The China.Table editorial team wishes you a successful New Year 2024. Whether you are doing business in China, have academic or diplomatic relations with the country, or came into contact with the rival and partner in politics and administration: It will be an exciting year for us. The many developments that have started in recent years are now entering a critical phase.
Several simmering trade disputes are about to reach their moment of truth. The ball is in the EU’s court: If it imposes tariffs on Chinese cars, it will send a signal as a determined player, but it will also sow further discord in global trade.
In the US, the election in November will decide whether there will be new drama surrounding Trump. Foreign trade is particularly important for China at the moment: Domestically, the property crisis is far from over, and young people are so discouraged that they are turning “lying flat” into “rotting.”
As a specialist editorial team, we have looked at these trends and pondered what could happen in the New Year. By the end of 2024, we will be able to compare our assessments and forecasts with reality.
2024 could become a pivotal year in China’s relations with the West. In particular, the trade conflicts between Brussels and Beijing could intensify. Meanwhile, the German government seems unlikely to provide any new impetus for the country’s relations with China. International affairs are likely to be overshadowed by the elections in the USA. Meanwhile, the economy of the People’s Republic continues to feel the effects of the property crisis.
Since the publication of Germany’s “Strategy on China” in July 2023, the topic has fallen quiet again in political Berlin. Not much seems to be happening, especially when it comes to the much-vaunted strengthening of China expertise. Existing China programs have been scaled back by the Green-led Ministry of Economics, for instance, and no new programs are planned for 2024 at least.
But, a strategy only makes sense if it is consistently implemented. So far, however, there has been no concrete action. Instead, the suspicion arises that the government has ticked off the unpleasant topic as settled by publishing the paper. This inaction may soon backfire.
Over the past year, China has been a key focus of German government policy. Although this was more than necessary, it was not a matter of course. As recently as 2019, a senior politician of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) admitted that, despite the importance of trade policy for the German economy, China was not at the top of the government’s political agenda; after all, foreign policy does not win elections.
However, awareness of the dangers of excessive dependence on dictatorial regimes has grown steadily since then. However, the conclusions are still very different. While the Greens and FDP call for a tougher relationship with China, the Chancellery led by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) is putting the brakes on. The Social Democrats fear for tens of thousands of jobs particularly dependent on business with China. flee
The year 2024 is unlikely to ease tensions in the relationship between Brussels and Beijing. China remains an important trading partner for the EU. However, the EU investigation into Chinese EVs and the new investigation launched at the end of December into dumping biodiesel from China harbor a high risk that trade tensions will intensify in the coming year. It is not unlikely that Brussels will extend further investigations into sectors such as medical technology, cosmetics, wind turbines and solar panels.
The EU trade instrument against economic coercion has been in force since the last week of December – the first official application could be in 2024. Beijing had already threatened consequences if the Netherlands tightened its export controls on semiconductor technology.
Geopolitical issues such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East will also continue to cloud diplomatic talks. The EU representatives should perhaps finally scratch Beijing’s influence on Moscow off their list of feasible options.
The European elections in June will be decisive for the EU’s standing when the European Parliament is elected and the EU Commission and the EU Council Presidency are reappointed. Europe must show unity and not drift into a chaotic election. Targeted disinformation campaigns from China before the election would come as no surprise in order to discredit the voting. ari
The Communist Party is not known to be a fan of democratic elections. Nevertheless, the leadership in Beijing will be watching two presidential elections next year with great interest: In Taiwan on January 13 and in the US on November 5.
Our prediction: William Lai from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party will become Taiwan’s new president. Beijing will protest the election – as it considers the island nation an integral part of the People’s Republic – and label the winner of the election as a “separatist.” Tensions over Taiwan will increase, but will not escalate – unless there is an unforeseen incident.
Because Beijing is hoping for the US election. There is a certain probability that Donald Trump will move into the White House – and that will raise spirits in Zhongnanhai. Trump is by no means a friend of China – examples include punitive tariffs and the “China virus.” He is also considered unpredictable, something that China does not like at all.
But: Trump loves “strong man politics.” The next US president will strive for a “deal” with Xi Jinping – in which Trump only has American domestic policy in mind. Everyone else is in danger of falling by the wayside. Be it Europe, Japan, South Korea or Taiwan. rad
Property prices in China continue to fall, as does house building activity. As the construction industry is the driving force behind the Chinese economy, the crisis is dragging down all other sectors.
