Taiwan is engaging in intense travel diplomacy. While incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen heads to America to meet with high-ranking US officials, former President Ma Ying-jeou travels to mainland China. A meeting with top cadres is also not ruled out there.
This sounds like a coordinated offensive at a time when Taiwan is under diplomatic pressure. But in reality, it shows the rivalry between the government and the opposition in the election campaign. The two trips are competing for the attention of the world’s public and voters. Tsai and Ma are diametrically opposed. They come from two parties with different positions on China. Ma stands for closer ties to the mainland, while Tsai represents deep-rooted distrust.
But in the end, the rival top politicians could actually help their country despite their different intentions, as Fabian Peltsch and Frank Sieren’s Features show. Ma helps to somewhat ease relations with the People’s Republic. Meanwhile, Tsai is strengthening security guarantees for Taiwan in the United States. Diplomacy plus assertiveness – that’s a good formula for maintaining the status quo.
Chinese companies are often affected by the geopolitical disputes in which their home country is involved. This is also the case with battery manufacturer CATL, which is building a large plant in Hungary. New factory constructions often face mistrust from the population, as the Tesla project in Brandenburg shows. In Hungary, there are now also reservations about the Chinese investor, as Amelie Richter writes.
In Debrecen, China’s battery giant Contemporary Amperex Technology (CATL) faces headwinds. In the city in Hungary’s east, citizens have demonstrated against a planned factory of the company. The protesters are concerned about the impact of the lithium-ion battery factory on the environment and water consumption in the region. The possible settlement of Chinese workers and the political weight of the Chinese battery manufacturer in the city are also bitterly opposed.
The project has been the subject of controversy ever since the billion-euro investment was announced. However, CATL recently tried to dispel local concerns and invited local media to a background discussion. To show that the planned factory in Debrecen would primarily mean jobs for local workers, CATL spokesperson Balázs Szilágyi referred to the careers page of the Arnstadt plant. The offers there are aimed at local people, the Hungarian online business newspaper Világgazdaság quotes the spokesperson as saying. “We cannot estimate the development of the Hungarian labor market in such a long term, but recruiting Chinese workers is not worth it,” Szilágyi clarified, according to the report.
CATL announced plans to build a 100-GWh battery plant in Hungary’s second-largest city last August. The group plans to invest more than €7 billion in the plant – the largest investment ever made in Hungary. The factory site will cover around 220 hectares, and a good 9,000 people are expected to find employment there. The first customer for the battery cells from Hungary has already been identified: German automaker Mercedes-Benz. The plant in Hungary is also expected to make it easier to supply other European customers such as BMW, Stellantis and Volkswagen.
The push by the government of right-wing populist Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in Budapest is actually in line with the priorities of the European Union, which wants to produce a quarter of the world’s batteries by 2030. The CATL project also fits Orbán’s eastward-looking policies: lucrative tax breaks and subsidies for infrastructure to attract Asian – primarily Chinese – companies. Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó said the CATL factory is the “biggest greenfield investment in Hungary’s history so far”.
According to CATL spokesperson Szilágyi, the construction of the plant is to be implemented in three phases. The Chinese group initially acquired 110 hectares of commercial land, on which the first two construction phases will be realized. As reported by the business portal portfolio.hu, the earthworks will be completed by the end of April. More complex permits are needed to start the building construction. According to group spokesperson Szilágyi, the machines can be installed in 2024, after which the plant will go into operation. Series production of the battery cells would then begin in 2025.
The objections of opponents of the investment in court are known to the specialized authorities, explained CATL spokesperson Szilágyi. However, these do not currently prevent the group from seeking building permits for further phases. Debrecen Mayor Papp László recently spoke out in favor of calming the debate. Fake news about poisoned water and other allegations had turned people against the project. László declined an interview request from Table.Media.
Environmental activists such as WWF and Greenpeace, as well as local residents, view the plans of the government in Budapest and Debrecen with great skepticism. This is because the production of rechargeable batteries is not only energy-intensive but also consumes a lot of water. “Our most basic need is clean water, clean air and healthy land, not batteries,” protest co-organizer Julia Perge told the AFP news agency. “People living here were not properly informed or asked if they wanted this,” Gabor Bogos complained at the demonstration, according to the report.
According to the Hajdú-Bihar county government authority, it had issued an environmental permit for the construction of the battery factory under stricter conditions than ever before. This entailed a number of obligations to protect the environment. In addition, for some parameters, compliance with stricter limits than those set by law and more frequent inspections had been stipulated. CATL spokesperson Szilágyi stressed that the plant’s water requirements would be around 10,000 cubic meters per day after final completion.
