When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz travels to China this weekend, he will probably find himself performing a precarious balancing act. After all, China is guilty of serious human rights violations. Rights and freedoms are being massively curtailed in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. On the other hand, China is also the world’s second-largest economy, which is why a large business delegation is accompanying the Chancellor to China. Marcel Grzanna’s analysis urges the Chancellor to focus on both the economy and human rights – and explains how this can be achieved without Scholz coming across as moralizing.
Meanwhile, the leadership in Beijing is trying to perform a balancing act of a different kind: On the one hand, it strives to become a climate frontrunner, while on the other, China emits more CO2 than any other country. Emissions in the iron and steel sector alone are almost as high as those of the whole of Russia, the world’s fourth-largest carbon emitter. This puts China at risk of missing its own climate targets. Nico Beckert explains how Beijing wants to turn things around after all – with a plan from the powerful central planning authority NDRC.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz will probably have to perform a balancing act in China next week: Vaguely addressing human rights while trying to consider the interests of business leaders. However, it is unlikely that such a shaky balancing act will be successful in China.
It would be better for him to make clear demands regarding the improvement of the human rights situation or to mention names. That would not be moralizing, but the right of one of China’s important economic partners.
After all, the human rights situation in China has never been as bad before a German chancellor’s trip as in 2024. The People’s Republic has become the epitome of the most severe human rights violations of the 21st century. The United Nations has expressed deep concern about the situation in Xinjiang and Tibet, is powerless in the face of the end of all liberal civil rights in Hong Kong and fears for the safety of political opponents in the country.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult enough to put on the right face as Chancellor when shaking the hands of those who are responsible. And as a democrat, it is almost impossible to express your distaste for authoritarian state despotism when you have a high-ranking travel delegation with its own significant economic interests with you on the plane.
Realpolitik in China means having to defy these contradictions. Photos of cute panda bears or trips to the Great Wall of China, which Bavaria’s Minister President Markus Soeder brought back from China last week, are not helpful, critics say.
The German rift when dealing with a dictatorship that is also the second-largest economy became apparent in the aftermath of Soeder’s visit. Various German foreign policy experts, like Michael Roth from the Social Democratic Party (SPD), consider Soeder’s appearance in China wrong and not in line with Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock’s critical stance on China. Soeder himself summarized his appearance with the slogan “Realpolitik instead of moral politics.”
But it is also a fact that the good faces of the past decades have by no means improved the human rights situation in the People’s Republic. Since Xi Jinping has been leading the state and the Communist Party, the climate for social discourse has become harsher over the past eleven years, the corridor for expressing opinions narrower and the punishments for political dissent tougher.
But not only that. China has long since gone on the offensive and is consistently working to dominate the global discourse on its human rights violations. If you enter the terms human rights xi jinping development into the search engines of Western tech companies, you will mainly find results from English-language, state-run Chinese sources, declaring like a mantra that the dramatic human rights record in China is actually a sign of progress.
Observers see the fact that search engines such as Google rank such sources at the top as the result of Chinese disinformation campaigns. That is why the German Federal Chancellery even felt compelled to use Chinese video platforms such as TikTok – to counter the disinformation in the digital space with its own perspective, you could say.
But China is successful. For example, in the Human Rights Council. China has managed to win over numerous advocates who vote against the adoption of resolutions condemning Chinese human rights crimes. It is becoming clear in Geneva that human rights policy has devolved into a secondary aspect of economic interests.
The country no longer even has to fear serious sanctions if it kidnaps foreign citizens or takes them hostage. Australian author Yang Hengjun was recently sentenced to death in China for alleged espionage. Without the rule of law and without the Australian government drawing any serious consequences.
