At a time when everyone normally switches into Christmas mode, political activity in Germany is picking up speed. Yesterday, Olaf Scholz called for a confidence vote in the German parliament, and today, the political parties have published their election manifestos. The election campaign is thus entering the next phase. Amelie Richter and Julia Fiedler have taken a look at the SPD, Green and CDU manifestos for you, which Table.Briefings already received yesterday. They analyze how the various parties intend to focus their China policy.
Elections are also the subject of our second piece. In two weeks, the super election year 2024 will end, a year in which around 3.7 billion people in over 70 countries cast their votes. Although China did not participate in the super election year, the People’s Republic influenced voting decisions around the world as an election campaign issue. In particular, China’s industrial overcapacity – for example, in electric cars – was a concern for governments and voters worldwide, writes Leonardo Pape.
Our third piece is also dedicated to elections: The next elections in South Korea, from which the left-wing populist Lee Jae-myung could emerge victorious and become South Korea’s new president. As far as China is concerned, Lee seeks to strike a balance between Washington and Beijing. Taiwan’s fate does not particularly interest him. “Why should we intervene in the Taiwan Strait issue?” he said in a 2022 interview. Fabian Kretschmer has written down for you what else drives Lee.
Have an enlightening read and a productive day,
The Chancellor’s party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), seeks a “robust” dialog with Beijing. Its partner, the Green Party, sees China increasingly as a rival. The CDU/CSU promises to set up a network of independent China experts. This was revealed in the draft election manifestos for the 2025 Bundestag elections, officially presented by the SPD, Greens, CDU/CSU and FDP on Tuesday.
The People’s Republic definitely plays a role in the programs. The focus is on Germany’s economy, Europe’s security and its positioning in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.
China is seen as a “systemic rival” whose military and economic ambitions pose a challenge. The Greens focus on implementing and developing the German government’s China strategy, which aims to reduce economic dependencies and strengthen cooperation with partner states in the Indo-Pacific – for example, in climate, trade and security.
In this respect, the Greens see the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the global systemic conflict with authoritarian states such as China as a reason to realign “economic security and trade, supply chains and sales markets.” Other important points for the Greens:
The SPD describes China with the triad “partner, competitor, and system rival,” coined by the German government’s China strategy. The party sees the People’s Republic as “a leading global power” whose involvement in global challenges such as climate change, arms control and the debt crisis is indispensable.
However, it also criticizes China’s “assertive and aggressive behavior,” its claims to power in its backyard and its failure to distance itself from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Moreover, the SPD wants to prioritize these points:
The draft manifesto of the CDU/CSU describes China as increasingly expansive, with the goal of creating “economic, financial and political dependencies.” The CDU therefore wants to “push back China’s influence wherever our strategic interests are affected” through an “independent European China policy” that is closely coordinated with the USA.
In foreign policy, the CDU and CSU want to pursue a “European peace in freedom and security” strategy: Europe’s geopolitical capability is to be strengthened and its presence in the Indo-Pacific expanded to actively tackle “systemic competition with China.” It also positions itself as follows:
Taiwan, India, Indonesia, USA, Japan – to name just a few. In 2024, around 3.7 billion people in over 70 countries were able to cast their vote in national and supranational elections (such as the EU elections). While the People’s Republic of China did not participate in the super election year, the second-largest economy influenced election campaigns worldwide – and newly elected governments redefined their China policy.
In January, China already played by far the most important role in presidential and parliamentary elections. China’s presence in the election campaign was roughly comparable only in small countries with close ties to the People’s Republic. These included the Pacific republics of Palau, Tuvalu, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati, as well as Namibia in South Africa, where economic dependencies on the People’s Republic are particularly pronounced. Apart from Palau and Tuvalu, two of Taiwan’s last twelve diplomatic allies, the leaderships of all these countries opted for close relations with China despite ambivalent public sentiment – and won their elections, albeit under circumstances that were sometimes criticized as unfree.
Except for Taiwan’s new president Lai Ching-te and Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, the government in Beijing congratulated pretty much every election winner – including Putin in Russia, who received no congratulations from Western states, or Maduro in Venezuela, who did not recognize the official election results and clung to power by force. China used the super election year above all to present itself to the outside world as a defender of national sovereignty and non-interference, and also to categorically put other states in their place if they criticized China. Beijing’s underlying offer to everyone is: economic partnership without any expectations regarding the political system.
