Academic collaboration is one of the few fields where exchange with China remains possible. Resuming exchange programs for visiting students would be highly welcome. Contact with Chinese scientists makes sense and is worthy of support. After all, access to reliable information about what is happening in the People’s Republic is becoming scarce.
However, it is also alarming how naïve some academics are when it comes to collaborating with Chinese partners. A survey by the think tank CEIAS has revealed: European universities also cooperate with research partners who maintain ties to the People’s Liberation Army. And this also applies to fields such as computer science or life sciences. Thus, the Chinese military benefits from European research collaboration. There is a “dire risk” of “forced technology transfer,” says Matej Šimalčík, Executive Director of CEIAS, in an interview with Amelie Richter. Security awareness at universities is far too low.
Collaborations are a good thing, but they should also be well-executed, especially in security-related disciplines. However, German universities are not sufficiently prepared for cooperation with Chinese institutions, says Šimalčík.
China is currently taking a less than cooperative verbal stance against Nancy Pelosi’s planned visit to Taiwan. Some wolf warriors and government media are bringing out new verbal weapons, analyzes Michael Radunski. The saber-rattling is getting louder and more dangerous. At first glance, there is hardly a suitable way to solve it. If Pelosi cancels her trip, China’s aggression will have succeeded. If she travels to Taiwan, the visit could further deteriorate US relations with the People’s Republic. But as our author explains, there is a way out.
Which universities and research institutes in Europe are cooperating with Chinese institutions? The “Academic Engagement Tracker” of the Central European think tank The Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) has recorded more than 2,300 ties of academic institutions with Chinese cooperation partners and summarized details on their respective scientific cooperation.
Mr. Šimalčík, what areas of academic cooperation are you most concerned about?
There are some worrying trends that we have observed: First, we see a high share of collaboration with Chinese entities linked to the defense sector, such as the People’s Liberation Army, and military research and development. On average, over 40 percent of all connections are to military-linked entities. This share is highest in Austria and Germany, where it is around 55 percent. All but one of the top 10 most active Chinese universities are linked to the Chinese defense sector.
Are there other problematic connections?
Yes, we can observe that in the Central and Eastern European countries there is a very high level of dependence in China-focused education on Confucius Institutes which provide teachers, materials and finances to otherwise under-financed departments. That is a big problem. Future generations of China experts will be educated in an environment controlled by the Communist Party of China.
The third point of concern is that several European universities are cooperating with Chinese universities based in Xinjiang. These are mainly German and Polish institutions, but also from Bulgaria, Hungary and Georgia. What is worrying is the fact that many of these links were established after information about human rights abuses in Xinjiang became publicly available.
Is China focusing on specific academic fields for collaboration?
There is a predominant focus on STEM fields. Social sciences and humanities are only of secondary importance in the China-Europe academic engagement. Consequently, the direst risk European academia faces in collaborating with China is forced technology transfers. This risk is increasingly being highlighted by Western security agencies, including a joint statement by the directors of the FBI and MI5 intelligence agencies. Secret services in Central and Eastern Europe have also warned of the risks of technology theft.
In which country did you find the closest connection network?
The tracker focuses on eleven European countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The most active were the German and Polish universities and research institutes. Looking at the top 10 most active academic institutions, all of them were either from Germany or Poland.
How did you collect all the data?
To map the interaction of European academic institutions and Chinese entities, we have relied on data collected from various open sources. The methodology constituted firstly of gathering data through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the public universities and research institutes. When that wasn’t possible, we used similar approaches. We have used this method to gather data on the scope and outcomes of cooperation with Chinese entities and evaluate the financial flows between them.
Filing the FOIA requests has also helped us assess the overall openness of public academic institutions regarding their dealings with China. Then we juxtaposed the collected data with media coverage of various academic interactions and other public sources to broaden the scope of the information where possible. In cases where it is allowed, such as Slovakia or Czechia, we also relied on publicly disclosed contracts to help supplement and check the transparency of agreements signed as a part of various interactions.
In the tracker, they also assessed the risk of individual cooperation. How did you go about it?
Where available, we have also cross-referenced the collected data with the China Defense University Tracker by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, which has allowed us to note instances of cooperation with entities linked to the People’s Liberation Army and assign approximate risk levels. At this moment, the Tracker relies only on this cross-reference.
