Isn’t it astonishing that 75 years after its foundation, the People’s Republic of China is regressing in some respects? After Mao Zedong’s death, the Communist Party laid the groundwork to ensure that no successor would ever be given such power. But the events of the past ten years have undermined all these efforts.
Today, with Xi Jinping at the helm, there is a new helmsman who, with a firm hand and massive help from technological developments, is guiding the political actions and social thinking of a nation of 1.4 billion people. It remains to be seen what consequences this will have. Nowadays, even the ideological hardliners in the Communist Party admit that even the great Mao didn’t do everything right; in fact, he made many mistakes. Fabian Kretschmer has looked into the question of what will happen after the anniversary.
It is already becoming apparent that the People’s Republic will increasingly focus its diplomatic attention on Africa. The continent has resources, markets and many countries whose favor will become rather valuable in the geopolitical tug-of-war. This is why China is in direct competition with the European Union, which, for its part, is trying to gain influence over African nations.
Belt & Road Initiative vs. Global Gateway – two infrastructure programs with not entirely altruistic intentions. China’s advantage: The People’s Republic was there first and is almost everywhere in Africa. Europe’s Global Gateway, on the other hand, is far from realizing its potential, according to an analysis published by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. Amelie Richter took a look at the paper.
When Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China at exactly three o’clock in the afternoon on 1 October 1949, it was almost unimaginable that his larger-than-life portrait would still be watching over Tiananmen Square 75 years later. In fact, decades after his death, Mao continues to shape the country and the ideological direction of the Communist Party.
Today, a party leader with absolute power is once again guiding the fate of the Communist Party – just as Mao once did. And in a way that Mao’s heirs actually wanted to prevent. Xi Jinping has managed to bring competing factions within the Party to heel and impose his ideas on the country as a guideline for political action and social thinking. His goal is to shed China’s psychological baggage of the past centuries and compete on an equal footing with the USA for the leading role in the world. He has inherited this recipe from his predecessors: The Communist Party shall be the eternal ruler of the Chinese nation.
But when the People’s Republic marks its 75th anniversary on Tuesday, most of China’s 1.4 billion people will be in little mood to celebrate the prospect of more geopolitical power and another 75 years of Communist Party rule. Youth unemployment is at a record high, the social divide separates winners and losers, and the property crisis has severely eroded the wealth of the middle class. The years of economic boom are over and are dragging down the boundless optimism of the recent past.
Where is the People’s Republic headed 75 years after that fateful day in October 1949? For Xi, the transformation of his homeland has probably only just begun. In his third term of office, the 71-year-old is working on fundamentally changing the social contract that has existed for decades.
Since Deng Xiaoping (1904-92) set the country on an unprecedented development path with the help of market economy reforms, the Communist Party legitimized itself primarily through its pragmatic policies. The Chinese promise was that as long as the Party ensured steadily growing prosperity, the masses would willingly relinquish their right to political co-determination. And the Communist Party delivered: Prosperity reached the people rapidly, albeit very unevenly distributed. From 1980 to 2010, the People’s Republic’s GDP grew by an average of almost 10 percent – every year.
But the booming years are over. Growth is slowing down. People are not consuming enough, the social safety net is too weak, and the population is aging too quickly. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese entrepreneurs set up shop overseas instead of at home. Economists are now warning of a lasting economic downturn. However, Xi appears prepared to pay the price for this economic slump to maintain control over the country and its people.
The Party leader is primarily concerned with two things: ideological loyalty and national security. Instead of prosperity, he promises his people patriotic self-confidence. In his vision of the “Chinese dream,” the country’s “effeminate” youth should tighten their belts and work for a stronger, socialist state that generates technological achievements and confidently presents itself on the diplomatic stage – but no longer promises wealth for the individual. Quite the opposite: Xi has repeatedly made it clear in his speeches that he rejects a “decadent” welfare state based on the European model. He believes this would weaken the people’s “work ethic.”
It is almost impossible to gauge how the Chinese people genuinely feel about the course of their Party leadership. Any public criticism of the central government is met with harsh repression. Those who keep their mouth shut live less dangerously. However, the manifestations of subcultures and comments on social media offer clues. Parts of the youth are frustrated in view of declining economic prospects and a party that is meddling in their everyday lives with its values.
