Until now, mainly foreign companies such as H&M and Dolce & Gabbana drew the ire of Chinese nationalists. Domestic businesses have now also become targets. But even Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of the propaganda newspaper Global Times, which is not exactly innocent of nationalism, is worried about the accusations on the internet. As Fabian Peltsch describes in his analysis, some critics even feel reminded of the denunciations of the Cultural Revolution under Mao Zedong.
The engineers at car manufacturer BYD know what it takes to be successful. The Shenzhen-based company has been stirring up the EV mass market for some time now. The company has now set its sights on the next target: the luxury segment. To this end, BYD has developed the sports car Yangwang U9. The price: a whopping 215,000 euros.
The car’s design alone immediately shows who BYD is trying to snatch customers away from: The attack on Ferrari and Lamborghini has begun. Is someone biting off more than they can chew? Joern Petring shows BYD’s strategy in the race – and explains why the chances are not too bad.
What do Chinese Nobel Prize winner Mo Yan and Nongfu Spring iced tea have in common? Both were recently accused on China’s social media channels of hurting the feelings of the Chinese people. Mo allegedly spread “pro-Western” clichés about China in his novels. The iced tea, on the other hand, is accused of being “pro-Japanese” because its label depicts a Japanese-looking temple.
The accusations seem far-fetched – in the case of Nongfu Spring, even the red caps of the mineral water bottles were accused of representing the Japanese flag. But these accusations have far-reaching consequences: The accused are forced to make public statements and emphasize their patriotism. Nongfu Spring also immediately felt the economic impact: Two supermarkets in Jiangsu province pulled the manufacturer’s drinks from their shelves in a highly publicized move and benefited from online approval. The company’s share price, which went public on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2020, temporarily plummeted by five percent. According to the US television station CNN, this reduced Nongfu Spring’s market capitalization by three billion dollars.
When it comes to certain topics, such as Japan or conflicts of interest with the US, Chinese social media platforms such as Weibo are no place for calm discussions. Anyone who offers a target is usually attacked, especially users representing liberal values such as feminism, which are quickly criticized as “Western.” While it doesn’t necessarily reflect the opinion of the majority of society, it does have the effect that many people on the internet remain silent on particular issues and censor themselves. Nobody wants to be publicly accused of possibly having colluded with “foreign forces.”
Nationalism has increased under Xi Jinping. Even at the beginning of his term of office, he called on the media and the country’s citizens to “tell China’s history well.” Last year, the state presented a bill to combat “historical nihilism,” penalizing the defamation of “heroes and martyrs” with a prison sentence of 15 days or a fine of the equivalent of 680 US dollars. However, the party does not always successfully determine what is patriotism and what is extreme nationalism. “There is not just one nationalism in China,” Florian Schneider, Professor of Modern China at the Institute of Area Studies at Leiden University and author of the book “China’s Digital Nationalism”, told Table.Briefings.
“Nationalists in particular, who hold similar positions to those of ‘alt-right’ populists in other parts of the world, are not afraid to criticize domestic players,” explains Schneider. Sometimes they even attack party cadres or politicians. “For example, many nationalists were unhappy when they learned in 2018 that Xi Jinping’s term of office would be extended. Some felt that this would betray Deng Xiaoping’s legacy, and so different groups of nationalists fought online over who represented the more authentic nationalist views.” Censoring such clearly patriotic positions is a fine line for the party. And this is also increasingly becoming a problem for the domestic economy.
So far, mainly foreign companies such as H&M and D&G have drawn the ire of the “little pinks” 小粉紅 – as the online ultranationalists are dismissively called. However, once local brands are affected, the state will have to intervene sooner or later, as one of the current prime directives is to revitalize the domestic economy. So it is no surprise that even Hu Xijin, the infamous former editor-in-chief of the Global Times, speaks of “a very alarming trend in online public opinion” that could have a lasting negative impact on China’s society.
Some critics even feel reminded of the denunciations of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. “One frightening conclusion from these recent nationalist agitations is that no one is ‘safe’,” Schneider summarizes. A single mistake can antagonize radical nationalists, even if this mistake was made years ago and is only now being uncovered. Wu Fang, professor at the Business College of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, has therefore already called on China’s entrepreneurs to “avoid the limelight” in times of nationalism. Issues such as nationality and personal beliefs are quickly taken up and blown out of proportion, he told the South China Morning Post.
