Germany will step up its military involvement in the Indo-Pacific in the future. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius made this clear during his visit to Korea, Hawaii and the Philippines. The agreements he signed during the trip envisage, for example, cooperation between the German and Philippine armed forces.
The primary goal is de-escalation. However, one country will probably see the initiative in a rather negative light: China. Despite Pistorius’ assurance that Germany’s involvement is not directed against a specific country, the elephant is still in the room. The Philippines, South Korea, and the United States are concerned about China’s pursuit of its goals. Michael Radunski analyzes Pistorius’ plans.
The experiences of the Covid pandemic have caused rifts between China’s urban population and the government – trust in the wisdom, omnipotence and prudence of the political leadership has suffered. This is what Michael Kahn-Ackermann says in an interview by Finn Mayer-Kuckuk. However, he emphasizes that this by no means weakens the Chinese state.
Kahn-Ackermann is one of the most influential cultural mediators between China and Germany with almost 50 years of experience. He also experienced the Covid period first-hand in China. The interview was part of our China.Table Toolbox event, which we jointly hosted with the China Network Baden- Wuerttemberg last Thursday. Perhaps you will be joining us next time?
Germany wants to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific – and German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius backed up this ambition with action during his visit to the Indo-Pacific. The most important agreements are
On Sunday in Manila, Pistorius stressed that Germany’s involvement in the region was not directed against any particular country. Instead, the country aims to contribute to de-escalation by ensuring a rules-based international order, securing freedom of navigation, and protecting trade routes. All of this is right – and important.
Nevertheless, there is always the proverbial elephant in the room at every stop on Pistorius’ trip: China. The People’s Republic is building up its military and pursuing its goals with increasing determination. The Philippines, South Korea, and, above all, the USA are watching China with concern. Tensions in the region, which is also of economic importance to Germany, continue to rise.
The relationship between China and Germany is also becoming increasingly difficult – just last week, Chinese cyber espionage became an issue. In 2023, Berlin responded to the growing tensions by launching a dedicated China strategy, which includes strengthening partnerships in East Asia.
So, Pistorius also does justice to his government’s strategy paper. Germany intends to regard China more as a partner, competitor and rival. Another goal is to diversify.
Pistorius also laid down several priorities during his trip:
However, given the strained state of the German Armed Forces, not much more than setting priorities will happen in the military sector for the foreseeable future. However, focusing on these areas is already sending important signals to Germany’s regional partners.
Pistorius and his Philippine counterpart Gilberto Teodoro agreed on closer military cooperation on Sunday. The aim: joint exercises, more bilateral exchange in the defense sector and possibly also arms cooperation. An agreement to this effect is due to be signed this year. This is also economically important: German defense companies could receive large contracts. They could play an important role in the modernization of the Philippine military.
The Philippines particularly sees itself under massive pressure from China due to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In response, the Philippines has recently strengthened its military cooperation with the United States and signed a defense agreement with Japan.
During his stop in South Korea on Friday, Pistorius announced that Germany would join the United Nations Command. The Command is led by the United States and is not under the authority of the United Nations. It is tasked with monitoring the border and the ceasefire between North and South Korea. The specific nature of Germany’s contribution will be decided in the coming weeks and months.
South Korea’s relations with China are also strained. However, the main focus here is on North Korea. Ruler Kim Jong-un continues to press ahead with his missile and nuclear weapons program. He repeatedly threatens the South. This makes it important for Germany to support its partner, South Korea, in national security matters.
Russia and North Korea have also recently expanded their cooperation. In addition to ammunition deliveries, there are initial reports that North Korean weapons are also being used in the Ukraine war. This is where German and European security is directly affected. In South Korea, Pistorius also made it clear: “Putin and Kim are arming themselves while ignoring the rules-based international order and international law.”
At the start of his trip to the Indo-Pacific, Defense Minister Pistorius announced that the German Armed Forces would permanently station a liaison officer at the headquarters of the US Indo-Pacific Command (Indopacom) in the US state of Hawaii. He also watched the military exercise Rimpac2024.
