China.Table is celebrating its anniversary: We have produced 1,000 issues since the beginning of 2021. We are happy that you have stayed loyal to us, and we promise you: We certainly won’t run out of topics any time soon. China.Table was founded to create a briefing that takes a differentiated, in-depth look at China every workday. We are now Germany’s largest China editorial team. We have remained true to our goal of reporting objectively and fairly, even on emotionally loaded issues.
Issue 1,000 is special in more ways than one: It was produced on the day of Donald Trump’s inauguration as US President. Find out what signals he sent to China on the evening of the inauguration in the news section.
It is also the day on which Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock reviewed the German government’s China strategy on the premises of Merics in Berlin. Angela Köckritz was there and reports. Her analysis is accompanied by a collection of voices on the China strategy. Julia Fiedler has brought together experts from business, civil society, and China research to discuss the challenges the strategy will face in the future. One thing is particularly clear today: Germany’s relationship with China will also depend on how Donald Trump shapes Sino-American relations.
I hope you enjoy today’s issue.
Ihre
Julia Fiedler
China.Table is celebrating its anniversary: We have produced 1,000 issues since the beginning of 2021. We are happy that you have stayed loyal to us, and we promise you: We certainly won’t run out of topics any time soon. China.Table was founded to create a briefing that takes a differentiated, in-depth look at China every workday. We are now Germany’s largest China editorial team. We have remained true to our goal of reporting objectively and fairly, even on emotionally loaded issues.
Issue 1,000 is special in more ways than one: It was produced on the day of Donald Trump’s inauguration as US President. Find out what signals he sent to China on the evening of the inauguration in the news section.
It is also the day on which Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock reviewed the German government’s China strategy on the premises of Merics in Berlin. Angela Köckritz was there and reports. Her analysis is accompanied by a collection of voices on the China strategy. Julia Fiedler has brought together experts from business, civil society, and China research to discuss the challenges the strategy will face in the future. One thing is particularly clear today: Germany’s relationship with China will also depend on how Donald Trump shapes Sino-American relations.
I hope you enjoy today’s issue.
It is an assessment, albeit not an official one, that Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock made on Monday when she discussed “China and the current geopolitical challenges for Germany and Europe” with experts. One and a half years after the outgoing German government presented its China strategy, the think tank Merics discussed the question of what strategic position Germany and Europe should take towards China – and this on a day of the inauguration of the new US President Donald Trump in Washington.
“We have shown that we will not be threatened or blackmailed,” said Baerbock on Monday, referring to the EU’s countervailing duties on Chinese EVs. “If others try to flood our markets and challenge workers and business hubs, we can counter this with our EU negotiating power. Many said: Oh dear, what will happen then? Well, for now, nothing has happened.”
The interesting thing about Baerbock’s statement is that Germany did not support these tariffs. Chancellor Olaf Scholz – listening to the complaints of the car industry – used his powers to push through the German veto against the will of the Green Party. And that puts us right in the middle of the issue. There is only one China strategy. But there are very different ideas about how to implement it.
Baerbock has never shied away from frank words and has always made it clear that she wants to show China its boundaries. “The time for a sleepwalking China policy is over,” she recently told German media. Especially as China is “more or less” openly supporting the Russian trade war in Ukraine and is “playing dirty” with enormous, highly subsidized export capacities.
Diplomats consider the reaction to the EU’s additional tariffs on Chinese EVs very restrained. “With their Cognac sanctions, they chose the lowest level of escalation,” says an EU diplomat – one of several diplomats Table.Briefings spoke to for this article. “We had assumed that they would target Airbus very quickly.”
When the parties agreed to draw up a China strategy in the 2021 government coalition agreement, they did so under the impression that the Chinese government was using the openness of democratic systems to pitch one actor against the other. It pushes CEOs of multinational corporations with businesses in China to influence the German government, positioning one European country against the other, playing off the states and the federal government against each other, and maneuvering between party lines.
The government wanted to chart a common course with the China strategy. There were considerations to keep this strategy secret, as everyone involved was of course aware that it would send a diplomatically problematic signal to China. “You could have done it like China: smile at the front and strategize at the back,” one of the diplomats says. In a system as open as Germany’s, however, the government would not have been able to reach all key players – companies, universities, local authorities, foundations.