This is merely the first layer of risk assessment that should be conducted, as the actual risk assignment should consider more factors. For example, on the transfer of intellectual property or in which scientific area exactly the cooperation takes place. These factors can lead us to conclude that risk is higher or lower than the ASPI-assigned institutional risk level.
This is a task that universities should do themselves. In reality, however, they rarely do so. Conducting a rigorous risk assessment can help universities develop appropriate mitigation measures while continuing to collaborate academically with Chinese partners.
I studied sinology at the LMU in Munich. I spent my year abroad at Tongji in Shanghai, which was and is essential for my studies at the time and still is for my work today. Is every cooperation with Chinese universities equally “bad”?
No, obviously not all academic interaction with China is problematic. Mutual exchange can benefit European academics, provided that it is done sustainably and equitably. However, due to the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime, which relies on a whole-of-society approach to achieve its interests – including academic institutions, civil society and corporations – engaging with Chinese entities carries specific risks.
What do you think European universities need to know or be better prepared for when it comes to cooperation with Chinese institutions?
Currently, universities are not prepared to deal with the challenges posed by academic cooperation with China. Only a few of the studies’ countries have specific guidelines and measures to prevent link abuse. As a result, there is a high level of variance among the countries in their awareness of potential risks. Response to these challenges should be three-pronged and focused on awareness raising, risk assessment and tailored risk mitigation measures, and transparency promotion.
Matej Šimalčík is Executive Director of the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), a think tank focused on foreign and security policy in East Asia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. CEIAS institutes are located in Bratislava (Slovakia), Olomouc (Czech Republic), and Vienna (Austria).
It is not yet official whether Nancy Pelosi will indeed fly to Taiwan in August. Originally, the Speaker of the US House of Representatives was supposed to fly to Taipei in April, but then she fell ill with Covid. The anger in Beijing is correspondingly great.
Pelosi is considered one of the most powerful female politicians in the USA. As Speaker of the House of Representatives, she is number three in the state, after US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris. And so, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman warned that such a visit would “harm China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Wang Wenbin threatened with strong countermeasures, and clarified: “We mean what we say.”
Over the weekend, Beijing reportedly increased its warnings to Washington. According to the Financial Times, the threats have become more drastic than ever. In non-public talks, a possible military response is even being considered.
While China usually issues strong threats in response to any mention of a US politician’s potential visit to Taiwan. However, this time, it is not the obligatory uproar from Beijing, as the editorial in the nationalist newspaper Global Times shows. It explicitly threatens violence: China “has the right to take forceful measures against ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces and extraterritorial forces at any time in accordance with changes in the situation, including against the trip and Pelosi herself.” China’s People’s Liberation Army would supposedly bring Pelosi a nightmare.
What is also new and unusual is that concrete retaliatory measures are openly called for. Among other things, Pelosi is to be placed on the Chinese sanctions list in order to hit the China business of Pelosi’s husband Paul, a successful real estate and venture capital investor.
Hu Xijin strikes a similar note. The former editor-in-chief of the Global Times newspaper writes on Twitter, “Biden is supposed to have the ability to prevent the reckless visit of Pelosi, rather than “I don’t know what the status of it is.” If the US can’t restrain her, let China restrain her & punish her. PLA Air Force will surely make her visit a disgrace to herself and to the US.”
China’s warning is apparently being taken seriously in Washington. US President Joe Biden conceded that the US Defense Department harbors reservations about Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan: “I think that the military thinks it’s not a good idea right now,” Pelosi said. “Maybe the military was afraid our plane would get shot down, or something like that, by the Chinese.”
And indeed, China has several ways to prevent Pelosi’s arrival, or at least make it very unpleasant:
The dispute comes at the wrong time for both presidents. China will hold its 20th Party Congress this fall, where President Xi Jinping plans to run for a third term in office. Xi cannot afford to look weak at such a crucial moment. Especially not when it comes to Taiwan.
But Joe Biden is also under pressure. With inflation high and a recession on the horizon, he aims to improve trade relations with Beijing. A trip by Pelosi would severely interfere with these plans. On the other hand, if Biden were to prevent the trip, it could be interpreted as giving in to China’s threats and enormously diminish the Democrats’ chances in the upcoming midterm elections this fall.