On closer inspection, the cases of Mo Yan and Nongfu Spring are less about patriotism and more about harming individuals who were previously considered relatively untouchable. The emphasized nationalism becomes a universal weapon. Mo Yan is by no means a dissident with a pro-Western agenda. If anything, he was previously vilified as a state scribe, having served as a member of the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference and vice president of the state-backed China Writers Association from 2013 to 2018.
And Nongfu Spring provided the opportunity to attack CEO Zhong Shanshan. He is none other than China’s richest man. According to Forbes, his fortune stands at 60 billion US dollars. The fact that his son has a US passport provided an additional target. Nationalists complained that his wealth would migrate overseas in the long term and not benefit the people of China.
In a country where people can otherwise rarely publicly vent their anger, this kind of patriotism must be seen as an outlet for frustration, says Florian Schneider. “With inflation, housing shortages, unemployment, dwindling pensions, and many other social and economic problems, a man like Nongfu owner Zhong Shanshan easily becomes a symbol of privilege and power, making his ultra-rich family the target of the people’s anger. This anger is expressed in the language of nationalism, but these cases are rarely just about nationalism.”
After the mass market, the world’s largest EV manufacturer BYD now wants to conquer the luxury segment. The Shenzhen-based company is already accepting orders for the Yangwang U9 electric super sports car. The price is 1.68 million yuan, around 215,000 euros. BYD announced on Weibo that a deposit of 300,000 yuan is required to reserve a U9. The sports car is expected to reach a top speed of 309 kilometers per hour and will be delivered to customers in mid-2024.
The sales launch of the U9 has far-reaching implications. With this project, BYD emphasizes that it now wants to grow in the luxury segment in addition to the mass market. The aim is to poach wealthy Chinese from brands such as Ferrari and Lamborghini. However, this is not happening under the name BYD, but Yangwang. BYD is thus pushing ahead with its multi-brand strategy.
The electric car specialist has been particularly successful with its core brand BYD. Most of the more than three million cars sold last year were sold under this brand. However, except for Tesla, hardly any other global automotive group focuses solely on one brand and is successful with it.
Leading car manufacturers such as Volkswagen, with its luxury brands Audi and Porsche, and Toyota’s Lexus, have shown that diversification into different brand segments brings strategic advantages, particularly in the higher-margin luxury segment. In the highly competitive Chinese mid-range EV segment, BYD could tap into completely new customer groups with Yangwang.
BYD launched Yangwang, which literally means “to look up” and figuratively means “to strive,” back in January 2023. The first car unveiled was the U8 SUV, which rolled off the production line in November. The plug-in hybrid SUV, which visually resembles cars such as the Jeep or the Mercedes G-Class, was the most expensive vehicle in the BYD Group portfolio, with a list price of around one million yuan (around 130,000 euros). Now, the U9 surpasses this price.
Yangwang also recently presented the U7 model. This luxury saloon could compete with the BMW i5 or the Mercedes EQ series, for example. The U7 is set to launch in the second quarter.
Car manufacturers generally achieve higher profit margins in the luxury segment than in the highly competitive electric car mass market in China. But even in this exclusive segment, market conditions are anything but easy. A clear sign of this is Apple’s decision this week to drop its ambitious plans for its own premium EV. Reports indicate that this was due to fears that the high margins Apple is accustomed to could not be achieved.
In comparison, BYD naturally appears to be in a much better position, not least because BYD controls not only vehicle production but also battery production. However, BYD is probably not only interested in acquiring new, lucrative customers. The Yangwang brand also offers a platform for implementing new technologies in its luxury models. This could also benefit the more affordable models in the long term.
BYD has been working on expanding its success to other brands for some time now. The company first gained experience 14 years ago when it founded the Denza brand together with Daimler. The first cars entered the market in 2012.
Sales were low for a long time until the Germans reduced their share in Denza from 50 to 10 percent in 2017. Business has been booming since. Especially with the latest model, the D9 MPV, another model in the luxury segment.
After Denza and Yangwang, BYD is already planning its next new brand. In September, the Shenzhen-based company presented the Bao 5 SUV, the first car from the premium-positioned Fangchengbao brand.