Since about 70 percent of the water is needed for cooling processes, pipelines are needed that can transport a fluctuating demand of a maximum of 18,000 cubic meters per day. However, treated graywater is sufficient for this, Szilágyi said. Wastewater from baths, showers or washing machines is also suitable. The plant’s energy needs will initially be around 80 megawatts, peaking at 300 megawatts. With solar panels on the roof, CATL plans to generate 18 megawatts itself, according to the spokesperson, as well as participate in green projects off-site.
In February, the environmental organization WWF came to a less positive assessment: The water use of the entire plant had not been examined, WWF Hungary claims. The construction of the factory had been approved in several phases, WWF expert Dalma Dedák said at an expert hearing of the responsible Sustainable Development Committee in the Budapest Parliament.
Dedák spoke of salami slicing tactics in providing information about the Debrecen plant. According to local media reports, the invited representatives of the Energy and Foreign Ministries did not even appear at the hearing.
On both sides of the Taiwan Strait, signs may point to cautious détente. Former President (2008-2016) Ma Ying-jeou of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party is traveling to the mainland this week, the first visit by a former Taiwanese president to the People’s Republic. Channels of conversation are opening here where there has been little exchange in recent years.
Recently, state and party leader Xi Jinping also struck more moderate tones with regard to Taiwan. At the conclusion of this year’s People’s Congress, the annual session of the not freely elected parliament, Xi put more emphasis on peaceful cooperation. At the very least, he refrained from stepping up his threats. Xi also tasked his chief strategist, Wang Huning, with developing a new, peaceful Taiwan strategy.
The new Premier Li Qiang, who has been in office for less than a month, also struck a conciliatory note. At his first press conference, China’s number two said that Beijing wanted to promote “economic and cultural exchanges” with Taiwan; after all, they are “one family”.
Ma’s visit has been accompanied by much controversy in Taiwan and internationally; however, the gesture is in line with the policy he pursued as an active president: Ma wanted to end the conflict with the People’s Republic through a peace treaty and allow more Chinese business activity in Taiwan. In the end, however, he lost the 2016 election to Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) by doing so. The DPP tends to reject rapprochement with the People’s Republic.
The presidential office nevertheless said Monday that it “respects” Mas’s travel plan. Tsai instructed authorities to support the trip where necessary. At the same time, she admonished Ma to safeguard Taiwan’s interests.
Tsai also opened the door for Ma to travel despite all reservations. Paragraph 26 of the Classified National Security Information Protection Act prohibits former presidents of Taiwan from traveling abroad for three years after their term ends. Tsai could therefore prohibit Ma to travel to Hong Kong in 2019. She then extended the travel ban again until 2021. But now she has refrained from using paragraph 12 of the law to extend it again.
Ma may not only travel with four of his sisters but also with 30 students who will meet with Chinese students. So the visit is not so entirely private after all. “It’s about bringing young vitality to the peaceful development of relations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait,” a presidential spokesperson said. Former President Ma may be traveling to the mainland for the first time but Xi and Ma already met face-to-face in Singapore in 2015. This time, however, no political talks are officially planned.
Meanwhile, Ma’s party, the KMT, is divided over the China visits. Party Vice-Chairman Andrew Hsia flew to the People’s Republic in February for a trip that was announced as “non-political”. Party leader Eric Chu, on the other hand, is said to have reacted with little enthusiasm to the former president’s travel plans.
For Beijing, Taiwan is not an independent country but a breakaway province. Most countries (181 out of 194 countries in the world) also adhere to the one-China principle and do not recognize Taiwan as an independent country. Recently, the Central American country of Honduras broke with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with Beijing.
In recent years, the tone under President Tsai has also become somewhat more confrontational, despite her restraint, even though she continues to make offers of talks. Beijing had responded no less aggressively and also attempted to demonstrate its determination to unify through large-scale military maneuvers. A reversal of the spiral of accusations, however, would be welcomed by many actors on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Ma’s trip is also important in that the KMT has a realistic chance of replacing the incumbent DPP in next year’s elections. Tsai’s DPP suffered a major setback in last year’s municipal elections. It had won only five of 22 municipalities and independent cities, while the KMT won even in the three largest industrial cities of Taipei, Taoyuan and Keelung. There is thus a shifting mood toward a party that tends to stand for a rapprochement with the People’s Republic.
However, this does not mean that the KMT wants unification – and that would not be in line with the will of the voters. Surveys on the subject of independence versus reunification are clear: Only five percent of Taiwanese want independence immediately. 25.4 percent want to maintain the status quo but move toward independence. The majority, however, of 57 percent, wants almost equal shares either to keep the status quo forever or to keep the status quo and “decide later,” i.e., no change for now.