It seems as if there are only bad options for both sides. But there are also ways to solve the tense situation: In China, Pelosi’s trip is a hugely controversial issue, especially in the English-language media, while domestic media have hardly reported on it at all. This gives the leadership in Beijing the opportunity to save face in front of the vast majority of Chinese. And for the US, Pelosi could cancel the trip, citing President Biden’s current Covid illness. In addition, Biden and Xi plan to speak on the phone in the coming days – the first time in four months.
Over the weekend, Pelosi neither confirmed nor denied a possible trip to Taiwan. It would be the highest-ranking US visit to Taipei in 25 years. In 1997, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, visited Taiwan. A Taiwan official at the time recently recalled a time when US-China relations were good, and “the sun would shine again after the clouds have cleared.”
Things could be different this time. In the controversy over Pelosi’s trip, a very disturbing rigor has emerged. It reflects the new reality of the relationship between the two superpowers: On the one hand, America’s perceived decline; on the other, China’s increased capabilities and new self-confidence. It is a highly volatile situation, in which neither side should create any unnecessary sparks – be it through reckless travel plans or wild threats.
Li Shuhong grew up in Chengdu amid the Chinese Cultural Revolution and famine. Her mother enjoyed painting, although not professionally. “I inherited the interest in art from her,” Li says. She studied English and Western art history in China and wanted to go to the United States at the age of 23 to continue her studies – but she ended up in Europe.
Li met her husband in China, an Austrian. “He told me that Western art history could only be studied in Europe. For example, in Vienna, where art history is simply on the street.” Perhaps her husband wasn’t acting entirely selflessly at the time, but this turn of events probably turned out to be to the advantage of both of them.
She became a real painter in Vienna, Li says. She taught herself everything she knows. “I paint nature, especially flowers, but also portraits and still lifes.” But she also translates and writes herself. Her essays have now been published in Chinese in several volumes.
“With my books, I want to raise awareness about the situation of women in China,” Li says. “In China, women have been and continue to be oppressed and abused on a large scale.” The truth is a taboo; it is swept under the rug. “Chinese civilization is a continuation of despotism, misogyny and superstition.”
Li focuses on Confucian ideology, which places women at the bottom of the family and social hierarchy. “Women are not considered equal in China, this ideology, in combination with the one-child policy, also causes an imbalance between newborn girls and women,” Li says. Especially in rural areas, female fetuses would deliberately be aborted. “Women are also only token numbers in the political leadership of the Party and state.”
Currently, Li is working with her husband on a manuscript about modern Chinese history. But in the summer, she mainly spends a lot of time in the garden. “There, I take care of the vegetables and fruit trees. In between, I cook and paint my pictures, both with oil and gusto.”
She rarely misses the old Chengdu, her home. The city as she knows it is also hard to find anymore, she says. “The old streets, small cookshops, the food, the casual way of life, the slowness and leisureliness of the people in Chengdu” – all that is gone. With a bit of melancholy, she remembers the Chengdu cabaret she used to visit often, a kind of stand-up comedy in the teahouses. “I liked to stroll around the city or visit the farmer’s market, where you would get addicted just from looking at the different foods, spices and all kinds of nibbles in all kinds of shapes and colors.” Svenja Napp
How are things in your office garden or in your private environment? Is everything growing in order, or are there perhaps one or two exotic plants sprouting up among colleagues or acquaintances? In China, plants that stand out from the biomass are called 奇葩 qípā – literally exotic or strange flowers. It describes oddballs or eccentrics who attract attention with a wacky lifestyle, offbeat ideas or crazy clothes. Sometimes it is also used in a derogatory sense. But it is also used as an adjective – as in 有奇葩的想法 yǒu qípā de xiǎngfǎ “to have weird ideas/views” or 做奇葩的事情 zuò qípā de shìqing “to do weird things”.
Qípā has also gained fame in China in recent years as the namesake of a quirky streaming show. 奇葩说 qípā shuō – “The exotic flower speaks” – is the name of the long-running entertainment show since 2014 and is entering its eighth season this year. The contestants’ task is to engage in a verbal battle on topics ranging from the profound to the wacky. This sometimes leads to bizarre arguments, but also sprouts new ideas and – not least – provides new vocabulary input for us as linguists.