In an interview with Politico, Canadian Michael Kovrig warned: “There should be costs and consequences to the abduction of foreign nationals by China. Governments must reinforce the basic international norm that responsible states don’t abduct each other’s citizens. We’ve got to better protect our citizens, making clear that actions against them will carry costs and consequences.” The diplomat had spent several years in Chinese custody on charges of espionage. The Western countries unanimously considered the case an act of revenge for investigations against a senior Huawei executive under arrest in Canada.
This week, the leading climate diplomats from the EU, Germany, France, Denmark and the Netherlands will meet with the Chinese leadership in Beijing. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is also expected next weekend. The list of topics discussed at these meetings always includes the climate policy of the largest carbon emitter. After all, China is about to miss its targets.
That is why the People’s Republic wants to obligate companies from industries requiring large amounts of energy to cover a certain percentage of their energy needs from renewable sources. The powerful central planning authority NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission) recently urged the provinces to issue such regulations.
Experts consider this new NDRC guideline “major Chinese climate policy news.“ David Fishman, energy expert at the consulting firm The Lantau Group, called the decision to no longer limit renewable energy quotas to electricity producers but to include consumers as well “big news” in a post on X. According to Lauri Myllyvirta, China expert at the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), “China’s renewable energy quotas promise to be a key tool to drive installations and profitability.”
The current climate data shows just how important such new approaches are: Overall, China risks missing its climate targets for the coming years. To at least keep the government’s targets within reach, emissions from the energy sector would have to fall by an unprecedented four to six percent by 2025. China is not on the right path for many indicators.
Yin Ming, Senior Advisor China Power at Agora Energiewende, also considers the new guidelines a good step forward: “The new policy can help to accelerate the replacement of fossil fuels with renewable energies in the provinces and thus make a contribution to China’s energy transition.”
However, many details of the recently adopted directive are still unclear. This makes it questionable whether the regulations on the use of renewable energies can make a difference in time.
China’s industrial sector faces a massive transformation. Compared to other G20 countries, the country’s manufacturing industry is still very carbon heavy. Moreover, the industrial sector remains of considerable economic importance: Emissions in the iron and steel sector alone are almost as high as those of Russia, the world’s fourth-largest carbon emitter. Accelerating the energy transition in the industrial sector has the potential to have a significant impact on climate action.
However, it is still unclear to what extent the new regulations will contribute to reducing carbon emissions. “It’s still too early to say whether the new policy will reduce overall emissions or simply offset a larger increase in emissions,” Fishman told Table.Briefings, adding that there are still some unanswered questions.
The NDRC directive shifts a lot of responsibility to the individual provinces, which will set their own targets for renewable energy consumption, Fishman says. It is also difficult to categorize the provinces’ targets and check whether their quotas are too low, as there is a lack of access to information. However, the Lantau expert suspects that authorities at the national level will review the provincial targets and have to wave them through. This could restrict the provinces’ leeway. Yin Ming from Agora Energiewende says: “Strict oversight and enforcement will be crucial to ensure that the new regulations accelerate the industry’s transition to clean energy.”
The new guidelines potentially affect around 20,000 manufacturing companies and over one million data centers. The Chinese government classifies around 14,000 companies from the iron and steel sector, 4,000 cement manufacturers and several hundred chemical companies as well as aluminum manufacturers, oil refineries, glass manufacturers and data centers as “industries with high energy requirements”. It is not yet clear whether the latter will also be affected by the new directive.
According to Myllyvirta, the new measure is “much more likely” to be more successful than the Chinese emissions trading system (ETS). The ETS still has serious design flaws and, according to the China analyst from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, does not set a carbon price. Myllyvirta estimates that “administrative measures, targets and quotas” remain important tools in China’s climate policy.
Such government interventions are important to reduce industrial emissions fast enough. The sector has already achieved some successes:
Overall, however, emissions from the industrial sector are still too high. Industrial end consumption has increased significantly in the wake of economic stimulus programs after the COVID-19 pandemic. And while electrification represents progress, it is currently only shifting emissions: Although more and more coal-fired power plants at industrial locations (“captive power plants”) are being decommissioned, coal consumption in the energy sector is rising – along with emissions – as the industrial sector demands more electricity and renewables are not yet able to meet the higher demand.