The urban youth even refer to the present as “the garbage time of history” – a reference to the term “garbage time,” which describes the irrelevant final phase of a sports match that has been decided early on, in which a team can no longer avoid defeat despite its best efforts.
In the provinces, however, Mao portraits still line the walls. People proudly echo the propaganda of the dominant state media, calling China the safest country in the world thanks to the protective hand of the Party, while war and chaos reign in other countries. And Xi Jinping is praised for his rigid anti-corruption campaign.
The perception toward the rest of the world has changed under Xi. While openness and curiosity prevailed in the noughties, mistrust and even hostility now dominate perceptions. One indication of this is that tourists have returned after the “zero Covid” years, but expats are becoming increasingly rare.
The country is increasingly distancing itself from the West. Tensions overshadow cooperation. The USA is the big adversary, and China only woos Europe as long as it remains an attractive market for Chinese exports. But whenever the EU dares to extend its hand over the Atlantic, Beijing responds with economic retaliation.
China’s diplomatic efforts are focused on the Global South. From Africa to the Middle East and Central Asia, the Middle Kingdom presents itself as an alternative superpower that seeks to replace the hegemonic United States. China is systematically attempting to reshape the institutions of the liberal world order in line with its own values. In recent years, no other country has been able to fill as many leadership positions in the United Nations as China.
This also requires domestic companies that continue to want to do business in China to rethink their approach. The market has become more political, more state-controlled. Private companies practically only flourish if they strategically comply with the state’s five-year plans. Far-reaching reforms have become a distant prospect. Foreign companies inevitably lose out in core industries, which Xi Jinping has declared to be a state matter with extensive subsidies.
This has led to a turning point for a growing number of companies, summarizes the EU Chamber of Commerce in Beijing. They now look closer at their China business, as the challenges are beginning to outweigh the benefits. None of this is helping China’s economic development and international integration.
75 years after the founding of the People’s Republic, it has left its mark on history. Its rise from the world’s poorhouse to the second-largest economy at breathtaking speed will continue to fascinate scientists for hundreds of years to come. What they will think of Xi Jinping will largely depend on whether he can make patriotic self-confidence more appealing to his people than prosperity. Fabian Kretschmer/ Contribution: Marcel Grzanna
According to analysts, the EU still has some work to do on its Global Gateway (GG) infrastructure initiative strategy. With the start of the new EU cabinet, communication around GG needs to become more transparent to realize its full potential and strengthen existing partnerships, especially in Africa.
This is the conclusion of a joint analysis published on Tuesday by Merics, the German Marshall Fund, the African think tank Nkafu Politics Institute and the British think tank Institute of Economic Affairs, published by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. The paper has been made available to Table.Briefings in advance.
Africa was the continent with the most Global Gateway projects in 2024. The analysis notes that communication and perception of the EU infrastructure initiative in African countries remains a significant problem.
Since its inception, GG has drawn comparisons with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – not least because EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen herself presented the initiative as an alternative to the BRI. The analysts write that the EU must clearly communicate its goals and the value of GG to avoid misunderstandings and create a positive image.
The analysis shows that there have so far been several problems with the initiative’s own positioning and external perception – not only in Africa, but also in China: The decline in mutual investment goals between the EU and the People’s Republic shows that Beijing perceives GG as a direct competitor to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
This is why the Chinese side attempts to downplay the importance of the EU initiative and present GG as a complement to the BRI: “China has developed a narrative that presents GG as complementary to the BRI, while the EU should emphasize its competitive role more clearly,” the report states. It is “Europe’s responsibility to also correct the Chinese narrative and perception regarding European support for the Belt and Road Initiative and its synergy potential with GG.”
The crux of the matter is that the competition narrative is less well received in Africa: The analysts write that the EU should avoid seeing Africa as a chessboard in competition with China. Instead, the focus should be on Africa’s actual development needs.
The report recommends several steps:
However, the analysts take a realistic view of the success potential: “Some of the EU’s implementation difficulties with GG are related to the simple fact that many recipient countries have no interest in fulfilling the basic EU criteria within the framework of GG” the paper states. This applies, in particular, to requirements relating to transparency and democratic standards. “A faster provision of BRI loans with fewer governance criteria will continue to be more appealing to many.”
The paper argues that the complexity of EU decision-making processes and financing problems generally reduce GG’s competitiveness. As a result, Chinese analysts are often skeptical about the initiative’s effectiveness. The paper found that the Chinese media often view the GG narrative through the lens of strategic competition between the US and China, leading to skepticism regarding the EU’s geopolitical motives.
