war over Taiwan, it will hit our car industry to the very core. For this reason alone, we should not pretend that Taiwan does not concern us, but do everything we can to prevent a war.
That sounds like surrendering.
It is no use closing our eyes to reality. And it is not all bad: The entire SME sector, which is the backbone of our economy, has begun to change its perspective. Action is already being undertaken there. These companies want to stay in China, but are diversifying their commitment and reducing it where necessary. What is indispensable on the government side is a new growth strategy that achieves growth and thus generates prosperity without entering into political dependencies. You cannot have a China policy without a veritable European economic and growth policy. This is the real strategic task and the core of a new China policy.
Norbert Roettgen has been a member of the German Bundestag since 1994. Between 2014 and 2021, he served as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
France, Ukraine and the Baltic States have expressed dismay over the remarks of China’s ambassador in Paris. Lu Shaye questioned the sovereignty of former Soviet states such as Ukraine and the Baltic countries in a television interview. On Sunday, the French government expressed its “full solidarity” with all the states in question, which had gained their independence “after decades of oppression”.
It called on China to clarify whether Lu’s remarks reflected the official position or not. “On Ukraine specifically, it was internationally recognized within borders including Crimea in 1991 by the entire international community, including China,” a spokesperson for France’s Foreign Ministry said.
The Chinese ambassador’s statements will also be discussed at the Council of EU Foreign Ministers today, Monday, Latvia’s Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs said. He expects “a strong and unified EU response”, Rinkēvičs wrote on Twitter. His Estonian counterpart Margus Tsahkna criticized it as “a misinterpretation of history”.
In an interview broadcast on Friday by the French television station LCI, Lu said that Crimea historically belongs to Russia and was offered to Ukraine by the former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
When asked whether Crimea belonged to Ukraine, the diplomat said that it would all depend on the way this issue is looked at. Following an interjection by the moderator that the Black Sea peninsula occupied by Russia since 2014 is part of Ukraine under international law, Lu replied: “These ex-USSR countries don’t have actual status in international law because there is no international agreement to materialize their sovereign status.”
The Chinese Foreign Ministry did not initially react to the diplomat’s remarks. The Chinese top diplomat is considered one of the most extreme “Wolf Warriors”. So far, Beijing has refrained from expressing too much support for the ambassador’s behavior, but Lu has not been publicly kept in line either.
The three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Ukraine, which used to be part of the Soviet Union, reacted in much the same way as France. “It is strange to hear an absurd version of the “history of Crimea” from a representative of a country that is scrupulous about its thousand-year history,” Mychajlo Podolyak, a senior adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, wrote on Twitter. “If you want to be a major political player, do not parrot the propaganda of Russian outsiders.”
The Baltic States have been members of the EU and NATO for years – they have already taken formal steps. Latvia’s Foreign Minister Rinkēvičs announced on Twitter on Saturday evening that he summoned the chargé d’affaires of the Chinese embassy in Riga for Monday due to the “completely unacceptable” remarks. He said the move had been coordinated with Lithuania and Estonia. “We expect explanation from the Chinese side and complete retraction of this statement,” Rinkēvičs said.
Lithuania’s Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis posted a screenshot of the interview on Twitter: “If anyone is still wondering why the Baltic States don’t trust China to ‘broker peace in Ukraine’, here’s a Chinese ambassador arguing that Crimea is Russian and our countries’ borders have no legal basis.”
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were occupied alternately by the Soviet Union and Germany during the Second World War. After the end of the war, the three small Baltic Sea states in north-eastern Europe were forced to become Soviet republics for decades. It was not until 1991 that they gained their independence.
Lu Shaye is no stranger to scandalous statements. He regularly lashed out on Twitter against French journalists, think tanks and China experts. Among other things, the press team of the Chinese embassy called French academic Antoine Bondaz a “little thug” and a “crazy hyena”. Lu ignored a subsequent summons by the French Foreign Ministry.
Commenting on the white-paper protests, he said they had been exploited by foreign forces. Following Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Lu declared twice that the Taiwanese people, misguided by the USA and their own government, would first have to be re-educated after being conquered.
