Could a coup attempt like the one in Russia last weekend happen in China? At first glance, this question may seem absurd, especially considering that China does not have a private mercenary army like the “Wagner” group in Russia. However, there is also a traditional concern in Beijing about a revolt from within the military, as highlighted by Michael Radunski in his Feature. The problem in China is that the larger and more powerful a military apparatus becomes, the more unpredictable it becomes, even for someone like Xi Jinping.
In the research collaboration between China and Germany, the mood was good for a long time. After all, what could be wrong with wanting to learn from each other? However, this has also changed significantly in the German-Chinese relationship.
First, there was criticism of Confucius Institutes because they apparently tried to exert political influence on the German academic landscape. Then, the Chinese side sanctioned entire European scientific institutions. And last but not least, reports about German scientists unknowingly collaborating with institutes close to the military in China have fueled the debate even further. More and more people in the academic world are wondering how much scientific cooperation can still be done with authoritarian states.
The uprising of Yevgeny Prigozhin and his mercenary group “Wagner” certainly caused concern in many capitals around the world, particularly in Beijing. There are several obvious reasons for this concern: Not so much the personal closeness between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, but rather the fact that Russia is an almost indispensable partner for China in its rivalry with the United States, a reliable energy supplier and shares a more than 4,000-kilometer-long border where China seeks stability.
However, there are also less apparent reasons, such as the question of whether a Prigozhin-style uprising is possible in China. The answer is that such a scenario is not conceivable in China. But concern about an uprising from within the Chinese military exists nonetheless.
A Prigozhin-like coup attempt is not possible in China, simply because there are no mercenary forces like the “Wagner” army in China. In contrast, Russia has various forces in addition to the Russian army: troops under the control of the Moscow mayor, the local militarist Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya or the “Wagner” group led by Prigozhin. Not to mention the private militias of some oligarchs. All of these forces operate outside the command chain of the Russian army.
The era of Chinese warlords (军阀时代) is long gone. The years from 1916 to 1928, and partly into the 1930s/40s, were marked by constant civil war. No ruler could claim authority over all of China. The country was divided and weak and millions of people fell victim to the deadly conflicts.
It was Mao Zedong who derived the slogan that power grows out of the barrel of a gun from this period. His guiding principle was that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never command the party. Therefore, after the Communists won the civil war in 1949, Mao began to destroy all alternative power sources in China. The consequence – and the significant difference from other states – is that the People’s Liberation Army of China is an army of the party, not an army of the state.
However, it would be a fallacy to derive blind trust from this, which would not align with the authoritarian leadership in Zhongnanhai anyway. “Xi’s most important position is, therefore, the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission,” says political scientist Eberhard Sandschneider. It’s worth noting that Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) was neither party chairman nor president of the state, but he was the chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Nevertheless, concerns about an uprising from the military in China are not entirely unfounded. In 1971, the then Defense Minister Lin Biao (林彪) attempted to stage a coup against Mao. Lin failed and tried to flee to Russia, but his plane crashed for unclear reasons over Mongolia.
Xi Jinping is also rumored to have encountered dissident generals indirectly. There are rumors that Bo Xilai (薄熙来) held discussions with renegade army leaders in 2012 in an attempt to swiftly seize power. Shortly after assuming power, Xi Jinping ensured the dismissal of several generals. Since then, the People’s Liberation Army has been firmly under the control of the party leadership.
The former CIA analyst John Culver connects the dots by pointing to the arrests of Chinese generals Xu Caihou (徐才厚) and Guo Boxiong (郭伯雄). Xu and Guo were appointed to the Central Military Commission by Jiang Zemin in 1999 and continued to consolidate their power over the years, even when the party, state,and military leadership transitioned to Hu Jintao. It was only under Xi Jinping that this accumulation of power was brought to an end, and the People’s Liberation Army was freed from disloyalty and corruption, according to Culver.
In a military textbook published in excerpts in the People’s Liberation Army Daily in 2016, it is stated about the case: “The problems of bribery and corruption by Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou are shocking. But that was not the core of their problems. The crux of the matter was that they had violated political principles.”
Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the party’s control over the People’s Liberation Army, especially the People’s Armed Police, has been significantly tightened. The People’s Armed Police (中国人民武装警察部队) is a paramilitary unit that primarily operates within China. It is responsible for internal security, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and disaster relief.
“The Chinese leadership under Xi pays great attention to frequent transfers or replacements of general officers. This is intended to prevent the emergence of independent power bases within the People’s Liberation Army. It is said that the generals should not draw strings in the ground,” explains Sandschneider, who works as a partner at the consulting firm “Berlin Global Advisors”.
“In the end, we don’t know if there is someone like Prigozhin in China,” admits the political scientist. “But if such a person exists, we certainly wouldn’t know about them.” Because not only the leadership in Beijing will learn from the uprising in Russia but also the military. A coup plotter must be absolutely sure before venturing out of hiding. Otherwise, they will face the same fate as Prigozhin, or worse.
On the one hand, there is a willingness to engage in dialogue, and on the other hand, there is only limited scope for new collaborations. The statements from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research regarding the seventh German-Chinese government consultations held in Berlin in June describe a balancing act between the desire for cooperation and withdrawal tendencies.
In meetings with the two partner ministries, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the Ministry of Education (MOW), it was agreed that “cooperation in education and research represents an important foundation of bilateral relations,” said a spokesperson for the BMBF. Chinese Minister of Research Wan Gang was not in Berlin, but his deputy, Zhang Guangiun, attended.
“Strong competitor” and “systemic rival” are the most frequently used terms by Federal Minister of Research Bettina Stark-Watzinger regarding China. This was evident, for example, on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with China last October. At that time, the minister called for a “critical examination of German-Chinese relations.”
In March, she traveled to Taiwan and signed research agreements with the Taiwanese government, despite a Chinese protest note. Since the Russian aggression, there has been a turning point not only in relations with Russia. In politics, there is a determination not to be accused of naivety in dealing with dependencies again. The relationship with China is, therefore, under scrutiny. The BMBF’s statements on the progress of the German-Chinese consultations read like a list of deficiencies:
However, the spokesperson for the BMBF stated that there is a willingness to continue the dialogue on both sides: “Global challenges cannot be solved by individual actors – international scientific cooperation is indispensable for this.” As a sign of goodwill, two sustainability exchange workshops were proposed, and the Chinese side was invited to the next regular WTZ meeting.
The debate on critical reflection of research relationships between China and Germany was also fueled earlier this year by the report by American security researcher Jeffrey Stoff and his company, the Center for Research Security and Integrity. Stoff documented how German researchers collaborate with military-related institutes in China, sometimes without being aware of it. His conclusion: Awareness of the problem is underdeveloped.
“Jeff Stoff has made us think and talk, and that is definitely an achievement of the study,” says Hannes Gohli, Managing Director of the China Competence Center at the University of Wuerzburg. Although Gohli considers the methodology of Stoff’s study to be opaque and suspects business interests behind it, he still believes it is “very healthy to reflect on and question research cooperation with authoritarian states”.
The need for this is evident from the number of specialist events currently addressing this topic. In May, within the framework of the WIKOOP-Infra project, the BMBF organized the conference “Ensuring Action in Research Cooperation with China,” which was attended by State Secretary Jens Brandenburg. Gohli also recently discussed “International Cooperation in Science” with a focus on China at the University of Ulm, including with Jeffrey Stoff.
Clearly, many actors in the German scientific system are currently searching for a new approach to China. Today, experts at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel) are discussing the topic: German Research Cooperation: Creating knowledge for or with China? Table.Media is a cooperation partner for the event.
According to expert Sascha Klotzbuecher, one of the panelists, it is important to use the strong interest of Chinese researchers in the German scientific location for dialogue. “This must be based consistently on the principles and freedom of speech in our society.” Germany needs more and different “China competence,” even beyond sinology, says the associate professor of sinology at Comenius University in Bratislava.