The analysts add further points to the to-do list of the designated EU Commissioner for International Partnerships, Jozef Síkela, who will be responsible for GG. Among them: The “indiscriminate use of the ‘Global Gateway’ brand” must be abandoned. It is “inflationary” to simply bundle all types of development aid projects under GG, the analysts criticize – “possibly in order to reach the global mobilization sum of 300 billion euros by 2027.” In this way, GG loses credibility, they say.
Sinolytics is a research-based business consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and specific business activities in the People’s Republic.
When China celebrates the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic these days, there is really no way around Frank Dikoetter. The Dutch historian is one of the most renowned chroniclers of the People’s Republic – highly critical, extremely thorough and knowledgeable. To understand what China is celebrating, it is worth picking up Dikoetter’s latest book: “China After Mao: The Rise of a Superpower.” It describes an incredible rise that Dikoetter experienced first-hand.
The book begins in the summer of 1985, when Dikoetter came to China as a young student. The Chinese Foreign Ministry allocated him a spot at Nankai University in Tianjin, and a friend wrote him a postcard addressed to “Frank from the Netherlands, Tianjin, China.” It seems like an event from a bygone era – not only because of the postcard but above all concerning today’s China: How can anyone find a Frank in Tianjin, with its population of around 14 million? Downright absurd.
But back then, China was not only in a different calendar century, but also politically, economically and socially. And so the postcard really did reach Dikoetter. The sinologist recalls that there were only 80 foreigners living in the port city near Beijing at the time, seven of them Dutch – and one Frank.
Frank Dikoetter was born in Kerensheide in the Netherlands in 1961. He studied history and Russian at the University of Geneva before moving to China in the summer of 1985. Not even 40 years have passed since then, but in China’s development, that is an eternity. The following decades saw economic growth averaging more than ten percent – every year! The People’s Republic has long since become the world’s second-largest economy. It has become a superpower poised to play a major role in shaping the 21st century and challenge the global supremacy of the USA.
Frank is still there. In the meantime, the 63-year-old has moved from Tianjin to Hong Kong, married a Chinese woman and has been Professor of Humanities at the University of Hong Kong since 2006. And while the leadership in Beijing primarily praises its reform and opening-up policy, Dikoetter poses almost heretical questions in his book: Has there been any “reform and opening-up” at all – when less than one million foreigners live in China, barely 0.07 percent of the population? When masses of finished products leave the country and flood the global markets, but comparatively little is allowed to be imported? Or when one-fifth of humanity is allowed to see just 36 foreign films a year in the country’s cinemas? And: “Capital can come into the country, but it is difficult to withdraw it again.”
This puts Dikötter in sharp contrast to the current celebrations, to all the hymns of praise for reform and opening up and collective leadership of a dictatorship of the people. And yet they are all legitimate questions that basically show two things: Frank Dikoetter is a well-versed sinologist. And: China can look back on a development full of contradictions. There are different narratives: an official from the top and ordinary ones from the bottom. It is a breathtaking development, but it also contains dark chapters – which are not mentioned in the Beijing celebratory speeches these days.
But Frank Dikötter’s impressive People’s Trilogy does: Mao’s Great Famine (2010), The Tragedy of Liberation (2013) and The Cultural Revolution (2016). His books have long been a staple of China studies and impressively depict the impact of Communist Party rule on the lives and everyday lives of the Chinese people. They have been praised – with prizes and nominations. And also sharply criticized. After all, Dikoetter refuses to let the Communist Party narrative dominate the story. Instead of merely reporting on top-down directives, he focuses on the people and their day-to-day lives. This creates tensions, but Dikötter approaches them with confidence, because the Dutchman knows his stuff. For his research, he rummages through Chinese city and provincial archives and reads countless original documents.
Dikoetter does not want to comment on the current celebrations and refers to the tense situation in the country. This also makes him an important China historian – beyond the directives. Michael Radunski
Frank Dikoetter: China After Mao: The Rise of a Superpower, Bloomsbury Publishing, 416 pages.
(Image: Bloomsbury Publishing)
One last rehearsal before the big day: Around 7,000 teachers and students from the Hongxiang Education Group in Suqian (Jiangsu province) rehearse for the National Day celebrations on Monday. This Tuesday marks 75 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
Isn’t it astonishing that 75 years after its foundation, the People’s Republic of China is regressing in some respects? After Mao Zedong’s death, the Communist Party laid the groundwork to ensure that no successor would ever be given such power. But the events of the past ten years have undermined all these efforts.