On Monday, the German government announced further details of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s China visit. Scholz will set off on a several-day trip to the People’s Republic next Saturday and visit three Chinese cities:
In Beijing, Transport Minister Volker Wissing, Agriculture Minister Cem Ozdemir and Environment Minister Steffi Lemke will join the talks with the Chinese government.
Scholz will be accompanied on his trip by a large business delegation. Maximilian Butek, Managing Director and Member of the Board of the German Chamber of Commerce in East China told Reuters that “the fact that the Chancellor is coming to China for so long and traveling to three cities is a strong sign of the normalization of relations.” However, government spokesman Steffen Hebestreit rejected this assessment. Instead of normalization, he said, there was continuity based on the German government’s China strategy.
Germany’s China strategy refers to the People’s Republic as a partner, competitor and systemic rival. In addition, the German government has urged its economy to reduce existing dependencies on China for geopolitical reasons. rad
Before Xi Jinping’s France visit, Trade Minister Wang Wentao met with business and political representatives in Paris. At the meeting with Wang, he emphasized the need for balanced trade relations, wrote Franck Riester, Minister Delegate for Foreign Trade, on X on Monday. These would offer opportunities for companies in both countries.
According to media reports, Wang also met with representatives of the Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac (BNIC) in Paris to discuss a Chinese investigation into French cognac subsidies. For this investigation, the Chinese authorities have chosen Martell, a subsidiary of Pernod Ricard, Jas Hennessy of the luxury group LVMH and E. Remy Martin from Rémy Cointreau.
China initiated the Cognac investigation after the EU Commission announced its investigation into state subsidies for Chinese EVs. The EU Commission has been examining Chinese subsidy practices since October. The outcome will determine whether tariffs will be imposed.
Wang emphasized that Chinese car manufacturers are not dependent on subsidies in order to gain a competitive advantage. Furthermore, accusations from the US and the EU claiming that there is overcapacity are unfounded, Wang said in a statement from the ministry on Monday. The minister made his remarks during a meeting with Chinese companies in Paris, where he discussed, among other things, China’s EV exports to the European market.
Representatives from over ten companies attended the meeting. “China’s electric vehicle companies rely on continuous technological innovation, perfect production and supply chain system and full market competition for rapid development, not relying on subsidies to gain competitive advantage,” Wang said. China’s Minister of Commerce was joined by the heads of BYD, Geely and SAIC, among others.
On Sunday, Wang met with representatives of the European Automobile Manufacturers Association and the CEO of Renault, Luca de Meo. According to Reuters, de Meo emphasized the importance of the principle of reciprocity between the two countries and called for joint development programs for future technologies. Wang is also said to have met representatives of the French cosmetics industry, including Hermès and L’Oréal.
The Chinese minister’s visit precedes President Xi’s visit, who is expected to arrive in Paris in May for the 60th anniversary of Sino-French diplomatic relations. So far, the dates of the trip have varied. Reuters reports that Wang will travel on to an economic forum in Verona this week in the presence of Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani. ari
The German government’s China strategy emphasizes the need to expand China expertise in Germany. Remarks made by Research Minister Bettina Stark-Watzinger, who suspects that the Communist Party is behind every researcher, show that there is plenty of room for improvement in the government’s own China expertise. Such statements are tendentious and risk suggesting a generalized suspicion towards Chinese scientists.
Pointing out the risk of Chinese influence and espionage is one thing, but implying a generalized suspicion is highly problematic and not very constructive. Such statements merely fuel debates but do not lead to a solution. There may be high-risk areas with a significantly heightened risk of espionage, but this is by no means the case in all areas, meaning that a blanket exclusion of Chinese researchers seems neither sensible nor expedient.
