Once before, he traveled secretly to Beijing when relations between the USA and China were at their lowest point. That was almost exactly 52 years ago, the heads of government were Mao and Nixon. Henry Kissinger displayed remarkable diplomatic skill in 1971, and the ice between the nations began to melt in the following years. Now, in the current tense situation, Kissinger has unexpectedly flown to Beijing again at the age of 100, where many still call him a “friend of China.” Li Shangfu, China’s Minister of Defence, who only a few weeks ago refused to meet with his US counterpart Lloyd Austin in person at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, agreed to a meeting with Kissinger. More on this in our news.
This means two high-ranking Americans are in China, as John Kerry is also in China’s capital for talks. Besides his counterpart Xie Zhenhua, he also met with Wang Yi and Premier Li Qiang. Primarily, the talks were about cooperation on climate action, but they were also about fundamental issues. The Chinese side is unwilling to cooperate on one issue if the USA is trying to contain it in other areas, Joern Petring describes in his analysis.
Cooperation paired with segregation – this is also the goal of Germany’s recently published first China strategy. In research, the Federal Government wants to promote cooperation in important fields and minimize risks such as dual-use or one-sided knowledge transfer. MP’s and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research now specify which concrete measures could apply to scientific cooperation and collaboration between research institutions, universities and research-based companies. Tim Gabel has taken a look at the different ideas.
When it comes to concrete measures for scientific cooperation and collaboration between research institutions, universities and research-based companies, the German government’s China strategy has not been very fruitful. Experts say this could be because implementation must not cost anything: “Above all, however, it struggles with the capacity to implement it. Not enough resources are provided for it. As with the national security strategy, this was a prerequisite: The strategies must not make any new demands on the budget,” says the Director of the China Research Institute Merics, Mikko Huotari, in an interview.
Table.Media asked the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and research policymakers in the Federal Government what offers and initiatives can be derived from the paper for the research sector – and what is now being done to cope with the new relationship with China. What concrete measures are behind the vague announcement that “a better mutual understanding of the respective funding structures and processes” is being sought?
On this issue, the BMBF refers to the regular Science & Technology Cooperation meetings. At these meetings, the BMBF and the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) also exchange information on science funding structures and processes in their respective countries. In the government consultations in June, they also agreed on exchange workshops in which “among other things, the content and underlying processes of the innovation strategies of both countries will be discussed,” said a BMBF spokeswoman.
However, after the last STC meeting in 2021, the Federal Government regularly extended invitations for exchange anyway. The BMBF does not explain what is new about the exchange format and what concrete insights it is supposed to produce. The deepened China expertise the BMBF hopes to achieve “through this and other measures,” which experts also call for, will probably only be achieved selectively.
The Chair of the Research Committee, Kai Gehring (Greens), can also envision the expansion and consolidation of the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics) in Berlin: “The need for consultation in German universities and research institutions is high. A central China competence center that advises on all science-policy issues relating to China makes sense – besides the existing specialist support at the BMBF,” said Gehring. Due to the expected demand and complexity of the issues, sufficient expertise in science issues must be ensured, he added. The Merics Institute is currently sanctioned by Beijing, along with a few other researchers in the EU.
Regarding the cooperation between German universities and research institutions with Chinese partners, the need for greater awareness has become apparent since the beginning of this year. Not least the report by security expert Jeffrey Stoff showed that German research institutions and companies are too naïve in their dealings with Chinese institutions that also have a military background.
The strategy lacks any concrete offers for researchers. In her response to the China Strategy, the Federal Minister of Education and Research is only slightly more specific: “The Federal Government will adapt its funding regulations accordingly and strengthen the dialogue with science and universities as well as their further sensitization,” Bettina Stark-Watzinger announced.
For now, the BMBF does not provide more detailed information on the new requirements for funding recipients in the regulations. Other than that, the BMBF refers to existing measures such as the China orientation website, the international office, initial legal advice and a guide to relevant laws.
Together with the International Security Strategy and the Future Strategy for Research and Innovation, the China Strategy provides a solid foundation for science when dealing with China, says SPD research policy expert Ruppert Stuewe. Now it is a matter of operationalizing it. “I would like to see a more differentiated assessment of each individual research cooperation instead of symbolic politics in this field,” Stuewe told Table.Media when asked what he thought of the BMBF’s harsh tone towards China. “We must be able to clearly state what benefits and effects research cooperation with China has for us and conduct a risk-benefit assessment.”