Since 1971, the military units of Pacific states and other countries with an interest in the Indo-Pacific have met every two years under US leadership. The aim is to improve interoperability between the various forces.
For the first time, the German Armed Forces sent two combat ships to the massive exercise: the frigate “Baden-Wuerttemberg” and the task force supply vessel Frankfurt am Main. They will be joined by three Eurofighters and two A400Ms for aerial refueling. The main aim is to signal to its important partner, the USA, that Germany is willing to participate in joint tasks and show a greater presence in the Indo-Pacific.
With his trip and the agreements reached, Pistorius is sending a clear signal: Germany has recognized the importance of the Indo-Pacific. What’s more, it is also prepared to show its presence, take on tasks and thus support its partners in the region. Even though the Indo-Pacific is geographically far away, Germany’s interests are closely interwoven with the region – both politically and economically.
The United States has made it unmistakably clear that its future focus will no longer be on Europe, but on the Indo-Pacific. This is where Washington sees its biggest challenger going forward: China. This will not change regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election in November. If Germany and Europe want to continue to be heard in Washington, they must become more involved.
To what extent has the pandemic damaged the population’s trust in the government?
I wouldn’t speak of “the population” or even “the Chinese,” but only of affected parts of the population. And Covid has had very different effects on different places in China. Overall, it can be said that the experience of the Covid policy has left cracks in the trust in the wisdom, omnipotence and prudence of the political leadership in large parts of the urban population.
Cracks – that does not mean large-scale destabilization, but only a decline in trust.
We must distinguish between a current decline in confidence and the systemic issue. Covid has not caused destabilization in a systemic sense. Here in Germany, we often immediately raise the systemic question when China experiences difficulties. I think that’s unrealistic, wishful thinking. Most of the population does not question the current political system in China. However, there is no question that its reputation and relationship with the political leadership have suffered due to the lockdowns.
The high stability is also due to the digital control, and Covid has made it possible to perfect the instruments. Has surveillance become tighter overall?
Increasing control of society works with the help of digital technologies, but not exclusively; A large part of it is simply physical control. It is not an invention of the Covid era, but has long been part of political strategy. However, Covid has intensified and accelerated this process. Generally speaking, you could say that surveillance has increased in the past three or four years since Covid.
Can you give an example of the increase in non-digital surveillance?
Let me give you an example that is so outlandish – it sounds almost comical. As we all know, all printed products go through censorship. This also applies to theater plays, which are censored before publication; the unfortunate authors have to rewrite some of them. The problem with physical theater is that every evening is new. The censorship authorities now fear that the actors will deviate from the approved text. This is why older women are instructed to read along, line by line, with the script in hand, to ensure that the spoken text matches the text approved by the censor.
So, a lot of effort is put into intercepting every unwanted statement.
Also, for example, all lectures at universities are filmed nowadays.
Not just spied on, but recorded?
And additionally monitored by the so-called Xinxiyuan 信息員, i.e., informants. We experienced this first-hand when we organized a workshop at a Chinese university. University staff warned us off the record: ‘Be a little careful. There is at least one informer in every such group, but we don’t know who they are.’ This has certain career advantages for those who agree to do so.
Doesn’t suspicion then dominate the lecture hall?
Yes, there is an atmosphere of mistrust and fear. This is particularly the case in the social sciences and humanities. I know several academics who suffer from depression as a result.
This again raises the question of how typical these population groups are for the country. How can we know exactly what is going on in China?
We need to distinguish two aspects here. One is changes in societal structures, such as urbanization, unemployment, and birth rates. The other is social perception, meaning society’s perception. As far as structural changes are concerned, we mainly see a continuation of existing trends. Covid has impacted this but has not given developments an entirely new direction.
And in the second area, society’s perception?
