Faith stands in the way of state modernization. That is what communism preaches. Nevertheless, spirituality is experiencing great popularity in China. Sinologist and Pulitzer Prize winner Ian Johnson spoke with Leonardo Pape about what he thinks explains this magnetic effect in a communist state like China and why economic development plays a role.
The Communist Party is using the trend to try to legitimize itself in ways other than simply creating wealth, says Johnson. To this end, it promotes popular religious activities previously considered superstition. Johnson has examined spiritual movements in the People’s Republic for many years. In 2001, he won the Pulitzer Prize for his coverage on the persecution of Falun Gong members.
Today’s opinion piece looks at the boom of the lifestyle app Xiaohongshu among Western users. Björn Ognibeni, who advises companies on how they can learn from digital innovations in China, describes the difference between the atmosphere in Western social media and among Xiaohongshu users – and the consequences for advertisers.
Mr. Johnson, the Spring Festival, the most important traditional festival in China and other parts of Asia, is approaching. It is sometimes compared to Christmas. How much religion is in it?
For most people in China today, the Spring Festival is not strictly religious. However, it is traditionally associated with rituals like visiting a temple or paying respects to ancestors’ graves. Today, the Spring Festival still has a spiritual significance for people, as it is a time to get together with friends and family. For a migrant worker, it may be the only opportunity in the whole year to go home.
How important is religion in Chinese society after over seven decades of communist rule?
Some would say that most Chinese people no longer have a religion. But that’s only true if you define religion very narrowly. It is more about the little things you do rather than a strict dogma that you believe in. People may have a small altar at home or light incense for a recently deceased parent.
What influence does the Communist Party have on religious life in China?
When the People’s Republic was founded in 1949, the Communist Party created five associations to regulate religious life: the Buddhist, Taoist, Protestant, Catholic and Islamic Associations of China. They still exist today. During the Cultural Revolution, all forms of religion were severely attacked, and almost all religious groups were forced underground. The late 1970s saw a new upsurge of spirituality, and the structure of official religions and their official associations was renewed.
What triggered this upswing?
At the end of the Cultural Revolution, the party had little legitimacy among the population. Under Mao, China was a totalitarian dictatorship. After that, the prevailing idea was that you could have freedom as long as you did not challenge the party’s power. What surprised the CCP was the fact that people longed for a spiritual answer. Communism was obviously no longer able to provide it.
In 2023, after a visit to China, you spoke of widespread disillusionment among the population.
Sometimes, societies turn to religion in times of crisis, and China is experiencing perhaps the biggest crisis since the Cultural Revolution. We haven’t seen a real sense of stagnation in China for half a century. We look at the country’s military might and technological advances and say: wow, China is on the rise. But I doubt that most people in China see it that way. There is a sense of malaise in China. Spirituality is certainly a way of turning more inward.
What is the way out of stagnation?
The party seems to want to muddle through by investing a little more to boost the economy. It hopes that some future technologies will catch on. Between the 1980s and the 2000s, China there was a genuine sense of excitement. You no longer sense this excitement when you talk to Chinese people today. It seems as if China is facing a less exciting, tougher time.
China has been isolating certain areas from the outside world in recent years. Is this trend also noticeable in how it deals with religion and spirituality?
In the late 2000s, civil society was flourishing. From 2008, the party cracked down. This is reflected in the restrictions on the internet and social media, even before Xi Jinping took power. There is still a space for religion, but it must be within the official associations. Among other things, the party has reached an agreement with the Vatican that supports the ordination of clergy but puts pressure on underground churches to submit to state control. Religion is part of efforts to re-centralize control over society and close off potential channels for dissent. And these efforts are primarily directed against the so-called foreign religions of Christianity and Islam.
How does the party respond to people’s search for meaning and spiritual expression?
The party feels it needs to legitimize itself in other ways than just by creating wealth, especially as economic growth has slowed. It has not given up on communism. The Communist Party is still investing great sums in related myth-making. All this and the nationalist and patriotic education propaganda works to a certain extent. Because the party knows this is not enough, it presents itself as the defender of traditional Chinese culture. Xi Jinping does not visit temples, but the Communist Party has rebuilt temples. It also promotes many popular religious activities that were previously considered superstition by redefining them as “intangible cultural heritage.” Among other things, the government financially supports pilgrimages to sacred mountains.