“Knowledge is power,” says Marina Rudyak. The fact that the power structure between China and Europe is currently shifting so drastically, she says, also has to do with the fact that China has been watching Europe closely for 150 years. For most Europeans, on the other hand, China is as distant and foreign as ever. “How can it be,” Rudyak asks, “that we can afford to know so little about the country that is Germany’s biggest trading partner and strategic rival?”
In an article, the sinologist from Heidelberg University therefore calls for more strategic empathy and China competence. However, when speaking to her, she immediately notes that empathy should not be confused with sympathy. Rather, it is about understanding what drives the other person, what history, ideologies and world views shape their decisions. Only then are informed and good decisions possible, she believes. The greatest risk, which is easy to avoid, is to believe that you already know enough.
For Rudyak, that means, “If you want to understand China’s strategies under Xi Jinping, you have to read what the party says and take it seriously.” For that, Germany would need more of almost everything. More language skills. More expertise. More strategic translation. Because only a fraction of the freely accessible Chinese documents are being translated. Moreover, official Chinese translations are mostly propaganda documents: They contain the same terms, but they often mean something different.
That is why Rudyak and four other sinologists founded the “Decoding China Dictionary“. It explains how the core concepts of international relations – such as human rights, democracy or multilateralism – are differently perceived in Europe and the Chinese Communist Party.
The fact that Rudyak considers the examination of the thinking of others to be so important has to do with her background. She was born in Moscow and, she says herself, is a typical child of the Soviet Union: her father is Ukrainian-Jewish, her mother is from Tashkent with Belarusian, Georgian and Russian roots. In 1991, at the age of ten, Rudyak’s family moved to the German city of Heidelberg, where her father held a visiting professorship – and stayed. Later, another culture was added professionally, China.
Rudyak stays in touch with the political discourse in Russia, which is why to her – as to many others of her generation who have a Soviet migration background – an invasion of Ukraine by Russia already seemed a likely scenario in 2008.
But she does not see a parallel to China and Taiwan. Rather, Rudyak warns against equating China with Russia. “The comparison easily tempts people not to look at China at all.” But the consequences of not properly understanding China and its policies are already severe, she says.
As a sinologist, she currently works as a doctoral researcher at the Institute of Sinology at the University of Heidelberg and currently holds a professorship for Chinese society and economy at the University of Goettingen. She criticizes the fact that China remains a marginal topic in the German school and university scene, despite its importance. Worse still, the more difficult the relationship with China becomes, the less people in Germany want to deal with it, she says. “There is a lack of strategic approaches, unlike in the United States. There, the more China is perceived as a rival, the more people jump on it.”
In politics, too, there are lessons to be learned from the USA, she believes. In the United States, it is common for scientists to go into politics for a few years – and vice versa. According to Rudyak, German politics could also benefit from such “revolving doors”. Except for the Foreign Office, China expertise is rare in German politics.
After earning her M.A. from the University of Heidelberg, Rudyak initially worked for several years as an economic policy advisor for the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) in Beijing in a program on regional economic cooperation and integration. In 2014, she went back to Heidelberg to write a doctoral dissertation on Chinese development aid policy. Her plan: earn a PhD quickly and return to GIZ. But Rudyak then decided to stay at the university. “As exciting as working at GIZ was, I didn’t have time to read. And I want to explore, understand and explain” she says.
That’s why she is doing both: In addition to her university research and lecturing, Rudyak advises German and European policymakers, government agencies and non-governmental organizations, especially on China’s development policy. Since the start of the Ukraine war, Rudyak has also been focusing extensively on China-Russia relations. “If you’re one of the few in Germany who can read both languages, then that’s a responsibility,” Rudyak says. Michael Radunski
Once the temperatures start to climb, the motto in Chinese cities this year is once again: watch out for flat flying plastic discs. This time, we are not talking about the lids of the ubiquitous waimai packaging (外卖 wàimài = takeout), but about Frisbees discs.
Since 2022, the frisbee has been gaining momentum in China and, under the Chinese name 飞盘 fēipán (literally “flying disc”, 玩飞盘 wán fēipán “playing frisbee”), has become a hip trend sport among young people. No matter whether it’s in the park on the weekend or between the glossy facades in the Financial District during the lunch break, anyone who wants to be trendy in China these days goes out and casually throws a few rounds of discs with proper grit. The disc discipline is popular not least because it also works well in mixed teams. Muscle power does not play a huge role in this sport, which originally comes from the United States.