This is about views, opinions and values. It is almost impossible to draw reliable conclusions about them. We have to rely on minimal access channels such as personal acquaintances or internet forums.
The internet tends to be hysterical, and personal inquiries often only occur in certain social circles.
Foreigners like me, who live permanently in China and work there professionally, mainly have personal contacts with people from the urban middle class, often with an academic background. In my case, they are mostly intellectuals, people from the cultural scene and the media. Foreigners who work in business, on the other hand, mainly have contacts with Chinese colleagues, entrepreneurs or executives. All of these groups are important, but are only partially representative of the predominant views and opinions of the population. The internet is indeed hysterical, but above all, it is always controlled and censored in China.
Michael Kahn-Ackermann is one of the most influential cultural mediators between China and Germany. While the Cultural Revolution was still raging, he studied sinology in Munich and Beijing, among other places. In 1988, he founded the Goethe-Institut in Beijing as its director and, after several interim positions, served as its director again from 2006 to 2011. Readers of Chinese literature know him as a prolific translator. He has been an advisor to the Mercator Foundation in China since 2012. He lives in Nanjing and Berlin.
This interview is based on the event “Changes in Chinese Society after Corona” organized by CNBW Berlin Naehkaestle and China.Table Toolbox. The text has been translated from German into English.
Are you looking for a career change? Then make sure that you don’t fall victim to a radish recruitment when browsing through the open jobs in your occupational field. The Chinese saying goes: 一个萝卜一个坑 yí gè luóbo yí gè kēng. Loosely translated: Each radish grows in its own hole. And that means: As far as work is concerned, everyone has their place and a specific task to concentrate on. A quintessence of thousands of years of working the fields. But sometimes the agricultural world is turned upside down: When the radish is there first and the matching hole only comes later. Sounds like a crazy version of the chicken-or-egg problem? That’s right!
Before you start wondering what that is supposed to mean, I won’t dangle the carrot in front of your nose any longer. Radish hole 萝卜坑 luóbokēng – is the Chinese organic term for a fake job offer. In other words, it is a position that is only advertised pro forma and the perfect radish has long been ready in the company, just waiting to be planted.
坑 kēng means “trough, pit, hole” or “cave” in Chinese. 萝卜 luóbo refers to the vegetable radish. Some Chinese learners know the word mainly from the beginner’s vegetable vocabulary 胡萝卜 húluóbo – meaning “carrot.” Sometimes a position is specifically created for a radish candidate. As a tailor-made employment hole, so to speak. In China, these tailor-made jobs are called “radish jobs” (萝卜岗位 luóbo gǎngwèi).
The new linguistic creations are reactions to an age-old problem: Nepotism, which can still occur occasionally in Chinese state-owned companies, public institutions or universities when it comes to assigning lucrative and secure positions. In state-run danwei work units, the iron rice bowl (铁饭碗 tiěfànwǎn) is often passed on internally via connections, leaving the guanxi-strapped ordinary applicant no chance on the job market. Naturally, such rigged jobs turn application procedures into a farce. After all, it has long been decided which beet will win the race. And the application procedure is a mere formality for the groomed candidate.
However, in the Middle Kingdom, it’s not just job holes that are created, sometimes real pits are dug. This is because the word 坑 kēng also means “pit” in the colloquial sense of “trap.” 挖坑 wā kēng accordingly means “to dig someone a pit.” However, in China, you can also dig the pit yourself before happily jumping in. 给自己挖坑 gěi zìjǐ wā kēng “digging a pit for yourself” is what young people in China call it. It means willingly indulging in addictive things that you can’t get away from.
First and foremost, this includes the black hole of the internet. YouTube, TikTok, Netflix and the like are not just sucking in people in the West. The Chinese are also disappearing down the rabbit hole of the World Wide Web day after day. 入坑 rù kēng, “to fall into a pit, to enter a cave,” is the Chinese expression for getting hooked on something that eats up one’s time or money. One example of this is an exciting streaming series, which can sometimes turn into binge-watching weekends. Another typical hype among young Chinese is the euphoria surrounding the collectible Pop Mart figurines (泡泡泡玛特 pàopao mǎté in Chinese), with which the company is making billions in China. It seems that it is hard to crawl out of this pit. Or, as China’s youth put it, they have been successfully “caved” or “put in a hole” (被坑了 bèi kēng le).