Scientific cooperation with China was not only the subject of heated debate. A series of detailed recommendations followed, which generally highlight some crucial points, but whose actual feasibility remains unclear. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) recently published a set of recommendations that contain little substance because they are very abstract and vague.
It seems particularly problematic that the application of such recommendations requires in-depth China knowledge. Expertise that is often not and cannot be available. Why should a university administration have proven China expertise? Why should an engineer or biologist also be a China expert?
As a regional scientist, I work with different background knowledge. However, I must openly admit that even before my research on academic freedom in China, I only had a rudimentary understanding of the Chinese higher education system. We only managed to gain in-depth information on the legal and practical framework conditions of higher education in China during our research project. Without such background knowledge, the various recommendations do not offer any actual help.
Due to the sensitive nature of the research question, we decided against field research in China. So, I conducted interviews in Europe, Hong Kong, and Taiwan with academics who have personally worked in China and/or conducted research on China. The realization: Many assumptions about the Chinese science system are purely anecdotal or characterized by general assumptions that cannot be proven.
Such general assumptions and the resulting uncertainty often result in maximum passivity. The assumption that every party member is automatically a party cell is highly problematic and demonstrates ignorance. Mere party membership means very little and is not uncommon. The specific role that a person plays in the system is much more important. Such generalized assumptions were primarily made by academics who had traveled to China with very little knowledge. In other cases, the picture was more nuanced.
My research deals with core aspects of academic freedom in China, in other words, freedom of teaching and research and institutional autonomy. The aim is to close the knowledge gap about the Chinese academic system and provide guidance so that recommendations can be implemented in a targeted manner.
Due to its close interweaving with the party-state and the multitude of legal regulations, the Chinese scientific system is highly complex. For example, it is difficult to make general statements about party influence. Nevertheless, generalizations can be made based on knowledge of the organizational structure of Chinese universities and relevant regulations on freedom of teaching and research, meaning that certain framework conditions apply to all.
For example, the political demands on academics in China have become stricter in recent years, meaning that commitment to the party-state is demanded more openly and must be articulated in publications or third-party funding applications. By contrast, criticizing the Chinese government’s political agenda has become more difficult.
Considering this can minimize risks. A basic understanding of the organization of Chinese universities is important to better understand the role of the negotiating partners and avoid making general assumptions. Furthermore, examining the legal framework conditions can help weigh up the risks in individual cases. Firstly, a look at the research object itself can help determine whether it is a high-risk area that the party-state considers sensitive.
If it is a gray area, a moral consideration is necessary. For example, I personally would not seek to conduct a research project on human rights with scientists in China. In my opinion, critical research and joint publications would not be feasible in this case. I would not want to jeopardize my partners in China and support the party-state’s narrative and thus its legitimacy through my research.
I regard the elimination of moral concerns as mandatory, and such a reflection process can certainly be beneficial. In addition to discussions within the research team and with the Chinese partners, establishing a central contact unit that can act as an ad hoc ethics committee would make sense. To this end, universities should work more closely together.
This would help to pool information and establish a long-term standardized strategy, which would be entirely in line with the China strategy and could drive it forward. On the other hand, decentralizing such processes would be inefficient. Realistically, there is currently a lack of resources, not least in science. Politicians cannot expect research to shoulder risk minimization processes without additional capacities.
Alexandra Kaiser studied China regional studies and law in Cologne. She is currently working as a researcher at the Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg and the Academia Sinica in Taiwan.
Chinese companies have invested heavily in Africa. And they are now also focusing on soft power there. For instance, the Chinese streaming service Boomplay sponsored a music festival in the Kenyan capital Nairobi over the weekend. Local artists such as rapper Sylvia Saru were invited to “Boomfest.” Founded in 2015 by parent company Transsnet, Boomplay is now the largest music streaming service in Africa with more than 100 million users. Kenya is considered one of the continent’s pop-cultural centers. According to Boomplay, around 4.5 million people in the East African country use the app.