Those who venture deeper into the lexical undergrowth of Putonghua on their own will realize that there are still many flowery surprises to be found here. For example, if you dig in the dictionary for even more common characters for flower, like 花 huā. It can be found, for example, in such poetic puns as “smoke flower” (烟花 yānhuā – fireworks), “wave flower” (浪花 lànghuā – sea spray), “fire flower” (火花 huǒhuā – spark) or “cotton flower” (棉花 miánhuā – absorbent cotton).
It should also be noted that in China, people do not see stars, but flowers (眼花 yǎnhuā “to see blurred, to see stars”). Flower metaphors also revolve around the theme of femininity. For example, in the case of the “class flower” (班花 bānhuā – class beauty, most beautiful girl in class) or the “school flower” (校花 xiàohuā – campus beauty, most beautiful girl in school). The “field flower” or “wild flower” (野花 yěhuā), on the other hand, awakens a sense of adventure in some and an impulse to dig up weeds in others – it is the flowery name for an extramarital lover or rival.
But there is more. Flowers occasionally end up on the table in China – and not just as decoration. Not only in the form of spicy stewed “flower vegetables” (花菜 huācài) – known to us as “cauliflower” – but also as flower tea (花茶 huāchá) or flowery pastries – here, the rose (玫瑰花 méiguīhuā) or its petals are particularly popular as a mushy filling material for cakes and desserts. Chinese gourmets also like to treat themselves to “tofu flowers” (豆花 dòuhuā), which are available in sweet and savory varieties. It is a tender tofu pudding that gently melts in the mouth and is often served for breakfast.
If that’s too wild for you, you might prefer the “beer flower” (or rather the drink brewed from it). 啤酒花 píjiǔhuā is actually the Chinese word for hop flowers. Pollen-free liquid drinking pleasure is guaranteed here. And that also brings new gift ideas, for example for people with allergies. Why not just give a beer bouquet instead of a bouquet of flowers next time? You now have the right reason – thanks to the Chinese language.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
Academic collaboration is one of the few fields where exchange with China remains possible. Resuming exchange programs for visiting students would be highly welcome. Contact with Chinese scientists makes sense and is worthy of support. After all, access to reliable information about what is happening in the People’s Republic is becoming scarce.
However, it is also alarming how naïve some academics are when it comes to collaborating with Chinese partners. A survey by the think tank CEIAS has revealed: European universities also cooperate with research partners who maintain ties to the People’s Liberation Army. And this also applies to fields such as computer science or life sciences. Thus, the Chinese military benefits from European research collaboration. There is a “dire risk” of “forced technology transfer,” says Matej Šimalčík, Executive Director of CEIAS, in an interview with Amelie Richter. Security awareness at universities is far too low.
Collaborations are a good thing, but they should also be well-executed, especially in security-related disciplines. However, German universities are not sufficiently prepared for cooperation with Chinese institutions, says Šimalčík.
China is currently taking a less than cooperative verbal stance against Nancy Pelosi’s planned visit to Taiwan. Some wolf warriors and government media are bringing out new verbal weapons, analyzes Michael Radunski. The saber-rattling is getting louder and more dangerous. At first glance, there is hardly a suitable way to solve it. If Pelosi cancels her trip, China’s aggression will have succeeded. If she travels to Taiwan, the visit could further deteriorate US relations with the People’s Republic. But as our author explains, there is a way out.
Which universities and research institutes in Europe are cooperating with Chinese institutions? The “Academic Engagement Tracker” of the Central European think tank The Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) has recorded more than 2,300 ties of academic institutions with Chinese cooperation partners and summarized details on their respective scientific cooperation.
Mr. Šimalčík, what areas of academic cooperation are you most concerned about?
There are some worrying trends that we have observed: First, we see a high share of collaboration with Chinese entities linked to the defense sector, such as the People’s Liberation Army, and military research and development. On average, over 40 percent of all connections are to military-linked entities. This share is highest in Austria and Germany, where it is around 55 percent. All but one of the top 10 most active Chinese universities are linked to the Chinese defense sector.
Are there other problematic connections?