As soon as the weather gets warmer, China’s disc hipsters invade the nation’s urban soccer fields and turn the artificial turf into a competitive arena for Ultimate Frisbee, the competitive version of the sport known in Chinese as 极限飞盘 jíxiàn fēipán. And wherever new things sprout in China, new language blossoms are not far away. And so the plastic disc boom has once again set a neologism snowball rolling.
In the case of the “flying disc”, the fan community has coined the term “frisbee babe” in this context, in Chinese 飞盘媛 fēipányuán. The character 媛 – pronounced either yuàn (4th tone) or colloquially usually yuán (2nd tone) – means “beautiful woman”. It is therefore also a popular element of female first names.
Originally, the Chinese associate this hanzi with famous and cultivated beauties from a good home. But not so in the case of the frisbee players. Instead, young ladies are mockingly referred to as feipanyuan, who turn the playing field into a catwalk in order to show off their dream figure in a photo-perfect fashion wearing a crop top and tight yoga pants (秀身材 xiù shēncái). The frisbee is mainly used as a prop, the sport becomes secondary (if it is played at all). Instead, the program is all about showing off the discs and getting clicks, likes and views on WeChat, Xiaohongshu, Douyin and the like – or the looks and whistles of the soccer players on the neighboring field. Of course, genuine frisbee girls can only shake their heads at this.
Of course, doll posing is not limited to plastic discs. And so China’s Internet community is exposing an entire universe of beauty posers who celebrate the latest trends without any talent or ambition and only for the camera, instead of really engaging in the experience. Thus, China’s Internet not only frowns upon fitness babes (健身媛 jiànshēnyuán) and yoga babes (瑜伽媛 yújiāyuán), badminton babes (羽毛媛 yǔmáoyuán) or shooting babes (射击媛 shèjīyuán – either with a gun or a bow), car enthusiast babes (车友媛 chēyǒuyuán) and mountain climber babes (爬山媛 páshānyuán), but also about tea drinker babes (茶媛 cháyuán) and Buddhism babes (佛媛 fóyuán).
The list of mocking neologisms goes on. This is also due to the fact that a new outdoor sports fever (户外运动 hùwài yùndòng “outdoor sports”) has flared up in China. For a long time, outdoor activities were labeled as boring and a restless routine for old people. But those who think of outdoor recreation in the Middle Kingdom only think of sidewalk poker (打牌 dǎpái) and street chess (下棋 xiàqí), taking birds for a walk (遛鸟 liùniǎo) and granny mahjong (打麻将 dǎ májiàng), group dance groove (跳广场舞 tiào guǎngchǎngwǔ) and outdoor fitness equipment (户外健身器材 hùwài jiànshēn qìcái) were clearly born yesterday. China’s youth has developed a taste for the outdoors. As a result, besides frisbee, numerous other outdoor sports and activities are trending, such as skateboarding (滑板 huábǎn) and stand-up paddling (桨板 jiǎngbǎn), camping (露营 lùyíng) and surfing (冲浪 chōnglàng), baseball (棒球 bàngqiú, literally “stick ball”), rugby (橄榄球 gǎnlǎnqiú, literally “olive ball”), and climbing (攀岩 pānyán).
The only question that remains is what to call the male counterpart to the frisbee babe, the frisbee boy? After all, there are also men who show more presence than commitment and prefer to pose and post instead of sweating. So far, unfortunately, no masculine counterpart has established itself, although proposals are certainly circulating on Chinese online forums, for example, the飞盘夹 fēipánjiā “frisbee clip” (actually a clip with which you can attach the sports disc to your belt or bag). So creative ideas are welcome. Perhaps a good reason to promptly leave your office or armchair and follow the call of the outdoors. It’s a well-known fact that the best ideas still come from exercising in the fresh air.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
German foreign policy expert Norbert Roettgen (CDU) does not believe that China is a viable mediator in the Ukraine war. On the contrary: In an interview with Table.Media, he downright warns that the Europeans could regret calling on China to influence Moscow: “A country that we see as a systemic rival is supposed to become part of security in Europe? I think that is fundamentally wrong and dangerous.” Europe cannot have any interest in an order in which the most powerful rules, Roettgen told Felix Lee and Michael Radunski. “Because that is what China wants.” Moreover, all this would be incompatible with the principles of a European security and peace order.