Stuewe has a concrete proposal for improving transparency and the overview of collaborations: “I can imagine that the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) could be strengthened here with its Competence Centre for International Science Cooperation (KIWi) to also play a key role in documenting such collaborations with China.” At the beginning of the year, there had already been a controversial debate in the scientific community about whether a central register of German-Chinese research cooperations could provide better monitoring of research activities or it would endanger Chinese researchers in particular.
The stronger involvement of the intelligence services is also in the interest of successful research cooperation, because they “can provide important information on sensitive areas”, said Green Party politician Kai Gehring. He left open what this institutional integration would look like.
It is necessary to prevent “the Chinese surveillance apparatus from extending its arms to German universities and research institutions”. In addition to Gehring advocating a functioning welcome infrastructure – which supports Chinese students in emancipating themselves from state control and practicing free science in Germany – it also makes sense to be more attentive when issuing visas.
During the visit of US climate envoy John Kerry to Beijing, China and the US showed that the two feuding powers can work together harmoniously after all. In a meeting with high-ranking Chinese diplomat Wang Yi on Tuesday, Kerry said: “Our hope is that this can be the beginning of a new definition of cooperation and capacity to resolve differences between us.” Wang called Kerry an “old friend” and stressed that a “reasonable solution to all problems” could be found through dialogue.
So Kerry was given a high-level reception in Beijing. Besides Wang Yi, he also met with Premier Li Qiang. And both sides are also taking their time. Kerry will continue talks until Wednesday; he spent around 12 hours with his counterpart Xie Zhenhua on Monday. “The world is facing a daunting challenge,” Li Qiang said, referring to climate action. “It is incumbent on China and the United States and indeed all countries to strengthen coordination, build consensus and speed up actions.”
The reception and the remarks clearly show that Beijing and Washington are interested in more than just saving the world’s climate during Kerry’s four-day visit. Both sides were keen to push for a general relaxation of relations. Kerry is the third high-ranking US politician to travel to Beijing within a few weeks. Shortly before him, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen had visited the country.
First, cooperation between the two largest emitters is crucial for the success of global climate action. According to data from the EU Commission, China is currently responsible for 32.6 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, and the USA for 12.6 percent. Both have somewhat less ambitious reduction targets than the EU, but are now setting weighty accents. US President Joe Biden, for example, set up a huge subsidy package for climate-friendly technologies with the Inflation Reduction Act. And no country is building more solar and wind power plants than China. Both countries have explicitly committed themselves to cooperating in this area in a joint declaration from 2021.
During the meeting with Wang Yi, Kerry “emphasized that enhanced action by the PRC to accelerate decarbonization, reduce methane emissions, and address deforestation is essential for the world to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.”
But there is one significant difference in their approach: While Kerry tried to separate the climate issue from other disputes and define it as a starting point for improved relations, China reiterated its well-known position: Climate negotiations cannot be viewed isolated from other issues. Kerry’s interlocutors made it clear several times that it was not an option for Beijing to work constructively with the USA on climate issues, but to continue to be pressured by Washington in all other areas. The dialogue must be conducted at eye level, said Wang Yi at his meeting with Kerry.
The state news agency Xinhua was even more explicit in an editorial on Sunday: “For China-US cooperation to be healthy and sustainable, bilateral ties must be treated as a whole.” While both countries hoped for practical results and meaningful measures, it said. “To achieve those, both must show their sincerity for genuine cooperation,” Xinhua added. “Otherwise any promises for progress on relations are just empty talk.” Above all, the White House should bear in mind that dividing bilateral relations into competition and suppression is “simply unrealistic in practice and unacceptable for Beijing.”
Climate action is considered in both the US and Europe as the most likely issue for constructive cooperation. Brussels, for instance, cites it as an example of potential partnership within the well-known triad of China as “partner, competitor and rival.” The climate question is by no means unproblematic. Beijing is upset about US tariffs on solar cells manufactured in China. The US, like Europe, wants to break China’s dominance as the main supplier of critical materials for climate change technologies – from EV batteries to photovoltaic modules. Germany’s China strategy also sees similar points of contention.
So far, reports from the meetings are scarce. Xie reportedly indicated to Kerry at their mammoth meeting in the Beijing Hotel a general willingness to set up a national methane reduction plan. This highly active greenhouse gas is emitted in China primarily from the coal sector and agriculture – and there, mainly from rice fields. However, this has not yet been officially confirmed.