However, between 2019 and 2022, the group of those who want to keep the status quo and move toward independence later has increased from 12 to 25 percent. At the same time, the group that wants to maintain the status quo and later move toward unification has halved from 12 to 6 percent.
Another survey from December 2022 shows that 70 percent of respondents would defend Taiwan if China were to attack the island militarily. Both surveys are possibly a reason for Beijing to tend to give in. In addition, Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine has made it very clear to Beijing cadres how high the international political costs of a military strike would be.
In the meeting with Hsia, the KMT party vice chairman, CP party strategists have already stressed that he is in favor of implementing Xi’s “policy of peaceful development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, promoting exchanges and cooperation”. So instead of just fearing the worst-case scenario, it may be time to address the question of how to bring Taiwan closer to Beijing in a way that Taipei can live with.
With her trip to North America, Taiwan’s President Tasi Ing-wen sends a clear message: Taiwan will not bow to pressure from China. She also wants to secure further security guarantees for the island’s freedom. Speaking in Taipei shortly before her departure for America, Tsai said she did not want to provoke anyone with her trip, but neither did she want to give in to anyone. “The trip is to show our determination to deepen exchanges and cooperation with diplomatic allies,” Tsai told a press conference in the waiting area of Taoyuan Airport.
The deepening of relations with the remaining partners is urgently needed after Honduras broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan last Sunday in favor of Beijing. The trip to the United States is politically sensitive for precisely this reason. Even if they are declared as unofficial “transit trips” from the outset for the sake of innocuousness, Beijing considers them a violation of the one-China principle.
In fact, such flying visits are not unusual for Taiwanese heads of government. Including Tsai, 29 Taiwanese heads of state have already visited the United States on such alleged “transit trips” since 1994. On average, such visits occur once a year and twice in some years. And depending on how tense US-China relations are at the moment, they offer Taiwanese presidents sometimes more and sometimes less leeway for meetings with high-ranking US politicians.
And therein lies the explosive power of Tsai’s visit: According to reports that have not yet been officially confirmed, she could meet Kevin McCarthy, the new speaker of the US House of Representatives, in Los Angeles. McCarthy had already declared after taking office that he wanted to travel to Taiwan, like his predecessor Nancy Pelosi. A meeting in the US is now seen as a compromise to provoke Beijing into non-military action around Taiwan’s waters. This had come after Nancy Pelosis’ visit to the island.
Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office nevertheless described a possible meeting with McCarthy in advance as “another provocation” that would “sabotage peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait”. Beijing reserved the right to take “countermeasures”, they said.
For Tsai, it is the seventh transit through the United States during her tenure as head of government. The last time she traveled to America was in 2019, before the start of the Covid pandemic. The fact that her visit now coincides with the China trip of Taiwan’s former president, Ma Ying-jeou, may not be a coincidence. Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), like Ma’s Kuomintang National People’s Party (KMT), is using the opportunity to publicly demonstrate its foreign policy positions ahead of the presidential elections on Jan. 13, 2024.
Ma’s trip to China is also declared as an unofficial visit by a private citizen. The politician has been considered corrupt and self-absorbed not only since the end of his term in 2016. Potential KMT presidential candidates such as New Taipei Mayor Hou Yu-ih do not want to be too closely associated with him.
Young KMT voters, in particular, view Ma critically. This also applies to his statement announced this week in China, “We are all Chinese.” There are also hardliners in the KMT who favor reunification, but there are also many moderates and even those who regard Taiwan as de facto independent. Although the KMT wants better relations with China, it also does not want to be taken over by Beijing. The party also continues to have an interest in good relations with the United States and Japan.
The EU sees itself as a normative power. In its common foreign and security policy, it wants to represent fundamental values. The EU also sees itself – and rightly so – as a global power. From its undeniably great economic importance, the EU derives – again quite rightly – the need to represent its interests globally, especially in the Indo-Pacific. The EU is thus becoming an increasingly important factor in the escalating conflict between the US and China. Be it with regard to the strategic readjustment of trade flows, the imposition of technology boycotts against Chinese companies or the treatment of Taiwan in the global system.
The European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen emphasizes its strategic autonomy. However, although formally a strategic partnership continues to exist with the People’s Republic of China, increasing rivalries in terms of political, social and economic orders are forcing a growing distancing from the East Asian power. Globally, Europe is once again standing more firmly at the side of its most important military ally, the USA.
