For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. The unequivocal announcement by EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has prompted a firm response from Beijing. The announced investigations into China’s EV would negatively affect economic and trade relations between the People’s Republic and the EU. This was not surprising.
What is surprising, however, is what Felix Lee writes: The entire plan could backfire. A review could equally affect foreign manufacturers in the People’s Republic. Moreover, government subsidies are anything but the sole reason for the success of the Chinese EV industry.
Beijing has presented a new plan for unification with Taiwan. The document with the somewhat unwieldy title “Building a Demonstration Zone for Integrated Cross-Straits Development” states that unification should happen peacefully at best. Michael Radunski explains which levers the Chinese government intends to use to achieve this and which incentives it plans to offer.
However, he also notes that Beijing’s plan should be taken with a grain of salt: 68 Chinese aircraft and ten ships have been spotted in the waters around Taiwan between Wednesday and Thursday morning alone.
The reactions from Beijing followed quickly. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce warned that the EU Commission’s investigation of the Chinese EV market would have negative consequences for the economy and impact trade relations between China and the EU as a whole. It said it was “highly concerned” and “strongly dissatisfied” with the European Union’s plans. “The Chinese side believes that the EU’s proposed investigative measures are to protect its own industry in the name of ‘fair competition.’” It went on to say that this “naked protectionist behavior” would hit the global automotive supply chain hard.
Frank words in response to an equally frank announcement from the other side: In her State of the Union address on Wednesday, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a competition investigation into market distortions caused by Chinese EV subsidies. The world markets are currently “flooded with cheaper Chinese electric cars,” von der Leyen raged in her speech. “This is distorting our market.”
Yet the answer to the question of to what extent the leadership in Beijing is creating unfair competition with excessive subsidies for the domestic EV industry and how appropriate anti-dumping duties would be is anything but clear.
However, Germany and the EU have also invested much money into setting up domestic battery cell production for electric cars. In 2019, the EU Commission itself approved aid of 3.2 billion euros for the production of EV batteries in Europe. From the German side, five companies are involved in this Europe-wide alliance, including BASF, BMW and battery manufacturer Varta.
The support from the Chinese government has indeed helped companies such as CATL or BYD to become industry heavyweights; BYD displaced Volkswagen as the best-selling brand in China for the first time this year. But this success cannot be explained by subsidies alone.
One fundamental reason for their success: The competition from the Far East is made up of tech companies, or in BYD’s case, battery manufacturers. They understand that building EVs is much cheaper than manufacturing vehicles with internal combustion engines. The effort is lower, and much less workforce is required. This means they don’t have a huge apparatus in tow like the traditional carmakers, who still haven’t abandoned building diesel and gasoline engines.
The German carmakers’ biggest competitors from the People’s Republic are by no means traditional Chinese carmakers; they are struggling with similar problems as VW or Mercedes. Instead, the Chinese EV competitors are modern software or battery companies that can adapt quickly to new market trends and bring new models to market much more cheaply than VW or BMW.
According to Reuters, the EU Commission plans to focus its investigations not only on raw material and battery prices, but also on preferential loans and the alleged provision of land at excessively low prices. According to estimates by consulting firm AlixPartners, China disbursed state subsidies amounting to 57 billion dollars for electric and hybrid vehicles between 2016 and 2022.
The best-known example is the government support to stimulate the purchase of EVs, which is paid to the manufacturers. This started in 2009 and was actually scaled back gradually until the end of last year. After demand for EVs subsequently collapsed, the Chinese government announced a new tax package worth the equivalent of 72 billion dollars in June, which is intended to run for four years.
But it’s not just that government incentives for EV purchases have also been granted in Europe: The investigation would also affect foreign car manufacturers in China. For example, the US-based EV company Tesla operates its largest production facility in Shanghai. The US company assembled over 700,000 vehicles in the People’s Republic in 2022. That corresponds to half of its total production. According to the US think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, 40 percent of EV exports between January and April this year came from Tesla.
However, the EU Commission’s investigations would also affect BMW, Renault and the former Swedish brand Volvo, which the Chinese Geely Group acquired. These companies also produce in China and export vehicles to Europe. However, the EU Commission certainly does not have its sights on them, but rather on the Chinese newcomers such as MG Motors, BYD, NIO and Xpeng, all of which have begun to expand into Europe. Ten days ago, the International Motor Show (IAA) in Munich provided a first glimpse. The former showcase of the German carmakers has turned into a showroom for Chinese EV manufacturers.