Shortly before Baerbock headed for Beijing in December 2024, a high-ranking Chinese politician met with various leading figures from the Social Democratic Party (SPD). There is a lack of strategic direction and coordination because various interests often dominate short-term economic interests. And to make matters worse, with a counterpart that pursues very long-term strategic interests and subordinates all individual interests to the national objective. “China has a completely different toolbox to ours,” says one diplomat. “They can tell their companies what to do and massively subsidize them.”
In October 2022, it became clear how difficult it would be for the various government parties to reconcile their widely differing positions when Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz wanted to enforce the participation of the Chinese state-owned company Cosco in a terminal in the Port of Hamburg – against the will of half a dozen of his ministries, the Federal Intelligence Service and the EU Commission. They were up in arms about the fact that Germany wanted to grant the People’s Republic access to yet another part of its critical infrastructure.
Despite all the differences, the government coalition still managed to agree on a joint strategy – all disputed points were tweaked until the wording was soft as silk. It opted for the triad of “partner,” “competitor,” and “strategic rival,” which had already been enshrined in the EU’s China strategy in 2019. The China strategy was published on July 13, 2023. And although almost everyone agreed with the analysis of China’s problematic behavior described in the document, political divides kept cropping up in everyday business. For example, in the debate surrounding the ban on Chinese components in the German 5G network. At the time, Scholz and Transport Minister Volker Wissing, who wanted to keep the Chinese equipment, clashed with Baerbock and her party colleague and Economy Minister Robert Habeck, who had security concerns.
It is a debate that is constantly being repeated in different scenarios. Strategic considerations and security concerns clash with economic interests, long-term goals with short-term ones.
“We are a free country in which, thank god, not everything goes in the same direction,” says Baerbock. She highlighted that some progress has been made: the diversification of the economy, the screening of foreign investments, Global Gateway as a European alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative, the expansion of relations with Asian and Pacific partners, the commitment to freedom of the seas, internal security and the resilience of democracy, for example through better handling of disinformation and the Digital Services Act.
But Baerbock wants more. She wants to better protect Germany and Europe – be it from investments in critical infrastructure, overcapacity or secret Chinese police stations on German soil. “We had to pull the lever first. Strategies work over time.”
Now, just a few weeks before the general election, the question is who will shape this period politically. And with whom? Will a new coalition government similarly clash with China? And in what geopolitical environment will it operate? “This is a marathon, not a sprint,” Baerbock said. The only question is who will run it.
Baerbock considers it particularly important that by imposing countervailing duties on Chinese EVs, Europe has already developed an instrument to protect itself in the future. “We have already experienced this with the solar industry and the steel industry. If we hadn’t had a clear response for EVs, the next attempt would have been foreseeable.”
After all, the Chinese overcapacity will most likely not end with EVs. “Mechanical engineering is a big issue,” says an EU diplomat. “We used to be leaders in this field. The Chinese now offer products that are 40 percent cheaper than ours, but are almost as good.”
German companies in China want politicians to put more emphasis on the partnership with the People’s Republic. This was revealed by the latest AHK business climate survey. The German government, on the other hand, tends to stress the risks. What do China experts think? And what are their proposals for a future China strategy? Mikko Huotari, Director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies, Wolfgang Niedermark, Managing Director of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) and Robin Mallick, Director of the Goethe-Institut in Beijing, answer our questions.
Huotari: We need a China strategy adapted to the new realities of transatlantic and US-Chinese relations. We expect a significant deterioration. I see three main areas where China presents a new level of challenge. How do we deal with market-distorting trade practices? China is also a security policy challenge. And we have to be ready for fierce technological competition. This also means drawing clearer boundaries as to where our technologies contribute to strengthening Chinese ecosystems. In some areas, however, we must also focus very specifically on a closer technology partnership with China.
Niedermark: The basic line of the China strategy for the economy is: de-risking, but no decoupling. What we are sorely missing: De-risking must be based on our own competitiveness. This is where we see the biggest need for the new EU Commission and a new German government to improve. On the one hand, Germany and Europe must show a strong geopolitical line to China. On the other hand, we need to cooperate effectively with China.