In this field of tension, the European Union has now rediscovered a protagonist that for a long time was at best on the fringes of European attention: Taiwan, the colorful democracy in East Asia, victim of the One-China policy; at the same time, the technology country that houses 90 percent of the world’s production of the most advanced semiconductors. Without the chips produced by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. the most forward-looking projects in the global technology industry would collapse.
The EU faces a massive dilemma here: It must make its supply chains more resilient, reduce its strategic dependence not only, but above all, on China as quickly as possible, and prevent Europe from becoming a complete technological developing country. To do this, it needs to work more closely with Taiwan. It also wants to support Taiwan as a value partner in its de facto independence, especially in the face of pressure from China, and prevent a further escalation of tensions between Beijing on the one hand and Washington and Taipei on the other.
At first glance, normative convictions and geostrategic interests of the EU meet here in the most excellent way: The EU promotes cooperation with Taiwanese democracy, thus securing access to one of the central building blocks of modern economies and sending an important signal to Beijing that Taiwan’s security is a very concrete concern of the EU.
However, this narrative is too good to be true. Deepening cooperation with Taiwan, especially in the high-tech sector, i.e., in the most advanced computer chips, erodes what is perhaps Taiwan’s most important security guarantee: its “silicon shield”. China’s economy is also still dependent on the top products from Taiwan.
Beijing cannot afford to see this resource disappear due to military pressure or even an invasion of the island. It is true that TSMC production facilities in the US – under construction – and in Europe – under exploration – strengthen the ties between Taiwan and powerful allies. But the establishment of these production facilities abroad also means that the importance of the facilities in Taiwan itself will diminish.
In the event of war, these central building blocks of the global economy would continue to be manufactured, but outside Taiwan. The EU’s intended closer cooperation in the area of semiconductors and the relocation of production facilities out of Taiwan, therefore, considerably weakens Taiwan’s “silicon shield”.
So what does Brussels do? The EU must keep a clear view of its own interests – and these mean not only rhetorical and practical support for Taiwan, but also ensuring its own ability to act. So the EU must continue to try to work with Taiwan to diversify the global supply chains for semiconductors and to secure access to this strategically so enormously important resource even in the event of a Chinese blockade or an attack by the People’s Liberation Army – in other words, to build production facilities outside Taiwan as well.
In return for the accompanying weakening of Taiwan’s “silicon shield”, comprehensive technology cooperation in other areas would be conceivable: green energies and green hydrogen, new battery technologies, Big Data-driven medical technology, et cetera would be particularly suitable here. Integrating Taiwan into European economic cycles on many levels simultaneously, without creating excessive dependencies, would be an option to strengthen Taiwan while sending a strong signal to Beijing.
It is becoming increasingly important for the EU to steer a clear and differentiated course toward Beijing. Even if the People’s Republic is increasingly becoming a system rival, it remains an indispensable partner in important policy areas. Global challenges such as climate protection, peacekeeping or peace restoration, poverty reduction and development can ultimately only be solved together with China.
German politics – and with it, society and the economy – will therefore have to endure tensions and contradictions and learn to deal much more soberly with the actual capacities of German foreign policy. A first step would be a more honest discussion of what specifically Germany’s interests are with regard to Taiwan and China. This discussion must not be hijacked by professional lobbyists and raving idealists.
A second step should be the open admission that Germany needs the cooperation and support of its partners in the EU in order to be able to represent its own position in the Indo-Pacific – and to be taken seriously by Beijing. Only on this basis can the difficult balancing act of a closer cooperation with Taiwan while maintaining partnership and rivalry with China be set in motion at all.
National thinking in black-and-white templates – decoupling from Beijing, flirting with Taiwan – is dangerous and harms everyone, not least Taiwan.
Joern-Carsten Gottwald has been Professor of East Asian Politics at the Ruhr University Bochum since 2011. Previously, he worked at the Center for Chinese and East Asian Politics at Freie Universitaet Berlin and the Irish Institute of Chinese Studies at the National University of Ireland Cork.
Steffi Weil is a professor at Antwerp Management School and the University of Antwerp. She has more than 15 years of professional experience inside and outside academia. She is the academic director of the Executive PhD Program and the China-Europe Master there.
Markus Taube holds the Chair of East Asian Economics / China at the Mercator School of Management of the University of Duisburg-Essen and is a founding partner of THINK!DESK China Research & Consulting.
The authors of this text wrote a study on the possibilities of a Resilient Supply Chain Agreement of the EU with Taiwan for the Green / EVA Group in the EP in December 2022.