Today, with Xi Jinping at the helm, there is a new helmsman who, with a firm hand and massive help from technological developments, is guiding the political actions and social thinking of a nation of 1.4 billion people. It remains to be seen what consequences this will have. Nowadays, even the ideological hardliners in the Communist Party admit that even the great Mao didn’t do everything right; in fact, he made many mistakes. Fabian Kretschmer has looked into the question of what will happen after the anniversary.
It is already becoming apparent that the People’s Republic will increasingly focus its diplomatic attention on Africa. The continent has resources, markets and many countries whose favor will become rather valuable in the geopolitical tug-of-war. This is why China is in direct competition with the European Union, which, for its part, is trying to gain influence over African nations.
Belt & Road Initiative vs. Global Gateway – two infrastructure programs with not entirely altruistic intentions. China’s advantage: The People’s Republic was there first and is almost everywhere in Africa. Europe’s Global Gateway, on the other hand, is far from realizing its potential, according to an analysis published by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. Amelie Richter took a look at the paper.
When Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China at exactly three o’clock in the afternoon on 1 October 1949, it was almost unimaginable that his larger-than-life portrait would still be watching over Tiananmen Square 75 years later. In fact, decades after his death, Mao continues to shape the country and the ideological direction of the Communist Party.
Today, a party leader with absolute power is once again guiding the fate of the Communist Party – just as Mao once did. And in a way that Mao’s heirs actually wanted to prevent. Xi Jinping has managed to bring competing factions within the Party to heel and impose his ideas on the country as a guideline for political action and social thinking. His goal is to shed China’s psychological baggage of the past centuries and compete on an equal footing with the USA for the leading role in the world. He has inherited this recipe from his predecessors: The Communist Party shall be the eternal ruler of the Chinese nation.
But when the People’s Republic marks its 75th anniversary on Tuesday, most of China’s 1.4 billion people will be in little mood to celebrate the prospect of more geopolitical power and another 75 years of Communist Party rule. Youth unemployment is at a record high, the social divide separates winners and losers, and the property crisis has severely eroded the wealth of the middle class. The years of economic boom are over and are dragging down the boundless optimism of the recent past.
Where is the People’s Republic headed 75 years after that fateful day in October 1949? For Xi, the transformation of his homeland has probably only just begun. In his third term of office, the 71-year-old is working on fundamentally changing the social contract that has existed for decades.
Since Deng Xiaoping (1904-92) set the country on an unprecedented development path with the help of market economy reforms, the Communist Party legitimized itself primarily through its pragmatic policies. The Chinese promise was that as long as the Party ensured steadily growing prosperity, the masses would willingly relinquish their right to political co-determination. And the Communist Party delivered: Prosperity reached the people rapidly, albeit very unevenly distributed. From 1980 to 2010, the People’s Republic’s GDP grew by an average of almost 10 percent – every year.
But the booming years are over. Growth is slowing down. People are not consuming enough, the social safety net is too weak, and the population is aging too quickly. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese entrepreneurs set up shop overseas instead of at home. Economists are now warning of a lasting economic downturn. However, Xi appears prepared to pay the price for this economic slump to maintain control over the country and its people.
The Party leader is primarily concerned with two things: ideological loyalty and national security. Instead of prosperity, he promises his people patriotic self-confidence. In his vision of the “Chinese dream,” the country’s “effeminate” youth should tighten their belts and work for a stronger, socialist state that generates technological achievements and confidently presents itself on the diplomatic stage – but no longer promises wealth for the individual. Quite the opposite: Xi has repeatedly made it clear in his speeches that he rejects a “decadent” welfare state based on the European model. He believes this would weaken the people’s “work ethic.”
It is almost impossible to gauge how the Chinese people genuinely feel about the course of their Party leadership. Any public criticism of the central government is met with harsh repression. Those who keep their mouth shut live less dangerously. However, the manifestations of subcultures and comments on social media offer clues. Parts of the youth are frustrated in view of declining economic prospects and a party that is meddling in their everyday lives with its values.
The urban youth even refer to the present as “the garbage time of history” – a reference to the term “garbage time,” which describes the irrelevant final phase of a sports match that has been decided early on, in which a team can no longer avoid defeat despite its best efforts.