Mallick: The German government’s current China strategy is a solid theoretical foundation. However, the implementation of this very ambitious initiative remains unfinished. For example, the emphasis on an exchange between civil society and other areas is hardly matched by any real initiatives, which would be particularly important in times of tense political relations.
Huotari: We should not be concerned with pigeonholing China, but ultimately with how we act. We can cooperate and try to achieve things together. But for me, the status of partner or even strategic partner does not reflect reality.
Niedermark: China is trying to reshape the existing rules-based order in line with the interests of its authoritarian one-party state. We must counter this with our own interests. The European triad in China policy is still appropriate for this. In the economy, the three dimensions run through all areas: We have fierce competition between companies, but also between different economic models, and we have security risks in supply chain and technology issues.
Mallick: In the long term, Germany should strive for a self-confident, open-minded, yet critical position towards China. This first requires a higher level of China expertise. This would allow us to openly address the similarities in challenges – primarily through regular exchanges at all levels, including in culture and civil society. Then, in the long term, triads of this kind will become superfluous.
Huotari: Companies need to think more and more in two ecosystems. Economic pressure, coercive measures, the leverage of resource availability, or critical raw materials are a new reality. Accordingly, we need to dramatically accelerate our own de-risking efforts once again. We are entering a whole new sectoral economic partnership logic that we are not really thinking ahead yet, although that would be appropriate for the third-largest economy.
Niedermark: The USA will remain our main partner, even under Trump. At the same time, the EU must shape its relations with China based on its own interests and values. With the growing tensions between the US and China, the EU is becoming even more central to Chinese exports and investments. Companies risk becoming increasingly caught up in the escalating trade conflict between the US and China.
Huotari: De-risking is difficult and causes costs. In the end, we need a much more proactive trade policy agenda. To me, de-risking essentially means introducing a new, layered form of globalization. There will be a narrower circle of partners. This is the like-minded circle, for example OECD countries or countries with certain standards. Defining and shaping this is a huge political task.
Niedermark: Diversification means a stronger localization in different lead markets. Many companies need to be in China to be able to compete with Chinese rivals in third markets, for example. There are enormous costs involved in reducing import dependencies in critical areas, such as raw materials, because investments are not decided purely on competitive criteria, but also security and sovereignty criteria. Politicians and all of society must bear the costs of de-risking.
Huotari: Germany has highly qualified China researchers. The Federal Ministry of Research has made efforts to establish new funding channels. We are not as bad as we sometimes make ourselves out to be. What is missing now is pooling these capacities in one place or another. Ultimately, there is a lack of funds to train young talent and offer them attractive positions.
Niedermark: With Merics, we have one of the world’s leading China think tanks in Berlin. Several other research institutions have excellent China expertise. Risk awareness has grown among many players in companies, universities and at the local political level. One big problem, however, is that China’s autocratic hardening causes the general interest in Germany to decline. Today’s China is no longer particularly attractive, especially for young people. This makes it all the more important to actively foster China competence.
Mallick: Germany is only beginning to develop an independent and reflective China competence. The introduction of a wide range of Chinese as a foreign language courses at German schools and universities, a better-coordinated transfer of knowledge, and the international networking of multipliers from society, culture, and science would be essential here. Individual experience of the country is also important and should be promoted through scholarships and residency programs. Collaboration: Manuel Liu
It takes a while to get a clear picture of Prof. Zhang Yu 张彧’s numerous projects. The 51-year-old has already achieved a great deal in her life – as an entrepreneur, author, patron of the arts and bridge builder between Germany and China – even if she considers the term “bridge builder” somewhat “overused.”
For over 20 years, she has dedicated herself to cultural exchange, for example, through major exhibitions such as “The 8 of Ways” in Berlin’s Uferhallen. Zhang emphasizes that intercultural dialogue is more needed today than ever: “I have experienced many ups and downs in Sino-German relations.” But Germany is currently experiencing a particularly “turbulent climate.” And even in China, the former enthusiasm for Germany has cooled noticeably.