Aside from the threats posed by the US Inflation Reduction Act, it is important to recognize the potentially much broader threat posed by China’s industrial policy counterpart, “Made in China 2025.” China has been Germany’s biggest trading partner for eight years and also plays a significant role as an economic partner. China has increasingly competed with German companies in photovoltaics and electromobility by pursuing an aggressive industrial policy. Now, China is not only striving for technological progress but also wants to establish a dedicated ecosystem for small and medium-sized German enterprises (SMEs) in its own country.
Nothing happens in China without a plan. Back in 2015, it announced the ten-year plan “Made in China 2025,” aimed at further developing Chinese industry towards higher-quality technology. This plan already indicated that the Chinese want to take over ten strategic manufacturing sectors themselves and replicate the German SME ecosystem.
The so-called German “hidden champions” – numerous small and medium-sized companies that are successful locally with special products in strategically important economic sectors and niches – have been targeted in particular. Beijing believes that state intervention can promote the rise of local “hidden champions” even though China’s social and economic circumstances differ from those in Germany.
The government under Xi Jinping is supporting thousands of small and medium-sized high-tech companies, from mechanical engineering companies to electromobility specialists. The long-term goal is to replace foreign imports with innovative products manufactured on the domestic market.
In its study “Accelerator state: How China fosters ‘Little Giant’ companies,” the Berlin-based Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics) has analyzed in detail how China’s innovation policy clearly focuses on smaller companies. By analyzing government documents and key statistics, the study clearly shows that state-certified high-tech SMEs in China enjoy the benefits of a comprehensive support system.
This system, known as the “pyramid cultivation system,” is hierarchically structured and based on a mechanism to ensure that the most competitive and promising companies benefit from the support. It includes different levels such as “innovative SMEs,” “specialized SMEs” and “small giants” or “manufacturing champions,” Companies are rated on their economic and innovative performance and receive government titles and support for three years. This support includes facilitated access to financing, stock exchanges, bond markets, subsidies, research funding and government cooperation.
Large and small German companies in the manufacturing sector need to be vigilant, as more than 70,000 specialized SMEs and more than 12,000 “small giants” in China are potential competitors that could threaten their (global) market shares. Germany’s exports to China, especially of machinery and vehicles, totaled around 67 billion euros in 2023 and account for a significant portion of Germany’s total exports to China of 98 billion euros. This makes all German companies vulnerable to Chinese industrial policy, something that Berlin has also recognized.
The German government’s new China strategy now refers to Beijing as a “systemic rival.” Initial steps are being taken at the EU level to safeguard the European market from heavily subsidized Chinese EVs, which are around 20 percent cheaper for the end customer than cars manufactured in the EU. German car manufacturers are worried that China could take countermeasures in response to the EU’s move, as they see the country not only as a sales market for combustion engines but also as a key market for technological competition in order not to be outpaced by Chinese manufacturers in the long term.
The Merics study emphasizes both the opportunities and risks of the Chinese funding approach. It leads to increased funding for successful high-tech SMEs, such as BWT Beijing, Leaderdrive and Endovastec, which have developed Chinese alternatives to foreign primary products. However, there is a risk that Chinese officials might incorrectly identify promising companies, which could lead to misinvestment and misuse of funds.
Despite billions of bad Chinese investments in the past, Germany must see the looming threat from China as a wake-up call. The days when European companies’ specialization and technological edge made them untouchable in China are ending. This does not mean that Germany should petrify in the face of China’s powerful industrial policy.
Instead, it is necessary to weigh up which German products need to be safeguarded from Chinese dumping by imposing trade barriers and/or supported through targeted measures and government investment. Considering China’s economic power, a coordinated EU-wide approach is probably more effective than national measures to protect economic competitiveness. Hopefully, Chancellor Scholz will take this into account during his visit to Beijing in mid-April. After all, nothing less than Germany’s long-term economic position is at stake.
Tariq K. Chaudhry is a China Economist at Hamburg Commercial Bank and runs the German podcast “China – der Wirtschaftspodcast.” Chaudhry is also the author of the weekly newsletter “China Economic Notes” on LinkedIn.
In times of economic uncertainty and a lack of alternatives, more and more Chinese are investing in gold. According to the China Gold Association, retail sales of gold products rose by almost nine percent year-on-year to 1,090 tons in 2023. Particularly popular are traditional lucky charms cast in gold, such as this dragon from a jewelry store in Nanjing. However, since the younger generation cannot afford such status symbols, so-called gold beans are the new trend. These small pieces of gold sold in a jar cost around 76 euros per gram.