By unconditionally recognizing unfree elections, China simultaneously legitimized the developments in some countries towards so-called electoral autocracy with formally democratic but structurally unfair elections. Free and non-free elections were also largely treated the same way in the discourse of the state media within China. For example, the state media interpreted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s election victory in March as proof of his support among the Russian people without qualifying it further. In the wake of the US elections, on the other hand, they preferred to highlight the political polarization in the country and the flaws of the American political system.
In the US presidential election debate itself, China was less present than in the Covid year 2020, even though Donald Trump blamed China for lost jobs in domestic industries and the trade imbalance with the US.
Above all, the US elections spearheaded a swing to the right in Western democracies. Right-wing populist and far-right forces also made significant gains in the EU elections, for example, in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, as well as in the parliamentary elections in Austria and Belgium. China’s proclaimed ideals of sovereignty and non-interference find increasing resonance among right-wing forces in the EU. This fragmentation of the international community could further complicate the vote on human rights issues, for example. At an economic policy level, the fragmentation was already evident in the high number of no votes and abstentions on the decision to impose tariffs on Chinese electric cars.
The People’s Republic was not a primary campaign issue in the elections in key emerging economies such as India, South Africa, Indonesia and Mexico. Nevertheless, the ambivalence of China’s role as both an economic partner and a risk factor for domestic industries was reflected in a large number of defensive measures against Chinese imports – even by leaders who are generally more inclined towards China. For example, Indonesia imposed import duties of up to 200 percent on textiles and other goods in July, citing unfair competition from China. In July, Mexico also joined the USA in imposing stricter import controls on steel.
According to the research institute Merics, China’s global trade surplus will exceed 900 million US dollars by the end of the year – a record figure. China’s industrial overcapacity in areas such as steel and the EV industry is becoming a global political issue. While China’s disputes with the US and the EU came to a head openly, most emerging countries took their defensive measures more quietly. Only India has a prominent, explicitly China-critical discourse. The world’s most populous country has also levied tariffs of between 12 and 30 percent on certain steel products imported from China and Vietnam since September.
China’s dependence on exports is likely to increase further, and with it the pressure on import markets in both emerging and developed countries. However, finding globally coordinated responses to such challenges will only become more difficult. One trend in this year’s elections has been the weakening of existing governments and majority coalitions – in the EU elections as well as in India, South Africa, Japan and Taiwan.
In addition, Donald Trump’s election victory suggests a further radical rift on the coordination axis between the US and Europe. The partial political fragmentation in the wake of this and other elections this year will benefit China. At the end of the 2024 super election year, the first thing that awaits Germany is the Bundestag election campaign. Leonardo Pape
Lee Jae-myung could become the next South Korean president. Beijing will probably take note of this with hope. Lee’s critics call his China policy naive, which probably pleases the Chinese government. Lee refuses to take sides and strives for a balance between the world powers in Washington and Beijing. He is considered an outspoken opponent of the THAAD missile defense system, which was installed by the US military on South Korean soil in 2016 and triggered massive economic boycotts from China.
The left-wing populist doesn’t care about the likewise democratically governed Taiwan: “Why should we intervene in the Taiwan Strait issue,” he said in a 2022 interview. This positioning pleases the Chinese government beyond measure. It declared its claim to Taiwan an internal Chinese matter that other countries should keep out of. Lee apparently takes a similar view.
Lee’s stance on North Korea has also met with approval in Beijing. He endorses the so-called sunshine policy, which seeks rapprochement between the hostile neighbors. The People’s Republic has no use for a highly explosive hotspot on its own doorstep, where one of the protagonists is constantly threatening to use nuclear weapons. A rapprochement between South and North Korea would demand less attention from China and free up resources for other regions.
While rapprochement sounds good on paper, it seems rather unlikely, given the political realities. North Korea’s ruler, Kim Jong-un, recently proclaimed the South to be the main enemy by constitution and is increasingly threatening it with nuclear annihilation. The fact that Lee wants to lift some economic sanctions against North Korea amid such a mood is considered controversial.
However, Beijing should not expect an unconditional supporter of its interests should Lee actually become the new president. He has accused China of cultural appropriation and “stealing Korean culture” in the past. And he has also made it clear that he will have any Chinese fishing boat “sunk” if it illegally enters South Korean waters.