In the case of streaming, this kind of pitfalling can, in the worst case, even lead to the point where you don’t want to put your smartphone down. Even in the bathroom. Incidentally, this is also known colloquially in Chinese as 坑 kēng, at least if it is a proper squat toilet (蹲坑 dūnkēng).
Excessive streaming sessions on the loo are, of course, best avoided at work. Unless you feel you’re in a safe job because you occupy a radish hole (This is where the radish metaphor comes full circle). But in the long term, this is not the best way to feather one’s vegetables. After all, radishes that don’t work are not popular anywhere, and that includes China. In this context, Deng Xiaoping already warned his cadres with a raised finger that they should not “occupy the toilet without pooping” (占着茅坑不拉屎 zhànzhe máokēng bù lāshǐ), in other words, occupy a post without doing their job. Sometimes you just need to call a spade a spade. Mandarin certainly has no shortage of entertaining metaphors in this regard. This has once again been impressively demonstrated by this linguistic excursion.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
The CEO of Xiaomi, Lei Jun, is one of China’s most popular entrepreneurs. This is also thanks to his online presence. His public presentations are watched by millions of viewers and his quotes are shared like Confucian wisdom. However, Lei Jun is also often the target of mocking memes and comments. The billionaire recently set up an account on Douyin, the Chinese TikTok, where he presents his everyday life for all to see. For example, on a trip to Paris or eating a Chinese breakfast of soy milk and toutiao. “And what do you eat for breakfast?” he asked his followers in one of his videos. “We eat bitterness for breakfast” (吃苦), replied one user, receiving hundreds of likes and laughs.
Germany will step up its military involvement in the Indo-Pacific in the future. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius made this clear during his visit to Korea, Hawaii and the Philippines. The agreements he signed during the trip envisage, for example, cooperation between the German and Philippine armed forces.
The primary goal is de-escalation. However, one country will probably see the initiative in a rather negative light: China. Despite Pistorius’ assurance that Germany’s involvement is not directed against a specific country, the elephant is still in the room. The Philippines, South Korea, and the United States are concerned about China’s pursuit of its goals. Michael Radunski analyzes Pistorius’ plans.
The experiences of the Covid pandemic have caused rifts between China’s urban population and the government – trust in the wisdom, omnipotence and prudence of the political leadership has suffered. This is what Michael Kahn-Ackermann says in an interview by Finn Mayer-Kuckuk. However, he emphasizes that this by no means weakens the Chinese state.
Kahn-Ackermann is one of the most influential cultural mediators between China and Germany with almost 50 years of experience. He also experienced the Covid period first-hand in China. The interview was part of our China.Table Toolbox event, which we jointly hosted with the China Network Baden- Wuerttemberg last Thursday. Perhaps you will be joining us next time?
Germany wants to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific – and German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius backed up this ambition with action during his visit to the Indo-Pacific. The most important agreements are
On Sunday in Manila, Pistorius stressed that Germany’s involvement in the region was not directed against any particular country. Instead, the country aims to contribute to de-escalation by ensuring a rules-based international order, securing freedom of navigation, and protecting trade routes. All of this is right – and important.
Nevertheless, there is always the proverbial elephant in the room at every stop on Pistorius’ trip: China. The People’s Republic is building up its military and pursuing its goals with increasing determination. The Philippines, South Korea, and, above all, the USA are watching China with concern. Tensions in the region, which is also of economic importance to Germany, continue to rise.
The relationship between China and Germany is also becoming increasingly difficult – just last week, Chinese cyber espionage became an issue. In 2023, Berlin responded to the growing tensions by launching a dedicated China strategy, which includes strengthening partnerships in East Asia.