Until now, mainly foreign companies such as H&M and Dolce & Gabbana drew the ire of Chinese nationalists. Domestic businesses have now also become targets. But even Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of the propaganda newspaper Global Times, which is not exactly innocent of nationalism, is worried about the accusations on the internet. As Fabian Peltsch describes in his analysis, some critics even feel reminded of the denunciations of the Cultural Revolution under Mao Zedong.
The engineers at car manufacturer BYD know what it takes to be successful. The Shenzhen-based company has been stirring up the EV mass market for some time now. The company has now set its sights on the next target: the luxury segment. To this end, BYD has developed the sports car Yangwang U9. The price: a whopping 215,000 euros.
The car’s design alone immediately shows who BYD is trying to snatch customers away from: The attack on Ferrari and Lamborghini has begun. Is someone biting off more than they can chew? Joern Petring shows BYD’s strategy in the race – and explains why the chances are not too bad.
What do Chinese Nobel Prize winner Mo Yan and Nongfu Spring iced tea have in common? Both were recently accused on China’s social media channels of hurting the feelings of the Chinese people. Mo allegedly spread “pro-Western” clichés about China in his novels. The iced tea, on the other hand, is accused of being “pro-Japanese” because its label depicts a Japanese-looking temple.
The accusations seem far-fetched – in the case of Nongfu Spring, even the red caps of the mineral water bottles were accused of representing the Japanese flag. But these accusations have far-reaching consequences: The accused are forced to make public statements and emphasize their patriotism. Nongfu Spring also immediately felt the economic impact: Two supermarkets in Jiangsu province pulled the manufacturer’s drinks from their shelves in a highly publicized move and benefited from online approval. The company’s share price, which went public on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2020, temporarily plummeted by five percent. According to the US television station CNN, this reduced Nongfu Spring’s market capitalization by three billion dollars.
When it comes to certain topics, such as Japan or conflicts of interest with the US, Chinese social media platforms such as Weibo are no place for calm discussions. Anyone who offers a target is usually attacked, especially users representing liberal values such as feminism, which are quickly criticized as “Western.” While it doesn’t necessarily reflect the opinion of the majority of society, it does have the effect that many people on the internet remain silent on particular issues and censor themselves. Nobody wants to be publicly accused of possibly having colluded with “foreign forces.”
Nationalism has increased under Xi Jinping. Even at the beginning of his term of office, he called on the media and the country’s citizens to “tell China’s history well.” Last year, the state presented a bill to combat “historical nihilism,” penalizing the defamation of “heroes and martyrs” with a prison sentence of 15 days or a fine of the equivalent of 680 US dollars. However, the party does not always successfully determine what is patriotism and what is extreme nationalism. “There is not just one nationalism in China,” Florian Schneider, Professor of Modern China at the Institute of Area Studies at Leiden University and author of the book “China’s Digital Nationalism”, told Table.Briefings.
“Nationalists in particular, who hold similar positions to those of ‘alt-right’ populists in other parts of the world, are not afraid to criticize domestic players,” explains Schneider. Sometimes they even attack party cadres or politicians. “For example, many nationalists were unhappy when they learned in 2018 that Xi Jinping’s term of office would be extended. Some felt that this would betray Deng Xiaoping’s legacy, and so different groups of nationalists fought online over who represented the more authentic nationalist views.” Censoring such clearly patriotic positions is a fine line for the party. And this is also increasingly becoming a problem for the domestic economy.
So far, mainly foreign companies such as H&M and D&G have drawn the ire of the “little pinks” 小粉紅 – as the online ultranationalists are dismissively called. However, once local brands are affected, the state will have to intervene sooner or later, as one of the current prime directives is to revitalize the domestic economy. So it is no surprise that even Hu Xijin, the infamous former editor-in-chief of the Global Times, speaks of “a very alarming trend in online public opinion” that could have a lasting negative impact on China’s society.
Some critics even feel reminded of the denunciations of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. “One frightening conclusion from these recent nationalist agitations is that no one is ‘safe’,” Schneider summarizes. A single mistake can antagonize radical nationalists, even if this mistake was made years ago and is only now being uncovered. Wu Fang, professor at the Business College of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, has therefore already called on China’s entrepreneurs to “avoid the limelight” in times of nationalism. Issues such as nationality and personal beliefs are quickly taken up and blown out of proportion, he told the South China Morning Post.