Despite all the differences, China faces a similar problem to Germany with its debt brake: Unlike his predecessors, Xi Jinping no longer wants to throw money around as freely to trigger economic fireworks. This is in line with what economists demand. However, to fulfill the party’s promise of prosperity, Beijing would need to invest huge sums now.
Our prediction: the leadership will relent and ultimately provide more money for investment. However, instead of increasing the official deficit, the funds will come from all kinds of hidden sources. This is something Germans are also familiar with. fin
The debate about the sustainability of their value creation will accompany European companies throughout the year. The EU Due Diligence Act, which is increasingly taking shape, will further tighten the conditions.
Companies whose value creation comes – at least in part – from the People’s Republic of China are particularly affected and are much more in the limelight than others. The reason for this is the forced labor system implemented by the Chinese authorities to integrate the Uyghur minority into the country’s industrial production.
The year 2024 will be dominated by discussions about the degree of responsibility that can be expected of companies and the social question of what role consumers play. grz
China’s youth questions the way things are more than ever. They want to work less or at least more meaningfully. Not necessarily start a family. Refuse to bow to tradition. They want to travel, celebrate, be spiritual, and, above all, strive for mental and physical health.
But the search for ways out and balance creates new pressure. Nowhere are the ideals of beauty and the beautiful lives of others as unattainable as in China’s social media world. Everyone is under scrutiny. Everyone competes with each other. The judgment and mockery of the invisible masses are merciless.
Even refusal is degraded to an internet trend. The protest stance “Tǎng píng 躺平” – “lie flat” – became “Bǎi làn 摆烂” – “let it rot” in 2023. It’s hard to imagine what will come next. fpe
In his New Year’s Address, Xi Jinping made a communicative turnaround: For the first time since the beginning of the property crisis three years ago, he semi-openly addressed economic problems. In a paragraph on the economic situation, he mentioned two details:
Admitting the difficulties was, as is typical for New Year’s speeches by politicians all over the world, the springboard for promising an improvement in the new year.
Overall, China is undertaking massive attempts to raise confidence in the economy for 2024. But so far, Xi is the only one who is allowed to name the problems, and that is likely to remain the case for a while. However, the first visible steps taken by the government have been to tighten censorship and intimidate economic observers who have dared to come out with pessimistic economic assessments.
The top leadership had already called in a major economic meeting in December to boost confidence over the Chinese economy. However, it failed to present a coherent concept as to how
Confidence in the economy consequently did not increase significantly after the conference. Instead, the leadership is now desperate to spread good vibes and uses its toolbox to control information.
Xi is even deploying the security authorities to combat pessimism. Negative economic forecasts or criticism of economic policies are labeled an attack on “China’s unique socialist system” on the WeChat account of the Ministry of State Security.
As a result, economic analysts and commentators, both Chinese and foreign, said consequently they would be more cautious when publishing research reports in the public sphere or simply stop posting things on public platforms.
Observers said the government’s interference would further distort information about the economy and hurt the regime’s credibility. Lying won’t fix the underlying problems. The attempt to employ propaganda to influence consumers and investors also reflected the leadership’s misperception of mass communication’s role in economic management, they said.
The Central Economic Work Conference, chaired by Party Secretary Xi Jinping, was held December 11-12 in Beijing. The conference, held annually in November or December, sets the economic agenda for the next year. “Weak social expectations” was named in the conference’s readout as one of the key challenges the Chinese economy faces. Expectation management for 2024 was named as one of the main remedies.
However, two other major issues – local government debts and the property sector slump – were mentioned, but no concrete measures were given. “Xi Jinping doesn’t seem to care what the market really is concerned about and simply wants to say things he loves to say and do things in his own way,” said an analyst in Hong Kong, who, like other people interviewed for this analysis, declined to be named.
The leadership has long since reached a consensus that private consumption should be made a stronger driving force for China’s growth. Better social welfare, particularly for the low- and middle-range incomers, is believed to hold the key.
According to the conference readout, however, the government should act “within its capacity” regarding social security. This weak statement, a euphemism for being stingy, echoed an article by Xi Jinping last year, saying China should not pursue “welfarism,” which he said was unsustainable and would “encourage laziness.”