China’s trade minister called for “dialogue and consultation” and urged the EU to “create a fair, non-discriminatory and predictable market environment for the joint development of the China-EU electric vehicle industry.” This will likely prove difficult, given the interdependencies on both sides.
According to the Chinese Communist Party, it is its unwavering historical task, the common aspiration of all the sons and daughters of China, and the inevitable necessity. In other words, the solution to the Taiwan question. Beijing sees only one way to achieve this: Taiwan must be united with the mainland. Preferably peacefully.
On Thursday, China’s State Council unveiled its plan for how exactly this will be done. The document, called “Building a Demonstration Zone for Integrated Cross-Straits Development” (建设两岸融合发展示范区), was already approved on Tuesday, but only officially unveiled on Thursday.
Right at the beginning, the document outlines the plan as an “overall strategy of the Party to solve the Taiwan question in the new era.” Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the concept of “两岸一家亲” (Both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family) is to be put into practice.
The document sounds like a peaceful invitation to Taiwan to participate in China’s economic and political rise. There is repeated talk of progress, innovation, exchange, respect and cooperation. But Beijing itself raises doubts about the credibility of the “peace plan”: According to Taiwanese authorities, a Chinese aircraft carrier and about two dozen Chinese warships were spotted in waters around Taiwan this week.
The directive, jointly issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, promises to make the province of Fujian a “demonstration zone” for integrated development with Taiwan and the “first home” for Taiwanese residents and businesses settling in China.
Beijing’s reason to focus on Fujian is apparent. With its 40 million citizens, the Chinese province is located directly across from Taiwan’s coast. Both geographically and culturally, Fujian is the closest to Taiwan. Many Taiwanese are descendants of Fujianese immigrants, who continue to significantly influence Taiwanese life today.
Accordingly, Beijing deliberately courts the people of Taiwan in the first six items. Taiwanese workers and their families are encouraged to settle in Fujian. Social welfare programs will be improved to facilitate living and working in the province for Taiwanese. They will be allowed to buy real estate and are equally entitled to enroll their children in public schools.
Moreover, Taiwanese companies are promised an improved environment for doing business in Fujian and deepened industrial and capital cooperation. Taiwan’s companies will be encouraged to list on Chinese stock exchanges.
The islands of Kinmen and Matsu play a special role in Beijing’s plans. They belong to Taiwan, but the islands are much closer to Fujian than Taiwan. For example, the distance between Kinmen and the Chinese mainland is only two kilometers. Accordingly, the islands already had the strongest connections to the mainland in the past. Therefore, Beijing’s new peace plan announces to accelerate their integration further.
Several infrastructure projects will be considered between Kinmen and Xiamen, including connecting the two cities via a bridge. In addition, the electricity and gas supply from Xiamen to Kinmen will be made possible. Similar integration measures are also planned for the cities of Fuzhou and Matsu.
With its plans for possible energy supplies, of all things, Beijing touches on a particularly sensitive point. Taiwan is hugely dependent on foreign imports. In the event of a Chinese blockade, Taiwan would face considerable energy problems. Accordingly, energy supply is considered a neuralgic point of Taiwan’s national security.
And indeed, Kinmen has its own plans to improve ties with mainland China. Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), the former mayor of Taipei and a candidate in the upcoming presidential election, recently proposed building a bridge to Xiamen. This would improve economic relations between the island and China. But Ko’s plans go further: The bridge could be the beginning of a far-reaching détente between China and Taiwan. Ko wishes to transform Kinmen into a demilitarized zone and thus into an “island of peace.”
Although some opposition members support the proposal, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) strongly rejects it. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council called the proposal “a Trojan horse with enormous risks to national security.”
Beijing’s plans for a complete integration of Taiwan are also met with firm rejection in Taipei. It calls it a “one-sided” plan. Equal treatment and economic incentives only serve as a pretext to “accept the leadership of the Communist Party,” according to Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council.
“China should think about how it can take care of its bad debts, but not how it can conduct united front work against Taiwan,” said Wang Ting-yu, a deputy of the ruling Democracy Party, in a video message.
And it seems Beijing’s supposed peace plan should indeed be taken with a grain of salt. After all, China’s extended hand can quickly turn into a fist. A glance at the waters around Taiwan is enough to realize this. Between Wednesday and Thursday morning alone, 68 Chinese aircraft and ten ships have been sighted, as the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense announced on Thursday.