So, Pistorius also does justice to his government’s strategy paper. Germany intends to regard China more as a partner, competitor and rival. Another goal is to diversify.
Pistorius also laid down several priorities during his trip:
However, given the strained state of the German Armed Forces, not much more than setting priorities will happen in the military sector for the foreseeable future. However, focusing on these areas is already sending important signals to Germany’s regional partners.
Pistorius and his Philippine counterpart Gilberto Teodoro agreed on closer military cooperation on Sunday. The aim: joint exercises, more bilateral exchange in the defense sector and possibly also arms cooperation. An agreement to this effect is due to be signed this year. This is also economically important: German defense companies could receive large contracts. They could play an important role in the modernization of the Philippine military.
The Philippines particularly sees itself under massive pressure from China due to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In response, the Philippines has recently strengthened its military cooperation with the United States and signed a defense agreement with Japan.
During his stop in South Korea on Friday, Pistorius announced that Germany would join the United Nations Command. The Command is led by the United States and is not under the authority of the United Nations. It is tasked with monitoring the border and the ceasefire between North and South Korea. The specific nature of Germany’s contribution will be decided in the coming weeks and months.
South Korea’s relations with China are also strained. However, the main focus here is on North Korea. Ruler Kim Jong-un continues to press ahead with his missile and nuclear weapons program. He repeatedly threatens the South. This makes it important for Germany to support its partner, South Korea, in national security matters.
Russia and North Korea have also recently expanded their cooperation. In addition to ammunition deliveries, there are initial reports that North Korean weapons are also being used in the Ukraine war. This is where German and European security is directly affected. In South Korea, Pistorius also made it clear: “Putin and Kim are arming themselves while ignoring the rules-based international order and international law.”
At the start of his trip to the Indo-Pacific, Defense Minister Pistorius announced that the German Armed Forces would permanently station a liaison officer at the headquarters of the US Indo-Pacific Command (Indopacom) in the US state of Hawaii. He also watched the military exercise Rimpac2024.
Since 1971, the military units of Pacific states and other countries with an interest in the Indo-Pacific have met every two years under US leadership. The aim is to improve interoperability between the various forces.
For the first time, the German Armed Forces sent two combat ships to the massive exercise: the frigate “Baden-Wuerttemberg” and the task force supply vessel Frankfurt am Main. They will be joined by three Eurofighters and two A400Ms for aerial refueling. The main aim is to signal to its important partner, the USA, that Germany is willing to participate in joint tasks and show a greater presence in the Indo-Pacific.
With his trip and the agreements reached, Pistorius is sending a clear signal: Germany has recognized the importance of the Indo-Pacific. What’s more, it is also prepared to show its presence, take on tasks and thus support its partners in the region. Even though the Indo-Pacific is geographically far away, Germany’s interests are closely interwoven with the region – both politically and economically.
The United States has made it unmistakably clear that its future focus will no longer be on Europe, but on the Indo-Pacific. This is where Washington sees its biggest challenger going forward: China. This will not change regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election in November. If Germany and Europe want to continue to be heard in Washington, they must become more involved.
To what extent has the pandemic damaged the population’s trust in the government?
I wouldn’t speak of “the population” or even “the Chinese,” but only of affected parts of the population. And Covid has had very different effects on different places in China. Overall, it can be said that the experience of the Covid policy has left cracks in the trust in the wisdom, omnipotence and prudence of the political leadership in large parts of the urban population.
Cracks – that does not mean large-scale destabilization, but only a decline in trust.
We must distinguish between a current decline in confidence and the systemic issue. Covid has not caused destabilization in a systemic sense. Here in Germany, we often immediately raise the systemic question when China experiences difficulties. I think that’s unrealistic, wishful thinking. Most of the population does not question the current political system in China. However, there is no question that its reputation and relationship with the political leadership have suffered due to the lockdowns.