On closer inspection, the cases of Mo Yan and Nongfu Spring are less about patriotism and more about harming individuals who were previously considered relatively untouchable. The emphasized nationalism becomes a universal weapon. Mo Yan is by no means a dissident with a pro-Western agenda. If anything, he was previously vilified as a state scribe, having served as a member of the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference and vice president of the state-backed China Writers Association from 2013 to 2018.
And Nongfu Spring provided the opportunity to attack CEO Zhong Shanshan. He is none other than China’s richest man. According to Forbes, his fortune stands at 60 billion US dollars. The fact that his son has a US passport provided an additional target. Nationalists complained that his wealth would migrate overseas in the long term and not benefit the people of China.
In a country where people can otherwise rarely publicly vent their anger, this kind of patriotism must be seen as an outlet for frustration, says Florian Schneider. “With inflation, housing shortages, unemployment, dwindling pensions, and many other social and economic problems, a man like Nongfu owner Zhong Shanshan easily becomes a symbol of privilege and power, making his ultra-rich family the target of the people’s anger. This anger is expressed in the language of nationalism, but these cases are rarely just about nationalism.”
After the mass market, the world’s largest EV manufacturer BYD now wants to conquer the luxury segment. The Shenzhen-based company is already accepting orders for the Yangwang U9 electric super sports car. The price is 1.68 million yuan, around 215,000 euros. BYD announced on Weibo that a deposit of 300,000 yuan is required to reserve a U9. The sports car is expected to reach a top speed of 309 kilometers per hour and will be delivered to customers in mid-2024.
The sales launch of the U9 has far-reaching implications. With this project, BYD emphasizes that it now wants to grow in the luxury segment in addition to the mass market. The aim is to poach wealthy Chinese from brands such as Ferrari and Lamborghini. However, this is not happening under the name BYD, but Yangwang. BYD is thus pushing ahead with its multi-brand strategy.
The electric car specialist has been particularly successful with its core brand BYD. Most of the more than three million cars sold last year were sold under this brand. However, except for Tesla, hardly any other global automotive group focuses solely on one brand and is successful with it.
Leading car manufacturers such as Volkswagen, with its luxury brands Audi and Porsche, and Toyota’s Lexus, have shown that diversification into different brand segments brings strategic advantages, particularly in the higher-margin luxury segment. In the highly competitive Chinese mid-range EV segment, BYD could tap into completely new customer groups with Yangwang.
BYD launched Yangwang, which literally means “to look up” and figuratively means “to strive,” back in January 2023. The first car unveiled was the U8 SUV, which rolled off the production line in November. The plug-in hybrid SUV, which visually resembles cars such as the Jeep or the Mercedes G-Class, was the most expensive vehicle in the BYD Group portfolio, with a list price of around one million yuan (around 130,000 euros). Now, the U9 surpasses this price.
Yangwang also recently presented the U7 model. This luxury saloon could compete with the BMW i5 or the Mercedes EQ series, for example. The U7 is set to launch in the second quarter.
Car manufacturers generally achieve higher profit margins in the luxury segment than in the highly competitive electric car mass market in China. But even in this exclusive segment, market conditions are anything but easy. A clear sign of this is Apple’s decision this week to drop its ambitious plans for its own premium EV. Reports indicate that this was due to fears that the high margins Apple is accustomed to could not be achieved.
In comparison, BYD naturally appears to be in a much better position, not least because BYD controls not only vehicle production but also battery production. However, BYD is probably not only interested in acquiring new, lucrative customers. The Yangwang brand also offers a platform for implementing new technologies in its luxury models. This could also benefit the more affordable models in the long term.
BYD has been working on expanding its success to other brands for some time now. The company first gained experience 14 years ago when it founded the Denza brand together with Daimler. The first cars entered the market in 2012.
Sales were low for a long time until the Germans reduced their share in Denza from 50 to 10 percent in 2017. Business has been booming since. Especially with the latest model, the D9 MPV, another model in the luxury segment.
After Denza and Yangwang, BYD is already planning its next new brand. In September, the Shenzhen-based company presented the Bao 5 SUV, the first car from the premium-positioned Fangchengbao brand.