Yes, we can observe that in the Central and Eastern European countries there is a very high level of dependence in China-focused education on Confucius Institutes which provide teachers, materials and finances to otherwise under-financed departments. That is a big problem. Future generations of China experts will be educated in an environment controlled by the Communist Party of China.
The third point of concern is that several European universities are cooperating with Chinese universities based in Xinjiang. These are mainly German and Polish institutions, but also from Bulgaria, Hungary and Georgia. What is worrying is the fact that many of these links were established after information about human rights abuses in Xinjiang became publicly available.
Is China focusing on specific academic fields for collaboration?
There is a predominant focus on STEM fields. Social sciences and humanities are only of secondary importance in the China-Europe academic engagement. Consequently, the direst risk European academia faces in collaborating with China is forced technology transfers. This risk is increasingly being highlighted by Western security agencies, including a joint statement by the directors of the FBI and MI5 intelligence agencies. Secret services in Central and Eastern Europe have also warned of the risks of technology theft.
In which country did you find the closest connection network?
The tracker focuses on eleven European countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The most active were the German and Polish universities and research institutes. Looking at the top 10 most active academic institutions, all of them were either from Germany or Poland.
How did you collect all the data?
To map the interaction of European academic institutions and Chinese entities, we have relied on data collected from various open sources. The methodology constituted firstly of gathering data through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the public universities and research institutes. When that wasn’t possible, we used similar approaches. We have used this method to gather data on the scope and outcomes of cooperation with Chinese entities and evaluate the financial flows between them.
Filing the FOIA requests has also helped us assess the overall openness of public academic institutions regarding their dealings with China. Then we juxtaposed the collected data with media coverage of various academic interactions and other public sources to broaden the scope of the information where possible. In cases where it is allowed, such as Slovakia or Czechia, we also relied on publicly disclosed contracts to help supplement and check the transparency of agreements signed as a part of various interactions.
In the tracker, they also assessed the risk of individual cooperation. How did you go about it?
Where available, we have also cross-referenced the collected data with the China Defense University Tracker by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, which has allowed us to note instances of cooperation with entities linked to the People’s Liberation Army and assign approximate risk levels. At this moment, the Tracker relies only on this cross-reference.
This is merely the first layer of risk assessment that should be conducted, as the actual risk assignment should consider more factors. For example, on the transfer of intellectual property or in which scientific area exactly the cooperation takes place. These factors can lead us to conclude that risk is higher or lower than the ASPI-assigned institutional risk level.
This is a task that universities should do themselves. In reality, however, they rarely do so. Conducting a rigorous risk assessment can help universities develop appropriate mitigation measures while continuing to collaborate academically with Chinese partners.
I studied sinology at the LMU in Munich. I spent my year abroad at Tongji in Shanghai, which was and is essential for my studies at the time and still is for my work today. Is every cooperation with Chinese universities equally “bad”?
No, obviously not all academic interaction with China is problematic. Mutual exchange can benefit European academics, provided that it is done sustainably and equitably. However, due to the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime, which relies on a whole-of-society approach to achieve its interests – including academic institutions, civil society and corporations – engaging with Chinese entities carries specific risks.
What do you think European universities need to know or be better prepared for when it comes to cooperation with Chinese institutions?
Currently, universities are not prepared to deal with the challenges posed by academic cooperation with China. Only a few of the studies’ countries have specific guidelines and measures to prevent link abuse. As a result, there is a high level of variance among the countries in their awareness of potential risks. Response to these challenges should be three-pronged and focused on awareness raising, risk assessment and tailored risk mitigation measures, and transparency promotion.
Matej Šimalčík is Executive Director of the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), a think tank focused on foreign and security policy in East Asia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. CEIAS institutes are located in Bratislava (Slovakia), Olomouc (Czech Republic), and Vienna (Austria).
It is not yet official whether Nancy Pelosi will indeed fly to Taiwan in August. Originally, the Speaker of the US House of Representatives was supposed to fly to Taipei in April, but then she fell ill with Covid. The anger in Beijing is correspondingly great.
Pelosi is considered one of the most powerful female politicians in the USA. As Speaker of the House of Representatives, she is number three in the state, after US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris. And so, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman warned that such a visit would “harm China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Wang Wenbin threatened with strong countermeasures, and clarified: “We mean what we say.”