Why did civil society movements like Falun Gong gain so many followers?
Falun Gong began with a rediscovery of traditional practices after the Cultural Revolution. Its leader, Li Hongzhi, eventually wrote down a complete philosophical and religious system. He also gave lectures that were distributed on audio cassettes and videotapes. He gained millions of followers.
The Communist Party eventually cracked down on Falun Gong. Why did things escalate?
In the late 1990s, Li called on the group to gather in Beijing to protest against a small case of negative coverage of Falun Gong. They assembled in front of the Communist Party headquarters in Zhongnanhai. This triggered the crackdown. The Communist Party could tolerate certain private religious practices, but no independent center of power outside the government.
Falun Gong is still active outside China. Some have probably already heard of their show Shen Yun, a dance performance that will also be shown in several German cities in the next few weeks. What kind of organization is Falun Gong now?
Li Hongzhi now lives in the USA. The organization exists as an exile opposition group to the Communist Party. It runs a newspaper called Epoch Times and other media. Their entertainment group, Shen Yun, travels the world performing songs and dances that are supposedly about Chinese culture but are actually a form of propaganda against the Communist Party. Leonardo Pape
Ian Johnson has spent two decades reporting from China for the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, among others. Before his journalistic career, he studied sinology at the Free University of Berlin. He is the author of several non-fiction books and the founder of the non-governmental organization China Unofficial Archives, which collects independent reports on Chinese history. Johnson is currently researching religion and spirituality in China at the Berlin Institute for Advanced Study.
The chances of a permanent TikTok ban in the USA were probably never really that high. What many don’t know: ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, has influential Western shareholders. 60 percent of the company is owned by large institutional investors, including KKR, BlackRock and General Atlantic. It was always unlikely that they would allow billions to be wiped off their balance sheets.
Nevertheless, many TikTok users looked for a new home. Someone started the rumor that the social media service Xiaohongshu (XHS) was the Chinese TikTok – which, of course, is not true; That would be Douyin, also owned by Bytedance.
However, Xiaohongshu, also known as Rednote, with its 300 million active monthly users, is much more than a short video app. It combines functions from Instagram, Pinterest and Reddit with extensive e-commerce services. Although it has been available in Western app stores for some time, it has only had a few Western users to date.
However, the impending TikTok ban suddenly changed this last week. Under the hashtag #TikTokRefugee, millions of new Western users signed up on Xiaohongshu and started an experiment that no side had expected. Several interesting lessons can already be drawn:
Social media in China is slower, more relaxed, and, above all, kinder. Interactions feel more like a nice corner pub, not a crowded department store during a sale with stock running out. Accordingly, the Chinese welcomed the new users with open arms and helped them familiarize themselves with the app. An experience that was as unfamiliar as it was positive for many Western users.
Equally unusual from a Western perspective: there is less advertising. Western social media services focus on advertising as a business model. They have been trying to optimize this for years. Polarization and emotionalization have long been important revenue drivers in this area and have led to high stock market prices. Unfortunately, they have also given rise to somewhat antisocial media that generate stress and exhaust their users.
Xiaohongshu, too, generates most of its revenue from advertising. However, it tends to rely on creating harmony and a positive mood to retain users. Anger tends to be counterproductive. This has cultivated a respectful, relaxed way of interacting with one another. A difference that Western users immediately noticed and appreciated.
Rednote combines the functions of very different Western apps and creates something that is called a “lifestyle app” in China. It is less dominated by quick dopamine triggers with a constant stream of new short videos – although those do exist. But there are also longer texts, with lots of discussion and exchange.
In addition to influencers (known as key opinion leaders, KOLs, in China), this ecosystem also includes KOCs (= key opinion customers), normal customers who share and discuss their opinions on products. As a result, brands also maintain a presence here, for example, in chat groups, where they communicate extensively with customers and fans.