What appears to be a moon rover that landed on a garden fence is actually a novel tea-picking robot. The solar-powered harvester, which can work around the clock, is in use near the city of Hangzhou. There, the famous Longjing Cha, or “Dragon Well tea”, which was designated as the imperial tea of the Qing Dynasty by China’s emperors, thrives.
Taiwan is engaging in intense travel diplomacy. While incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen heads to America to meet with high-ranking US officials, former President Ma Ying-jeou travels to mainland China. A meeting with top cadres is also not ruled out there.
This sounds like a coordinated offensive at a time when Taiwan is under diplomatic pressure. But in reality, it shows the rivalry between the government and the opposition in the election campaign. The two trips are competing for the attention of the world’s public and voters. Tsai and Ma are diametrically opposed. They come from two parties with different positions on China. Ma stands for closer ties to the mainland, while Tsai represents deep-rooted distrust.
But in the end, the rival top politicians could actually help their country despite their different intentions, as Fabian Peltsch and Frank Sieren’s Features show. Ma helps to somewhat ease relations with the People’s Republic. Meanwhile, Tsai is strengthening security guarantees for Taiwan in the United States. Diplomacy plus assertiveness – that’s a good formula for maintaining the status quo.
Chinese companies are often affected by the geopolitical disputes in which their home country is involved. This is also the case with battery manufacturer CATL, which is building a large plant in Hungary. New factory constructions often face mistrust from the population, as the Tesla project in Brandenburg shows. In Hungary, there are now also reservations about the Chinese investor, as Amelie Richter writes.
In Debrecen, China’s battery giant Contemporary Amperex Technology (CATL) faces headwinds. In the city in Hungary’s east, citizens have demonstrated against a planned factory of the company. The protesters are concerned about the impact of the lithium-ion battery factory on the environment and water consumption in the region. The possible settlement of Chinese workers and the political weight of the Chinese battery manufacturer in the city are also bitterly opposed.
The project has been the subject of controversy ever since the billion-euro investment was announced. However, CATL recently tried to dispel local concerns and invited local media to a background discussion. To show that the planned factory in Debrecen would primarily mean jobs for local workers, CATL spokesperson Balázs Szilágyi referred to the careers page of the Arnstadt plant. The offers there are aimed at local people, the Hungarian online business newspaper Világgazdaság quotes the spokesperson as saying. “We cannot estimate the development of the Hungarian labor market in such a long term, but recruiting Chinese workers is not worth it,” Szilágyi clarified, according to the report.
CATL announced plans to build a 100-GWh battery plant in Hungary’s second-largest city last August. The group plans to invest more than €7 billion in the plant – the largest investment ever made in Hungary. The factory site will cover around 220 hectares, and a good 9,000 people are expected to find employment there. The first customer for the battery cells from Hungary has already been identified: German automaker Mercedes-Benz. The plant in Hungary is also expected to make it easier to supply other European customers such as BMW, Stellantis and Volkswagen.
The push by the government of right-wing populist Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in Budapest is actually in line with the priorities of the European Union, which wants to produce a quarter of the world’s batteries by 2030. The CATL project also fits Orbán’s eastward-looking policies: lucrative tax breaks and subsidies for infrastructure to attract Asian – primarily Chinese – companies. Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó said the CATL factory is the “biggest greenfield investment in Hungary’s history so far”.
According to CATL spokesperson Szilágyi, the construction of the plant is to be implemented in three phases. The Chinese group initially acquired 110 hectares of commercial land, on which the first two construction phases will be realized. As reported by the business portal portfolio.hu, the earthworks will be completed by the end of April. More complex permits are needed to start the building construction. According to group spokesperson Szilágyi, the machines can be installed in 2024, after which the plant will go into operation. Series production of the battery cells would then begin in 2025.
The objections of opponents of the investment in court are known to the specialized authorities, explained CATL spokesperson Szilágyi. However, these do not currently prevent the group from seeking building permits for further phases. Debrecen Mayor Papp László recently spoke out in favor of calming the debate. Fake news about poisoned water and other allegations had turned people against the project. László declined an interview request from Table.Media.
Environmental activists such as WWF and Greenpeace, as well as local residents, view the plans of the government in Budapest and Debrecen with great skepticism. This is because the production of rechargeable batteries is not only energy-intensive but also consumes a lot of water. “Our most basic need is clean water, clean air and healthy land, not batteries,” protest co-organizer Julia Perge told the AFP news agency. “People living here were not properly informed or asked if they wanted this,” Gabor Bogos complained at the demonstration, according to the report.
According to the Hajdú-Bihar county government authority, it had issued an environmental permit for the construction of the battery factory under stricter conditions than ever before. This entailed a number of obligations to protect the environment. In addition, for some parameters, compliance with stricter limits than those set by law and more frequent inspections had been stipulated. CATL spokesperson Szilágyi stressed that the plant’s water requirements would be around 10,000 cubic meters per day after final completion.