When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz travels to China this weekend, he will probably find himself performing a precarious balancing act. After all, China is guilty of serious human rights violations. Rights and freedoms are being massively curtailed in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. On the other hand, China is also the world’s second-largest economy, which is why a large business delegation is accompanying the Chancellor to China. Marcel Grzanna’s analysis urges the Chancellor to focus on both the economy and human rights – and explains how this can be achieved without Scholz coming across as moralizing.
Meanwhile, the leadership in Beijing is trying to perform a balancing act of a different kind: On the one hand, it strives to become a climate frontrunner, while on the other, China emits more CO2 than any other country. Emissions in the iron and steel sector alone are almost as high as those of the whole of Russia, the world’s fourth-largest carbon emitter. This puts China at risk of missing its own climate targets. Nico Beckert explains how Beijing wants to turn things around after all – with a plan from the powerful central planning authority NDRC.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz will probably have to perform a balancing act in China next week: Vaguely addressing human rights while trying to consider the interests of business leaders. However, it is unlikely that such a shaky balancing act will be successful in China.
It would be better for him to make clear demands regarding the improvement of the human rights situation or to mention names. That would not be moralizing, but the right of one of China’s important economic partners.
After all, the human rights situation in China has never been as bad before a German chancellor’s trip as in 2024. The People’s Republic has become the epitome of the most severe human rights violations of the 21st century. The United Nations has expressed deep concern about the situation in Xinjiang and Tibet, is powerless in the face of the end of all liberal civil rights in Hong Kong and fears for the safety of political opponents in the country.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult enough to put on the right face as Chancellor when shaking the hands of those who are responsible. And as a democrat, it is almost impossible to express your distaste for authoritarian state despotism when you have a high-ranking travel delegation with its own significant economic interests with you on the plane.
Realpolitik in China means having to defy these contradictions. Photos of cute panda bears or trips to the Great Wall of China, which Bavaria’s Minister President Markus Soeder brought back from China last week, are not helpful, critics say.
The German rift when dealing with a dictatorship that is also the second-largest economy became apparent in the aftermath of Soeder’s visit. Various German foreign policy experts, like Michael Roth from the Social Democratic Party (SPD), consider Soeder’s appearance in China wrong and not in line with Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock’s critical stance on China. Soeder himself summarized his appearance with the slogan “Realpolitik instead of moral politics.”
But it is also a fact that the good faces of the past decades have by no means improved the human rights situation in the People’s Republic. Since Xi Jinping has been leading the state and the Communist Party, the climate for social discourse has become harsher over the past eleven years, the corridor for expressing opinions narrower and the punishments for political dissent tougher.
But not only that. China has long since gone on the offensive and is consistently working to dominate the global discourse on its human rights violations. If you enter the terms human rights xi jinping development into the search engines of Western tech companies, you will mainly find results from English-language, state-run Chinese sources, declaring like a mantra that the dramatic human rights record in China is actually a sign of progress.
Observers see the fact that search engines such as Google rank such sources at the top as the result of Chinese disinformation campaigns. That is why the German Federal Chancellery even felt compelled to use Chinese video platforms such as TikTok – to counter the disinformation in the digital space with its own perspective, you could say.
But China is successful. For example, in the Human Rights Council. China has managed to win over numerous advocates who vote against the adoption of resolutions condemning Chinese human rights crimes. It is becoming clear in Geneva that human rights policy has devolved into a secondary aspect of economic interests.
The country no longer even has to fear serious sanctions if it kidnaps foreign citizens or takes them hostage. Australian author Yang Hengjun was recently sentenced to death in China for alleged espionage. Without the rule of law and without the Australian government drawing any serious consequences.
