Mr Fooy, the Swedish Ministry of Justice created the Psychological Defense Agency (PDA) in 2022 to combat foreign false information. What was the reason for setting up this new agency?
In 2014, right before Russia’s annexation of Crimea, we noticed an increase in new forms of disinformation and propaganda. This made restarting a psychological defense capability more urgent. In 2019, the government announced the creation of a new agency for psychological defense. We can think of it as part of Sweden’s broader defense against hybrid threats.
The Swedish government pointed out that Russia, China, and Iran are countries known for disinformation campaigns targeting Sweden. What makes their approaches unique or particularly concerning?
I would say that broadly speaking, Russia has the most experience in reinforcing polarization and segmentation within society. China, of course, has the most significant resources to target vulnerabilities. And Iran is somewhat of a late bloomer. We recently had a very serious campaign against our Child protective services. Various groups in the Middle East, which are not directly state-affiliated, claim that the Swedish protective services were abducting Muslim children and trying to turn them into Christians or turn them over to be raised by homosexual parents. We and others handled this very well, but it could have led to dire consequences.
What does your authority’s work look like when confronted with such “foreign malign information influence” attacks, as you call them?
First of all: We are not an intelligence agency. We work entirely with open sources and provide reports on an operational basis to our government. Much of our work is aimed at building confidence within the Swedish population. A lot of our efforts focus on building public trust, educating people, and collaborating with social services, religious organizations, and other key institutions. However, we don’t aim to counter every piece of disinformation from Moscow, Beijing, or Tehran. That would be a superhuman effort and sometimes even counterproductive.
What challenges do you face especially when it comes to China?
We have to keep in mind that in authoritarian regimes, most information influence activities target the local population at home. That being said, however, China has vast manpower to become active on a global scale. The Chinese state media has an incredible reach. They are published in dozens of languages and are often incredibly professionally produced. I’ve seen cases where reputable outlets like the BBC unknowingly cite Chinese state media sources. Their influence is growing, especially in the Global South. For example, a Chinese publisher bought publishing rights to most of the in-flight magazines in Africa.
How does that affect Western democracies like Sweden?
As mentioned, China’s influence activities increasingly target topics beyond its borders. After the Israel-Hamas war broke out, we noticed anti-Semitic narratives in Chinese state media, for example. It’s peculiar, as anti-Semitism isn’t a common sentiment among Chinese citizens. However, these media reports can be read by Arabic speakers across the Middle East, North Africa, and also Europe, mainly without the readers realizing the source is Chinese. The same thing happens with Russian sources, and many people consuming this content might not question its origin. We want to change that.
Sometimes, it feels like China and Russia are coordinating their disinformation campaigns.
No, I wouldn’t say they coordinate. They do have agreements, like journalist exchange programs, and they amplify each other’s messaging at times. For example, narratives in Russian media may appear in Chinese outlets and vice versa. But calling it “coordination” would be an overstatement. Both are united by the perception of shared external enemies, but their operations are not fully collaborative in the Western sense.
How do you balance protecting Sweden from disinformation while maintaining freedom of speech, especially when Swedish citizens might inadvertently spread false information?
Freedom of speech is critical, and we don’t engage in censorship or fact-checking. That’s for the media and fact-checking organizations to handle. However, we focus on media literacy, ensuring that the public can critically evaluate what they’re reading and understand the intent behind certain narratives. We work with educational institutions to include media literacy in school curricula and have trained over 20,000 individuals on how to identify and counter foreign disinformation.
The PDA also prepares Sweden for the possibility of war. How would the agency support the government during a national security crisis?
While I can’t discuss wartime planning in detail, I can confirm that our mandate includes preparing for all scenarios, from crises to full-scale war. We’re part of Sweden’s total defense strategy.
I’m sure there’s much to learn from the situation in Ukraine and the Russian disinformation there.
Yes, absolutely. The situation in Ukraine is of paramount importance here, as well, because it is of great concern to our government and the Swedish population. And when it comes to figuring out how Chinese information flows works, we also look at Taiwan. But every democracy has a piece of the puzzle to help us understand how these state actors operate.
What challenges do you foresee in the future, for example, due to the advent of new technologies?