“People in China now have a more differentiated and reserved view of Germany,” she explains. “But in the past, the enthusiasm was sometimes almost blind: bread, beer and cars, everything was great,” she says, adding that there are still gaps in mutual perception. For years, her preferred means of closing these gaps has been art and culture – a somewhat more neutral ground for dialogue than politics. For example, she organized a concert in the Chamber Music Hall of the Berlin Philharmonie on January 22, 2025. Under the title “Music Connected! The Classics meets Chinese Rock,” the Berlin Symphony Orchestra and the Chinese rock band MOSAIK will perform together. The occasion is the 30th anniversary of the city partnership between Berlin and Beijing.
Yu Zhang originally came to Germany to study. Her father recommended the country, as he had experienced Germany as a highly developed and safe country during his own travels. “He said: ‘You can sleep with the doors open there, that’s how safe it is’,” she recalls. She eventually landed in Berlin with two suitcases. “I was part of the first generation of privately funded students in the early 90s.” Contrary to the wishes of her “tiger mother,” who wanted her to study law like herself, Zhang decided to study journalism and Japanese studies at the FU Berlin. “It was a kind of rebellion against my parents – I wanted to make my own decision for once.”
Zhang comes from an educated family, but this was precisely their downfall during the Cultural Revolution. “One grandfather was an industrialist and the other a businessman. They were also intellectuals with international connections in the USA and Japan – it couldn’t get any worse in the atmosphere at the time.” She later understood why her mother had insisted on law: Marked by the injustices of the Cultural Revolution, she wanted to bring justice to others. “She helped people with her legal knowledge, even if they could only pay with chickens and eggs,” the daughter recalls. This is how her mother managed to restore the family’s honor, which had suffered in those difficult times. “She was very strict with us children,” says Zhang. She says she inherited discipline, perfectionism and a social nature from her mother, which is reflected, for example, in the Female Impact Summit, which she set up to empower women in leadership positions.
As she was often the only Chinese woman in her environment, she had to fight her way to the top. In addition to her “rebellious” subjects, she also earned a Master of Business Administration (MBA), which ultimately paved her way into the business world. “Back then, many consulting firms didn’t have China desks or local implementation networks. It was precisely this gap that I filled with my consulting firm for the Chinese market – we wanted to be the first mover and beat the consulting firm Roland Berger.” In 1999, Zhang founded China Communications Consulting, which later became China Communications Holding. She later sold her company – in a boom time, as she says. “You have to be able to let go, especially when things are going well. I don’t regret it. I’m now over 50 and want to use my time differently and make a difference in society.”
In 2008, Yu Zhang founded the Society for German-Chinese Cultural Exchange (GeKA). Since then, she successfully launched numerous projects, including with state museums in China. One of her personal highlights was the exhibition “Micro Era. Media Art from China,” which was presented at the Kulturforum Berlin from September 5, 2019, to January 26, 2020. An extensive supporting program, including a Chinese film weekend at the Babylon cinema, accompanied the cooperation between GeKA and the Nationalgalerie Berlin. “I pay a lot of attention to quality,” emphasizes Zhang, who has been collecting art for years and will soon lend some pieces to the Humboldt Forum for an exhibition.
This love of art and creativity also has to do with her family: Her grandfather collected art and her mother painted in her free time. “Art was always present in my childhood and youth, but my ‘tiger mother’ didn’t tolerate any hobbies other than painting apart from learning.” She ponders briefly. “Perhaps this is why my creative side comes out today, which I wasn’t really able to live out as a child and teenager – with all the studying,” she says and laughs. Fabian Peltsch
The seemingly temporary TikTok ban in the US may have a surprising effect on language exchange. For instance, the learning app Duolingo has reported a sharp user increase for its Mandarin courses. Meanwhile, the Chinese app Xiaohongshu, which many US TikTok users have switched to, is apparently desperately looking for content moderators who are proficient enough in English to filter out critical content. Another, touching effect: Chinese students used to have to write fictional letters to American friends for their English exams. Now they re-upload their letters on Xiaohongshu – and American users reply.