One example of Beijing pursuing this path is provided by China’s top diplomat in Paris. Lu Shaye, considered a blueprint of the incited and overzealous wolf warrior in Europe, caused irritation with a remark concerning the sovereignty of states of the former Soviet Union. Specifically, the interview on French television was about Ukraine. When asked, however, Lu then explained that former Soviet Union countries had “actual status in international law because there is no international agreement to materialize their sovereign status”. For the Baltic EU countries, also former Soviet countries, this was proof that Beijing cannot be trusted to play a mediating role in the Ukraine war. Lu’s remarks are also to be addressed at the EU Council of Foreign Ministers today in Brussels .
Frank Sieren looked at how European companies in China deal with local research and development. The EU Chamber of Commerce and Merics surveyed European companies on the matter. The study shows: Although the sheer size of the Chinese market speaks for more than a third of the companies surveyed to expand R&D in China, a lack of intellectual property protection apparently deter them from doing so. The study also found that the Covid pandemic had a negative impact on the expansion plans of local companies.
Mr. Roettgen, France’s President Emmanuel Macron wants China to broker peace in Ukraine. Will China actually be able to play such a role?
No, I don’t think so.
Why not?
There are other, more important interests for China than peace in Ukraine. But I also wonder whether those politicians in Europe really know what they are calling for when they invite China to become part of our European security architecture. A country that we consider a systematic rival is supposed to become part of security in Europe? I would consider that fundamentally wrong and dangerous.
But Beijing has even presented a paper for a political solution in Ukraine.
That is true. But China does not even abide by the first point of this paper, which emphasizes the sovereignty of states. Otherwise, the Russian war of aggression should have been clearly condemned. This paper is not a peace paper, but an expression of Chinese interests.
Which are?
China’s power-political interests are to exploit the situation for its own benefit. This means: For Beijing, it is a satisfaction, firstly, that Russia is weaker in relation to China than ever before in its history. Economically, China benefits enormously from this because it can buy oil and gas from Russia very cheaply. Secondly, China wants to present itself publicly as a peace broker and thus portray itself in an advantageous contrast to the USA. And thirdly, China wants to divide the Europeans and above all Europe and the USA. This – and not peace in Europe – is the Chinese interest.
But we Europeans have not managed to bring peace for more than a year. Why not get outside help?
China is a repressive dictatorship with claims to global power and the goal of fundamentally changing the international order. We Europeans cannot have any interest in the international order based on the principle of law, which China actively undermines and harms repeatedly, being replaced by an order in which the most powerful rules. Because that is what China wants. All this is incompatible with the principles of a European security and peace order.
But we Europeans have no influence on Putin at the moment. China does.
That’s true, but I think it’s naive to believe that we can use this influence to our own advantage and therefore need to get on particularly well with Xi Jinping now. First of all, no one from Europe is needed to explain to Xi how he should behave towards Russia. The Chinese president knows exactly what he is doing. Secondly, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that China would do us any favors in the current global situation. And thirdly, which is probably the most dangerous naivety, we should not believe that we can outsource the solution to our problems. The reality is that the question of what happens next in Ukraine and whether there will be peace has a military prerequisite that cannot be ceded either.
What do you mean by that exactly?
If Russia gains the military upper hand, it will have consequences for Europe for decades to come. Europe would then be divided again. If, however, Ukraine prevails militarily, this will open up political opportunities. Anything else is denying reality.
Do you believe, conversely, that China is supplying Russia with weapons?
No. As long as Russia does not come under massive military pressure, I don’t think so, because it would completely counteract the international reputation and role that China is seeking for itself.
What role is China seeking?
Beijing wants to present itself as a mediator, as a conflict resolver – not as an arms supplier. This is working quite well at the moment and is having an impact on many countries.
Was it right what the German Foreign Minister did in China: Clear words to the point of an open exchange of blows?