In the provinces, however, Mao portraits still line the walls. People proudly echo the propaganda of the dominant state media, calling China the safest country in the world thanks to the protective hand of the Party, while war and chaos reign in other countries. And Xi Jinping is praised for his rigid anti-corruption campaign.
The perception toward the rest of the world has changed under Xi. While openness and curiosity prevailed in the noughties, mistrust and even hostility now dominate perceptions. One indication of this is that tourists have returned after the “zero Covid” years, but expats are becoming increasingly rare.
The country is increasingly distancing itself from the West. Tensions overshadow cooperation. The USA is the big adversary, and China only woos Europe as long as it remains an attractive market for Chinese exports. But whenever the EU dares to extend its hand over the Atlantic, Beijing responds with economic retaliation.
China’s diplomatic efforts are focused on the Global South. From Africa to the Middle East and Central Asia, the Middle Kingdom presents itself as an alternative superpower that seeks to replace the hegemonic United States. China is systematically attempting to reshape the institutions of the liberal world order in line with its own values. In recent years, no other country has been able to fill as many leadership positions in the United Nations as China.
This also requires domestic companies that continue to want to do business in China to rethink their approach. The market has become more political, more state-controlled. Private companies practically only flourish if they strategically comply with the state’s five-year plans. Far-reaching reforms have become a distant prospect. Foreign companies inevitably lose out in core industries, which Xi Jinping has declared to be a state matter with extensive subsidies.
This has led to a turning point for a growing number of companies, summarizes the EU Chamber of Commerce in Beijing. They now look closer at their China business, as the challenges are beginning to outweigh the benefits. None of this is helping China’s economic development and international integration.
75 years after the founding of the People’s Republic, it has left its mark on history. Its rise from the world’s poorhouse to the second-largest economy at breathtaking speed will continue to fascinate scientists for hundreds of years to come. What they will think of Xi Jinping will largely depend on whether he can make patriotic self-confidence more appealing to his people than prosperity. Fabian Kretschmer/ Contribution: Marcel Grzanna
According to analysts, the EU still has some work to do on its Global Gateway (GG) infrastructure initiative strategy. With the start of the new EU cabinet, communication around GG needs to become more transparent to realize its full potential and strengthen existing partnerships, especially in Africa.
This is the conclusion of a joint analysis published on Tuesday by Merics, the German Marshall Fund, the African think tank Nkafu Politics Institute and the British think tank Institute of Economic Affairs, published by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. The paper has been made available to Table.Briefings in advance.
Africa was the continent with the most Global Gateway projects in 2024. The analysis notes that communication and perception of the EU infrastructure initiative in African countries remains a significant problem.
Since its inception, GG has drawn comparisons with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – not least because EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen herself presented the initiative as an alternative to the BRI. The analysts write that the EU must clearly communicate its goals and the value of GG to avoid misunderstandings and create a positive image.
The analysis shows that there have so far been several problems with the initiative’s own positioning and external perception – not only in Africa, but also in China: The decline in mutual investment goals between the EU and the People’s Republic shows that Beijing perceives GG as a direct competitor to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
This is why the Chinese side attempts to downplay the importance of the EU initiative and present GG as a complement to the BRI: “China has developed a narrative that presents GG as complementary to the BRI, while the EU should emphasize its competitive role more clearly,” the report states. It is “Europe’s responsibility to also correct the Chinese narrative and perception regarding European support for the Belt and Road Initiative and its synergy potential with GG.”
The crux of the matter is that the competition narrative is less well received in Africa: The analysts write that the EU should avoid seeing Africa as a chessboard in competition with China. Instead, the focus should be on Africa’s actual development needs.
The report recommends several steps:
However, the analysts take a realistic view of the success potential: “Some of the EU’s implementation difficulties with GG are related to the simple fact that many recipient countries have no interest in fulfilling the basic EU criteria within the framework of GG” the paper states. This applies, in particular, to requirements relating to transparency and democratic standards. “A faster provision of BRI loans with fewer governance criteria will continue to be more appealing to many.”
The paper argues that the complexity of EU decision-making processes and financing problems generally reduce GG’s competitiveness. As a result, Chinese analysts are often skeptical about the initiative’s effectiveness. The paper found that the Chinese media often view the GG narrative through the lens of strategic competition between the US and China, leading to skepticism regarding the EU’s geopolitical motives.