A lot has been said this year about promoting private investment. Top government officials made rounds of assurances and promises, new preferential policies were introduced; a Bureau for Private Economy was established.
But the people that all these were aimed at, the company owners and manager, stayed unmoved. “Local private entrepreneurs have been asking themselves the same question as international investors: Shall I believe in their promises?” said a lawyer in Beijing.
According to a well-circulated lecture transcription by renowned economist Wei Jie (魏杰) of Tsinghua University in November, Chinese entrepreneurs were still reeling from the crackdown on the private sector just a couple of years ago. Only a complete legal framework protecting their property and personal rights could convince them, Wei said.
The lecture’s veracity could not be confirmed. However, other observers said what was in the lecture was stark truth, which many didn’t bother to say to offend the government.
So, instead of improving the fundamentals, the leadership tried to control speech. “It is imperative to strengthen publicity concerning the economic situation and to guide public opinion. Confidence about the Chinese economy’s bright prospects should be sung out loud” 加强经济宣传和舆论引导，唱响中国经济光明论, the conference readout says.
Even before the conference, social media accounts of popular economists and writers on financial topics, such as Wu Xiaobo 吴晓波 and Liu Jipeng 刘继鹏 were already suspended for writing critically about economic policy. One day after the conference’s closing, many less well-known economic and financial channels received platform messages advising them not to publish “negative comments.”
Then, the Ministry of State Security joined the censors with a more spooky step. In a stern statement issued on December 14, the ministry lambasted “maliciously fabricated narratives” aimed “to disrupt market expectations and market order” and “to strategically suppress China and to block its development.” The ministry would “resolutely crack down on and punish illegal and criminal activities jeopardizing the country’s economy,” it stated.
Analysts of China’s financial institutions have already been restraining themselves in recent years in expressing negative views about both the Chinese economy and its financial market. In addition, there have been reports on international institutions‘ offices in China being raided in the past two years after the institutions’ overseas employees published negative opinions on China.
A media researcher said the government’s approach may backfire. “The government might get the idea from what they see as success in the manipulation of international news,” a media researcher in Beijing said. “When it comes to the economy, it won’t work. People can simply look at themselves and the people around them, and then decide how much they would spend or whether they should invest.” Liu Yi
In his New Year’s address, China’s President Xi Jinping brought a “reunification” of China close to a mention of Taiwan. “China will surely be reunified, and all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be bound by a common sense of purpose and share in the glory of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” he said towards the end of his speech on New Year’s Eve.
Taiwan’s outgoing President, Tsai Ing-wen, rejected Xi Jinping’s sovereignty claim. The most important principle for the course of relations with China is democracy, Tsai said at her New Year’s press conference. Taiwan’s relations with China must be decided by the will of the people and peace must be based on “dignity.”
“This is taking the joint will of Taiwan’s people to make a decision. After all, we are a democratic country,” she said.
Last year, Xi said only that people on either side of the strait are “members of one and the same family.” The new wording thus increases the pressure on the island. Taiwan holds elections in January.
Before that, he spoke about the state of the nation. Xi’s main plans for 2024:
Among other things, Xi named the milestones for 2023:
There has also been a slight change in the photos in the background, which political observers traditionally attach symbolic importance to. New are:
Overall, it was once again a very confident speech with many references to China’s global strength. fin
Dong Jun has been appointed the new defense minister of the People’s Republic of China. According to the state news agency Xinhua, President Xi Jinping approved the appointment last Friday.
The post had been vacant for months after General Li Shangfu was ousted as defense minister in September. The promotion of Admiral Dong thus fills the vacancy at the top of the Chinese military. Together with other purges in the Chinese military, this caused much uncertainty and speculation.
In addition, Dong is the first defense minister to come from the ranks of the Chinese Navy. And this fact indicates where China’s military focus will be in the near future: on Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Dong Jun 董军 is what is commonly referred to as a man of the sea. He was born in 1961 in Yantai in the Chinese coastal province of Shandong. After graduating from the Dalian Naval Academy, he joined the Chinese Navy in 1979.
In his early career years, he headed the military training department of the People’s Liberation Army’s naval command and was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Beihai Fleet.