Hannes Gohli, the expert from Würzburg, also advocates for a strategy of prudence and sustainability. He believes that collaborations should not be generally restricted but that “individual cases should be carefully examined, and China research and expertise in science should be significantly expanded.” The University of Wuerzburg opened the China Competence Center for this purpose at the end of October 2022. However, Gohli says he is not acting alone, as many universities in Germany have good advisory structures. The guidelines of the HRK, the DAAD and the BAFA provide a good basis for addressing the issue.
“Since we cannot ask all the questions from these catalogs, as it would overwhelm researchers, we select the relevant guiding questions from the existing catalogs based on the individual challenges and opportunities of emerging collaborations,” says Gohli. In general, efforts should be made to engage in more dialogue with China instead of dismantling funding programs and collaborations with grand gestures.
“We don’t need red lines, but a conscientious case-by-case assessment, more personnel, and intensive engagement with the topic.”
After the government consultations, the focus now shifts to the China strategy, which the scientific community is also waiting for. The federal government originally announced the strategy for June 20. However, it is likely that the coalition will use the summer break to consider new approaches and solutions in German-Chinese relations, including in the field of research cooperation.
Cultural and social scientists are occasionally accused of being armchair scholars who try to explain the world from their own desks or from archives. For Gunter Schubert, such an approach is not an option. The sinologist from Eberhard Karls University Tuebingen regularly visits China – even as we interview him for this portrait. “One must develop the professional philosophy that it is impossible to do without regular contact with the region, with the country, with the society on-site. Fundamentally, it depends on networks and contacts how access to the field is. That is certainly the biggest difficulty in China,” says Schubert.
Especially in the research he conducts with local governments, it is always politically sensitive. It is impossible to make progress without colleagues and networks. “Even then, things can sometimes be volatile because local governments may be cautious during personnel changes or sudden policy shifts or close certain doors,” Schubert adds.
After studying political science, law and sinology at the universities of Marburg and Hamburg, Schubert embarked on his first extended academic stay in 1990. Until 1992, he was a visiting scholar at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University in Taipei.
Taiwan has always been a focal point in Schubert’s research work. In 2008, he founded the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT) at the University of Tübingen and continues to lead it. He was recently the editor of the “Taiwan Handbook on Contemporary Taiwan” and the co-editor of the 2022 anthology “Taiwan During the First Administration of Tsai Ing-wen. Navigating in Stormy Waters.” “Through my work, I have shown that I am not an independence activist but rather someone who engages with the subject matter academically,” says Schubert. He has never had the impression that China would not accept scholarly research on Taiwan.
“I have also given many lectures in China on Taiwan. It was highly interesting for people. The lecture halls were always very full, and there was a high demand for information from experts who are familiar with Taiwan and how they assess certain situations,” he adds. Even in China, attempts are made to address critical topics. At least, this was the case during the Hu Jintao era and the early Xi Jinping era. Schubert cannot assess how it will be in the future at this point.
In 2003, the native of Duesseldorf received the chair of Greater China Studies in Tuebingen and has since earned a reputation as a balanced and astute analyst, at least academically. However, Schubert is not constantly present in the public eye to comment on developments in the People’s Republic. “I am not a journalist, nor am I a think-tanker. I try to put things in perspective from a macro view and approach the whole thing analytically. I don’t chase after every piece of news,” says Schubert.
However, current developments also influence his work as they contextualize research projects. Currently, he and colleagues are designing a new project that focuses on Chinese “global politics” and, in this context, the political economy of the Sino-Taiwanese relations. These relations have naturally changed significantly over time. “The research design changes due to the political environment and must be constantly adjusted. I try to focus on the essentials, on the structural factors. That is my task as an academic. However, I stay out of the constant ‘interview business’. That is short-term and not my bread and butter business.” Constantin Eckner
These athletes are undergoing rigorous training in Shenyang for the 100-meter race trials for the Asian Games. The Asian Games are scheduled to take place in Hangzhou from Sep. 23-Oct. 8. Originally planned for the previous year, they were postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Could a coup attempt like the one in Russia last weekend happen in China? At first glance, this question may seem absurd, especially considering that China does not have a private mercenary army like the “Wagner” group in Russia. However, there is also a traditional concern in Beijing about a revolt from within the military, as highlighted by Michael Radunski in his Feature. The problem in China is that the larger and more powerful a military apparatus becomes, the more unpredictable it becomes, even for someone like Xi Jinping.