Since about 70 percent of the water is needed for cooling processes, pipelines are needed that can transport a fluctuating demand of a maximum of 18,000 cubic meters per day. However, treated graywater is sufficient for this, Szilágyi said. Wastewater from baths, showers or washing machines is also suitable. The plant’s energy needs will initially be around 80 megawatts, peaking at 300 megawatts. With solar panels on the roof, CATL plans to generate 18 megawatts itself, according to the spokesperson, as well as participate in green projects off-site.
In February, the environmental organization WWF came to a less positive assessment: The water use of the entire plant had not been examined, WWF Hungary claims. The construction of the factory had been approved in several phases, WWF expert Dalma Dedák said at an expert hearing of the responsible Sustainable Development Committee in the Budapest Parliament.
Dedák spoke of salami slicing tactics in providing information about the Debrecen plant. According to local media reports, the invited representatives of the Energy and Foreign Ministries did not even appear at the hearing.
On both sides of the Taiwan Strait, signs may point to cautious détente. Former President (2008-2016) Ma Ying-jeou of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party is traveling to the mainland this week, the first visit by a former Taiwanese president to the People’s Republic. Channels of conversation are opening here where there has been little exchange in recent years.
Recently, state and party leader Xi Jinping also struck more moderate tones with regard to Taiwan. At the conclusion of this year’s People’s Congress, the annual session of the not freely elected parliament, Xi put more emphasis on peaceful cooperation. At the very least, he refrained from stepping up his threats. Xi also tasked his chief strategist, Wang Huning, with developing a new, peaceful Taiwan strategy.
The new Premier Li Qiang, who has been in office for less than a month, also struck a conciliatory note. At his first press conference, China’s number two said that Beijing wanted to promote “economic and cultural exchanges” with Taiwan; after all, they are “one family”.
Ma’s visit has been accompanied by much controversy in Taiwan and internationally; however, the gesture is in line with the policy he pursued as an active president: Ma wanted to end the conflict with the People’s Republic through a peace treaty and allow more Chinese business activity in Taiwan. In the end, however, he lost the 2016 election to Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) by doing so. The DPP tends to reject rapprochement with the People’s Republic.
The presidential office nevertheless said Monday that it “respects” Mas’s travel plan. Tsai instructed authorities to support the trip where necessary. At the same time, she admonished Ma to safeguard Taiwan’s interests.
Tsai also opened the door for Ma to travel despite all reservations. Paragraph 26 of the Classified National Security Information Protection Act prohibits former presidents of Taiwan from traveling abroad for three years after their term ends. Tsai could therefore prohibit Ma to travel to Hong Kong in 2019. She then extended the travel ban again until 2021. But now she has refrained from using paragraph 12 of the law to extend it again.
Ma may not only travel with four of his sisters but also with 30 students who will meet with Chinese students. So the visit is not so entirely private after all. “It’s about bringing young vitality to the peaceful development of relations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait,” a presidential spokesperson said. Former President Ma may be traveling to the mainland for the first time but Xi and Ma already met face-to-face in Singapore in 2015. This time, however, no political talks are officially planned.
Meanwhile, Ma’s party, the KMT, is divided over the China visits. Party Vice-Chairman Andrew Hsia flew to the People’s Republic in February for a trip that was announced as “non-political”. Party leader Eric Chu, on the other hand, is said to have reacted with little enthusiasm to the former president’s travel plans.
For Beijing, Taiwan is not an independent country but a breakaway province. Most countries (181 out of 194 countries in the world) also adhere to the one-China principle and do not recognize Taiwan as an independent country. Recently, the Central American country of Honduras broke with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with Beijing.
In recent years, the tone under President Tsai has also become somewhat more confrontational, despite her restraint, even though she continues to make offers of talks. Beijing had responded no less aggressively and also attempted to demonstrate its determination to unify through large-scale military maneuvers. A reversal of the spiral of accusations, however, would be welcomed by many actors on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Ma’s trip is also important in that the KMT has a realistic chance of replacing the incumbent DPP in next year’s elections. Tsai’s DPP suffered a major setback in last year’s municipal elections. It had won only five of 22 municipalities and independent cities, while the KMT won even in the three largest industrial cities of Taipei, Taoyuan and Keelung. There is thus a shifting mood toward a party that tends to stand for a rapprochement with the People’s Republic.