Even without a breakthrough, climate activists considered Kerry’s visit a successful new start. After all, it was only last August that rising tensions led China to a temporary suspension of climate talks with Washington. This was in protest against the visit of the then Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan. “Substantial differences remain,” Li Shuo of Greenpeace East Asia wrote on Twitter. “Which is why to continue the conversation is key.” Collaboration: Christiane Kuehl
Sinolytics is a European research-based consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
In two opinions published by China.Table in June, Nottingham-based political scientist Andreas Fulda and Bratislava-based sinologist Sascha Klotzbucher reiterated their long-standing demands for a new way of approaching China’s authoritarian regime, especially concerning Sino-German research and academic cooperation.
There is nothing wrong with this. What is problematic, however, are the associated claims that there is no longer any German autonomous agency vis-à-vis China and that “straw man arguments” are used in Germany to dismiss critical contributions to the debate (Fulda); and that social science research on China in Germany is retreating from the principles of free thought and free speech in order to be able to still save its empirical research in China (Klotzbucher). Klotzbucher goes so far as to accuse China scholars of dishonesty regarding the self-censorship they have practiced and to keep quiet about it.
Both scholars should ask themselves whether the criticism they articulate in this way helps promote the dialogue they have repeatedly called for in public on the right way to approach authoritarian China. In any case, generalizing and empirically insufficient or even unfounded claims are counterproductive – and not only among China scholars. In this way, a justified concern, namely to point out the necessity of a repositioning in politics and academia vis-à-vis an authoritarian and increasingly self-confident China, devolves into a self-referential accusation against professional colleagues.
I agree with Fulda that no one should avoid the current debate on China for being “too polarized.” This is particularly true for colleagues working in the social sciences, whose expertise is important for assessing current politics in China. I also agree with him that “dialogue and cooperation” must not remain an empty phrase, but that (university) policy must explain “how we can minimize risks and address existing problems.”
However, to outright dismiss that this cooperation can still be fruitful in light of many Chinese restrictions and lead to “co-optation by the CCP’s United Front policy” is nothing more than a claim. Even if this caters to many fears of a public critical of China, and warnings against Sino-German cooperation sound plausible to the ears of those who are calling for a tough stance toward China anyway – Fulda’s assessments must first be critically examined and stand up to broad empirical scrutiny. Otherwise, they will flow unfiltered into the echo chamber of an increasingly one-dimensional and undifferentiated China criticism.
Klotzbücher’s normative assessment of German researchers’ attitude toward China is full of assumptions. For example, he insinuates that they “only cooperate with scholars” who suit the Chinese Communist Party. How does he know this? He refers to another China scholar (David Tobin) who, for his part, is on record as saying that China scholars refuse to show solidarity with Chinese citizens who suffer from state violence in China (and exclude it from the research process). But how can this be, when German and international China research has produced miles of literature in recent years examining, among other things, the oppression of the Uyghurs, the harassment of marginalized social groups, environmental protests, and pressure on regime critics – all in China? No one can say at this point whether this will be possible now, after the pandemic years. So why does Klotzbucher insinuate all-encompassing “censorship and restriction” and rhetorically asks whether “under these conditions (…) we just want to carry on as before?”
I agree with Klotzbücher that social science research on China needs to reflect critically on its methodological work and the social context in which it is cast in China. The restrictions of one’s research must be made transparent and built into the research design. Unlike him, however, I believe that reputable China research – and that is all that is at issue here – does just that. This is evidenced by countless publications in the profession’s top journals, which demand proof of these things for every article that is published there.
In this way, colleagues Fulda and Klotzbucher perform a disservice to an educated and fair discussion about Sino-German scientific cooperation. But they are right about one thing: There are problems that China research must address on a broad level. They should do so more than ever in a self-critical, open and courageous manner.
Gunter Schubert is Professor of Greater China Studies at the University of Tübingen. The chair’s research area covers not only the People’s Republic, but also Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and overseas Chinese communities. He is also the Director of the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT) at his university.
Who doesn’t know them, China’s late-night street food stalls offering a quick treat after a night of partying? Their menu is usually meat-heavy and greasy, often hygienically questionable, but always hearty and fragrant. Who could resist, even if meat skewers and the like go straight to the belly and hips? On China’s social media, one snack is currently trending that seems to be made for such moments: suodiu – fried stones. The pebbles are seasoned with garlic and chili and then sucked down and spit out by calorie-conscious gourmets. The dish is said to have come from Hubei and was born out of necessity centuries ago by boatmen. They ran out of vegetables and meat and therefore helped themselves with the stones they found in the river.