AI and deepfakes will be significant challenges, especially in terms of how much information can be flooded into the system. But we do have some advantages – Chinese disinformation, for example, is often constrained by the CCP’s rigid doctrines. Russia, on the other hand, was more imaginative during Crimea’s annexation than in its current full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The quality of disinformation varies depending on the topic and who’s behind it.
So, does that mean the quality differs significantly, even if it comes from the same state actor?
Most state actors do not have one agency dealing with information influence activities. There might be certain think tanks and security services that are part of the armed forces. There’s also a market for disinformation campaigns in China where regular nonaffiliated nationalists all of a sudden get very upset about some trope or narrative in the media space, and they do not necessarily follow the will of the country. So my greatest concern here is that somebody or a number of people in one of the authoritarian states starts being really imaginative and gets lots of resources from their governments. Such an entity could create activities that target vulnerabilities in our society that we aren’t even aware of yet.
Frederick Fooy has been working against information influence activities from various antagonistic actors for more than a decade. He has previous experience from the Swedish Armed Forces dating back to 1989, including deployments to the Balkans. Frederick has a B.A. in Byzantinology from New York University and an M.A. in Urban Policy from Brooklyn College.
There has been speculation for some time that North Korea might also send troops to Russia alongside large-scale ammunition shipments. Now, the South Korean intelligence agency has raised severe accusations: North Korea reportedly already shipped 1500 soldiers to Vladivostok, totaling around 12,000 men from four brigades – including the best special units of ruler Kim Jong-un.
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol convened a meeting on Friday to discuss the security situation with leading representatives from military, security and intelligence circles. A written statement from the presidential office states that North Korea’s cooperation is believed to go beyond the mere supply of weapons and include the deployment of soldiers. This would pose a “serious security threat not only to our country but also to the international community,” it said. “We strongly denounce North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia, which endangers world peace, and call on North Korea to immediately withdraw its troops from the Russia-Ukraine war,” said Choo Kyung-ho, parliamentary group leader of the ruling Gungminui-him (“People Power Party”), on Sunday.
What the South Korean National Intelligence Service NIS revealed on Friday is deeply concerning: North Korean troops are not only being given Russian uniforms, but they have also been provided with false Russian identities to disguise their true origins. They are said to be posing as Buryats, a Mongolian ethnic group in Siberia.
The NIS based its evidence on facial recognition software for identifying soldiers, which had been used jointly with the Ukrainian intelligence agency. The South Korean agency also backed up its accusations with satellite photos and has already published some of them: They show the Russian ships that are believed to have transported the troops from the North Korean port of Chongjin. However, this is not definitive, independently verifiable evidence.
In parallel, Spravda, a communications department of the Ukrainian government, has released a video allegedly showing North Korean soldiers in a training camp. Among other things, the footage shows them waiting in line to receive their uniforms.
After arriving in Russia, the North Korean recruits were reportedly asked to fill out a questionnaire in which they were supposed to state their clothing, headgear, and shoe sizes. The US television channel CNN managed to obtain the questionnaire. Parts are written in Russian, while the clothing sizes are in Korean.
Fact is: Ruler Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin have rapidly stepped up their military cooperation this year. As recently as June, the two signed an agreement that is de facto tantamount to an alliance. This is because the all-encompassing strategic cooperation also provides for mutual aid in the event of an attack by another country. Moreover, North Korea has supplied Russia with millions of artillery ammunition in recent months, as well as short-range missiles and presumably technical engineers.
In addition to the security guarantees from Moscow, Pyongyang hopes for more than just Russian foreign currency. Many observers believe that Russia might also send military technology to North Korea in return for the deployed soldiers. The worst possible scenario from the international community’s perspective would certainly be if Russia were to support the North Korean nuclear program.
Until now, most experts considered this unlikely. However, many scenarios have recently materialized that seemed almost impossible just a few months ago. And it is a fact that the more Russia relies on external support, the lower the reluctance to provide nuclear technology is likely to be. This makes the current dynamic between Pyongyang and Moscow correspondingly dangerous.
The deployment of North Korean soldiers already represents a red line for Seoul, which President Yoon has repeatedly declared. The current violation could lead South Korea to change its position and support Ukraine with direct arms deliveries from now on.