China.Table is celebrating its anniversary: We have produced 1,000 issues since the beginning of 2021. We are happy that you have stayed loyal to us, and we promise you: We certainly won’t run out of topics any time soon. China.Table was founded to create a briefing that takes a differentiated, in-depth look at China every workday. We are now Germany’s largest China editorial team. We have remained true to our goal of reporting objectively and fairly, even on emotionally loaded issues.
Issue 1,000 is special in more ways than one: It was produced on the day of Donald Trump’s inauguration as US President. Find out what signals he sent to China on the evening of the inauguration in the news section.
It is also the day on which Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock reviewed the German government’s China strategy on the premises of Merics in Berlin. Angela Köckritz was there and reports. Her analysis is accompanied by a collection of voices on the China strategy. Julia Fiedler has brought together experts from business, civil society, and China research to discuss the challenges the strategy will face in the future. One thing is particularly clear today: Germany’s relationship with China will also depend on how Donald Trump shapes Sino-American relations.
I hope you enjoy today’s issue.
Ihre
Julia Fiedler
China.Table is celebrating its anniversary: We have produced 1,000 issues since the beginning of 2021. We are happy that you have stayed loyal to us, and we promise you: We certainly won’t run out of topics any time soon. China.Table was founded to create a briefing that takes a differentiated, in-depth look at China every workday. We are now Germany’s largest China editorial team. We have remained true to our goal of reporting objectively and fairly, even on emotionally loaded issues.
Issue 1,000 is special in more ways than one: It was produced on the day of Donald Trump’s inauguration as US President. Find out what signals he sent to China on the evening of the inauguration in the news section.
It is also the day on which Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock reviewed the German government’s China strategy on the premises of Merics in Berlin. Angela Köckritz was there and reports. Her analysis is accompanied by a collection of voices on the China strategy. Julia Fiedler has brought together experts from business, civil society, and China research to discuss the challenges the strategy will face in the future. One thing is particularly clear today: Germany’s relationship with China will also depend on how Donald Trump shapes Sino-American relations.
I hope you enjoy today’s issue.
It is an assessment, albeit not an official one, that Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock made on Monday when she discussed “China and the current geopolitical challenges for Germany and Europe” with experts. One and a half years after the outgoing German government presented its China strategy, the think tank Merics discussed the question of what strategic position Germany and Europe should take towards China – and this on a day of the inauguration of the new US President Donald Trump in Washington.
“We have shown that we will not be threatened or blackmailed,” said Baerbock on Monday, referring to the EU’s countervailing duties on Chinese EVs. “If others try to flood our markets and challenge workers and business hubs, we can counter this with our EU negotiating power. Many said: Oh dear, what will happen then? Well, for now, nothing has happened.”
The interesting thing about Baerbock’s statement is that Germany did not support these tariffs. Chancellor Olaf Scholz – listening to the complaints of the car industry – used his powers to push through the German veto against the will of the Green Party. And that puts us right in the middle of the issue. There is only one China strategy. But there are very different ideas about how to implement it.
Baerbock has never shied away from frank words and has always made it clear that she wants to show China its boundaries. “The time for a sleepwalking China policy is over,” she recently told German media. Especially as China is “more or less” openly supporting the Russian trade war in Ukraine and is “playing dirty” with enormous, highly subsidized export capacities.
Diplomats consider the reaction to the EU’s additional tariffs on Chinese EVs very restrained. “With their Cognac sanctions, they chose the lowest level of escalation,” says an EU diplomat – one of several diplomats Table.Briefings spoke to for this article. “We had assumed that they would target Airbus very quickly.”
When the parties agreed to draw up a China strategy in the 2021 government coalition agreement, they did so under the impression that the Chinese government was using the openness of democratic systems to pitch one actor against the other. It pushes CEOs of multinational corporations with businesses in China to influence the German government, positioning one European country against the other, playing off the states and the federal government against each other, and maneuvering between party lines.
The government wanted to chart a common course with the China strategy. There were considerations to keep this strategy secret, as everyone involved was of course aware that it would send a diplomatically problematic signal to China. “You could have done it like China: smile at the front and strategize at the back,” one of the diplomats says. In a system as open as Germany’s, however, the government would not have been able to reach all key players – companies, universities, local authorities, foundations.