This makes Xiaohongshu a service geared towards dialogue and relationships – a real social medium, albeit one that is mainly product-based. This includes the ability to buy products directly from the Rednote app. This is the only way for brands and KOLs to generate sales. Links to external stores are not allowed.
This combination of different functions, a focus on dialogue and a different business model seem to appeal to more than just the Chinese. Could this be the foundation for Xiaohongshu’s rapid growth in the West?
The Chinese state is already beginning to erect censorship walls to control the previously very free exchange between Chinese and Western users. The renewed tightening of state control, along with the continued operation of TikTok, will most likely make this a very brief episode.
But as such, it is still exciting – especially for Western companies, who have witnessed that there are alternatives to our polarizing business models and that Western customers are more open to some things than they might have previously thought. Western brands and social media services should ask themselves what they could learn from this for their domestic markets, and how Xiaohongshu may react to this suddenly visible growth potential.
In just a few days, it spontaneously localized its app and made it usable for international users. Perhaps Xiaohongshu has realized that its own business could be scaled globally.
And since Temu and Shein or even Tiktok, we know how successful Chinese companies can be in the West if they really put their minds to it.
Björn Ognibeni lives in Hamburg and is an independent management consultant specializing in topics related to digital transformation. In 2019, he launched the online think tank ChinaBriefs.io, which helps Western companies and executives understand what they can learn from China’s digital innovations.
Editor’s note: Discussing China today means – more than ever – engaging in controversial debate. We aim to reflect a wide range of opinions to give you an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinions do not reflect the views of the editorial team.
Rugby may not be one of the most popular sports in China, but plenty of Chinese women have found their passion in this tough contact sport. And compared to a rugby nation like Australia, they are certainly not that bad. The two teams faced each other again in the rugby sevens tournament, the Olympic version of the ball sport, which only has seven instead of 15 players and is only played for 15 instead of 80 minutes per match. For the Chinese, the final score was 7:31. For rugby, that’s still a respectable score for an underdog. Last year in Dubai, China’s women suffered a 0:54 defeat. But anyone familiar with the Chinese quest for Olympic laurels can be sure that they will continue to train hard. Perhaps one day they will be able to beat Australia.
Faith stands in the way of state modernization. That is what communism preaches. Nevertheless, spirituality is experiencing great popularity in China. Sinologist and Pulitzer Prize winner Ian Johnson spoke with Leonardo Pape about what he thinks explains this magnetic effect in a communist state like China and why economic development plays a role.
The Communist Party is using the trend to try to legitimize itself in ways other than simply creating wealth, says Johnson. To this end, it promotes popular religious activities previously considered superstition. Johnson has examined spiritual movements in the People’s Republic for many years. In 2001, he won the Pulitzer Prize for his coverage on the persecution of Falun Gong members.
Today’s opinion piece looks at the boom of the lifestyle app Xiaohongshu among Western users. Björn Ognibeni, who advises companies on how they can learn from digital innovations in China, describes the difference between the atmosphere in Western social media and among Xiaohongshu users – and the consequences for advertisers.
Mr. Johnson, the Spring Festival, the most important traditional festival in China and other parts of Asia, is approaching. It is sometimes compared to Christmas. How much religion is in it?
For most people in China today, the Spring Festival is not strictly religious. However, it is traditionally associated with rituals like visiting a temple or paying respects to ancestors’ graves. Today, the Spring Festival still has a spiritual significance for people, as it is a time to get together with friends and family. For a migrant worker, it may be the only opportunity in the whole year to go home.
How important is religion in Chinese society after over seven decades of communist rule?
Some would say that most Chinese people no longer have a religion. But that’s only true if you define religion very narrowly. It is more about the little things you do rather than a strict dogma that you believe in. People may have a small altar at home or light incense for a recently deceased parent.
What influence does the Communist Party have on religious life in China?
When the People’s Republic was founded in 1949, the Communist Party created five associations to regulate religious life: the Buddhist, Taoist, Protestant, Catholic and Islamic Associations of China. They still exist today. During the Cultural Revolution, all forms of religion were severely attacked, and almost all religious groups were forced underground. The late 1970s saw a new upsurge of spirituality, and the structure of official religions and their official associations was renewed.
What triggered this upswing?