Over the weekend, Beijing reportedly increased its warnings to Washington. According to the Financial Times, the threats have become more drastic than ever. In non-public talks, a possible military response is even being considered.
While China usually issues strong threats in response to any mention of a US politician’s potential visit to Taiwan. However, this time, it is not the obligatory uproar from Beijing, as the editorial in the nationalist newspaper Global Times shows. It explicitly threatens violence: China “has the right to take forceful measures against ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces and extraterritorial forces at any time in accordance with changes in the situation, including against the trip and Pelosi herself.” China’s People’s Liberation Army would supposedly bring Pelosi a nightmare.
What is also new and unusual is that concrete retaliatory measures are openly called for. Among other things, Pelosi is to be placed on the Chinese sanctions list in order to hit the China business of Pelosi’s husband Paul, a successful real estate and venture capital investor.
Hu Xijin strikes a similar note. The former editor-in-chief of the Global Times newspaper writes on Twitter, “Biden is supposed to have the ability to prevent the reckless visit of Pelosi, rather than “I don’t know what the status of it is.” If the US can’t restrain her, let China restrain her & punish her. PLA Air Force will surely make her visit a disgrace to herself and to the US.”
China’s warning is apparently being taken seriously in Washington. US President Joe Biden conceded that the US Defense Department harbors reservations about Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan: “I think that the military thinks it’s not a good idea right now,” Pelosi said. “Maybe the military was afraid our plane would get shot down, or something like that, by the Chinese.”
And indeed, China has several ways to prevent Pelosi’s arrival, or at least make it very unpleasant:
The dispute comes at the wrong time for both presidents. China will hold its 20th Party Congress this fall, where President Xi Jinping plans to run for a third term in office. Xi cannot afford to look weak at such a crucial moment. Especially not when it comes to Taiwan.
But Joe Biden is also under pressure. With inflation high and a recession on the horizon, he aims to improve trade relations with Beijing. A trip by Pelosi would severely interfere with these plans. On the other hand, if Biden were to prevent the trip, it could be interpreted as giving in to China’s threats and enormously diminish the Democrats’ chances in the upcoming midterm elections this fall.
It seems as if there are only bad options for both sides. But there are also ways to solve the tense situation: In China, Pelosi’s trip is a hugely controversial issue, especially in the English-language media, while domestic media have hardly reported on it at all. This gives the leadership in Beijing the opportunity to save face in front of the vast majority of Chinese. And for the US, Pelosi could cancel the trip, citing President Biden’s current Covid illness. In addition, Biden and Xi plan to speak on the phone in the coming days – the first time in four months.
Over the weekend, Pelosi neither confirmed nor denied a possible trip to Taiwan. It would be the highest-ranking US visit to Taipei in 25 years. In 1997, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, visited Taiwan. A Taiwan official at the time recently recalled a time when US-China relations were good, and “the sun would shine again after the clouds have cleared.”
Things could be different this time. In the controversy over Pelosi’s trip, a very disturbing rigor has emerged. It reflects the new reality of the relationship between the two superpowers: On the one hand, America’s perceived decline; on the other, China’s increased capabilities and new self-confidence. It is a highly volatile situation, in which neither side should create any unnecessary sparks – be it through reckless travel plans or wild threats.
Li Shuhong grew up in Chengdu amid the Chinese Cultural Revolution and famine. Her mother enjoyed painting, although not professionally. “I inherited the interest in art from her,” Li says. She studied English and Western art history in China and wanted to go to the United States at the age of 23 to continue her studies – but she ended up in Europe.
Li met her husband in China, an Austrian. “He told me that Western art history could only be studied in Europe. For example, in Vienna, where art history is simply on the street.” Perhaps her husband wasn’t acting entirely selflessly at the time, but this turn of events probably turned out to be to the advantage of both of them.
She became a real painter in Vienna, Li says. She taught herself everything she knows. “I paint nature, especially flowers, but also portraits and still lifes.” But she also translates and writes herself. Her essays have now been published in Chinese in several volumes.
“With my books, I want to raise awareness about the situation of women in China,” Li says. “In China, women have been and continue to be oppressed and abused on a large scale.” The truth is a taboo; it is swept under the rug. “Chinese civilization is a continuation of despotism, misogyny and superstition.”