Once before, he traveled secretly to Beijing when relations between the USA and China were at their lowest point. That was almost exactly 52 years ago, the heads of government were Mao and Nixon. Henry Kissinger displayed remarkable diplomatic skill in 1971, and the ice between the nations began to melt in the following years. Now, in the current tense situation, Kissinger has unexpectedly flown to Beijing again at the age of 100, where many still call him a “friend of China.” Li Shangfu, China’s Minister of Defence, who only a few weeks ago refused to meet with his US counterpart Lloyd Austin in person at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, agreed to a meeting with Kissinger. More on this in our news.
This means two high-ranking Americans are in China, as John Kerry is also in China’s capital for talks. Besides his counterpart Xie Zhenhua, he also met with Wang Yi and Premier Li Qiang. Primarily, the talks were about cooperation on climate action, but they were also about fundamental issues. The Chinese side is unwilling to cooperate on one issue if the USA is trying to contain it in other areas, Joern Petring describes in his analysis.
Cooperation paired with segregation – this is also the goal of Germany’s recently published first China strategy. In research, the Federal Government wants to promote cooperation in important fields and minimize risks such as dual-use or one-sided knowledge transfer. MP’s and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research now specify which concrete measures could apply to scientific cooperation and collaboration between research institutions, universities and research-based companies. Tim Gabel has taken a look at the different ideas.
When it comes to concrete measures for scientific cooperation and collaboration between research institutions, universities and research-based companies, the German government’s China strategy has not been very fruitful. Experts say this could be because implementation must not cost anything: “Above all, however, it struggles with the capacity to implement it. Not enough resources are provided for it. As with the national security strategy, this was a prerequisite: The strategies must not make any new demands on the budget,” says the Director of the China Research Institute Merics, Mikko Huotari, in an interview.
Table.Media asked the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and research policymakers in the Federal Government what offers and initiatives can be derived from the paper for the research sector – and what is now being done to cope with the new relationship with China. What concrete measures are behind the vague announcement that “a better mutual understanding of the respective funding structures and processes” is being sought?
On this issue, the BMBF refers to the regular Science & Technology Cooperation meetings. At these meetings, the BMBF and the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) also exchange information on science funding structures and processes in their respective countries. In the government consultations in June, they also agreed on exchange workshops in which “among other things, the content and underlying processes of the innovation strategies of both countries will be discussed,” said a BMBF spokeswoman.
However, after the last STC meeting in 2021, the Federal Government regularly extended invitations for exchange anyway. The BMBF does not explain what is new about the exchange format and what concrete insights it is supposed to produce. The deepened China expertise the BMBF hopes to achieve “through this and other measures,” which experts also call for, will probably only be achieved selectively.
The Chair of the Research Committee, Kai Gehring (Greens), can also envision the expansion and consolidation of the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics) in Berlin: “The need for consultation in German universities and research institutions is high. A central China competence center that advises on all science-policy issues relating to China makes sense – besides the existing specialist support at the BMBF,” said Gehring. Due to the expected demand and complexity of the issues, sufficient expertise in science issues must be ensured, he added. The Merics Institute is currently sanctioned by Beijing, along with a few other researchers in the EU.
Regarding the cooperation between German universities and research institutions with Chinese partners, the need for greater awareness has become apparent since the beginning of this year. Not least the report by security expert Jeffrey Stoff showed that German research institutions and companies are too naïve in their dealings with Chinese institutions that also have a military background.
The strategy lacks any concrete offers for researchers. In her response to the China Strategy, the Federal Minister of Education and Research is only slightly more specific: “The Federal Government will adapt its funding regulations accordingly and strengthen the dialogue with science and universities as well as their further sensitization,” Bettina Stark-Watzinger announced.
For now, the BMBF does not provide more detailed information on the new requirements for funding recipients in the regulations. Other than that, the BMBF refers to existing measures such as the China orientation website, the international office, initial legal advice and a guide to relevant laws.
Together with the International Security Strategy and the Future Strategy for Research and Innovation, the China Strategy provides a solid foundation for science when dealing with China, says SPD research policy expert Ruppert Stuewe. Now it is a matter of operationalizing it. “I would like to see a more differentiated assessment of each individual research cooperation instead of symbolic politics in this field,” Stuewe told Table.Media when asked what he thought of the BMBF’s harsh tone towards China. “We must be able to clearly state what benefits and effects research cooperation with China has for us and conduct a risk-benefit assessment.”