Shortly before Baerbock headed for Beijing in December 2024, a high-ranking Chinese politician met with various leading figures from the Social Democratic Party (SPD). There is a lack of strategic direction and coordination because various interests often dominate short-term economic interests. And to make matters worse, with a counterpart that pursues very long-term strategic interests and subordinates all individual interests to the national objective. “China has a completely different toolbox to ours,” says one diplomat. “They can tell their companies what to do and massively subsidize them.”
In October 2022, it became clear how difficult it would be for the various government parties to reconcile their widely differing positions when Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz wanted to enforce the participation of the Chinese state-owned company Cosco in a terminal in the Port of Hamburg – against the will of half a dozen of his ministries, the Federal Intelligence Service and the EU Commission. They were up in arms about the fact that Germany wanted to grant the People’s Republic access to yet another part of its critical infrastructure.
Despite all the differences, the government coalition still managed to agree on a joint strategy – all disputed points were tweaked until the wording was soft as silk. It opted for the triad of “partner,” “competitor,” and “strategic rival,” which had already been enshrined in the EU’s China strategy in 2019. The China strategy was published on July 13, 2023. And although almost everyone agreed with the analysis of China’s problematic behavior described in the document, political divides kept cropping up in everyday business. For example, in the debate surrounding the ban on Chinese components in the German 5G network. At the time, Scholz and Transport Minister Volker Wissing, who wanted to keep the Chinese equipment, clashed with Baerbock and her party colleague and Economy Minister Robert Habeck, who had security concerns.
It is a debate that is constantly being repeated in different scenarios. Strategic considerations and security concerns clash with economic interests, long-term goals with short-term ones.
“We are a free country in which, thank god, not everything goes in the same direction,” says Baerbock. She highlighted that some progress has been made: the diversification of the economy, the screening of foreign investments, Global Gateway as a European alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative, the expansion of relations with Asian and Pacific partners, the commitment to freedom of the seas, internal security and the resilience of democracy, for example through better handling of disinformation and the Digital Services Act.
But Baerbock wants more. She wants to better protect Germany and Europe – be it from investments in critical infrastructure, overcapacity or secret Chinese police stations on German soil. “We had to pull the lever first. Strategies work over time.”
Now, just a few weeks before the general election, the question is who will shape this period politically. And with whom? Will a new coalition government similarly clash with China? And in what geopolitical environment will it operate? “This is a marathon, not a sprint,” Baerbock said. The only question is who will run it.
Baerbock considers it particularly important that by imposing countervailing duties on Chinese EVs, Europe has already developed an instrument to protect itself in the future. “We have already experienced this with the solar industry and the steel industry. If we hadn’t had a clear response for EVs, the next attempt would have been foreseeable.”
After all, the Chinese overcapacity will most likely not end with EVs. “Mechanical engineering is a big issue,” says an EU diplomat. “We used to be leaders in this field. The Chinese now offer products that are 40 percent cheaper than ours, but are almost as good.”
German companies in China want politicians to put more emphasis on the partnership with the People’s Republic. This was revealed by the latest AHK business climate survey. The German government, on the other hand, tends to stress the risks. What do China experts think? And what are their proposals for a future China strategy? Mikko Huotari, Director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies, Wolfgang Niedermark, Managing Director of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) and Robin Mallick, Director of the Goethe-Institut in Beijing, answer our questions.
Huotari: We need a China strategy adapted to the new realities of transatlantic and US-Chinese relations. We expect a significant deterioration. I see three main areas where China presents a new level of challenge. How do we deal with market-distorting trade practices? China is also a security policy challenge. And we have to be ready for fierce technological competition. This also means drawing clearer boundaries as to where our technologies contribute to strengthening Chinese ecosystems. In some areas, however, we must also focus very specifically on a closer technology partnership with China.
Niedermark: The basic line of the China strategy for the economy is: de-risking, but no decoupling. What we are sorely missing: De-risking must be based on our own competitiveness. This is where we see the biggest need for the new EU Commission and a new German government to improve. On the one hand, Germany and Europe must show a strong geopolitical line to China. On the other hand, we need to cooperate effectively with China.