Dong subsequently served in every major naval division of the PLA: in the North Sea Fleet, which regularly conducts joint exercises with the Russian Navy, as well as in the Baltic Sea Fleet, which focuses on potential conflicts with Japan. In January 2017, Dong was appointed deputy commander of the Southern Theater Command of the PLA.
This post is probably what qualified Dong as the new defense minister, as the main tasks of the Southern Theater Command 南部战区 are security in the South China Sea and supporting the Eastern Theater Command in any major operation against Taiwan.
And so it seems as if Dong’s career was made for the Chinese military’s current strategy: Good contacts with Russia coupled with years of expertise in dealing with Japan, Taiwan and the South China Sea.
However, it should be noted that Dong Jun has far less direct power than his counterparts in other countries. Command authority lies with the Central Military Commission – and its chairman is Xi Jinping.
Instead, China’s Defense Minister acts primarily as a public representative of the military. Dong will represent the People’s Liberation Army to the public and other military leaders – and this is likely to be his main focus in the coming months. Dong must improve relations with the USA. These had also deteriorated dramatically in the wake of growing tensions in the South China Sea. In mid-November, Presidents Biden and Xi agreed to resume direct dialogue between their militaries.
The start came last week when General Charles Brown, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke with his Chinese counterpart, General Liu Zhenli. However, the two countries’ defense ministers have not communicated with each other in over a year.
Yet this is essential, especially in Dong’s area of expertise. In the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, there is a risk that a lack of communication channels could lead to misunderstandings or an unwanted escalation. Dong Jun should, therefore, quickly seek dialogue with Lloyd Austin. In any case, the first hurdle has already been taken: Unlike his predecessor, Li Shangfu, Dong Jun has not been sanctioned by the US. Michael Radunski
There was a time when the German Embassy School in Beijing was able to rent Kunming Lake in the famous Summer Palace for the school’s own ice festival. That was in the mid-1980s. China was still poor and there were not many tourists. The Beijing park authorities were grateful for any Western currency that could be used to maintain the former imperial grounds. Today, this is almost unimaginable. Even in freezing temperatures, the Summer Palace is one of the most popular destinations in the capital. flee
The China.Table editorial team wishes you a successful New Year 2024. Whether you are doing business in China, have academic or diplomatic relations with the country, or came into contact with the rival and partner in politics and administration: It will be an exciting year for us. The many developments that have started in recent years are now entering a critical phase.
Several simmering trade disputes are about to reach their moment of truth. The ball is in the EU’s court: If it imposes tariffs on Chinese cars, it will send a signal as a determined player, but it will also sow further discord in global trade.
In the US, the election in November will decide whether there will be new drama surrounding Trump. Foreign trade is particularly important for China at the moment: Domestically, the property crisis is far from over, and young people are so discouraged that they are turning “lying flat” into “rotting.”
As a specialist editorial team, we have looked at these trends and pondered what could happen in the New Year. By the end of 2024, we will be able to compare our assessments and forecasts with reality.
2024 could become a pivotal year in China’s relations with the West. In particular, the trade conflicts between Brussels and Beijing could intensify. Meanwhile, the German government seems unlikely to provide any new impetus for the country’s relations with China. International affairs are likely to be overshadowed by the elections in the USA. Meanwhile, the economy of the People’s Republic continues to feel the effects of the property crisis.
Since the publication of Germany’s “Strategy on China” in July 2023, the topic has fallen quiet again in political Berlin. Not much seems to be happening, especially when it comes to the much-vaunted strengthening of China expertise. Existing China programs have been scaled back by the Green-led Ministry of Economics, for instance, and no new programs are planned for 2024 at least.
But, a strategy only makes sense if it is consistently implemented. So far, however, there has been no concrete action. Instead, the suspicion arises that the government has ticked off the unpleasant topic as settled by publishing the paper. This inaction may soon backfire.
Over the past year, China has been a key focus of German government policy. Although this was more than necessary, it was not a matter of course. As recently as 2019, a senior politician of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) admitted that, despite the importance of trade policy for the German economy, China was not at the top of the government’s political agenda; after all, foreign policy does not win elections.