Mrs. Baerbock had one task above all: Namely to make it clear that the German position lies with Mrs von der Leyen and not with Emmanuel Macron. A war over Taiwan would also affect Europe and would have massive repercussions for our relationship with China. In that respect, it was unavoidable that she had to be very clear. Otherwise, the international bewilderment about Europe would have become even greater.
But it is not only Europe that has the problem of not speaking with the same voice. The German government coalition has been promising a China strategy now for months. Proposals have already been leaked from the Green-led ministries. The Chancellery under Olaf Scholz, on the other hand, is stonewalling. Why does the Social Democratic Party (SPD) find it so difficult to take a clear stance on China?
It is not surprising that the Greens are constantly being pulled back by the Chancellery and the SPD. The Chancellery sees above all the domestically inconvenient consequences of a new China policy. What surprises me, on the other hand, is how much the Greens are willing to take. They could actually formulate their positions much more confidently. Especially in foreign policy, where there are snags everywhere.
Europe has reached a consensus on categorizing China as a systemic rival, as a competitor in economic matters, and as a partner when it comes to climate policy and other areas.
But what does that mean exactly? Nobody is seriously calling for de-coupling from China. Agreeing not to do something that no one is proposing anyway is not that hard. But when we talk about de-risking, that is, reducing the risks when dealing with China, the question arises: What are the concrete measures? This is precisely where there is a fundamental disagreement. The German Chancellor essentially stands for the continuity of a mercantilist China policy and wants to rely on bilateral relations with other countries in order to achieve diversification in this way. The Greens, on the other hand, want a fundamental reassessment of how to deal with China.
And where do the German Christian Democrats stand?
For a fundamental reassessment, because China has changed massively under Xi Jinping.
The political constellation is interesting: Chancellor Scholz is basically continuing what was the case for 16 years under Chancellor Merkel, so under your party, with regard to China. And now you seem to be much closer to the position of the Greens.
I already formulated my criticism of China and Germany’s China policy when Angela Merkel was still Chancellor. So it is not new. However, I agree with your observation. The Greens are maintaining their position, which unfortunately has not yet been translated into government action.
Reducing business relations with China would mean rising costs, for example, if we stopped sourcing pharmaceuticals from China and instead brought production back to Europe. Is the German population prepared to bear these higher costs?
I am sure that people will give their approval to a sensible policy that explains things step by step. That is what politics is for. And that is why it is the responsibility of a government to fight for these goals and not to sit there like a coward and ask: Oh, what will it cost us? On top of that, the pandemic and the war have given people an idea of what it means to be dependent. Our security and independence are very high goods that need to be protected. That comes at a price.
87 percent of all photovoltaic systems come from China, as do the majority of wind turbines and batteries for electric cars. We want the energy transition, but we are dependent on Chinese technology. A dilemma?
We would be in a dilemma if war broke out over Taiwan in six months’ time and we no longer had any options. That would be a disaster. But we are not yet in that situation, but in a phase in which we can still talk about considerations and costs. We need time to make ourselves less dependent on China. It is clear that this cannot be done abruptly. That’s why we need to carefully define our biggest security risks now. And if we find that dependence is a major security risk in certain areas, we need to act and reduce that dependence.
Last week, your political group in the Bundestag presented its own strategy paper on China. Now you are making it very concrete: Which dependencies on China do we have to address now?
First of all, we must prevent creating new dependencies. That’s why we need a policy shift regarding the roll-out of the 5G network. And that is also possible. If the old government’s draft law had remained in place, Huawei and ZTE, which are all massively subsidized by Beijing and controlled by the CCP, would have won all the tenders. We would have had a Chinese 5G here in Germany. We fought in the Bundestag for changing the law in the interest of the security of our networks and formulating clear requirements for the trustworthiness of providers that can lead to exclusion. Since the government change, the law was practically not applied until the Federal Ministry of the Interior announced a 180-degree turnaround a month ago. I very much welcome this. However, I have my doubts that this change of course was solely conceived in Berlin and the Chancellery.
But what about VW and BASF? They say: We can no longer leave China. That would mean certain ruin. That’s why they are investing even more billions in the People’s Republic.