In an interview with Politico, Canadian Michael Kovrig warned: “There should be costs and consequences to the abduction of foreign nationals by China. Governments must reinforce the basic international norm that responsible states don’t abduct each other’s citizens. We’ve got to better protect our citizens, making clear that actions against them will carry costs and consequences.” The diplomat had spent several years in Chinese custody on charges of espionage. The Western countries unanimously considered the case an act of revenge for investigations against a senior Huawei executive under arrest in Canada.
This week, the leading climate diplomats from the EU, Germany, France, Denmark and the Netherlands will meet with the Chinese leadership in Beijing. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is also expected next weekend. The list of topics discussed at these meetings always includes the climate policy of the largest carbon emitter. After all, China is about to miss its targets.
That is why the People’s Republic wants to obligate companies from industries requiring large amounts of energy to cover a certain percentage of their energy needs from renewable sources. The powerful central planning authority NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission) recently urged the provinces to issue such regulations.
Experts consider this new NDRC guideline “major Chinese climate policy news.“ David Fishman, energy expert at the consulting firm The Lantau Group, called the decision to no longer limit renewable energy quotas to electricity producers but to include consumers as well “big news” in a post on X. According to Lauri Myllyvirta, China expert at the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), “China’s renewable energy quotas promise to be a key tool to drive installations and profitability.”
The current climate data shows just how important such new approaches are: Overall, China risks missing its climate targets for the coming years. To at least keep the government’s targets within reach, emissions from the energy sector would have to fall by an unprecedented four to six percent by 2025. China is not on the right path for many indicators.
Yin Ming, Senior Advisor China Power at Agora Energiewende, also considers the new guidelines a good step forward: “The new policy can help to accelerate the replacement of fossil fuels with renewable energies in the provinces and thus make a contribution to China’s energy transition.”
However, many details of the recently adopted directive are still unclear. This makes it questionable whether the regulations on the use of renewable energies can make a difference in time.
China’s industrial sector faces a massive transformation. Compared to other G20 countries, the country’s manufacturing industry is still very carbon heavy. Moreover, the industrial sector remains of considerable economic importance: Emissions in the iron and steel sector alone are almost as high as those of Russia, the world’s fourth-largest carbon emitter. Accelerating the energy transition in the industrial sector has the potential to have a significant impact on climate action.
However, it is still unclear to what extent the new regulations will contribute to reducing carbon emissions. “It’s still too early to say whether the new policy will reduce overall emissions or simply offset a larger increase in emissions,” Fishman told Table.Briefings, adding that there are still some unanswered questions.
The NDRC directive shifts a lot of responsibility to the individual provinces, which will set their own targets for renewable energy consumption, Fishman says. It is also difficult to categorize the provinces’ targets and check whether their quotas are too low, as there is a lack of access to information. However, the Lantau expert suspects that authorities at the national level will review the provincial targets and have to wave them through. This could restrict the provinces’ leeway. Yin Ming from Agora Energiewende says: “Strict oversight and enforcement will be crucial to ensure that the new regulations accelerate the industry’s transition to clean energy.”
The new guidelines potentially affect around 20,000 manufacturing companies and over one million data centers. The Chinese government classifies around 14,000 companies from the iron and steel sector, 4,000 cement manufacturers and several hundred chemical companies as well as aluminum manufacturers, oil refineries, glass manufacturers and data centers as “industries with high energy requirements”. It is not yet clear whether the latter will also be affected by the new directive.
According to Myllyvirta, the new measure is “much more likely” to be more successful than the Chinese emissions trading system (ETS). The ETS still has serious design flaws and, according to the China analyst from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, does not set a carbon price. Myllyvirta estimates that “administrative measures, targets and quotas” remain important tools in China’s climate policy.
Such government interventions are important to reduce industrial emissions fast enough. The sector has already achieved some successes:
Overall, however, emissions from the industrial sector are still too high. Industrial end consumption has increased significantly in the wake of economic stimulus programs after the COVID-19 pandemic. And while electrification represents progress, it is currently only shifting emissions: Although more and more coal-fired power plants at industrial locations (“captive power plants”) are being decommissioned, coal consumption in the energy sector is rising – along with emissions – as the industrial sector demands more electricity and renewables are not yet able to meet the higher demand.