So far, South Korea has been somewhat reluctant to support Ukraine for tactical reasons: Although the country largely supports the sanctions policy, it does not send weapons to Kyiv – although it does send them to Poland and the Baltic States. South Korea is aware of the tightrope act that the war in Ukraine represents: Too much involvement could see Russia expand its cooperation with North Korea further, contrary to informal promises. However, it looks as if this disaster has already occurred.
Whether China approves of the quasi-military alliance between Russia and North Korea is questionable. Most experts had previously assumed that Xi Jinping viewed the close Pyongyang-Moscow axis with a critical eye, as it reduces Beijing’s influence over the Kim regime. China also claims to the outside world that it rejects any further escalation in the “Ukraine crisis” – and criticizes the USA in particular for its arms shipments to Kyiv.
So far, there has been no criticism from Beijing of North Korea’s direct interference in the war. Quite the opposite: As recently as Sunday, North Korean state media published a message from Xi Jinping in which he expressed his intention to advance relations between the two countries and promote “global peace.” The message reads: “China and the DPRK are linked by the same mountain and rivers, and the traditional friendship between the two countries is growing stronger with the passage of time.”
However, the letter published on Sunday cannot be interpreted as a direct reaction to the latest developments, as according to North Korean sources, it was written on Wednesday. But the fact is that China is anything but a neutral party in the Ukraine war. Xi stands firmly by the side of his “old friend” Putin. The People’s Republic is benefiting massively from the vacuum left behind by the exodus of Western companies from Russia – in the form of booming trade and inexpensive oil. Moreover, China is also supplying the Russians with so-called “dual-use goods,” i.e., products that can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Fabian Kretschmer
A new age of international relations is dawning. With the West accounting for a declining share of global GDP, and the world becoming increasingly multipolar, countries are jostling to establish their positions in the emerging order. This includes both the emerging economies – represented by the recently expanded BRICS grouping – that seek a leading role in writing the rules of the new order, and the smaller countries attempting to cultivate relationships that can safeguard their interests.
With the BRICS, what began as an asset class has become a symbol of the yearning for a more broadly representative global order, a hedge against Western-led institutions, and a means of navigating growing geopolitical uncertainty. All this has proved highly attractive. Earlier this year, the BRICS expanded from five countries (Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa) to nine (adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates). And almost three dozen more countries – including NATO member Turkey, close US partners Thailand and Mexico, and Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country – have applied to join.
While the diversity of the grouping’s members (and applicants) highlights the broad appeal of the BRICS+, it also creates challenges. These are countries with very different political systems, economies, and national goals. Some are even at odds with each other: China and India have been locked in a military standoff in the Himalayas for over four years, following China’s stealth encroachments on Indian territory.
Translating shared interests into a common plan of action, and becoming a unified force on the global stage, was difficult even when the BRICS had just five members. With nine – and possibly more – member countries, establishing a common identity and agenda will require sustained effort. But other multilateral groupings that are not formal, charter-based institutions with permanent secretariats – such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the G20, and even the G7 – also struggle with internal divisions.
Moreover, the BRICS have demonstrated considerable resilience. Western analysts have been predicting from the start that the grouping would unravel or drift into irrelevance. Yet this month’s BRICS+ summit in Kazan, Russia – the first since the expansion – may well bring movement toward further enlargement, as it underscores the West’s failure to isolate Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
This is not to underestimate the challenge of cohesion. The grouping’s founding members do not even agree about its fundamental objectives: whereas China and Russia want to spearhead a direct challenge to the United States-led world order, Brazil and India seek reforms of existing international institutions and appear uneasy about any anti-Western orientation.
In this disagreement, however, the enlargement might tip the scales. Six of the group’s nine members, including all four of the new additions, are formally part of the nonaligned movement, and two (Brazil and China) are observers. This suggests that there will be considerable internal pressure for the BRICS+ to chart a middle ground, focusing on democratizing the global order, rather than challenging the West.
That said, when it comes to fostering mutual trust with developing countries, the West has not been doing itself any favors lately. On the contrary, its weaponization of finance and seizure of the interest earned on frozen Russian central-bank assets have caused deepening disquiet in the non-Western world. As a result, a growing number of countries seem interested in exploring alternative arrangements, including new cross-border payment mechanisms, with some also reassessing their reliance on the US dollar in international transactions and reserve holdings.