The Chinese Communist Party and its General Secretary Xi Jinping never tire of emphasizing that they are striving for a peaceful unification of the People’s Republic with Taiwan. But there is also no doubt about the alternative. At the last CP Party Congress in October, Xi said: “Reunification of the motherland must be achieved and will be achieved. But will never commit to abandoning the use of force.”
More than sixty years after he passed away, the legendary Mei Lanfang (1894 – 1961) is still a cultural icon and a top symbol for Peking Opera. The life of the bisexual actor, who also played female roles on stage, was as interesting as it was complicated. His life story reflected the zeitgeist of different periods in which he lived and some difficult decisions people in those times had to make.
When Mei started his career in Peking Opera, all women were played by men. Men and women acting together were considered indecent, even though performance artists, Peking Opera players included, had a social status already almost as low as prostitutes.
In fact, many young male Peking Opera actors playing female roles were indeed involved in prostitution. In a way similar to that of Geisha, they entertained guests (all males, of course) in their well-decorated homes. These boys earned much more from this than from performing in theater. Sexual service was not necessary, but could be part of it.
Unlike in Christian cultures, sexual intercourse between men was never considered a sin in Chinese history. As long as a man met his family obligation and married a woman, or multiple – having concubines was once allowed – he was free to have “fun.” There were exceptions, however, such as during the strict communist rule between the 1960s and the early 1980s, when same-sex intercourse could be punishable by death. By contrast, during the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties, sex with young boys even became something fashionable among social elites.
Mei made his stage debut at the age of ten in Beijing. In addition to performance, he also did what his peers did before getting married for the first time at the age of 16. When Mei achieved diva or “divo” status in the 1920s, an era roughly comparable to Berlin in the 1920s was dawning in some major Chinese cities such as Shanghai and Beijing. China was still weak, and the majority of its city’s residents still lived in dire poverty. But a new republic was being built on the ruins of the imperial past, and Western things – from factories to futures exchanges, from films to nightclubs, from communist thoughts and feminist ideas – rushed in. Traditional and modern things competed with each other. Money flows, decadence, mafia and uprisings co-existed. Radical intellectuals, who longed for China’s rapid modernization, condemned “medieval” things like Peking Opera as cultural trash. But this did not diminish its popularity. On the contrary, thanks to some thoughtful foreign tours by Mei and his troupe, it even earned acclaim from artists and audiences in the Western world.
Mei’s shining career was interrupted by the Japanese invasion of China in 1937. He withdrew from the stage and politely, tactfully refused invitations from both the Japanese occupiers and the puppet government to give shows. This won him accolades afterward because this was not something that all the Peking Opera stars had done during the difficult times.
In 1927, Mei married for the third time under the arrangement of his boyfriend Feng. Feng, a banker, was Mei’s lifelong supporter and not-so-openly boyfriend. His third spouse, Meng Xiaodong (孟小冬1908 – 1977), was a beloved Peking Opera singer who played male roles and was famous for her rich, low voice and sharply cool looks. However, feeling not being fairly treated, Meng openly divorced Mei in 1933.
Meng happened to be bisexual, too. Under recommendation from her girlfriend Yao Yulan, the third concubine of the Shanghai mafia boss Du Yuesheng (杜月笙, 1888 – 1951), Meng became Du’s fourth concubine. Meng went to Hong Kong with Du in 1949 when the Communists won the civil war on the mainland.
Mei stayed and rose to become an important figure in artist circles. Initially, he tried to stay away from politics and the Communist Party, but later realized that this was not possible if he wanted to keep his social status. In 1959, he joined the Communist Party with the then-Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (1898 – 1976), being his official endorser. Mei passed away in 1961, believed to be lucky to leave the world five years before the Cultural Revolution broke out. When he died, the dark clouds were already gathering. They would eventually develop into violent storms, which saw Peking Opera mutilated, all traditional pieces banned, and almost all Peking Opera stars persecuted, tortured, or even pressured to commit suicide.
Meanwhile, Mei’s old sweetheart, Meng Xiaodong, stayed in Hong Kong. She refused several invitations from Premier Zhou to move back to China. She actually moved a bit further to Taiwan. In 1964, and died there from illness more than a decade later.
Chilies first reached China in the 16th century. Sailors brought them from Southeast Asia. The Portuguese and Dutch had brought them there. The Chinese sailors imported the red pods allegedly not only for their taste, but also for their beauty. In Gaotai (Gansu), farmers have been growing these nightshade plants for 300 years. Here they turn chilies that shrivel away drying in the sun.