On Monday, the German government announced further details of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s China visit. Scholz will set off on a several-day trip to the People’s Republic next Saturday and visit three Chinese cities:
In Beijing, Transport Minister Volker Wissing, Agriculture Minister Cem Ozdemir and Environment Minister Steffi Lemke will join the talks with the Chinese government.
Scholz will be accompanied on his trip by a large business delegation. Maximilian Butek, Managing Director and Member of the Board of the German Chamber of Commerce in East China told Reuters that “the fact that the Chancellor is coming to China for so long and traveling to three cities is a strong sign of the normalization of relations.” However, government spokesman Steffen Hebestreit rejected this assessment. Instead of normalization, he said, there was continuity based on the German government’s China strategy.
Germany’s China strategy refers to the People’s Republic as a partner, competitor and systemic rival. In addition, the German government has urged its economy to reduce existing dependencies on China for geopolitical reasons. rad
Before Xi Jinping’s France visit, Trade Minister Wang Wentao met with business and political representatives in Paris. At the meeting with Wang, he emphasized the need for balanced trade relations, wrote Franck Riester, Minister Delegate for Foreign Trade, on X on Monday. These would offer opportunities for companies in both countries.
According to media reports, Wang also met with representatives of the Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac (BNIC) in Paris to discuss a Chinese investigation into French cognac subsidies. For this investigation, the Chinese authorities have chosen Martell, a subsidiary of Pernod Ricard, Jas Hennessy of the luxury group LVMH and E. Remy Martin from Rémy Cointreau.
China initiated the Cognac investigation after the EU Commission announced its investigation into state subsidies for Chinese EVs. The EU Commission has been examining Chinese subsidy practices since October. The outcome will determine whether tariffs will be imposed.
Wang emphasized that Chinese car manufacturers are not dependent on subsidies in order to gain a competitive advantage. Furthermore, accusations from the US and the EU claiming that there is overcapacity are unfounded, Wang said in a statement from the ministry on Monday. The minister made his remarks during a meeting with Chinese companies in Paris, where he discussed, among other things, China’s EV exports to the European market.
Representatives from over ten companies attended the meeting. “China’s electric vehicle companies rely on continuous technological innovation, perfect production and supply chain system and full market competition for rapid development, not relying on subsidies to gain competitive advantage,” Wang said. China’s Minister of Commerce was joined by the heads of BYD, Geely and SAIC, among others.
On Sunday, Wang met with representatives of the European Automobile Manufacturers Association and the CEO of Renault, Luca de Meo. According to Reuters, de Meo emphasized the importance of the principle of reciprocity between the two countries and called for joint development programs for future technologies. Wang is also said to have met representatives of the French cosmetics industry, including Hermès and L’Oréal.
The Chinese minister’s visit precedes President Xi’s visit, who is expected to arrive in Paris in May for the 60th anniversary of Sino-French diplomatic relations. So far, the dates of the trip have varied. Reuters reports that Wang will travel on to an economic forum in Verona this week in the presence of Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani. ari
The German government’s China strategy emphasizes the need to expand China expertise in Germany. Remarks made by Research Minister Bettina Stark-Watzinger, who suspects that the Communist Party is behind every researcher, show that there is plenty of room for improvement in the government’s own China expertise. Such statements are tendentious and risk suggesting a generalized suspicion towards Chinese scientists.
Pointing out the risk of Chinese influence and espionage is one thing, but implying a generalized suspicion is highly problematic and not very constructive. Such statements merely fuel debates but do not lead to a solution. There may be high-risk areas with a significantly heightened risk of espionage, but this is by no means the case in all areas, meaning that a blanket exclusion of Chinese researchers seems neither sensible nor expedient.