All of this could aid the larger designs of Russia and China, two natural competitors that have become close strategic partners partly in response to US policy. China, in particular, stands to gain, such as from increased international use of the renminbi. Russia now generates much of its international export earnings in renminbi and stores them mostly in Chinese banks, thereby effectively giving China a share of the returns. China’s ultimate goal – which Western financial warfare is inadvertently aiding – is to establish an alternative renminbi-based financial system.
The BRICS are already engaged in institution-building, having established the New Development Bank – conceived by India and headquartered in Shanghai – in 2015. The NDB is not only the world’s first multilateral development bank created and led by emerging economies; it is also the only one whose founding members remain equal shareholders with equal voice, even as more countries join. By contrast, the US is the dominant shareholder and holds veto power in the World Bank.
The expanded BRICS+ boast formidable global clout. The grouping dwarfs the G7, both demographically (with nearly 46 percent of the world’s population, compared to the G7’s 8.8 percent) and economically (accounting for 35 percent of global GDP, compared to the G7’s 30 percent). Its economies are also likely to be the most important source of future global growth. Furthermore, with Iran and the UAE having joined their oil-producing counterparts Brazil and Russia as members, the BRICS+ now account for about 40 percent of crude-oil production and exports.
Yes, the group faces significant challenges, not least uniting to become a meaningful global force with defined (and realistic) political and economic objectives. But they also have the potential to serve as a catalyst for a long-overdue revamping of global governance so that it better reflects twenty-first-century realities.
Brahma Chellaney, Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011).
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024.
Anyone who has seen enough panda videos online knows that the bears are pretty clumsy. So it is probably not surprising that the life expectancy of a giant panda in the wild is only 20 years, while pandas in captivity live to be around 30 years old. Proper care is everything, and Ai Lian is also well looked after at Chongqing Zoo. For his 5th birthday, the keepers created a veritable feast for him. Happy birthday!
Mr Fooy, the Swedish Ministry of Justice created the Psychological Defense Agency (PDA) in 2022 to combat foreign false information. What was the reason for setting up this new agency?
In 2014, right before Russia’s annexation of Crimea, we noticed an increase in new forms of disinformation and propaganda. This made restarting a psychological defense capability more urgent. In 2019, the government announced the creation of a new agency for psychological defense. We can think of it as part of Sweden’s broader defense against hybrid threats.
The Swedish government pointed out that Russia, China, and Iran are countries known for disinformation campaigns targeting Sweden. What makes their approaches unique or particularly concerning?
I would say that broadly speaking, Russia has the most experience in reinforcing polarization and segmentation within society. China, of course, has the most significant resources to target vulnerabilities. And Iran is somewhat of a late bloomer. We recently had a very serious campaign against our Child protective services. Various groups in the Middle East, which are not directly state-affiliated, claim that the Swedish protective services were abducting Muslim children and trying to turn them into Christians or turn them over to be raised by homosexual parents. We and others handled this very well, but it could have led to dire consequences.
What does your authority’s work look like when confronted with such “foreign malign information influence” attacks, as you call them?
First of all: We are not an intelligence agency. We work entirely with open sources and provide reports on an operational basis to our government. Much of our work is aimed at building confidence within the Swedish population. A lot of our efforts focus on building public trust, educating people, and collaborating with social services, religious organizations, and other key institutions. However, we don’t aim to counter every piece of disinformation from Moscow, Beijing, or Tehran. That would be a superhuman effort and sometimes even counterproductive.
What challenges do you face especially when it comes to China?
We have to keep in mind that in authoritarian regimes, most information influence activities target the local population at home. That being said, however, China has vast manpower to become active on a global scale. The Chinese state media has an incredible reach. They are published in dozens of languages and are often incredibly professionally produced. I’ve seen cases where reputable outlets like the BBC unknowingly cite Chinese state media sources. Their influence is growing, especially in the Global South. For example, a Chinese publisher bought publishing rights to most of the in-flight magazines in Africa.
How does that affect Western democracies like Sweden?