For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. The unequivocal announcement by EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has prompted a firm response from Beijing. The announced investigations into China’s EV would negatively affect economic and trade relations between the People’s Republic and the EU. This was not surprising.
What is surprising, however, is what Felix Lee writes: The entire plan could backfire. A review could equally affect foreign manufacturers in the People’s Republic. Moreover, government subsidies are anything but the sole reason for the success of the Chinese EV industry.
Beijing has presented a new plan for unification with Taiwan. The document with the somewhat unwieldy title “Building a Demonstration Zone for Integrated Cross-Straits Development” states that unification should happen peacefully at best. Michael Radunski explains which levers the Chinese government intends to use to achieve this and which incentives it plans to offer.
However, he also notes that Beijing’s plan should be taken with a grain of salt: 68 Chinese aircraft and ten ships have been spotted in the waters around Taiwan between Wednesday and Thursday morning alone.
The reactions from Beijing followed quickly. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce warned that the EU Commission’s investigation of the Chinese EV market would have negative consequences for the economy and impact trade relations between China and the EU as a whole. It said it was “highly concerned” and “strongly dissatisfied” with the European Union’s plans. “The Chinese side believes that the EU’s proposed investigative measures are to protect its own industry in the name of ‘fair competition.’” It went on to say that this “naked protectionist behavior” would hit the global automotive supply chain hard.
Frank words in response to an equally frank announcement from the other side: In her State of the Union address on Wednesday, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a competition investigation into market distortions caused by Chinese EV subsidies. The world markets are currently “flooded with cheaper Chinese electric cars,” von der Leyen raged in her speech. “This is distorting our market.”
Yet the answer to the question of to what extent the leadership in Beijing is creating unfair competition with excessive subsidies for the domestic EV industry and how appropriate anti-dumping duties would be is anything but clear.
However, Germany and the EU have also invested much money into setting up domestic battery cell production for electric cars. In 2019, the EU Commission itself approved aid of 3.2 billion euros for the production of EV batteries in Europe. From the German side, five companies are involved in this Europe-wide alliance, including BASF, BMW and battery manufacturer Varta.
The support from the Chinese government has indeed helped companies such as CATL or BYD to become industry heavyweights; BYD displaced Volkswagen as the best-selling brand in China for the first time this year. But this success cannot be explained by subsidies alone.
One fundamental reason for their success: The competition from the Far East is made up of tech companies, or in BYD’s case, battery manufacturers. They understand that building EVs is much cheaper than manufacturing vehicles with internal combustion engines. The effort is lower, and much less workforce is required. This means they don’t have a huge apparatus in tow like the traditional carmakers, who still haven’t abandoned building diesel and gasoline engines.
The German carmakers’ biggest competitors from the People’s Republic are by no means traditional Chinese carmakers; they are struggling with similar problems as VW or Mercedes. Instead, the Chinese EV competitors are modern software or battery companies that can adapt quickly to new market trends and bring new models to market much more cheaply than VW or BMW.
According to Reuters, the EU Commission plans to focus its investigations not only on raw material and battery prices, but also on preferential loans and the alleged provision of land at excessively low prices. According to estimates by consulting firm AlixPartners, China disbursed state subsidies amounting to 57 billion dollars for electric and hybrid vehicles between 2016 and 2022.
The best-known example is the government support to stimulate the purchase of EVs, which is paid to the manufacturers. This started in 2009 and was actually scaled back gradually until the end of last year. After demand for EVs subsequently collapsed, the Chinese government announced a new tax package worth the equivalent of 72 billion dollars in June, which is intended to run for four years.
But it’s not just that government incentives for EV purchases have also been granted in Europe: The investigation would also affect foreign car manufacturers in China. For example, the US-based EV company Tesla operates its largest production facility in Shanghai. The US company assembled over 700,000 vehicles in the People’s Republic in 2022. That corresponds to half of its total production. According to the US think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, 40 percent of EV exports between January and April this year came from Tesla.
However, the EU Commission’s investigations would also affect BMW, Renault and the former Swedish brand Volvo, which the Chinese Geely Group acquired. These companies also produce in China and export vehicles to Europe. However, the EU Commission certainly does not have its sights on them, but rather on the Chinese newcomers such as MG Motors, BYD, NIO and Xpeng, all of which have begun to expand into Europe. Ten days ago, the International Motor Show (IAA) in Munich provided a first glimpse. The former showcase of the German carmakers has turned into a showroom for Chinese EV manufacturers.