Just a few weeks ago, it was not foreseeable that Lee might soon be in charge of his country. New elections have only been made possible because the conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law, which led to his impeachment. If South Korea’s Constitutional Court confirms the parliamentarians’ impeachment, new elections would have to be held within two months.
Although Lee is currently considered a promising candidate, he is despised by many Koreans – not just in the conservative camp. His populism is extremely polarizing and makes him a big target. Earlier this year, Lee became the victim of a knife attack – a consequence of the growing political radicalization.
Jae-myung Lee was born in 1963 as the fifth of seven children in Andong and grew up in socially disadvantaged conditions. During the country’s rapid industrialization, the family moved to a satellite town of the metropolis of Seoul, where Lee toiled in the factories as a teenager. He defied the difficult circumstances and attended secondary school. Thanks to a scholarship, he later studied law.
His entire political worldview is based on those years of sacrifice: Lee wants to limit the privileges of the rich and improve the lives of the poor. Within the left-wing camp, Lee enjoyed a stellar career over 20 years, which took him to the national assembly as provincial governor. There, in the night hours of December 3, he produced the footage that shows him climbing over the parliamentary fence and forcing President Yoon to revoke martial law in a hastily convened vote with 189 other members of parliament.
However, whether the left-wing populist will actually be elected president will only become clear in six months’ time at the earliest. New elections could be held by then. Lee Jae-myung has a double incentive to be elected head of state as early as possible. Lee was only sentenced to a suspended prison sentence by a court in November for violating the election law after making false statements about corruption allegations. An appeal against the verdict is still pending. Should Lee lose the case before the time of potential new elections, however, the law would prevent him from running for office. Fabian Kretschmer
What do the Dutch and Chinese have in common? Both call penguins “goose.” The Dutch use the term “fat goose” (vetgans is a synonym for penguin in Dutch). The Chinese see the cute, flightless seabirds as “geese standing on their tiptoes,” at least that’s what the Chinese term 企鹅 qǐ’é for “penguin” suggests (企 qǐ means, among other things, “standing on tiptoes,” 鹅 é is the Chinese character for “goose”).
At a time when everyone normally switches into Christmas mode, political activity in Germany is picking up speed. Yesterday, Olaf Scholz called for a confidence vote in the German parliament, and today, the political parties have published their election manifestos. The election campaign is thus entering the next phase. Amelie Richter and Julia Fiedler have taken a look at the SPD, Green and CDU manifestos for you, which Table.Briefings already received yesterday. They analyze how the various parties intend to focus their China policy.
Elections are also the subject of our second piece. In two weeks, the super election year 2024 will end, a year in which around 3.7 billion people in over 70 countries cast their votes. Although China did not participate in the super election year, the People’s Republic influenced voting decisions around the world as an election campaign issue. In particular, China’s industrial overcapacity – for example, in electric cars – was a concern for governments and voters worldwide, writes Leonardo Pape.
Our third piece is also dedicated to elections: The next elections in South Korea, from which the left-wing populist Lee Jae-myung could emerge victorious and become South Korea’s new president. As far as China is concerned, Lee seeks to strike a balance between Washington and Beijing. Taiwan’s fate does not particularly interest him. “Why should we intervene in the Taiwan Strait issue?” he said in a 2022 interview. Fabian Kretschmer has written down for you what else drives Lee.
Have an enlightening read and a productive day,
The Chancellor’s party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), seeks a “robust” dialog with Beijing. Its partner, the Green Party, sees China increasingly as a rival. The CDU/CSU promises to set up a network of independent China experts. This was revealed in the draft election manifestos for the 2025 Bundestag elections, officially presented by the SPD, Greens, CDU/CSU and FDP on Tuesday.
The People’s Republic definitely plays a role in the programs. The focus is on Germany’s economy, Europe’s security and its positioning in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.
China is seen as a “systemic rival” whose military and economic ambitions pose a challenge. The Greens focus on implementing and developing the German government’s China strategy, which aims to reduce economic dependencies and strengthen cooperation with partner states in the Indo-Pacific – for example, in climate, trade and security.