However, awareness of the dangers of excessive dependence on dictatorial regimes has grown steadily since then. However, the conclusions are still very different. While the Greens and FDP call for a tougher relationship with China, the Chancellery led by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) is putting the brakes on. The Social Democrats fear for tens of thousands of jobs particularly dependent on business with China. flee
The year 2024 is unlikely to ease tensions in the relationship between Brussels and Beijing. China remains an important trading partner for the EU. However, the EU investigation into Chinese EVs and the new investigation launched at the end of December into dumping biodiesel from China harbor a high risk that trade tensions will intensify in the coming year. It is not unlikely that Brussels will extend further investigations into sectors such as medical technology, cosmetics, wind turbines and solar panels.
The EU trade instrument against economic coercion has been in force since the last week of December – the first official application could be in 2024. Beijing had already threatened consequences if the Netherlands tightened its export controls on semiconductor technology.
Geopolitical issues such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East will also continue to cloud diplomatic talks. The EU representatives should perhaps finally scratch Beijing’s influence on Moscow off their list of feasible options.
The European elections in June will be decisive for the EU’s standing when the European Parliament is elected and the EU Commission and the EU Council Presidency are reappointed. Europe must show unity and not drift into a chaotic election. Targeted disinformation campaigns from China before the election would come as no surprise in order to discredit the voting. ari
The Communist Party is not known to be a fan of democratic elections. Nevertheless, the leadership in Beijing will be watching two presidential elections next year with great interest: In Taiwan on January 13 and in the US on November 5.
Our prediction: William Lai from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party will become Taiwan’s new president. Beijing will protest the election – as it considers the island nation an integral part of the People’s Republic – and label the winner of the election as a “separatist.” Tensions over Taiwan will increase, but will not escalate – unless there is an unforeseen incident.
Because Beijing is hoping for the US election. There is a certain probability that Donald Trump will move into the White House – and that will raise spirits in Zhongnanhai. Trump is by no means a friend of China – examples include punitive tariffs and the “China virus.” He is also considered unpredictable, something that China does not like at all.
But: Trump loves “strong man politics.” The next US president will strive for a “deal” with Xi Jinping – in which Trump only has American domestic policy in mind. Everyone else is in danger of falling by the wayside. Be it Europe, Japan, South Korea or Taiwan. rad
Property prices in China continue to fall, as does house building activity. As the construction industry is the driving force behind the Chinese economy, the crisis is dragging down all other sectors.
Despite all the differences, China faces a similar problem to Germany with its debt brake: Unlike his predecessors, Xi Jinping no longer wants to throw money around as freely to trigger economic fireworks. This is in line with what economists demand. However, to fulfill the party’s promise of prosperity, Beijing would need to invest huge sums now.
Our prediction: the leadership will relent and ultimately provide more money for investment. However, instead of increasing the official deficit, the funds will come from all kinds of hidden sources. This is something Germans are also familiar with. fin
The debate about the sustainability of their value creation will accompany European companies throughout the year. The EU Due Diligence Act, which is increasingly taking shape, will further tighten the conditions.
Companies whose value creation comes – at least in part – from the People’s Republic of China are particularly affected and are much more in the limelight than others. The reason for this is the forced labor system implemented by the Chinese authorities to integrate the Uyghur minority into the country’s industrial production.
The year 2024 will be dominated by discussions about the degree of responsibility that can be expected of companies and the social question of what role consumers play. grz
China’s youth questions the way things are more than ever. They want to work less or at least more meaningfully. Not necessarily start a family. Refuse to bow to tradition. They want to travel, celebrate, be spiritual, and, above all, strive for mental and physical health.
But the search for ways out and balance creates new pressure. Nowhere are the ideals of beauty and the beautiful lives of others as unattainable as in China’s social media world. Everyone is under scrutiny. Everyone competes with each other. The judgment and mockery of the invisible masses are merciless.
Even refusal is degraded to an internet trend. The protest stance “Tǎng píng 躺平” – “lie flat” – became “Bǎi làn 摆烂” – “let it rot” in 2023. It’s hard to imagine what will come next. fpe
In his New Year’s Address, Xi Jinping made a communicative turnaround: For the first time since the beginning of the property crisis three years ago, he semi-openly addressed economic problems. In a paragraph on the economic situation, he mentioned two details:
Admitting the difficulties was, as is typical for New Year’s speeches by politicians all over the world, the springboard for promising an improvement in the new year.