China’s trade minister called for “dialogue and consultation” and urged the EU to “create a fair, non-discriminatory and predictable market environment for the joint development of the China-EU electric vehicle industry.” This will likely prove difficult, given the interdependencies on both sides.
According to the Chinese Communist Party, it is its unwavering historical task, the common aspiration of all the sons and daughters of China, and the inevitable necessity. In other words, the solution to the Taiwan question. Beijing sees only one way to achieve this: Taiwan must be united with the mainland. Preferably peacefully.
On Thursday, China’s State Council unveiled its plan for how exactly this will be done. The document, called “Building a Demonstration Zone for Integrated Cross-Straits Development” (建设两岸融合发展示范区), was already approved on Tuesday, but only officially unveiled on Thursday.
Right at the beginning, the document outlines the plan as an “overall strategy of the Party to solve the Taiwan question in the new era.” Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the concept of “两岸一家亲” (Both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family) is to be put into practice.
The document sounds like a peaceful invitation to Taiwan to participate in China’s economic and political rise. There is repeated talk of progress, innovation, exchange, respect and cooperation. But Beijing itself raises doubts about the credibility of the “peace plan”: According to Taiwanese authorities, a Chinese aircraft carrier and about two dozen Chinese warships were spotted in waters around Taiwan this week.
The directive, jointly issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, promises to make the province of Fujian a “demonstration zone” for integrated development with Taiwan and the “first home” for Taiwanese residents and businesses settling in China.
Beijing’s reason to focus on Fujian is apparent. With its 40 million citizens, the Chinese province is located directly across from Taiwan’s coast. Both geographically and culturally, Fujian is the closest to Taiwan. Many Taiwanese are descendants of Fujianese immigrants, who continue to significantly influence Taiwanese life today.
Accordingly, Beijing deliberately courts the people of Taiwan in the first six items. Taiwanese workers and their families are encouraged to settle in Fujian. Social welfare programs will be improved to facilitate living and working in the province for Taiwanese. They will be allowed to buy real estate and are equally entitled to enroll their children in public schools.
Moreover, Taiwanese companies are promised an improved environment for doing business in Fujian and deepened industrial and capital cooperation. Taiwan’s companies will be encouraged to list on Chinese stock exchanges.
The islands of Kinmen and Matsu play a special role in Beijing’s plans. They belong to Taiwan, but the islands are much closer to Fujian than Taiwan. For example, the distance between Kinmen and the Chinese mainland is only two kilometers. Accordingly, the islands already had the strongest connections to the mainland in the past. Therefore, Beijing’s new peace plan announces to accelerate their integration further.
Several infrastructure projects will be considered between Kinmen and Xiamen, including connecting the two cities via a bridge. In addition, the electricity and gas supply from Xiamen to Kinmen will be made possible. Similar integration measures are also planned for the cities of Fuzhou and Matsu.
With its plans for possible energy supplies, of all things, Beijing touches on a particularly sensitive point. Taiwan is hugely dependent on foreign imports. In the event of a Chinese blockade, Taiwan would face considerable energy problems. Accordingly, energy supply is considered a neuralgic point of Taiwan’s national security.
And indeed, Kinmen has its own plans to improve ties with mainland China. Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), the former mayor of Taipei and a candidate in the upcoming presidential election, recently proposed building a bridge to Xiamen. This would improve economic relations between the island and China. But Ko’s plans go further: The bridge could be the beginning of a far-reaching détente between China and Taiwan. Ko wishes to transform Kinmen into a demilitarized zone and thus into an “island of peace.”
Although some opposition members support the proposal, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) strongly rejects it. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council called the proposal “a Trojan horse with enormous risks to national security.”
Beijing’s plans for a complete integration of Taiwan are also met with firm rejection in Taipei. It calls it a “one-sided” plan. Equal treatment and economic incentives only serve as a pretext to “accept the leadership of the Communist Party,” according to Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council.
“China should think about how it can take care of its bad debts, but not how it can conduct united front work against Taiwan,” said Wang Ting-yu, a deputy of the ruling Democracy Party, in a video message.
And it seems Beijing’s supposed peace plan should indeed be taken with a grain of salt. After all, China’s extended hand can quickly turn into a fist. A glance at the waters around Taiwan is enough to realize this. Between Wednesday and Thursday morning alone, 68 Chinese aircraft and ten ships have been sighted, as the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense announced on Thursday.