However, this does not mean that the KMT wants unification – and that would not be in line with the will of the voters. Surveys on the subject of independence versus reunification are clear: Only five percent of Taiwanese want independence immediately. 25.4 percent want to maintain the status quo but move toward independence. The majority, however, of 57 percent, wants almost equal shares either to keep the status quo forever or to keep the status quo and “decide later,” i.e., no change for now.
However, between 2019 and 2022, the group of those who want to keep the status quo and move toward independence later has increased from 12 to 25 percent. At the same time, the group that wants to maintain the status quo and later move toward unification has halved from 12 to 6 percent.
Another survey from December 2022 shows that 70 percent of respondents would defend Taiwan if China were to attack the island militarily. Both surveys are possibly a reason for Beijing to tend to give in. In addition, Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine has made it very clear to Beijing cadres how high the international political costs of a military strike would be.
In the meeting with Hsia, the KMT party vice chairman, CP party strategists have already stressed that he is in favor of implementing Xi’s “policy of peaceful development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, promoting exchanges and cooperation”. So instead of just fearing the worst-case scenario, it may be time to address the question of how to bring Taiwan closer to Beijing in a way that Taipei can live with.
With her trip to North America, Taiwan’s President Tasi Ing-wen sends a clear message: Taiwan will not bow to pressure from China. She also wants to secure further security guarantees for the island’s freedom. Speaking in Taipei shortly before her departure for America, Tsai said she did not want to provoke anyone with her trip, but neither did she want to give in to anyone. “The trip is to show our determination to deepen exchanges and cooperation with diplomatic allies,” Tsai told a press conference in the waiting area of Taoyuan Airport.
The deepening of relations with the remaining partners is urgently needed after Honduras broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan last Sunday in favor of Beijing. The trip to the United States is politically sensitive for precisely this reason. Even if they are declared as unofficial “transit trips” from the outset for the sake of innocuousness, Beijing considers them a violation of the one-China principle.
In fact, such flying visits are not unusual for Taiwanese heads of government. Including Tsai, 29 Taiwanese heads of state have already visited the United States on such alleged “transit trips” since 1994. On average, such visits occur once a year and twice in some years. And depending on how tense US-China relations are at the moment, they offer Taiwanese presidents sometimes more and sometimes less leeway for meetings with high-ranking US politicians.
And therein lies the explosive power of Tsai’s visit: According to reports that have not yet been officially confirmed, she could meet Kevin McCarthy, the new speaker of the US House of Representatives, in Los Angeles. McCarthy had already declared after taking office that he wanted to travel to Taiwan, like his predecessor Nancy Pelosi. A meeting in the US is now seen as a compromise to provoke Beijing into non-military action around Taiwan’s waters. This had come after Nancy Pelosis’ visit to the island.
Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office nevertheless described a possible meeting with McCarthy in advance as “another provocation” that would “sabotage peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait”. Beijing reserved the right to take “countermeasures”, they said.
For Tsai, it is the seventh transit through the United States during her tenure as head of government. The last time she traveled to America was in 2019, before the start of the Covid pandemic. The fact that her visit now coincides with the China trip of Taiwan’s former president, Ma Ying-jeou, may not be a coincidence. Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), like Ma’s Kuomintang National People’s Party (KMT), is using the opportunity to publicly demonstrate its foreign policy positions ahead of the presidential elections on Jan. 13, 2024.
Ma’s trip to China is also declared as an unofficial visit by a private citizen. The politician has been considered corrupt and self-absorbed not only since the end of his term in 2016. Potential KMT presidential candidates such as New Taipei Mayor Hou Yu-ih do not want to be too closely associated with him.
Young KMT voters, in particular, view Ma critically. This also applies to his statement announced this week in China, “We are all Chinese.” There are also hardliners in the KMT who favor reunification, but there are also many moderates and even those who regard Taiwan as de facto independent. Although the KMT wants better relations with China, it also does not want to be taken over by Beijing. The party also continues to have an interest in good relations with the United States and Japan.
The EU sees itself as a normative power. In its common foreign and security policy, it wants to represent fundamental values. The EU also sees itself – and rightly so – as a global power. From its undeniably great economic importance, the EU derives – again quite rightly – the need to represent its interests globally, especially in the Indo-Pacific. The EU is thus becoming an increasingly important factor in the escalating conflict between the US and China. Be it with regard to the strategic readjustment of trade flows, the imposition of technology boycotts against Chinese companies or the treatment of Taiwan in the global system.
The European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen emphasizes its strategic autonomy. However, although formally a strategic partnership continues to exist with the People’s Republic of China, increasing rivalries in terms of political, social and economic orders are forcing a growing distancing from the East Asian power. Globally, Europe is once again standing more firmly at the side of its most important military ally, the USA.