In the research collaboration between China and Germany, the mood was good for a long time. After all, what could be wrong with wanting to learn from each other? However, this has also changed significantly in the German-Chinese relationship.
First, there was criticism of Confucius Institutes because they apparently tried to exert political influence on the German academic landscape. Then, the Chinese side sanctioned entire European scientific institutions. And last but not least, reports about German scientists unknowingly collaborating with institutes close to the military in China have fueled the debate even further. More and more people in the academic world are wondering how much scientific cooperation can still be done with authoritarian states.
The uprising of Yevgeny Prigozhin and his mercenary group “Wagner” certainly caused concern in many capitals around the world, particularly in Beijing. There are several obvious reasons for this concern: Not so much the personal closeness between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, but rather the fact that Russia is an almost indispensable partner for China in its rivalry with the United States, a reliable energy supplier and shares a more than 4,000-kilometer-long border where China seeks stability.
However, there are also less apparent reasons, such as the question of whether a Prigozhin-style uprising is possible in China. The answer is that such a scenario is not conceivable in China. But concern about an uprising from within the Chinese military exists nonetheless.
A Prigozhin-like coup attempt is not possible in China, simply because there are no mercenary forces like the “Wagner” army in China. In contrast, Russia has various forces in addition to the Russian army: troops under the control of the Moscow mayor, the local militarist Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya or the “Wagner” group led by Prigozhin. Not to mention the private militias of some oligarchs. All of these forces operate outside the command chain of the Russian army.
The era of Chinese warlords (军阀时代) is long gone. The years from 1916 to 1928, and partly into the 1930s/40s, were marked by constant civil war. No ruler could claim authority over all of China. The country was divided and weak and millions of people fell victim to the deadly conflicts.
It was Mao Zedong who derived the slogan that power grows out of the barrel of a gun from this period. His guiding principle was that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never command the party. Therefore, after the Communists won the civil war in 1949, Mao began to destroy all alternative power sources in China. The consequence – and the significant difference from other states – is that the People’s Liberation Army of China is an army of the party, not an army of the state.
However, it would be a fallacy to derive blind trust from this, which would not align with the authoritarian leadership in Zhongnanhai anyway. “Xi’s most important position is, therefore, the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission,” says political scientist Eberhard Sandschneider. It’s worth noting that Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) was neither party chairman nor president of the state, but he was the chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Nevertheless, concerns about an uprising from the military in China are not entirely unfounded. In 1971, the then Defense Minister Lin Biao (林彪) attempted to stage a coup against Mao. Lin failed and tried to flee to Russia, but his plane crashed for unclear reasons over Mongolia.
Xi Jinping is also rumored to have encountered dissident generals indirectly. There are rumors that Bo Xilai (薄熙来) held discussions with renegade army leaders in 2012 in an attempt to swiftly seize power. Shortly after assuming power, Xi Jinping ensured the dismissal of several generals. Since then, the People’s Liberation Army has been firmly under the control of the party leadership.
The former CIA analyst John Culver connects the dots by pointing to the arrests of Chinese generals Xu Caihou (徐才厚) and Guo Boxiong (郭伯雄). Xu and Guo were appointed to the Central Military Commission by Jiang Zemin in 1999 and continued to consolidate their power over the years, even when the party, state,and military leadership transitioned to Hu Jintao. It was only under Xi Jinping that this accumulation of power was brought to an end, and the People’s Liberation Army was freed from disloyalty and corruption, according to Culver.
In a military textbook published in excerpts in the People’s Liberation Army Daily in 2016, it is stated about the case: “The problems of bribery and corruption by Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou are shocking. But that was not the core of their problems. The crux of the matter was that they had violated political principles.”
Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the party’s control over the People’s Liberation Army, especially the People’s Armed Police, has been significantly tightened. The People’s Armed Police (中国人民武装警察部队) is a paramilitary unit that primarily operates within China. It is responsible for internal security, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and disaster relief.
“The Chinese leadership under Xi pays great attention to frequent transfers or replacements of general officers. This is intended to prevent the emergence of independent power bases within the People’s Liberation Army. It is said that the generals should not draw strings in the ground,” explains Sandschneider, who works as a partner at the consulting firm “Berlin Global Advisors”.
“In the end, we don’t know if there is someone like Prigozhin in China,” admits the political scientist. “But if such a person exists, we certainly wouldn’t know about them.” Because not only the leadership in Beijing will learn from the uprising in Russia but also the military. A coup plotter must be absolutely sure before venturing out of hiding. Otherwise, they will face the same fate as Prigozhin, or worse.
On the one hand, there is a willingness to engage in dialogue, and on the other hand, there is only limited scope for new collaborations. The statements from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research regarding the seventh German-Chinese government consultations held in Berlin in June describe a balancing act between the desire for cooperation and withdrawal tendencies.
In meetings with the two partner ministries, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the Ministry of Education (MOW), it was agreed that “cooperation in education and research represents an important foundation of bilateral relations,” said a spokesperson for the BMBF. Chinese Minister of Research Wan Gang was not in Berlin, but his deputy, Zhang Guangiun, attended.
“Strong competitor” and “systemic rival” are the most frequently used terms by Federal Minister of Research Bettina Stark-Watzinger regarding China. This was evident, for example, on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with China last October. At that time, the minister called for a “critical examination of German-Chinese relations.”
In March, she traveled to Taiwan and signed research agreements with the Taiwanese government, despite a Chinese protest note. Since the Russian aggression, there has been a turning point not only in relations with Russia. In politics, there is a determination not to be accused of naivety in dealing with dependencies again. The relationship with China is, therefore, under scrutiny. The BMBF’s statements on the progress of the German-Chinese consultations read like a list of deficiencies:
However, the spokesperson for the BMBF stated that there is a willingness to continue the dialogue on both sides: “Global challenges cannot be solved by individual actors – international scientific cooperation is indispensable for this.” As a sign of goodwill, two sustainability exchange workshops were proposed, and the Chinese side was invited to the next regular WTZ meeting.
The debate on critical reflection of research relationships between China and Germany was also fueled earlier this year by the report by American security researcher Jeffrey Stoff and his company, the Center for Research Security and Integrity. Stoff documented how German researchers collaborate with military-related institutes in China, sometimes without being aware of it. His conclusion: Awareness of the problem is underdeveloped.
“Jeff Stoff has made us think and talk, and that is definitely an achievement of the study,” says Hannes Gohli, Managing Director of the China Competence Center at the University of Wuerzburg. Although Gohli considers the methodology of Stoff’s study to be opaque and suspects business interests behind it, he still believes it is “very healthy to reflect on and question research cooperation with authoritarian states”.
The need for this is evident from the number of specialist events currently addressing this topic. In May, within the framework of the WIKOOP-Infra project, the BMBF organized the conference “Ensuring Action in Research Cooperation with China,” which was attended by State Secretary Jens Brandenburg. Gohli also recently discussed “International Cooperation in Science” with a focus on China at the University of Ulm, including with Jeffrey Stoff.
Clearly, many actors in the German scientific system are currently searching for a new approach to China. Today, experts at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel) are discussing the topic: German Research Cooperation: Creating knowledge for or with China? Table.Media is a cooperation partner for the event.
According to expert Sascha Klotzbuecher, one of the panelists, it is important to use the strong interest of Chinese researchers in the German scientific location for dialogue. “This must be based consistently on the principles and freedom of speech in our society.” Germany needs more and different “China competence,” even beyond sinology, says the associate professor of sinology at Comenius University in Bratislava.