Stuewe has a concrete proposal for improving transparency and the overview of collaborations: “I can imagine that the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) could be strengthened here with its Competence Centre for International Science Cooperation (KIWi) to also play a key role in documenting such collaborations with China.” At the beginning of the year, there had already been a controversial debate in the scientific community about whether a central register of German-Chinese research cooperations could provide better monitoring of research activities or it would endanger Chinese researchers in particular.
The stronger involvement of the intelligence services is also in the interest of successful research cooperation, because they “can provide important information on sensitive areas”, said Green Party politician Kai Gehring. He left open what this institutional integration would look like.
It is necessary to prevent “the Chinese surveillance apparatus from extending its arms to German universities and research institutions”. In addition to Gehring advocating a functioning welcome infrastructure – which supports Chinese students in emancipating themselves from state control and practicing free science in Germany – it also makes sense to be more attentive when issuing visas.
During the visit of US climate envoy John Kerry to Beijing, China and the US showed that the two feuding powers can work together harmoniously after all. In a meeting with high-ranking Chinese diplomat Wang Yi on Tuesday, Kerry said: “Our hope is that this can be the beginning of a new definition of cooperation and capacity to resolve differences between us.” Wang called Kerry an “old friend” and stressed that a “reasonable solution to all problems” could be found through dialogue.
So Kerry was given a high-level reception in Beijing. Besides Wang Yi, he also met with Premier Li Qiang. And both sides are also taking their time. Kerry will continue talks until Wednesday; he spent around 12 hours with his counterpart Xie Zhenhua on Monday. “The world is facing a daunting challenge,” Li Qiang said, referring to climate action. “It is incumbent on China and the United States and indeed all countries to strengthen coordination, build consensus and speed up actions.”
The reception and the remarks clearly show that Beijing and Washington are interested in more than just saving the world’s climate during Kerry’s four-day visit. Both sides were keen to push for a general relaxation of relations. Kerry is the third high-ranking US politician to travel to Beijing within a few weeks. Shortly before him, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen had visited the country.
First, cooperation between the two largest emitters is crucial for the success of global climate action. According to data from the EU Commission, China is currently responsible for 32.6 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, and the USA for 12.6 percent. Both have somewhat less ambitious reduction targets than the EU, but are now setting weighty accents. US President Joe Biden, for example, set up a huge subsidy package for climate-friendly technologies with the Inflation Reduction Act. And no country is building more solar and wind power plants than China. Both countries have explicitly committed themselves to cooperating in this area in a joint declaration from 2021.
During the meeting with Wang Yi, Kerry “emphasized that enhanced action by the PRC to accelerate decarbonization, reduce methane emissions, and address deforestation is essential for the world to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.”
But there is one significant difference in their approach: While Kerry tried to separate the climate issue from other disputes and define it as a starting point for improved relations, China reiterated its well-known position: Climate negotiations cannot be viewed isolated from other issues. Kerry’s interlocutors made it clear several times that it was not an option for Beijing to work constructively with the USA on climate issues, but to continue to be pressured by Washington in all other areas. The dialogue must be conducted at eye level, said Wang Yi at his meeting with Kerry.
The state news agency Xinhua was even more explicit in an editorial on Sunday: “For China-US cooperation to be healthy and sustainable, bilateral ties must be treated as a whole.” While both countries hoped for practical results and meaningful measures, it said. “To achieve those, both must show their sincerity for genuine cooperation,” Xinhua added. “Otherwise any promises for progress on relations are just empty talk.” Above all, the White House should bear in mind that dividing bilateral relations into competition and suppression is “simply unrealistic in practice and unacceptable for Beijing.”
Climate action is considered in both the US and Europe as the most likely issue for constructive cooperation. Brussels, for instance, cites it as an example of potential partnership within the well-known triad of China as “partner, competitor and rival.” The climate question is by no means unproblematic. Beijing is upset about US tariffs on solar cells manufactured in China. The US, like Europe, wants to break China’s dominance as the main supplier of critical materials for climate change technologies – from EV batteries to photovoltaic modules. Germany’s China strategy also sees similar points of contention.
So far, reports from the meetings are scarce. Xie reportedly indicated to Kerry at their mammoth meeting in the Beijing Hotel a general willingness to set up a national methane reduction plan. This highly active greenhouse gas is emitted in China primarily from the coal sector and agriculture – and there, mainly from rice fields. However, this has not yet been officially confirmed.