Li focuses on Confucian ideology, which places women at the bottom of the family and social hierarchy. “Women are not considered equal in China, this ideology, in combination with the one-child policy, also causes an imbalance between newborn girls and women,” Li says. Especially in rural areas, female fetuses would deliberately be aborted. “Women are also only token numbers in the political leadership of the Party and state.”
Currently, Li is working with her husband on a manuscript about modern Chinese history. But in the summer, she mainly spends a lot of time in the garden. “There, I take care of the vegetables and fruit trees. In between, I cook and paint my pictures, both with oil and gusto.”
She rarely misses the old Chengdu, her home. The city as she knows it is also hard to find anymore, she says. “The old streets, small cookshops, the food, the casual way of life, the slowness and leisureliness of the people in Chengdu” – all that is gone. With a bit of melancholy, she remembers the Chengdu cabaret she used to visit often, a kind of stand-up comedy in the teahouses. “I liked to stroll around the city or visit the farmer’s market, where you would get addicted just from looking at the different foods, spices and all kinds of nibbles in all kinds of shapes and colors.” Svenja Napp
How are things in your office garden or in your private environment? Is everything growing in order, or are there perhaps one or two exotic plants sprouting up among colleagues or acquaintances? In China, plants that stand out from the biomass are called 奇葩 qípā – literally exotic or strange flowers. It describes oddballs or eccentrics who attract attention with a wacky lifestyle, offbeat ideas or crazy clothes. Sometimes it is also used in a derogatory sense. But it is also used as an adjective – as in 有奇葩的想法 yǒu qípā de xiǎngfǎ “to have weird ideas/views” or 做奇葩的事情 zuò qípā de shìqing “to do weird things”.
Qípā has also gained fame in China in recent years as the namesake of a quirky streaming show. 奇葩说 qípā shuō – “The exotic flower speaks” – is the name of the long-running entertainment show since 2014 and is entering its eighth season this year. The contestants’ task is to engage in a verbal battle on topics ranging from the profound to the wacky. This sometimes leads to bizarre arguments, but also sprouts new ideas and – not least – provides new vocabulary input for us as linguists.
Those who venture deeper into the lexical undergrowth of Putonghua on their own will realize that there are still many flowery surprises to be found here. For example, if you dig in the dictionary for even more common characters for flower, like 花 huā. It can be found, for example, in such poetic puns as “smoke flower” (烟花 yānhuā – fireworks), “wave flower” (浪花 lànghuā – sea spray), “fire flower” (火花 huǒhuā – spark) or “cotton flower” (棉花 miánhuā – absorbent cotton).
It should also be noted that in China, people do not see stars, but flowers (眼花 yǎnhuā “to see blurred, to see stars”). Flower metaphors also revolve around the theme of femininity. For example, in the case of the “class flower” (班花 bānhuā – class beauty, most beautiful girl in class) or the “school flower” (校花 xiàohuā – campus beauty, most beautiful girl in school). The “field flower” or “wild flower” (野花 yěhuā), on the other hand, awakens a sense of adventure in some and an impulse to dig up weeds in others – it is the flowery name for an extramarital lover or rival.
But there is more. Flowers occasionally end up on the table in China – and not just as decoration. Not only in the form of spicy stewed “flower vegetables” (花菜 huācài) – known to us as “cauliflower” – but also as flower tea (花茶 huāchá) or flowery pastries – here, the rose (玫瑰花 méiguīhuā) or its petals are particularly popular as a mushy filling material for cakes and desserts. Chinese gourmets also like to treat themselves to “tofu flowers” (豆花 dòuhuā), which are available in sweet and savory varieties. It is a tender tofu pudding that gently melts in the mouth and is often served for breakfast.
If that’s too wild for you, you might prefer the “beer flower” (or rather the drink brewed from it). 啤酒花 píjiǔhuā is actually the Chinese word for hop flowers. Pollen-free liquid drinking pleasure is guaranteed here. And that also brings new gift ideas, for example for people with allergies. Why not just give a beer bouquet instead of a bouquet of flowers next time? You now have the right reason – thanks to the Chinese language.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