Aside from the threats posed by the US Inflation Reduction Act, it is important to recognize the potentially much broader threat posed by China’s industrial policy counterpart, “Made in China 2025.” China has been Germany’s biggest trading partner for eight years and also plays a significant role as an economic partner. China has increasingly competed with German companies in photovoltaics and electromobility by pursuing an aggressive industrial policy. Now, China is not only striving for technological progress but also wants to establish a dedicated ecosystem for small and medium-sized German enterprises (SMEs) in its own country.
Nothing happens in China without a plan. Back in 2015, it announced the ten-year plan “Made in China 2025,” aimed at further developing Chinese industry towards higher-quality technology. This plan already indicated that the Chinese want to take over ten strategic manufacturing sectors themselves and replicate the German SME ecosystem.
The so-called German “hidden champions” – numerous small and medium-sized companies that are successful locally with special products in strategically important economic sectors and niches – have been targeted in particular. Beijing believes that state intervention can promote the rise of local “hidden champions” even though China’s social and economic circumstances differ from those in Germany.
The government under Xi Jinping is supporting thousands of small and medium-sized high-tech companies, from mechanical engineering companies to electromobility specialists. The long-term goal is to replace foreign imports with innovative products manufactured on the domestic market.
In its study “Accelerator state: How China fosters ‘Little Giant’ companies,” the Berlin-based Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics) has analyzed in detail how China’s innovation policy clearly focuses on smaller companies. By analyzing government documents and key statistics, the study clearly shows that state-certified high-tech SMEs in China enjoy the benefits of a comprehensive support system.
This system, known as the “pyramid cultivation system,” is hierarchically structured and based on a mechanism to ensure that the most competitive and promising companies benefit from the support. It includes different levels such as “innovative SMEs,” “specialized SMEs” and “small giants” or “manufacturing champions,” Companies are rated on their economic and innovative performance and receive government titles and support for three years. This support includes facilitated access to financing, stock exchanges, bond markets, subsidies, research funding and government cooperation.
Large and small German companies in the manufacturing sector need to be vigilant, as more than 70,000 specialized SMEs and more than 12,000 “small giants” in China are potential competitors that could threaten their (global) market shares. Germany’s exports to China, especially of machinery and vehicles, totaled around 67 billion euros in 2023 and account for a significant portion of Germany’s total exports to China of 98 billion euros. This makes all German companies vulnerable to Chinese industrial policy, something that Berlin has also recognized.
The German government’s new China strategy now refers to Beijing as a “systemic rival.” Initial steps are being taken at the EU level to safeguard the European market from heavily subsidized Chinese EVs, which are around 20 percent cheaper for the end customer than cars manufactured in the EU. German car manufacturers are worried that China could take countermeasures in response to the EU’s move, as they see the country not only as a sales market for combustion engines but also as a key market for technological competition in order not to be outpaced by Chinese manufacturers in the long term.
The Merics study emphasizes both the opportunities and risks of the Chinese funding approach. It leads to increased funding for successful high-tech SMEs, such as BWT Beijing, Leaderdrive and Endovastec, which have developed Chinese alternatives to foreign primary products. However, there is a risk that Chinese officials might incorrectly identify promising companies, which could lead to misinvestment and misuse of funds.
Despite billions of bad Chinese investments in the past, Germany must see the looming threat from China as a wake-up call. The days when European companies’ specialization and technological edge made them untouchable in China are ending. This does not mean that Germany should petrify in the face of China’s powerful industrial policy.
Instead, it is necessary to weigh up which German products need to be safeguarded from Chinese dumping by imposing trade barriers and/or supported through targeted measures and government investment. Considering China’s economic power, a coordinated EU-wide approach is probably more effective than national measures to protect economic competitiveness. Hopefully, Chancellor Scholz will take this into account during his visit to Beijing in mid-April. After all, nothing less than Germany’s long-term economic position is at stake.
Tariq K. Chaudhry is a China Economist at Hamburg Commercial Bank and runs the German podcast “China – der Wirtschaftspodcast.” Chaudhry is also the author of the weekly newsletter “China Economic Notes” on LinkedIn.
In times of economic uncertainty and a lack of alternatives, more and more Chinese are investing in gold. According to the China Gold Association, retail sales of gold products rose by almost nine percent year-on-year to 1,090 tons in 2023. Particularly popular are traditional lucky charms cast in gold, such as this dragon from a jewelry store in Nanjing. However, since the younger generation cannot afford such status symbols, so-called gold beans are the new trend. These small pieces of gold sold in a jar cost around 76 euros per gram.