The high stability is also due to the digital control, and Covid has made it possible to perfect the instruments. Has surveillance become tighter overall?
Increasing control of society works with the help of digital technologies, but not exclusively; A large part of it is simply physical control. It is not an invention of the Covid era, but has long been part of political strategy. However, Covid has intensified and accelerated this process. Generally speaking, you could say that surveillance has increased in the past three or four years since Covid.
Can you give an example of the increase in non-digital surveillance?
Let me give you an example that is so outlandish – it sounds almost comical. As we all know, all printed products go through censorship. This also applies to theater plays, which are censored before publication; the unfortunate authors have to rewrite some of them. The problem with physical theater is that every evening is new. The censorship authorities now fear that the actors will deviate from the approved text. This is why older women are instructed to read along, line by line, with the script in hand, to ensure that the spoken text matches the text approved by the censor.
So, a lot of effort is put into intercepting every unwanted statement.
Also, for example, all lectures at universities are filmed nowadays.
Not just spied on, but recorded?
And additionally monitored by the so-called Xinxiyuan 信息員, i.e., informants. We experienced this first-hand when we organized a workshop at a Chinese university. University staff warned us off the record: ‘Be a little careful. There is at least one informer in every such group, but we don’t know who they are.’ This has certain career advantages for those who agree to do so.
Doesn’t suspicion then dominate the lecture hall?
Yes, there is an atmosphere of mistrust and fear. This is particularly the case in the social sciences and humanities. I know several academics who suffer from depression as a result.
This again raises the question of how typical these population groups are for the country. How can we know exactly what is going on in China?
We need to distinguish two aspects here. One is changes in societal structures, such as urbanization, unemployment, and birth rates. The other is social perception, meaning society’s perception. As far as structural changes are concerned, we mainly see a continuation of existing trends. Covid has impacted this but has not given developments an entirely new direction.
And in the second area, society’s perception?
This is about views, opinions and values. It is almost impossible to draw reliable conclusions about them. We have to rely on minimal access channels such as personal acquaintances or internet forums.
The internet tends to be hysterical, and personal inquiries often only occur in certain social circles.
Foreigners like me, who live permanently in China and work there professionally, mainly have personal contacts with people from the urban middle class, often with an academic background. In my case, they are mostly intellectuals, people from the cultural scene and the media. Foreigners who work in business, on the other hand, mainly have contacts with Chinese colleagues, entrepreneurs or executives. All of these groups are important, but are only partially representative of the predominant views and opinions of the population. The internet is indeed hysterical, but above all, it is always controlled and censored in China.
Michael Kahn-Ackermann is one of the most influential cultural mediators between China and Germany. While the Cultural Revolution was still raging, he studied sinology in Munich and Beijing, among other places. In 1988, he founded the Goethe-Institut in Beijing as its director and, after several interim positions, served as its director again from 2006 to 2011. Readers of Chinese literature know him as a prolific translator. He has been an advisor to the Mercator Foundation in China since 2012. He lives in Nanjing and Berlin.
This interview is based on the event “Changes in Chinese Society after Corona” organized by CNBW Berlin Naehkaestle and China.Table Toolbox. The text has been translated from German into English.
Are you looking for a career change? Then make sure that you don’t fall victim to a radish recruitment when browsing through the open jobs in your occupational field. The Chinese saying goes: 一个萝卜一个坑 yí gè luóbo yí gè kēng. Loosely translated: Each radish grows in its own hole. And that means: As far as work is concerned, everyone has their place and a specific task to concentrate on. A quintessence of thousands of years of working the fields. But sometimes the agricultural world is turned upside down: When the radish is there first and the matching hole only comes later. Sounds like a crazy version of the chicken-or-egg problem? That’s right!
Before you start wondering what that is supposed to mean, I won’t dangle the carrot in front of your nose any longer. Radish hole 萝卜坑 luóbokēng – is the Chinese organic term for a fake job offer. In other words, it is a position that is only advertised pro forma and the perfect radish has long been ready in the company, just waiting to be planted.