In this respect, the Greens see the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the global systemic conflict with authoritarian states such as China as a reason to realign “economic security and trade, supply chains and sales markets.” Other important points for the Greens:
The SPD describes China with the triad “partner, competitor, and system rival,” coined by the German government’s China strategy. The party sees the People’s Republic as “a leading global power” whose involvement in global challenges such as climate change, arms control and the debt crisis is indispensable.
However, it also criticizes China’s “assertive and aggressive behavior,” its claims to power in its backyard and its failure to distance itself from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Moreover, the SPD wants to prioritize these points:
The draft manifesto of the CDU/CSU describes China as increasingly expansive, with the goal of creating “economic, financial and political dependencies.” The CDU therefore wants to “push back China’s influence wherever our strategic interests are affected” through an “independent European China policy” that is closely coordinated with the USA.
In foreign policy, the CDU and CSU want to pursue a “European peace in freedom and security” strategy: Europe’s geopolitical capability is to be strengthened and its presence in the Indo-Pacific expanded to actively tackle “systemic competition with China.” It also positions itself as follows:
Taiwan, India, Indonesia, USA, Japan – to name just a few. In 2024, around 3.7 billion people in over 70 countries were able to cast their vote in national and supranational elections (such as the EU elections). While the People’s Republic of China did not participate in the super election year, the second-largest economy influenced election campaigns worldwide – and newly elected governments redefined their China policy.
In January, China already played by far the most important role in presidential and parliamentary elections. China’s presence in the election campaign was roughly comparable only in small countries with close ties to the People’s Republic. These included the Pacific republics of Palau, Tuvalu, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati, as well as Namibia in South Africa, where economic dependencies on the People’s Republic are particularly pronounced. Apart from Palau and Tuvalu, two of Taiwan’s last twelve diplomatic allies, the leaderships of all these countries opted for close relations with China despite ambivalent public sentiment – and won their elections, albeit under circumstances that were sometimes criticized as unfree.
Except for Taiwan’s new president Lai Ching-te and Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, the government in Beijing congratulated pretty much every election winner – including Putin in Russia, who received no congratulations from Western states, or Maduro in Venezuela, who did not recognize the official election results and clung to power by force. China used the super election year above all to present itself to the outside world as a defender of national sovereignty and non-interference, and also to categorically put other states in their place if they criticized China. Beijing’s underlying offer to everyone is: economic partnership without any expectations regarding the political system.
By unconditionally recognizing unfree elections, China simultaneously legitimized the developments in some countries towards so-called electoral autocracy with formally democratic but structurally unfair elections. Free and non-free elections were also largely treated the same way in the discourse of the state media within China. For example, the state media interpreted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s election victory in March as proof of his support among the Russian people without qualifying it further. In the wake of the US elections, on the other hand, they preferred to highlight the political polarization in the country and the flaws of the American political system.
In the US presidential election debate itself, China was less present than in the Covid year 2020, even though Donald Trump blamed China for lost jobs in domestic industries and the trade imbalance with the US.
Above all, the US elections spearheaded a swing to the right in Western democracies. Right-wing populist and far-right forces also made significant gains in the EU elections, for example, in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, as well as in the parliamentary elections in Austria and Belgium. China’s proclaimed ideals of sovereignty and non-interference find increasing resonance among right-wing forces in the EU. This fragmentation of the international community could further complicate the vote on human rights issues, for example. At an economic policy level, the fragmentation was already evident in the high number of no votes and abstentions on the decision to impose tariffs on Chinese electric cars.
The People’s Republic was not a primary campaign issue in the elections in key emerging economies such as India, South Africa, Indonesia and Mexico. Nevertheless, the ambivalence of China’s role as both an economic partner and a risk factor for domestic industries was reflected in a large number of defensive measures against Chinese imports – even by leaders who are generally more inclined towards China. For example, Indonesia imposed import duties of up to 200 percent on textiles and other goods in July, citing unfair competition from China. In July, Mexico also joined the USA in imposing stricter import controls on steel.
According to the research institute Merics, China’s global trade surplus will exceed 900 million US dollars by the end of the year – a record figure. China’s industrial overcapacity in areas such as steel and the EV industry is becoming a global political issue. While China’s disputes with the US and the EU came to a head openly, most emerging countries took their defensive measures more quietly. Only India has a prominent, explicitly China-critical discourse. The world’s most populous country has also levied tariffs of between 12 and 30 percent on certain steel products imported from China and Vietnam since September.