Hannes Gohli, the expert from Würzburg, also advocates for a strategy of prudence and sustainability. He believes that collaborations should not be generally restricted but that “individual cases should be carefully examined, and China research and expertise in science should be significantly expanded.” The University of Wuerzburg opened the China Competence Center for this purpose at the end of October 2022. However, Gohli says he is not acting alone, as many universities in Germany have good advisory structures. The guidelines of the HRK, the DAAD and the BAFA provide a good basis for addressing the issue.
“Since we cannot ask all the questions from these catalogs, as it would overwhelm researchers, we select the relevant guiding questions from the existing catalogs based on the individual challenges and opportunities of emerging collaborations,” says Gohli. In general, efforts should be made to engage in more dialogue with China instead of dismantling funding programs and collaborations with grand gestures.
“We don’t need red lines, but a conscientious case-by-case assessment, more personnel, and intensive engagement with the topic.”
After the government consultations, the focus now shifts to the China strategy, which the scientific community is also waiting for. The federal government originally announced the strategy for June 20. However, it is likely that the coalition will use the summer break to consider new approaches and solutions in German-Chinese relations, including in the field of research cooperation.
Cultural and social scientists are occasionally accused of being armchair scholars who try to explain the world from their own desks or from archives. For Gunter Schubert, such an approach is not an option. The sinologist from Eberhard Karls University Tuebingen regularly visits China – even as we interview him for this portrait. “One must develop the professional philosophy that it is impossible to do without regular contact with the region, with the country, with the society on-site. Fundamentally, it depends on networks and contacts how access to the field is. That is certainly the biggest difficulty in China,” says Schubert.
Especially in the research he conducts with local governments, it is always politically sensitive. It is impossible to make progress without colleagues and networks. “Even then, things can sometimes be volatile because local governments may be cautious during personnel changes or sudden policy shifts or close certain doors,” Schubert adds.
After studying political science, law and sinology at the universities of Marburg and Hamburg, Schubert embarked on his first extended academic stay in 1990. Until 1992, he was a visiting scholar at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University in Taipei.
Taiwan has always been a focal point in Schubert’s research work. In 2008, he founded the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT) at the University of Tübingen and continues to lead it. He was recently the editor of the “Taiwan Handbook on Contemporary Taiwan” and the co-editor of the 2022 anthology “Taiwan During the First Administration of Tsai Ing-wen. Navigating in Stormy Waters.” “Through my work, I have shown that I am not an independence activist but rather someone who engages with the subject matter academically,” says Schubert. He has never had the impression that China would not accept scholarly research on Taiwan.
“I have also given many lectures in China on Taiwan. It was highly interesting for people. The lecture halls were always very full, and there was a high demand for information from experts who are familiar with Taiwan and how they assess certain situations,” he adds. Even in China, attempts are made to address critical topics. At least, this was the case during the Hu Jintao era and the early Xi Jinping era. Schubert cannot assess how it will be in the future at this point.
In 2003, the native of Duesseldorf received the chair of Greater China Studies in Tuebingen and has since earned a reputation as a balanced and astute analyst, at least academically. However, Schubert is not constantly present in the public eye to comment on developments in the People’s Republic. “I am not a journalist, nor am I a think-tanker. I try to put things in perspective from a macro view and approach the whole thing analytically. I don’t chase after every piece of news,” says Schubert.
However, current developments also influence his work as they contextualize research projects. Currently, he and colleagues are designing a new project that focuses on Chinese “global politics” and, in this context, the political economy of the Sino-Taiwanese relations. These relations have naturally changed significantly over time. “The research design changes due to the political environment and must be constantly adjusted. I try to focus on the essentials, on the structural factors. That is my task as an academic. However, I stay out of the constant ‘interview business’. That is short-term and not my bread and butter business.” Constantin Eckner
These athletes are undergoing rigorous training in Shenyang for the 100-meter race trials for the Asian Games. The Asian Games are scheduled to take place in Hangzhou from Sep. 23-Oct. 8. Originally planned for the previous year, they were postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