坑 kēng means “trough, pit, hole” or “cave” in Chinese. 萝卜 luóbo refers to the vegetable radish. Some Chinese learners know the word mainly from the beginner’s vegetable vocabulary 胡萝卜 húluóbo – meaning “carrot.” Sometimes a position is specifically created for a radish candidate. As a tailor-made employment hole, so to speak. In China, these tailor-made jobs are called “radish jobs” (萝卜岗位 luóbo gǎngwèi).
The new linguistic creations are reactions to an age-old problem: Nepotism, which can still occur occasionally in Chinese state-owned companies, public institutions or universities when it comes to assigning lucrative and secure positions. In state-run danwei work units, the iron rice bowl (铁饭碗 tiěfànwǎn) is often passed on internally via connections, leaving the guanxi-strapped ordinary applicant no chance on the job market. Naturally, such rigged jobs turn application procedures into a farce. After all, it has long been decided which beet will win the race. And the application procedure is a mere formality for the groomed candidate.
However, in the Middle Kingdom, it’s not just job holes that are created, sometimes real pits are dug. This is because the word 坑 kēng also means “pit” in the colloquial sense of “trap.” 挖坑 wā kēng accordingly means “to dig someone a pit.” However, in China, you can also dig the pit yourself before happily jumping in. 给自己挖坑 gěi zìjǐ wā kēng “digging a pit for yourself” is what young people in China call it. It means willingly indulging in addictive things that you can’t get away from.
First and foremost, this includes the black hole of the internet. YouTube, TikTok, Netflix and the like are not just sucking in people in the West. The Chinese are also disappearing down the rabbit hole of the World Wide Web day after day. 入坑 rù kēng, “to fall into a pit, to enter a cave,” is the Chinese expression for getting hooked on something that eats up one’s time or money. One example of this is an exciting streaming series, which can sometimes turn into binge-watching weekends. Another typical hype among young Chinese is the euphoria surrounding the collectible Pop Mart figurines (泡泡泡玛特 pàopao mǎté in Chinese), with which the company is making billions in China. It seems that it is hard to crawl out of this pit. Or, as China’s youth put it, they have been successfully “caved” or “put in a hole” (被坑了 bèi kēng le).
In the case of streaming, this kind of pitfalling can, in the worst case, even lead to the point where you don’t want to put your smartphone down. Even in the bathroom. Incidentally, this is also known colloquially in Chinese as 坑 kēng, at least if it is a proper squat toilet (蹲坑 dūnkēng).
Excessive streaming sessions on the loo are, of course, best avoided at work. Unless you feel you’re in a safe job because you occupy a radish hole (This is where the radish metaphor comes full circle). But in the long term, this is not the best way to feather one’s vegetables. After all, radishes that don’t work are not popular anywhere, and that includes China. In this context, Deng Xiaoping already warned his cadres with a raised finger that they should not “occupy the toilet without pooping” (占着茅坑不拉屎 zhànzhe máokēng bù lāshǐ), in other words, occupy a post without doing their job. Sometimes you just need to call a spade a spade. Mandarin certainly has no shortage of entertaining metaphors in this regard. This has once again been impressively demonstrated by this linguistic excursion.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
The CEO of Xiaomi, Lei Jun, is one of China’s most popular entrepreneurs. This is also thanks to his online presence. His public presentations are watched by millions of viewers and his quotes are shared like Confucian wisdom. However, Lei Jun is also often the target of mocking memes and comments. The billionaire recently set up an account on Douyin, the Chinese TikTok, where he presents his everyday life for all to see. For example, on a trip to Paris or eating a Chinese breakfast of soy milk and toutiao. “And what do you eat for breakfast?” he asked his followers in one of his videos. “We eat bitterness for breakfast” (吃苦), replied one user, receiving hundreds of likes and laughs.