At the end of the Cultural Revolution, the party had little legitimacy among the population. Under Mao, China was a totalitarian dictatorship. After that, the prevailing idea was that you could have freedom as long as you did not challenge the party’s power. What surprised the CCP was the fact that people longed for a spiritual answer. Communism was obviously no longer able to provide it.
In 2023, after a visit to China, you spoke of widespread disillusionment among the population.
Sometimes, societies turn to religion in times of crisis, and China is experiencing perhaps the biggest crisis since the Cultural Revolution. We haven’t seen a real sense of stagnation in China for half a century. We look at the country’s military might and technological advances and say: wow, China is on the rise. But I doubt that most people in China see it that way. There is a sense of malaise in China. Spirituality is certainly a way of turning more inward.
What is the way out of stagnation?
The party seems to want to muddle through by investing a little more to boost the economy. It hopes that some future technologies will catch on. Between the 1980s and the 2000s, China there was a genuine sense of excitement. You no longer sense this excitement when you talk to Chinese people today. It seems as if China is facing a less exciting, tougher time.
China has been isolating certain areas from the outside world in recent years. Is this trend also noticeable in how it deals with religion and spirituality?
In the late 2000s, civil society was flourishing. From 2008, the party cracked down. This is reflected in the restrictions on the internet and social media, even before Xi Jinping took power. There is still a space for religion, but it must be within the official associations. Among other things, the party has reached an agreement with the Vatican that supports the ordination of clergy but puts pressure on underground churches to submit to state control. Religion is part of efforts to re-centralize control over society and close off potential channels for dissent. And these efforts are primarily directed against the so-called foreign religions of Christianity and Islam.
How does the party respond to people’s search for meaning and spiritual expression?
The party feels it needs to legitimize itself in other ways than just by creating wealth, especially as economic growth has slowed. It has not given up on communism. The Communist Party is still investing great sums in related myth-making. All this and the nationalist and patriotic education propaganda works to a certain extent. Because the party knows this is not enough, it presents itself as the defender of traditional Chinese culture. Xi Jinping does not visit temples, but the Communist Party has rebuilt temples. It also promotes many popular religious activities that were previously considered superstition by redefining them as “intangible cultural heritage.” Among other things, the government financially supports pilgrimages to sacred mountains.
Why did civil society movements like Falun Gong gain so many followers?
Falun Gong began with a rediscovery of traditional practices after the Cultural Revolution. Its leader, Li Hongzhi, eventually wrote down a complete philosophical and religious system. He also gave lectures that were distributed on audio cassettes and videotapes. He gained millions of followers.
The Communist Party eventually cracked down on Falun Gong. Why did things escalate?
In the late 1990s, Li called on the group to gather in Beijing to protest against a small case of negative coverage of Falun Gong. They assembled in front of the Communist Party headquarters in Zhongnanhai. This triggered the crackdown. The Communist Party could tolerate certain private religious practices, but no independent center of power outside the government.
Falun Gong is still active outside China. Some have probably already heard of their show Shen Yun, a dance performance that will also be shown in several German cities in the next few weeks. What kind of organization is Falun Gong now?
Li Hongzhi now lives in the USA. The organization exists as an exile opposition group to the Communist Party. It runs a newspaper called Epoch Times and other media. Their entertainment group, Shen Yun, travels the world performing songs and dances that are supposedly about Chinese culture but are actually a form of propaganda against the Communist Party. Leonardo Pape
Ian Johnson has spent two decades reporting from China for the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, among others. Before his journalistic career, he studied sinology at the Free University of Berlin. He is the author of several non-fiction books and the founder of the non-governmental organization China Unofficial Archives, which collects independent reports on Chinese history. Johnson is currently researching religion and spirituality in China at the Berlin Institute for Advanced Study.
The chances of a permanent TikTok ban in the USA were probably never really that high. What many don’t know: ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, has influential Western shareholders. 60 percent of the company is owned by large institutional investors, including KKR, BlackRock and General Atlantic. It was always unlikely that they would allow billions to be wiped off their balance sheets.