Mallick: The German government’s current China strategy is a solid theoretical foundation. However, the implementation of this very ambitious initiative remains unfinished. For example, the emphasis on an exchange between civil society and other areas is hardly matched by any real initiatives, which would be particularly important in times of tense political relations.
Huotari: We should not be concerned with pigeonholing China, but ultimately with how we act. We can cooperate and try to achieve things together. But for me, the status of partner or even strategic partner does not reflect reality.
Niedermark: China is trying to reshape the existing rules-based order in line with the interests of its authoritarian one-party state. We must counter this with our own interests. The European triad in China policy is still appropriate for this. In the economy, the three dimensions run through all areas: We have fierce competition between companies, but also between different economic models, and we have security risks in supply chain and technology issues.
Mallick: In the long term, Germany should strive for a self-confident, open-minded, yet critical position towards China. This first requires a higher level of China expertise. This would allow us to openly address the similarities in challenges – primarily through regular exchanges at all levels, including in culture and civil society. Then, in the long term, triads of this kind will become superfluous.
Huotari: Companies need to think more and more in two ecosystems. Economic pressure, coercive measures, the leverage of resource availability, or critical raw materials are a new reality. Accordingly, we need to dramatically accelerate our own de-risking efforts once again. We are entering a whole new sectoral economic partnership logic that we are not really thinking ahead yet, although that would be appropriate for the third-largest economy.
Niedermark: The USA will remain our main partner, even under Trump. At the same time, the EU must shape its relations with China based on its own interests and values. With the growing tensions between the US and China, the EU is becoming even more central to Chinese exports and investments. Companies risk becoming increasingly caught up in the escalating trade conflict between the US and China.
Huotari: De-risking is difficult and causes costs. In the end, we need a much more proactive trade policy agenda. To me, de-risking essentially means introducing a new, layered form of globalization. There will be a narrower circle of partners. This is the like-minded circle, for example OECD countries or countries with certain standards. Defining and shaping this is a huge political task.
Niedermark: Diversification means a stronger localization in different lead markets. Many companies need to be in China to be able to compete with Chinese rivals in third markets, for example. There are enormous costs involved in reducing import dependencies in critical areas, such as raw materials, because investments are not decided purely on competitive criteria, but also security and sovereignty criteria. Politicians and all of society must bear the costs of de-risking.
Huotari: Germany has highly qualified China researchers. The Federal Ministry of Research has made efforts to establish new funding channels. We are not as bad as we sometimes make ourselves out to be. What is missing now is pooling these capacities in one place or another. Ultimately, there is a lack of funds to train young talent and offer them attractive positions.
Niedermark: With Merics, we have one of the world’s leading China think tanks in Berlin. Several other research institutions have excellent China expertise. Risk awareness has grown among many players in companies, universities and at the local political level. One big problem, however, is that China’s autocratic hardening causes the general interest in Germany to decline. Today’s China is no longer particularly attractive, especially for young people. This makes it all the more important to actively foster China competence.
Mallick: Germany is only beginning to develop an independent and reflective China competence. The introduction of a wide range of Chinese as a foreign language courses at German schools and universities, a better-coordinated transfer of knowledge, and the international networking of multipliers from society, culture, and science would be essential here. Individual experience of the country is also important and should be promoted through scholarships and residency programs. Collaboration: Manuel Liu
It takes a while to get a clear picture of Prof. Zhang Yu 张彧’s numerous projects. The 51-year-old has already achieved a great deal in her life – as an entrepreneur, author, patron of the arts and bridge builder between Germany and China – even if she considers the term “bridge builder” somewhat “overused.”
For over 20 years, she has dedicated herself to cultural exchange, for example, through major exhibitions such as “The 8 of Ways” in Berlin’s Uferhallen. Zhang emphasizes that intercultural dialogue is more needed today than ever: “I have experienced many ups and downs in Sino-German relations.” But Germany is currently experiencing a particularly “turbulent climate.” And even in China, the former enthusiasm for Germany has cooled noticeably.