As mentioned, China’s influence activities increasingly target topics beyond its borders. After the Israel-Hamas war broke out, we noticed anti-Semitic narratives in Chinese state media, for example. It’s peculiar, as anti-Semitism isn’t a common sentiment among Chinese citizens. However, these media reports can be read by Arabic speakers across the Middle East, North Africa, and also Europe, mainly without the readers realizing the source is Chinese. The same thing happens with Russian sources, and many people consuming this content might not question its origin. We want to change that.
Sometimes, it feels like China and Russia are coordinating their disinformation campaigns.
No, I wouldn’t say they coordinate. They do have agreements, like journalist exchange programs, and they amplify each other’s messaging at times. For example, narratives in Russian media may appear in Chinese outlets and vice versa. But calling it “coordination” would be an overstatement. Both are united by the perception of shared external enemies, but their operations are not fully collaborative in the Western sense.
How do you balance protecting Sweden from disinformation while maintaining freedom of speech, especially when Swedish citizens might inadvertently spread false information?
Freedom of speech is critical, and we don’t engage in censorship or fact-checking. That’s for the media and fact-checking organizations to handle. However, we focus on media literacy, ensuring that the public can critically evaluate what they’re reading and understand the intent behind certain narratives. We work with educational institutions to include media literacy in school curricula and have trained over 20,000 individuals on how to identify and counter foreign disinformation.
The PDA also prepares Sweden for the possibility of war. How would the agency support the government during a national security crisis?
While I can’t discuss wartime planning in detail, I can confirm that our mandate includes preparing for all scenarios, from crises to full-scale war. We’re part of Sweden’s total defense strategy.
I’m sure there’s much to learn from the situation in Ukraine and the Russian disinformation there.
Yes, absolutely. The situation in Ukraine is of paramount importance here, as well, because it is of great concern to our government and the Swedish population. And when it comes to figuring out how Chinese information flows works, we also look at Taiwan. But every democracy has a piece of the puzzle to help us understand how these state actors operate.
What challenges do you foresee in the future, for example, due to the advent of new technologies?
AI and deepfakes will be significant challenges, especially in terms of how much information can be flooded into the system. But we do have some advantages – Chinese disinformation, for example, is often constrained by the CCP’s rigid doctrines. Russia, on the other hand, was more imaginative during Crimea’s annexation than in its current full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The quality of disinformation varies depending on the topic and who’s behind it.
So, does that mean the quality differs significantly, even if it comes from the same state actor?
Most state actors do not have one agency dealing with information influence activities. There might be certain think tanks and security services that are part of the armed forces. There’s also a market for disinformation campaigns in China where regular nonaffiliated nationalists all of a sudden get very upset about some trope or narrative in the media space, and they do not necessarily follow the will of the country. So my greatest concern here is that somebody or a number of people in one of the authoritarian states starts being really imaginative and gets lots of resources from their governments. Such an entity could create activities that target vulnerabilities in our society that we aren’t even aware of yet.
Frederick Fooy has been working against information influence activities from various antagonistic actors for more than a decade. He has previous experience from the Swedish Armed Forces dating back to 1989, including deployments to the Balkans. Frederick has a B.A. in Byzantinology from New York University and an M.A. in Urban Policy from Brooklyn College.
There has been speculation for some time that North Korea might also send troops to Russia alongside large-scale ammunition shipments. Now, the South Korean intelligence agency has raised severe accusations: North Korea reportedly already shipped 1500 soldiers to Vladivostok, totaling around 12,000 men from four brigades – including the best special units of ruler Kim Jong-un.
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol convened a meeting on Friday to discuss the security situation with leading representatives from military, security and intelligence circles. A written statement from the presidential office states that North Korea’s cooperation is believed to go beyond the mere supply of weapons and include the deployment of soldiers. This would pose a “serious security threat not only to our country but also to the international community,” it said. “We strongly denounce North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia, which endangers world peace, and call on North Korea to immediately withdraw its troops from the Russia-Ukraine war,” said Choo Kyung-ho, parliamentary group leader of the ruling Gungminui-him (“People Power Party”), on Sunday.