The Chinese Communist Party and its General Secretary Xi Jinping never tire of emphasizing that they are striving for a peaceful unification of the People’s Republic with Taiwan. But there is also no doubt about the alternative. At the last CP Party Congress in October, Xi said: “Reunification of the motherland must be achieved and will be achieved. But will never commit to abandoning the use of force.”
More than sixty years after he passed away, the legendary Mei Lanfang (1894 – 1961) is still a cultural icon and a top symbol for Peking Opera. The life of the bisexual actor, who also played female roles on stage, was as interesting as it was complicated. His life story reflected the zeitgeist of different periods in which he lived and some difficult decisions people in those times had to make.
When Mei started his career in Peking Opera, all women were played by men. Men and women acting together were considered indecent, even though performance artists, Peking Opera players included, had a social status already almost as low as prostitutes.
In fact, many young male Peking Opera actors playing female roles were indeed involved in prostitution. In a way similar to that of Geisha, they entertained guests (all males, of course) in their well-decorated homes. These boys earned much more from this than from performing in theater. Sexual service was not necessary, but could be part of it.
Unlike in Christian cultures, sexual intercourse between men was never considered a sin in Chinese history. As long as a man met his family obligation and married a woman, or multiple – having concubines was once allowed – he was free to have “fun.” There were exceptions, however, such as during the strict communist rule between the 1960s and the early 1980s, when same-sex intercourse could be punishable by death. By contrast, during the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties, sex with young boys even became something fashionable among social elites.
Mei made his stage debut at the age of ten in Beijing. In addition to performance, he also did what his peers did before getting married for the first time at the age of 16. When Mei achieved diva or “divo” status in the 1920s, an era roughly comparable to Berlin in the 1920s was dawning in some major Chinese cities such as Shanghai and Beijing. China was still weak, and the majority of its city’s residents still lived in dire poverty. But a new republic was being built on the ruins of the imperial past, and Western things – from factories to futures exchanges, from films to nightclubs, from communist thoughts and feminist ideas – rushed in. Traditional and modern things competed with each other. Money flows, decadence, mafia and uprisings co-existed. Radical intellectuals, who longed for China’s rapid modernization, condemned “medieval” things like Peking Opera as cultural trash. But this did not diminish its popularity. On the contrary, thanks to some thoughtful foreign tours by Mei and his troupe, it even earned acclaim from artists and audiences in the Western world.
Mei’s shining career was interrupted by the Japanese invasion of China in 1937. He withdrew from the stage and politely, tactfully refused invitations from both the Japanese occupiers and the puppet government to give shows. This won him accolades afterward because this was not something that all the Peking Opera stars had done during the difficult times.
In 1927, Mei married for the third time under the arrangement of his boyfriend Feng. Feng, a banker, was Mei’s lifelong supporter and not-so-openly boyfriend. His third spouse, Meng Xiaodong (孟小冬1908 – 1977), was a beloved Peking Opera singer who played male roles and was famous for her rich, low voice and sharply cool looks. However, feeling not being fairly treated, Meng openly divorced Mei in 1933.
Meng happened to be bisexual, too. Under recommendation from her girlfriend Yao Yulan, the third concubine of the Shanghai mafia boss Du Yuesheng (杜月笙, 1888 – 1951), Meng became Du’s fourth concubine. Meng went to Hong Kong with Du in 1949 when the Communists won the civil war on the mainland.
Mei stayed and rose to become an important figure in artist circles. Initially, he tried to stay away from politics and the Communist Party, but later realized that this was not possible if he wanted to keep his social status. In 1959, he joined the Communist Party with the then-Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (1898 – 1976), being his official endorser. Mei passed away in 1961, believed to be lucky to leave the world five years before the Cultural Revolution broke out. When he died, the dark clouds were already gathering. They would eventually develop into violent storms, which saw Peking Opera mutilated, all traditional pieces banned, and almost all Peking Opera stars persecuted, tortured, or even pressured to commit suicide.
Meanwhile, Mei’s old sweetheart, Meng Xiaodong, stayed in Hong Kong. She refused several invitations from Premier Zhou to move back to China. She actually moved a bit further to Taiwan. In 1964, and died there from illness more than a decade later.
Chilies first reached China in the 16th century. Sailors brought them from Southeast Asia. The Portuguese and Dutch had brought them there. The Chinese sailors imported the red pods allegedly not only for their taste, but also for their beauty. In Gaotai (Gansu), farmers have been growing these nightshade plants for 300 years. Here they turn chilies that shrivel away drying in the sun.