BASF’s recent 10 billion investment, the largest in its corporate history, would not have been necessary. That is an additional risk. But at Volkswagen in particular, I see hardly any options for breaking out of the dependency. The company generates more than 50 percent of its profits in China. We must not fool ourselves: If there is a war over Taiwan, it will hit our car industry to the very core. For this reason alone, we should not pretend that Taiwan does not concern us, but do everything we can to prevent a war.
That sounds like surrendering.
It is no use closing our eyes to reality. And it is not all bad: The entire SME sector, which is the backbone of our economy, has begun to change its perspective. Action is already being undertaken there. These companies want to stay in China, but are diversifying their commitment and reducing it where necessary. What is indispensable on the government side is a new growth strategy that achieves growth and thus generates prosperity without entering into political dependencies. You cannot have a China policy without a veritable European economic and growth policy. This is the real strategic task and the core of a new China policy.
Norbert Roettgen has been a member of the German Bundestag since 1994. Between 2014 and 2021, he served as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
France, Ukraine and the Baltic States have expressed dismay over the remarks of China’s ambassador in Paris. Lu Shaye questioned the sovereignty of former Soviet states such as Ukraine and the Baltic countries in a television interview. On Sunday, the French government expressed its “full solidarity” with all the states in question, which had gained their independence “after decades of oppression”.
It called on China to clarify whether Lu’s remarks reflected the official position or not. “On Ukraine specifically, it was internationally recognized within borders including Crimea in 1991 by the entire international community, including China,” a spokesperson for France’s Foreign Ministry said.
The Chinese ambassador’s statements will also be discussed at the Council of EU Foreign Ministers today, Monday, Latvia’s Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs said. He expects “a strong and unified EU response”, Rinkēvičs wrote on Twitter. His Estonian counterpart Margus Tsahkna criticized it as “a misinterpretation of history”.
In an interview broadcast on Friday by the French television station LCI, Lu said that Crimea historically belongs to Russia and was offered to Ukraine by the former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
When asked whether Crimea belonged to Ukraine, the diplomat said that it would all depend on the way this issue is looked at. Following an interjection by the moderator that the Black Sea peninsula occupied by Russia since 2014 is part of Ukraine under international law, Lu replied: “These ex-USSR countries don’t have actual status in international law because there is no international agreement to materialize their sovereign status.”
The Chinese Foreign Ministry did not initially react to the diplomat’s remarks. The Chinese top diplomat is considered one of the most extreme “Wolf Warriors”. So far, Beijing has refrained from expressing too much support for the ambassador’s behavior, but Lu has not been publicly kept in line either.
The three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Ukraine, which used to be part of the Soviet Union, reacted in much the same way as France. “It is strange to hear an absurd version of the “history of Crimea” from a representative of a country that is scrupulous about its thousand-year history,” Mychajlo Podolyak, a senior adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, wrote on Twitter. “If you want to be a major political player, do not parrot the propaganda of Russian outsiders.”
The Baltic States have been members of the EU and NATO for years – they have already taken formal steps. Latvia’s Foreign Minister Rinkēvičs announced on Twitter on Saturday evening that he summoned the chargé d’affaires of the Chinese embassy in Riga for Monday due to the “completely unacceptable” remarks. He said the move had been coordinated with Lithuania and Estonia. “We expect explanation from the Chinese side and complete retraction of this statement,” Rinkēvičs said.
Lithuania’s Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis posted a screenshot of the interview on Twitter: “If anyone is still wondering why the Baltic States don’t trust China to ‘broker peace in Ukraine’, here’s a Chinese ambassador arguing that Crimea is Russian and our countries’ borders have no legal basis.”
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were occupied alternately by the Soviet Union and Germany during the Second World War. After the end of the war, the three small Baltic Sea states in north-eastern Europe were forced to become Soviet republics for decades. It was not until 1991 that they gained their independence.
Lu Shaye is no stranger to scandalous statements. He regularly lashed out on Twitter against French journalists, think tanks and China experts. Among other things, the press team of the Chinese embassy called French academic Antoine Bondaz a “little thug” and a “crazy hyena”. Lu ignored a subsequent summons by the French Foreign Ministry.