In this field of tension, the European Union has now rediscovered a protagonist that for a long time was at best on the fringes of European attention: Taiwan, the colorful democracy in East Asia, victim of the One-China policy; at the same time, the technology country that houses 90 percent of the world’s production of the most advanced semiconductors. Without the chips produced by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. the most forward-looking projects in the global technology industry would collapse.
The EU faces a massive dilemma here: It must make its supply chains more resilient, reduce its strategic dependence not only, but above all, on China as quickly as possible, and prevent Europe from becoming a complete technological developing country. To do this, it needs to work more closely with Taiwan. It also wants to support Taiwan as a value partner in its de facto independence, especially in the face of pressure from China, and prevent a further escalation of tensions between Beijing on the one hand and Washington and Taipei on the other.
At first glance, normative convictions and geostrategic interests of the EU meet here in the most excellent way: The EU promotes cooperation with Taiwanese democracy, thus securing access to one of the central building blocks of modern economies and sending an important signal to Beijing that Taiwan’s security is a very concrete concern of the EU.
However, this narrative is too good to be true. Deepening cooperation with Taiwan, especially in the high-tech sector, i.e., in the most advanced computer chips, erodes what is perhaps Taiwan’s most important security guarantee: its “silicon shield”. China’s economy is also still dependent on the top products from Taiwan.
Beijing cannot afford to see this resource disappear due to military pressure or even an invasion of the island. It is true that TSMC production facilities in the US – under construction – and in Europe – under exploration – strengthen the ties between Taiwan and powerful allies. But the establishment of these production facilities abroad also means that the importance of the facilities in Taiwan itself will diminish.
In the event of war, these central building blocks of the global economy would continue to be manufactured, but outside Taiwan. The EU’s intended closer cooperation in the area of semiconductors and the relocation of production facilities out of Taiwan, therefore, considerably weakens Taiwan’s “silicon shield”.
So what does Brussels do? The EU must keep a clear view of its own interests – and these mean not only rhetorical and practical support for Taiwan, but also ensuring its own ability to act. So the EU must continue to try to work with Taiwan to diversify the global supply chains for semiconductors and to secure access to this strategically so enormously important resource even in the event of a Chinese blockade or an attack by the People’s Liberation Army – in other words, to build production facilities outside Taiwan as well.
In return for the accompanying weakening of Taiwan’s “silicon shield”, comprehensive technology cooperation in other areas would be conceivable: green energies and green hydrogen, new battery technologies, Big Data-driven medical technology, et cetera would be particularly suitable here. Integrating Taiwan into European economic cycles on many levels simultaneously, without creating excessive dependencies, would be an option to strengthen Taiwan while sending a strong signal to Beijing.
It is becoming increasingly important for the EU to steer a clear and differentiated course toward Beijing. Even if the People’s Republic is increasingly becoming a system rival, it remains an indispensable partner in important policy areas. Global challenges such as climate protection, peacekeeping or peace restoration, poverty reduction and development can ultimately only be solved together with China.
German politics – and with it, society and the economy – will therefore have to endure tensions and contradictions and learn to deal much more soberly with the actual capacities of German foreign policy. A first step would be a more honest discussion of what specifically Germany’s interests are with regard to Taiwan and China. This discussion must not be hijacked by professional lobbyists and raving idealists.
A second step should be the open admission that Germany needs the cooperation and support of its partners in the EU in order to be able to represent its own position in the Indo-Pacific – and to be taken seriously by Beijing. Only on this basis can the difficult balancing act of a closer cooperation with Taiwan while maintaining partnership and rivalry with China be set in motion at all.
National thinking in black-and-white templates – decoupling from Beijing, flirting with Taiwan – is dangerous and harms everyone, not least Taiwan.
Joern-Carsten Gottwald has been Professor of East Asian Politics at the Ruhr University Bochum since 2011. Previously, he worked at the Center for Chinese and East Asian Politics at Freie Universitaet Berlin and the Irish Institute of Chinese Studies at the National University of Ireland Cork.
Steffi Weil is a professor at Antwerp Management School and the University of Antwerp. She has more than 15 years of professional experience inside and outside academia. She is the academic director of the Executive PhD Program and the China-Europe Master there.
Markus Taube holds the Chair of East Asian Economics / China at the Mercator School of Management of the University of Duisburg-Essen and is a founding partner of THINK!DESK China Research & Consulting.
The authors of this text wrote a study on the possibilities of a Resilient Supply Chain Agreement of the EU with Taiwan for the Green / EVA Group in the EP in December 2022.
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