What the South Korean National Intelligence Service NIS revealed on Friday is deeply concerning: North Korean troops are not only being given Russian uniforms, but they have also been provided with false Russian identities to disguise their true origins. They are said to be posing as Buryats, a Mongolian ethnic group in Siberia.
The NIS based its evidence on facial recognition software for identifying soldiers, which had been used jointly with the Ukrainian intelligence agency. The South Korean agency also backed up its accusations with satellite photos and has already published some of them: They show the Russian ships that are believed to have transported the troops from the North Korean port of Chongjin. However, this is not definitive, independently verifiable evidence.
In parallel, Spravda, a communications department of the Ukrainian government, has released a video allegedly showing North Korean soldiers in a training camp. Among other things, the footage shows them waiting in line to receive their uniforms.
After arriving in Russia, the North Korean recruits were reportedly asked to fill out a questionnaire in which they were supposed to state their clothing, headgear, and shoe sizes. The US television channel CNN managed to obtain the questionnaire. Parts are written in Russian, while the clothing sizes are in Korean.
Fact is: Ruler Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin have rapidly stepped up their military cooperation this year. As recently as June, the two signed an agreement that is de facto tantamount to an alliance. This is because the all-encompassing strategic cooperation also provides for mutual aid in the event of an attack by another country. Moreover, North Korea has supplied Russia with millions of artillery ammunition in recent months, as well as short-range missiles and presumably technical engineers.
In addition to the security guarantees from Moscow, Pyongyang hopes for more than just Russian foreign currency. Many observers believe that Russia might also send military technology to North Korea in return for the deployed soldiers. The worst possible scenario from the international community’s perspective would certainly be if Russia were to support the North Korean nuclear program.
Until now, most experts considered this unlikely. However, many scenarios have recently materialized that seemed almost impossible just a few months ago. And it is a fact that the more Russia relies on external support, the lower the reluctance to provide nuclear technology is likely to be. This makes the current dynamic between Pyongyang and Moscow correspondingly dangerous.
The deployment of North Korean soldiers already represents a red line for Seoul, which President Yoon has repeatedly declared. The current violation could lead South Korea to change its position and support Ukraine with direct arms deliveries from now on.
So far, South Korea has been somewhat reluctant to support Ukraine for tactical reasons: Although the country largely supports the sanctions policy, it does not send weapons to Kyiv – although it does send them to Poland and the Baltic States. South Korea is aware of the tightrope act that the war in Ukraine represents: Too much involvement could see Russia expand its cooperation with North Korea further, contrary to informal promises. However, it looks as if this disaster has already occurred.
Whether China approves of the quasi-military alliance between Russia and North Korea is questionable. Most experts had previously assumed that Xi Jinping viewed the close Pyongyang-Moscow axis with a critical eye, as it reduces Beijing’s influence over the Kim regime. China also claims to the outside world that it rejects any further escalation in the “Ukraine crisis” – and criticizes the USA in particular for its arms shipments to Kyiv.
So far, there has been no criticism from Beijing of North Korea’s direct interference in the war. Quite the opposite: As recently as Sunday, North Korean state media published a message from Xi Jinping in which he expressed his intention to advance relations between the two countries and promote “global peace.” The message reads: “China and the DPRK are linked by the same mountain and rivers, and the traditional friendship between the two countries is growing stronger with the passage of time.”
However, the letter published on Sunday cannot be interpreted as a direct reaction to the latest developments, as according to North Korean sources, it was written on Wednesday. But the fact is that China is anything but a neutral party in the Ukraine war. Xi stands firmly by the side of his “old friend” Putin. The People’s Republic is benefiting massively from the vacuum left behind by the exodus of Western companies from Russia – in the form of booming trade and inexpensive oil. Moreover, China is also supplying the Russians with so-called “dual-use goods,” i.e., products that can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Fabian Kretschmer
A new age of international relations is dawning. With the West accounting for a declining share of global GDP, and the world becoming increasingly multipolar, countries are jostling to establish their positions in the emerging order. This includes both the emerging economies – represented by the recently expanded BRICS grouping – that seek a leading role in writing the rules of the new order, and the smaller countries attempting to cultivate relationships that can safeguard their interests.