Even without a breakthrough, climate activists considered Kerry’s visit a successful new start. After all, it was only last August that rising tensions led China to a temporary suspension of climate talks with Washington. This was in protest against the visit of the then Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan. “Substantial differences remain,” Li Shuo of Greenpeace East Asia wrote on Twitter. “Which is why to continue the conversation is key.” Collaboration: Christiane Kuehl
Sinolytics is a European research-based consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
In two opinions published by China.Table in June, Nottingham-based political scientist Andreas Fulda and Bratislava-based sinologist Sascha Klotzbucher reiterated their long-standing demands for a new way of approaching China’s authoritarian regime, especially concerning Sino-German research and academic cooperation.
There is nothing wrong with this. What is problematic, however, are the associated claims that there is no longer any German autonomous agency vis-à-vis China and that “straw man arguments” are used in Germany to dismiss critical contributions to the debate (Fulda); and that social science research on China in Germany is retreating from the principles of free thought and free speech in order to be able to still save its empirical research in China (Klotzbucher). Klotzbucher goes so far as to accuse China scholars of dishonesty regarding the self-censorship they have practiced and to keep quiet about it.
Both scholars should ask themselves whether the criticism they articulate in this way helps promote the dialogue they have repeatedly called for in public on the right way to approach authoritarian China. In any case, generalizing and empirically insufficient or even unfounded claims are counterproductive – and not only among China scholars. In this way, a justified concern, namely to point out the necessity of a repositioning in politics and academia vis-à-vis an authoritarian and increasingly self-confident China, devolves into a self-referential accusation against professional colleagues.
I agree with Fulda that no one should avoid the current debate on China for being “too polarized.” This is particularly true for colleagues working in the social sciences, whose expertise is important for assessing current politics in China. I also agree with him that “dialogue and cooperation” must not remain an empty phrase, but that (university) policy must explain “how we can minimize risks and address existing problems.”
However, to outright dismiss that this cooperation can still be fruitful in light of many Chinese restrictions and lead to “co-optation by the CCP’s United Front policy” is nothing more than a claim. Even if this caters to many fears of a public critical of China, and warnings against Sino-German cooperation sound plausible to the ears of those who are calling for a tough stance toward China anyway – Fulda’s assessments must first be critically examined and stand up to broad empirical scrutiny. Otherwise, they will flow unfiltered into the echo chamber of an increasingly one-dimensional and undifferentiated China criticism.
Klotzbücher’s normative assessment of German researchers’ attitude toward China is full of assumptions. For example, he insinuates that they “only cooperate with scholars” who suit the Chinese Communist Party. How does he know this? He refers to another China scholar (David Tobin) who, for his part, is on record as saying that China scholars refuse to show solidarity with Chinese citizens who suffer from state violence in China (and exclude it from the research process). But how can this be, when German and international China research has produced miles of literature in recent years examining, among other things, the oppression of the Uyghurs, the harassment of marginalized social groups, environmental protests, and pressure on regime critics – all in China? No one can say at this point whether this will be possible now, after the pandemic years. So why does Klotzbucher insinuate all-encompassing “censorship and restriction” and rhetorically asks whether “under these conditions (…) we just want to carry on as before?”
I agree with Klotzbücher that social science research on China needs to reflect critically on its methodological work and the social context in which it is cast in China. The restrictions of one’s research must be made transparent and built into the research design. Unlike him, however, I believe that reputable China research – and that is all that is at issue here – does just that. This is evidenced by countless publications in the profession’s top journals, which demand proof of these things for every article that is published there.
In this way, colleagues Fulda and Klotzbucher perform a disservice to an educated and fair discussion about Sino-German scientific cooperation. But they are right about one thing: There are problems that China research must address on a broad level. They should do so more than ever in a self-critical, open and courageous manner.
Gunter Schubert is Professor of Greater China Studies at the University of Tübingen. The chair’s research area covers not only the People’s Republic, but also Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and overseas Chinese communities. He is also the Director of the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT) at his university.
Who doesn’t know them, China’s late-night street food stalls offering a quick treat after a night of partying? Their menu is usually meat-heavy and greasy, often hygienically questionable, but always hearty and fragrant. Who could resist, even if meat skewers and the like go straight to the belly and hips? On China’s social media, one snack is currently trending that seems to be made for such moments: suodiu – fried stones. The pebbles are seasoned with garlic and chili and then sucked down and spit out by calorie-conscious gourmets. The dish is said to have come from Hubei and was born out of necessity centuries ago by boatmen. They ran out of vegetables and meat and therefore helped themselves with the stones they found in the river.