Overall, China is undertaking massive attempts to raise confidence in the economy for 2024. But so far, Xi is the only one who is allowed to name the problems, and that is likely to remain the case for a while. However, the first visible steps taken by the government have been to tighten censorship and intimidate economic observers who have dared to come out with pessimistic economic assessments.
The top leadership had already called in a major economic meeting in December to boost confidence over the Chinese economy. However, it failed to present a coherent concept as to how
Confidence in the economy consequently did not increase significantly after the conference. Instead, the leadership is now desperate to spread good vibes and uses its toolbox to control information.
Xi is even deploying the security authorities to combat pessimism. Negative economic forecasts or criticism of economic policies are labeled an attack on “China’s unique socialist system” on the WeChat account of the Ministry of State Security.
As a result, economic analysts and commentators, both Chinese and foreign, said consequently they would be more cautious when publishing research reports in the public sphere or simply stop posting things on public platforms.
Observers said the government’s interference would further distort information about the economy and hurt the regime’s credibility. Lying won’t fix the underlying problems. The attempt to employ propaganda to influence consumers and investors also reflected the leadership’s misperception of mass communication’s role in economic management, they said.
The Central Economic Work Conference, chaired by Party Secretary Xi Jinping, was held December 11-12 in Beijing. The conference, held annually in November or December, sets the economic agenda for the next year. “Weak social expectations” was named in the conference’s readout as one of the key challenges the Chinese economy faces. Expectation management for 2024 was named as one of the main remedies.
However, two other major issues – local government debts and the property sector slump – were mentioned, but no concrete measures were given. “Xi Jinping doesn’t seem to care what the market really is concerned about and simply wants to say things he loves to say and do things in his own way,” said an analyst in Hong Kong, who, like other people interviewed for this analysis, declined to be named.
The leadership has long since reached a consensus that private consumption should be made a stronger driving force for China’s growth. Better social welfare, particularly for the low- and middle-range incomers, is believed to hold the key.
According to the conference readout, however, the government should act “within its capacity” regarding social security. This weak statement, a euphemism for being stingy, echoed an article by Xi Jinping last year, saying China should not pursue “welfarism,” which he said was unsustainable and would “encourage laziness.”
A lot has been said this year about promoting private investment. Top government officials made rounds of assurances and promises, new preferential policies were introduced; a Bureau for Private Economy was established.
But the people that all these were aimed at, the company owners and manager, stayed unmoved. “Local private entrepreneurs have been asking themselves the same question as international investors: Shall I believe in their promises?” said a lawyer in Beijing.
According to a well-circulated lecture transcription by renowned economist Wei Jie (魏杰) of Tsinghua University in November, Chinese entrepreneurs were still reeling from the crackdown on the private sector just a couple of years ago. Only a complete legal framework protecting their property and personal rights could convince them, Wei said.
The lecture’s veracity could not be confirmed. However, other observers said what was in the lecture was stark truth, which many didn’t bother to say to offend the government.
So, instead of improving the fundamentals, the leadership tried to control speech. “It is imperative to strengthen publicity concerning the economic situation and to guide public opinion. Confidence about the Chinese economy’s bright prospects should be sung out loud” 加强经济宣传和舆论引导，唱响中国经济光明论, the conference readout says.
Even before the conference, social media accounts of popular economists and writers on financial topics, such as Wu Xiaobo 吴晓波 and Liu Jipeng 刘继鹏 were already suspended for writing critically about economic policy. One day after the conference’s closing, many less well-known economic and financial channels received platform messages advising them not to publish “negative comments.”
Then, the Ministry of State Security joined the censors with a more spooky step. In a stern statement issued on December 14, the ministry lambasted “maliciously fabricated narratives” aimed “to disrupt market expectations and market order” and “to strategically suppress China and to block its development.” The ministry would “resolutely crack down on and punish illegal and criminal activities jeopardizing the country’s economy,” it stated.
Analysts of China’s financial institutions have already been restraining themselves in recent years in expressing negative views about both the Chinese economy and its financial market. In addition, there have been reports on international institutions‘ offices in China being raided in the past two years after the institutions’ overseas employees published negative opinions on China.