China’s dependence on exports is likely to increase further, and with it the pressure on import markets in both emerging and developed countries. However, finding globally coordinated responses to such challenges will only become more difficult. One trend in this year’s elections has been the weakening of existing governments and majority coalitions – in the EU elections as well as in India, South Africa, Japan and Taiwan.
In addition, Donald Trump’s election victory suggests a further radical rift on the coordination axis between the US and Europe. The partial political fragmentation in the wake of this and other elections this year will benefit China. At the end of the 2024 super election year, the first thing that awaits Germany is the Bundestag election campaign. Leonardo Pape
Lee Jae-myung could become the next South Korean president. Beijing will probably take note of this with hope. Lee’s critics call his China policy naive, which probably pleases the Chinese government. Lee refuses to take sides and strives for a balance between the world powers in Washington and Beijing. He is considered an outspoken opponent of the THAAD missile defense system, which was installed by the US military on South Korean soil in 2016 and triggered massive economic boycotts from China.
The left-wing populist doesn’t care about the likewise democratically governed Taiwan: “Why should we intervene in the Taiwan Strait issue,” he said in a 2022 interview. This positioning pleases the Chinese government beyond measure. It declared its claim to Taiwan an internal Chinese matter that other countries should keep out of. Lee apparently takes a similar view.
Lee’s stance on North Korea has also met with approval in Beijing. He endorses the so-called sunshine policy, which seeks rapprochement between the hostile neighbors. The People’s Republic has no use for a highly explosive hotspot on its own doorstep, where one of the protagonists is constantly threatening to use nuclear weapons. A rapprochement between South and North Korea would demand less attention from China and free up resources for other regions.
While rapprochement sounds good on paper, it seems rather unlikely, given the political realities. North Korea’s ruler, Kim Jong-un, recently proclaimed the South to be the main enemy by constitution and is increasingly threatening it with nuclear annihilation. The fact that Lee wants to lift some economic sanctions against North Korea amid such a mood is considered controversial.
However, Beijing should not expect an unconditional supporter of its interests should Lee actually become the new president. He has accused China of cultural appropriation and “stealing Korean culture” in the past. And he has also made it clear that he will have any Chinese fishing boat “sunk” if it illegally enters South Korean waters.
Just a few weeks ago, it was not foreseeable that Lee might soon be in charge of his country. New elections have only been made possible because the conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law, which led to his impeachment. If South Korea’s Constitutional Court confirms the parliamentarians’ impeachment, new elections would have to be held within two months.
Although Lee is currently considered a promising candidate, he is despised by many Koreans – not just in the conservative camp. His populism is extremely polarizing and makes him a big target. Earlier this year, Lee became the victim of a knife attack – a consequence of the growing political radicalization.
Jae-myung Lee was born in 1963 as the fifth of seven children in Andong and grew up in socially disadvantaged conditions. During the country’s rapid industrialization, the family moved to a satellite town of the metropolis of Seoul, where Lee toiled in the factories as a teenager. He defied the difficult circumstances and attended secondary school. Thanks to a scholarship, he later studied law.
His entire political worldview is based on those years of sacrifice: Lee wants to limit the privileges of the rich and improve the lives of the poor. Within the left-wing camp, Lee enjoyed a stellar career over 20 years, which took him to the national assembly as provincial governor. There, in the night hours of December 3, he produced the footage that shows him climbing over the parliamentary fence and forcing President Yoon to revoke martial law in a hastily convened vote with 189 other members of parliament.
However, whether the left-wing populist will actually be elected president will only become clear in six months’ time at the earliest. New elections could be held by then. Lee Jae-myung has a double incentive to be elected head of state as early as possible. Lee was only sentenced to a suspended prison sentence by a court in November for violating the election law after making false statements about corruption allegations. An appeal against the verdict is still pending. Should Lee lose the case before the time of potential new elections, however, the law would prevent him from running for office. Fabian Kretschmer
What do the Dutch and Chinese have in common? Both call penguins “goose.” The Dutch use the term “fat goose” (vetgans is a synonym for penguin in Dutch). The Chinese see the cute, flightless seabirds as “geese standing on their tiptoes,” at least that’s what the Chinese term 企鹅 qǐ’é for “penguin” suggests (企 qǐ means, among other things, “standing on tiptoes,” 鹅 é is the Chinese character for “goose”).