Nevertheless, many TikTok users looked for a new home. Someone started the rumor that the social media service Xiaohongshu (XHS) was the Chinese TikTok – which, of course, is not true; That would be Douyin, also owned by Bytedance.
However, Xiaohongshu, also known as Rednote, with its 300 million active monthly users, is much more than a short video app. It combines functions from Instagram, Pinterest and Reddit with extensive e-commerce services. Although it has been available in Western app stores for some time, it has only had a few Western users to date.
However, the impending TikTok ban suddenly changed this last week. Under the hashtag #TikTokRefugee, millions of new Western users signed up on Xiaohongshu and started an experiment that no side had expected. Several interesting lessons can already be drawn:
Social media in China is slower, more relaxed, and, above all, kinder. Interactions feel more like a nice corner pub, not a crowded department store during a sale with stock running out. Accordingly, the Chinese welcomed the new users with open arms and helped them familiarize themselves with the app. An experience that was as unfamiliar as it was positive for many Western users.
Equally unusual from a Western perspective: there is less advertising. Western social media services focus on advertising as a business model. They have been trying to optimize this for years. Polarization and emotionalization have long been important revenue drivers in this area and have led to high stock market prices. Unfortunately, they have also given rise to somewhat antisocial media that generate stress and exhaust their users.
Xiaohongshu, too, generates most of its revenue from advertising. However, it tends to rely on creating harmony and a positive mood to retain users. Anger tends to be counterproductive. This has cultivated a respectful, relaxed way of interacting with one another. A difference that Western users immediately noticed and appreciated.
Rednote combines the functions of very different Western apps and creates something that is called a “lifestyle app” in China. It is less dominated by quick dopamine triggers with a constant stream of new short videos – although those do exist. But there are also longer texts, with lots of discussion and exchange.
In addition to influencers (known as key opinion leaders, KOLs, in China), this ecosystem also includes KOCs (= key opinion customers), normal customers who share and discuss their opinions on products. As a result, brands also maintain a presence here, for example, in chat groups, where they communicate extensively with customers and fans.
This makes Xiaohongshu a service geared towards dialogue and relationships – a real social medium, albeit one that is mainly product-based. This includes the ability to buy products directly from the Rednote app. This is the only way for brands and KOLs to generate sales. Links to external stores are not allowed.
This combination of different functions, a focus on dialogue and a different business model seem to appeal to more than just the Chinese. Could this be the foundation for Xiaohongshu’s rapid growth in the West?
The Chinese state is already beginning to erect censorship walls to control the previously very free exchange between Chinese and Western users. The renewed tightening of state control, along with the continued operation of TikTok, will most likely make this a very brief episode.
But as such, it is still exciting – especially for Western companies, who have witnessed that there are alternatives to our polarizing business models and that Western customers are more open to some things than they might have previously thought. Western brands and social media services should ask themselves what they could learn from this for their domestic markets, and how Xiaohongshu may react to this suddenly visible growth potential.
In just a few days, it spontaneously localized its app and made it usable for international users. Perhaps Xiaohongshu has realized that its own business could be scaled globally.
And since Temu and Shein or even Tiktok, we know how successful Chinese companies can be in the West if they really put their minds to it.
Björn Ognibeni lives in Hamburg and is an independent management consultant specializing in topics related to digital transformation. In 2019, he launched the online think tank ChinaBriefs.io, which helps Western companies and executives understand what they can learn from China’s digital innovations.
Editor’s note: Discussing China today means – more than ever – engaging in controversial debate. We aim to reflect a wide range of opinions to give you an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinions do not reflect the views of the editorial team.
Rugby may not be one of the most popular sports in China, but plenty of Chinese women have found their passion in this tough contact sport. And compared to a rugby nation like Australia, they are certainly not that bad. The two teams faced each other again in the rugby sevens tournament, the Olympic version of the ball sport, which only has seven instead of 15 players and is only played for 15 instead of 80 minutes per match. For the Chinese, the final score was 7:31. For rugby, that’s still a respectable score for an underdog. Last year in Dubai, China’s women suffered a 0:54 defeat. But anyone familiar with the Chinese quest for Olympic laurels can be sure that they will continue to train hard. Perhaps one day they will be able to beat Australia.