“People in China now have a more differentiated and reserved view of Germany,” she explains. “But in the past, the enthusiasm was sometimes almost blind: bread, beer and cars, everything was great,” she says, adding that there are still gaps in mutual perception. For years, her preferred means of closing these gaps has been art and culture – a somewhat more neutral ground for dialogue than politics. For example, she organized a concert in the Chamber Music Hall of the Berlin Philharmonie on January 22, 2025. Under the title “Music Connected! The Classics meets Chinese Rock,” the Berlin Symphony Orchestra and the Chinese rock band MOSAIK will perform together. The occasion is the 30th anniversary of the city partnership between Berlin and Beijing.
Yu Zhang originally came to Germany to study. Her father recommended the country, as he had experienced Germany as a highly developed and safe country during his own travels. “He said: ‘You can sleep with the doors open there, that’s how safe it is’,” she recalls. She eventually landed in Berlin with two suitcases. “I was part of the first generation of privately funded students in the early 90s.” Contrary to the wishes of her “tiger mother,” who wanted her to study law like herself, Zhang decided to study journalism and Japanese studies at the FU Berlin. “It was a kind of rebellion against my parents – I wanted to make my own decision for once.”
Zhang comes from an educated family, but this was precisely their downfall during the Cultural Revolution. “One grandfather was an industrialist and the other a businessman. They were also intellectuals with international connections in the USA and Japan – it couldn’t get any worse in the atmosphere at the time.” She later understood why her mother had insisted on law: Marked by the injustices of the Cultural Revolution, she wanted to bring justice to others. “She helped people with her legal knowledge, even if they could only pay with chickens and eggs,” the daughter recalls. This is how her mother managed to restore the family’s honor, which had suffered in those difficult times. “She was very strict with us children,” says Zhang. She says she inherited discipline, perfectionism and a social nature from her mother, which is reflected, for example, in the Female Impact Summit, which she set up to empower women in leadership positions.
As she was often the only Chinese woman in her environment, she had to fight her way to the top. In addition to her “rebellious” subjects, she also earned a Master of Business Administration (MBA), which ultimately paved her way into the business world. “Back then, many consulting firms didn’t have China desks or local implementation networks. It was precisely this gap that I filled with my consulting firm for the Chinese market – we wanted to be the first mover and beat the consulting firm Roland Berger.” In 1999, Zhang founded China Communications Consulting, which later became China Communications Holding. She later sold her company – in a boom time, as she says. “You have to be able to let go, especially when things are going well. I don’t regret it. I’m now over 50 and want to use my time differently and make a difference in society.”
In 2008, Yu Zhang founded the Society for German-Chinese Cultural Exchange (GeKA). Since then, she successfully launched numerous projects, including with state museums in China. One of her personal highlights was the exhibition “Micro Era. Media Art from China,” which was presented at the Kulturforum Berlin from September 5, 2019, to January 26, 2020. An extensive supporting program, including a Chinese film weekend at the Babylon cinema, accompanied the cooperation between GeKA and the Nationalgalerie Berlin. “I pay a lot of attention to quality,” emphasizes Zhang, who has been collecting art for years and will soon lend some pieces to the Humboldt Forum for an exhibition.
This love of art and creativity also has to do with her family: Her grandfather collected art and her mother painted in her free time. “Art was always present in my childhood and youth, but my ‘tiger mother’ didn’t tolerate any hobbies other than painting apart from learning.” She ponders briefly. “Perhaps this is why my creative side comes out today, which I wasn’t really able to live out as a child and teenager – with all the studying,” she says and laughs. Fabian Peltsch
The seemingly temporary TikTok ban in the US may have a surprising effect on language exchange. For instance, the learning app Duolingo has reported a sharp user increase for its Mandarin courses. Meanwhile, the Chinese app Xiaohongshu, which many US TikTok users have switched to, is apparently desperately looking for content moderators who are proficient enough in English to filter out critical content. Another, touching effect: Chinese students used to have to write fictional letters to American friends for their English exams. Now they re-upload their letters on Xiaohongshu – and American users reply.