The analysts add further points to the to-do list of the designated EU Commissioner for International Partnerships, Jozef Síkela, who will be responsible for GG. Among them: The “indiscriminate use of the ‘Global Gateway’ brand” must be abandoned. It is “inflationary” to simply bundle all types of development aid projects under GG, the analysts criticize – “possibly in order to reach the global mobilization sum of 300 billion euros by 2027.” In this way, GG loses credibility, they say.
Sinolytics is a research-based business consultancy entirely focused on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and specific business activities in the People’s Republic.
When China celebrates the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic these days, there is really no way around Frank Dikoetter. The Dutch historian is one of the most renowned chroniclers of the People’s Republic – highly critical, extremely thorough and knowledgeable. To understand what China is celebrating, it is worth picking up Dikoetter’s latest book: “China After Mao: The Rise of a Superpower.” It describes an incredible rise that Dikoetter experienced first-hand.
The book begins in the summer of 1985, when Dikoetter came to China as a young student. The Chinese Foreign Ministry allocated him a spot at Nankai University in Tianjin, and a friend wrote him a postcard addressed to “Frank from the Netherlands, Tianjin, China.” It seems like an event from a bygone era – not only because of the postcard but above all concerning today’s China: How can anyone find a Frank in Tianjin, with its population of around 14 million? Downright absurd.
But back then, China was not only in a different calendar century, but also politically, economically and socially. And so the postcard really did reach Dikoetter. The sinologist recalls that there were only 80 foreigners living in the port city near Beijing at the time, seven of them Dutch – and one Frank.
Frank Dikoetter was born in Kerensheide in the Netherlands in 1961. He studied history and Russian at the University of Geneva before moving to China in the summer of 1985. Not even 40 years have passed since then, but in China’s development, that is an eternity. The following decades saw economic growth averaging more than ten percent – every year! The People’s Republic has long since become the world’s second-largest economy. It has become a superpower poised to play a major role in shaping the 21st century and challenge the global supremacy of the USA.
Frank is still there. In the meantime, the 63-year-old has moved from Tianjin to Hong Kong, married a Chinese woman and has been Professor of Humanities at the University of Hong Kong since 2006. And while the leadership in Beijing primarily praises its reform and opening-up policy, Dikoetter poses almost heretical questions in his book: Has there been any “reform and opening-up” at all – when less than one million foreigners live in China, barely 0.07 percent of the population? When masses of finished products leave the country and flood the global markets, but comparatively little is allowed to be imported? Or when one-fifth of humanity is allowed to see just 36 foreign films a year in the country’s cinemas? And: “Capital can come into the country, but it is difficult to withdraw it again.”
This puts Dikötter in sharp contrast to the current celebrations, to all the hymns of praise for reform and opening up and collective leadership of a dictatorship of the people. And yet they are all legitimate questions that basically show two things: Frank Dikoetter is a well-versed sinologist. And: China can look back on a development full of contradictions. There are different narratives: an official from the top and ordinary ones from the bottom. It is a breathtaking development, but it also contains dark chapters – which are not mentioned in the Beijing celebratory speeches these days.
But Frank Dikötter’s impressive People’s Trilogy does: Mao’s Great Famine (2010), The Tragedy of Liberation (2013) and The Cultural Revolution (2016). His books have long been a staple of China studies and impressively depict the impact of Communist Party rule on the lives and everyday lives of the Chinese people. They have been praised – with prizes and nominations. And also sharply criticized. After all, Dikoetter refuses to let the Communist Party narrative dominate the story. Instead of merely reporting on top-down directives, he focuses on the people and their day-to-day lives. This creates tensions, but Dikötter approaches them with confidence, because the Dutchman knows his stuff. For his research, he rummages through Chinese city and provincial archives and reads countless original documents.
Dikoetter does not want to comment on the current celebrations and refers to the tense situation in the country. This also makes him an important China historian – beyond the directives. Michael Radunski
Frank Dikoetter: China After Mao: The Rise of a Superpower, Bloomsbury Publishing, 416 pages.
(Image: Bloomsbury Publishing)
One last rehearsal before the big day: Around 7,000 teachers and students from the Hongxiang Education Group in Suqian (Jiangsu province) rehearse for the National Day celebrations on Monday. This Tuesday marks 75 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