Commenting on the white-paper protests, he said they had been exploited by foreign forces. Following Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Lu declared twice that the Taiwanese people, misguided by the USA and their own government, would first have to be re-educated after being conquered.
“Knowledge is power,” says Marina Rudyak. The fact that the power structure between China and Europe is currently shifting so drastically, she says, also has to do with the fact that China has been watching Europe closely for 150 years. For most Europeans, on the other hand, China is as distant and foreign as ever. “How can it be,” Rudyak asks, “that we can afford to know so little about the country that is Germany’s biggest trading partner and strategic rival?”
In an article, the sinologist from Heidelberg University therefore calls for more strategic empathy and China competence. However, when speaking to her, she immediately notes that empathy should not be confused with sympathy. Rather, it is about understanding what drives the other person, what history, ideologies and world views shape their decisions. Only then are informed and good decisions possible, she believes. The greatest risk, which is easy to avoid, is to believe that you already know enough.
For Rudyak, that means, “If you want to understand China’s strategies under Xi Jinping, you have to read what the party says and take it seriously.” For that, Germany would need more of almost everything. More language skills. More expertise. More strategic translation. Because only a fraction of the freely accessible Chinese documents are being translated. Moreover, official Chinese translations are mostly propaganda documents: They contain the same terms, but they often mean something different.
That is why Rudyak and four other sinologists founded the “Decoding China Dictionary“. It explains how the core concepts of international relations – such as human rights, democracy or multilateralism – are differently perceived in Europe and the Chinese Communist Party.
The fact that Rudyak considers the examination of the thinking of others to be so important has to do with her background. She was born in Moscow and, she says herself, is a typical child of the Soviet Union: her father is Ukrainian-Jewish, her mother is from Tashkent with Belarusian, Georgian and Russian roots. In 1991, at the age of ten, Rudyak’s family moved to the German city of Heidelberg, where her father held a visiting professorship – and stayed. Later, another culture was added professionally, China.
Rudyak stays in touch with the political discourse in Russia, which is why to her – as to many others of her generation who have a Soviet migration background – an invasion of Ukraine by Russia already seemed a likely scenario in 2008.
But she does not see a parallel to China and Taiwan. Rather, Rudyak warns against equating China with Russia. “The comparison easily tempts people not to look at China at all.” But the consequences of not properly understanding China and its policies are already severe, she says.
As a sinologist, she currently works as a doctoral researcher at the Institute of Sinology at the University of Heidelberg and currently holds a professorship for Chinese society and economy at the University of Goettingen. She criticizes the fact that China remains a marginal topic in the German school and university scene, despite its importance. Worse still, the more difficult the relationship with China becomes, the less people in Germany want to deal with it, she says. “There is a lack of strategic approaches, unlike in the United States. There, the more China is perceived as a rival, the more people jump on it.”
In politics, too, there are lessons to be learned from the USA, she believes. In the United States, it is common for scientists to go into politics for a few years – and vice versa. According to Rudyak, German politics could also benefit from such “revolving doors”. Except for the Foreign Office, China expertise is rare in German politics.
After earning her M.A. from the University of Heidelberg, Rudyak initially worked for several years as an economic policy advisor for the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) in Beijing in a program on regional economic cooperation and integration. In 2014, she went back to Heidelberg to write a doctoral dissertation on Chinese development aid policy. Her plan: earn a PhD quickly and return to GIZ. But Rudyak then decided to stay at the university. “As exciting as working at GIZ was, I didn’t have time to read. And I want to explore, understand and explain” she says.
That’s why she is doing both: In addition to her university research and lecturing, Rudyak advises German and European policymakers, government agencies and non-governmental organizations, especially on China’s development policy. Since the start of the Ukraine war, Rudyak has also been focusing extensively on China-Russia relations. “If you’re one of the few in Germany who can read both languages, then that’s a responsibility,” Rudyak says. Michael Radunski
Once the temperatures start to climb, the motto in Chinese cities this year is once again: watch out for flat flying plastic discs. This time, we are not talking about the lids of the ubiquitous waimai packaging (外卖 wàimài = takeout), but about Frisbees discs.