A media researcher said the government’s approach may backfire. “The government might get the idea from what they see as success in the manipulation of international news,” a media researcher in Beijing said. “When it comes to the economy, it won’t work. People can simply look at themselves and the people around them, and then decide how much they would spend or whether they should invest.” Liu Yi
In his New Year’s address, China’s President Xi Jinping brought a “reunification” of China close to a mention of Taiwan. “China will surely be reunified, and all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be bound by a common sense of purpose and share in the glory of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” he said towards the end of his speech on New Year’s Eve.
Taiwan’s outgoing President, Tsai Ing-wen, rejected Xi Jinping’s sovereignty claim. The most important principle for the course of relations with China is democracy, Tsai said at her New Year’s press conference. Taiwan’s relations with China must be decided by the will of the people and peace must be based on “dignity.”
“This is taking the joint will of Taiwan’s people to make a decision. After all, we are a democratic country,” she said.
Last year, Xi said only that people on either side of the strait are “members of one and the same family.” The new wording thus increases the pressure on the island. Taiwan holds elections in January.
Before that, he spoke about the state of the nation. Xi’s main plans for 2024:
Among other things, Xi named the milestones for 2023:
There has also been a slight change in the photos in the background, which political observers traditionally attach symbolic importance to. New are:
Overall, it was once again a very confident speech with many references to China’s global strength. fin
Dong Jun has been appointed the new defense minister of the People’s Republic of China. According to the state news agency Xinhua, President Xi Jinping approved the appointment last Friday.
The post had been vacant for months after General Li Shangfu was ousted as defense minister in September. The promotion of Admiral Dong thus fills the vacancy at the top of the Chinese military. Together with other purges in the Chinese military, this caused much uncertainty and speculation.
In addition, Dong is the first defense minister to come from the ranks of the Chinese Navy. And this fact indicates where China’s military focus will be in the near future: on Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Dong Jun 董军 is what is commonly referred to as a man of the sea. He was born in 1961 in Yantai in the Chinese coastal province of Shandong. After graduating from the Dalian Naval Academy, he joined the Chinese Navy in 1979.
In his early career years, he headed the military training department of the People’s Liberation Army’s naval command and was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Beihai Fleet.
Dong subsequently served in every major naval division of the PLA: in the North Sea Fleet, which regularly conducts joint exercises with the Russian Navy, as well as in the Baltic Sea Fleet, which focuses on potential conflicts with Japan. In January 2017, Dong was appointed deputy commander of the Southern Theater Command of the PLA.
This post is probably what qualified Dong as the new defense minister, as the main tasks of the Southern Theater Command 南部战区 are security in the South China Sea and supporting the Eastern Theater Command in any major operation against Taiwan.
And so it seems as if Dong’s career was made for the Chinese military’s current strategy: Good contacts with Russia coupled with years of expertise in dealing with Japan, Taiwan and the South China Sea.
However, it should be noted that Dong Jun has far less direct power than his counterparts in other countries. Command authority lies with the Central Military Commission – and its chairman is Xi Jinping.
Instead, China’s Defense Minister acts primarily as a public representative of the military. Dong will represent the People’s Liberation Army to the public and other military leaders – and this is likely to be his main focus in the coming months. Dong must improve relations with the USA. These had also deteriorated dramatically in the wake of growing tensions in the South China Sea. In mid-November, Presidents Biden and Xi agreed to resume direct dialogue between their militaries.
The start came last week when General Charles Brown, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke with his Chinese counterpart, General Liu Zhenli. However, the two countries’ defense ministers have not communicated with each other in over a year.
Yet this is essential, especially in Dong’s area of expertise. In the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, there is a risk that a lack of communication channels could lead to misunderstandings or an unwanted escalation. Dong Jun should, therefore, quickly seek dialogue with Lloyd Austin. In any case, the first hurdle has already been taken: Unlike his predecessor, Li Shangfu, Dong Jun has not been sanctioned by the US. Michael Radunski
There was a time when the German Embassy School in Beijing was able to rent Kunming Lake in the famous Summer Palace for the school’s own ice festival. That was in the mid-1980s. China was still poor and there were not many tourists. The Beijing park authorities were grateful for any Western currency that could be used to maintain the former imperial grounds. Today, this is almost unimaginable. Even in freezing temperatures, the Summer Palace is one of the most popular destinations in the capital. flee