With the BRICS, what began as an asset class has become a symbol of the yearning for a more broadly representative global order, a hedge against Western-led institutions, and a means of navigating growing geopolitical uncertainty. All this has proved highly attractive. Earlier this year, the BRICS expanded from five countries (Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa) to nine (adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates). And almost three dozen more countries – including NATO member Turkey, close US partners Thailand and Mexico, and Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country – have applied to join.
While the diversity of the grouping’s members (and applicants) highlights the broad appeal of the BRICS+, it also creates challenges. These are countries with very different political systems, economies, and national goals. Some are even at odds with each other: China and India have been locked in a military standoff in the Himalayas for over four years, following China’s stealth encroachments on Indian territory.
Translating shared interests into a common plan of action, and becoming a unified force on the global stage, was difficult even when the BRICS had just five members. With nine – and possibly more – member countries, establishing a common identity and agenda will require sustained effort. But other multilateral groupings that are not formal, charter-based institutions with permanent secretariats – such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the G20, and even the G7 – also struggle with internal divisions.
Moreover, the BRICS have demonstrated considerable resilience. Western analysts have been predicting from the start that the grouping would unravel or drift into irrelevance. Yet this month’s BRICS+ summit in Kazan, Russia – the first since the expansion – may well bring movement toward further enlargement, as it underscores the West’s failure to isolate Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
This is not to underestimate the challenge of cohesion. The grouping’s founding members do not even agree about its fundamental objectives: whereas China and Russia want to spearhead a direct challenge to the United States-led world order, Brazil and India seek reforms of existing international institutions and appear uneasy about any anti-Western orientation.
In this disagreement, however, the enlargement might tip the scales. Six of the group’s nine members, including all four of the new additions, are formally part of the nonaligned movement, and two (Brazil and China) are observers. This suggests that there will be considerable internal pressure for the BRICS+ to chart a middle ground, focusing on democratizing the global order, rather than challenging the West.
That said, when it comes to fostering mutual trust with developing countries, the West has not been doing itself any favors lately. On the contrary, its weaponization of finance and seizure of the interest earned on frozen Russian central-bank assets have caused deepening disquiet in the non-Western world. As a result, a growing number of countries seem interested in exploring alternative arrangements, including new cross-border payment mechanisms, with some also reassessing their reliance on the US dollar in international transactions and reserve holdings.
All of this could aid the larger designs of Russia and China, two natural competitors that have become close strategic partners partly in response to US policy. China, in particular, stands to gain, such as from increased international use of the renminbi. Russia now generates much of its international export earnings in renminbi and stores them mostly in Chinese banks, thereby effectively giving China a share of the returns. China’s ultimate goal – which Western financial warfare is inadvertently aiding – is to establish an alternative renminbi-based financial system.
The BRICS are already engaged in institution-building, having established the New Development Bank – conceived by India and headquartered in Shanghai – in 2015. The NDB is not only the world’s first multilateral development bank created and led by emerging economies; it is also the only one whose founding members remain equal shareholders with equal voice, even as more countries join. By contrast, the US is the dominant shareholder and holds veto power in the World Bank.
The expanded BRICS+ boast formidable global clout. The grouping dwarfs the G7, both demographically (with nearly 46 percent of the world’s population, compared to the G7’s 8.8 percent) and economically (accounting for 35 percent of global GDP, compared to the G7’s 30 percent). Its economies are also likely to be the most important source of future global growth. Furthermore, with Iran and the UAE having joined their oil-producing counterparts Brazil and Russia as members, the BRICS+ now account for about 40 percent of crude-oil production and exports.
Yes, the group faces significant challenges, not least uniting to become a meaningful global force with defined (and realistic) political and economic objectives. But they also have the potential to serve as a catalyst for a long-overdue revamping of global governance so that it better reflects twenty-first-century realities.
Brahma Chellaney, Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, 2011).
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024.
Anyone who has seen enough panda videos online knows that the bears are pretty clumsy. So it is probably not surprising that the life expectancy of a giant panda in the wild is only 20 years, while pandas in captivity live to be around 30 years old. Proper care is everything, and Ai Lian is also well looked after at Chongqing Zoo. For his 5th birthday, the keepers created a veritable feast for him. Happy birthday!