Scientific cooperation with China was not only the subject of heated debate. A series of detailed recommendations followed, which generally highlight some crucial points, but whose actual feasibility remains unclear. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) recently published a set of recommendations that contain little substance because they are very abstract and vague.
It seems particularly problematic that the application of such recommendations requires in-depth China knowledge. Expertise that is often not and cannot be available. Why should a university administration have proven China expertise? Why should an engineer or biologist also be a China expert?
As a regional scientist, I work with different background knowledge. However, I must openly admit that even before my research on academic freedom in China, I only had a rudimentary understanding of the Chinese higher education system. We only managed to gain in-depth information on the legal and practical framework conditions of higher education in China during our research project. Without such background knowledge, the various recommendations do not offer any actual help.
Due to the sensitive nature of the research question, we decided against field research in China. So, I conducted interviews in Europe, Hong Kong, and Taiwan with academics who have personally worked in China and/or conducted research on China. The realization: Many assumptions about the Chinese science system are purely anecdotal or characterized by general assumptions that cannot be proven.
Such general assumptions and the resulting uncertainty often result in maximum passivity. The assumption that every party member is automatically a party cell is highly problematic and demonstrates ignorance. Mere party membership means very little and is not uncommon. The specific role that a person plays in the system is much more important. Such generalized assumptions were primarily made by academics who had traveled to China with very little knowledge. In other cases, the picture was more nuanced.
My research deals with core aspects of academic freedom in China, in other words, freedom of teaching and research and institutional autonomy. The aim is to close the knowledge gap about the Chinese academic system and provide guidance so that recommendations can be implemented in a targeted manner.
Due to its close interweaving with the party-state and the multitude of legal regulations, the Chinese scientific system is highly complex. For example, it is difficult to make general statements about party influence. Nevertheless, generalizations can be made based on knowledge of the organizational structure of Chinese universities and relevant regulations on freedom of teaching and research, meaning that certain framework conditions apply to all.
For example, the political demands on academics in China have become stricter in recent years, meaning that commitment to the party-state is demanded more openly and must be articulated in publications or third-party funding applications. By contrast, criticizing the Chinese government’s political agenda has become more difficult.
Considering this can minimize risks. A basic understanding of the organization of Chinese universities is important to better understand the role of the negotiating partners and avoid making general assumptions. Furthermore, examining the legal framework conditions can help weigh up the risks in individual cases. Firstly, a look at the research object itself can help determine whether it is a high-risk area that the party-state considers sensitive.
If it is a gray area, a moral consideration is necessary. For example, I personally would not seek to conduct a research project on human rights with scientists in China. In my opinion, critical research and joint publications would not be feasible in this case. I would not want to jeopardize my partners in China and support the party-state’s narrative and thus its legitimacy through my research.
I regard the elimination of moral concerns as mandatory, and such a reflection process can certainly be beneficial. In addition to discussions within the research team and with the Chinese partners, establishing a central contact unit that can act as an ad hoc ethics committee would make sense. To this end, universities should work more closely together.
This would help to pool information and establish a long-term standardized strategy, which would be entirely in line with the China strategy and could drive it forward. On the other hand, decentralizing such processes would be inefficient. Realistically, there is currently a lack of resources, not least in science. Politicians cannot expect research to shoulder risk minimization processes without additional capacities.
Alexandra Kaiser studied China regional studies and law in Cologne. She is currently working as a researcher at the Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg and the Academia Sinica in Taiwan.
Chinese companies have invested heavily in Africa. And they are now also focusing on soft power there. For instance, the Chinese streaming service Boomplay sponsored a music festival in the Kenyan capital Nairobi over the weekend. Local artists such as rapper Sylvia Saru were invited to “Boomfest.” Founded in 2015 by parent company Transsnet, Boomplay is now the largest music streaming service in Africa with more than 100 million users. Kenya is considered one of the continent’s pop-cultural centers. According to Boomplay, around 4.5 million people in the East African country use the app.