Since 2022, the frisbee has been gaining momentum in China and, under the Chinese name 飞盘 fēipán (literally “flying disc”, 玩飞盘 wán fēipán “playing frisbee”), has become a hip trend sport among young people. No matter whether it’s in the park on the weekend or between the glossy facades in the Financial District during the lunch break, anyone who wants to be trendy in China these days goes out and casually throws a few rounds of discs with proper grit. The disc discipline is popular not least because it also works well in mixed teams. Muscle power does not play a huge role in this sport, which originally comes from the United States.
As soon as the weather gets warmer, China’s disc hipsters invade the nation’s urban soccer fields and turn the artificial turf into a competitive arena for Ultimate Frisbee, the competitive version of the sport known in Chinese as 极限飞盘 jíxiàn fēipán. And wherever new things sprout in China, new language blossoms are not far away. And so the plastic disc boom has once again set a neologism snowball rolling.
In the case of the “flying disc”, the fan community has coined the term “frisbee babe” in this context, in Chinese 飞盘媛 fēipányuán. The character 媛 – pronounced either yuàn (4th tone) or colloquially usually yuán (2nd tone) – means “beautiful woman”. It is therefore also a popular element of female first names.
Originally, the Chinese associate this hanzi with famous and cultivated beauties from a good home. But not so in the case of the frisbee players. Instead, young ladies are mockingly referred to as feipanyuan, who turn the playing field into a catwalk in order to show off their dream figure in a photo-perfect fashion wearing a crop top and tight yoga pants (秀身材 xiù shēncái). The frisbee is mainly used as a prop, the sport becomes secondary (if it is played at all). Instead, the program is all about showing off the discs and getting clicks, likes and views on WeChat, Xiaohongshu, Douyin and the like – or the looks and whistles of the soccer players on the neighboring field. Of course, genuine frisbee girls can only shake their heads at this.
Of course, doll posing is not limited to plastic discs. And so China’s Internet community is exposing an entire universe of beauty posers who celebrate the latest trends without any talent or ambition and only for the camera, instead of really engaging in the experience. Thus, China’s Internet not only frowns upon fitness babes (健身媛 jiànshēnyuán) and yoga babes (瑜伽媛 yújiāyuán), badminton babes (羽毛媛 yǔmáoyuán) or shooting babes (射击媛 shèjīyuán – either with a gun or a bow), car enthusiast babes (车友媛 chēyǒuyuán) and mountain climber babes (爬山媛 páshānyuán), but also about tea drinker babes (茶媛 cháyuán) and Buddhism babes (佛媛 fóyuán).
The list of mocking neologisms goes on. This is also due to the fact that a new outdoor sports fever (户外运动 hùwài yùndòng “outdoor sports”) has flared up in China. For a long time, outdoor activities were labeled as boring and a restless routine for old people. But those who think of outdoor recreation in the Middle Kingdom only think of sidewalk poker (打牌 dǎpái) and street chess (下棋 xiàqí), taking birds for a walk (遛鸟 liùniǎo) and granny mahjong (打麻将 dǎ májiàng), group dance groove (跳广场舞 tiào guǎngchǎngwǔ) and outdoor fitness equipment (户外健身器材 hùwài jiànshēn qìcái) were clearly born yesterday. China’s youth has developed a taste for the outdoors. As a result, besides frisbee, numerous other outdoor sports and activities are trending, such as skateboarding (滑板 huábǎn) and stand-up paddling (桨板 jiǎngbǎn), camping (露营 lùyíng) and surfing (冲浪 chōnglàng), baseball (棒球 bàngqiú, literally “stick ball”), rugby (橄榄球 gǎnlǎnqiú, literally “olive ball”), and climbing (攀岩 pānyán).
The only question that remains is what to call the male counterpart to the frisbee babe, the frisbee boy? After all, there are also men who show more presence than commitment and prefer to pose and post instead of sweating. So far, unfortunately, no masculine counterpart has established itself, although proposals are certainly circulating on Chinese online forums, for example, the飞盘夹 fēipánjiā “frisbee clip” (actually a clip with which you can attach the sports disc to your belt or bag). So creative ideas are welcome. Perhaps a good reason to promptly leave your office or armchair and follow the call of the outdoors. It’s a well-known fact that the best ideas still come from exercising in the fresh air.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
