Occasionally, strange “coincidences” can occur in geopolitics. For instance, Lithuania has just disappeared from China’s customs system for a few days. Curiously, trade is interrupted with the same country that recently turned to Taiwan and thus stood up to the People’s Republic. There was talk of a technical error. It is so thinly veiled that it can only be read as a message to Vilnius. Amelie Richter took a closer look at the conflict between the Baltic EU nation and China. Beijing provides a prime example of the potential use of the EU’s new instrument against economic coercion.
Whether any “technical errors” will also occur in the diplomatic boycott of the Winter Olympics by the US, in other words, whether the US will have to fear severe consequences, remains to be seen. However, Beijing has already announced “firm countermeasures”. Felix Lee reports about the reactions to the boycott from Beijing and political Berlin. In Germany, there is sympathy for a boycott among the Greens, but the coalition partners SPD and FDP are far more cautious.
To engage in a concerted refusal to have dealings with (a person, a store, an organization, etc.) usually to express disapproval – that is the definition of the term “boycott”. It goes back to the British landowner Charles Cunningham Boycott, who was known for charging usurious rates of interest to his tenants and for victimizing his employees. They all resigned and took to the streets to protest him. Villagers joined the protest and were boycotting all trade with him. Even mail was no longer delivered to him. The boycott as a form of protest was born.
The US has now announced a boycott of the Winter Olympics in Beijing. And a “diplomatic” one at that. Due to the ongoing human rights violations against the Muslim Uyghurs, among others, Washington will not send any government representatives to the Games, White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki announced. When asked why the US government refrained from a full boycott of the Games, Psaki replied that the intention was not to punish the athletes who had trained hard for the Games.
Now one might think: So what? Whether representatives of the US government will be sitting in the stands at the opening ceremony doesn’t really affect the Games. China’s rigid Covid measures do not provide for an audience from abroad anyway. In his first reaction to the decision, the spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington said on Twitter that the boycott would have no impact on the Games. “No one would care about whether these people come or not”. China’s state-run Global Times first tried to play down the conflict on Twitter: “To be honest, Chinese are relieved to hear the news, because the fewer US officials come, the fewer viruses will be brought in”
But Beijing is not taking the Olympic boycott so well after all. “The US should stop politicizing sports and stop disrupting the Beijing Winter Olympics with words or deeds,” China’s foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian stated the next morning. Otherwise, bilateral dialogue and cooperation with China on important topics or international issues could be damaged. Moreover, Washington should stop politicizing sports. The Olympics were “not a stage for political posturing and manipulation”. “The US will pay a price for its erroneous actions. You may wait and see,” Zhao threatened, announcing “firm countermeasures” without giving details. “The US attempt to interfere with the Beijing Winter Olympics out of ideological prejudice, based on lies and rumors, will only expose sinister intentions,” he added.
Apparently, the leadership had no intention of receiving many state visitors at all for the opening and also during the Winter Games between February 4 and 20. Only on Monday, Zhao had stated that China had not extended any invitations. Due to the pandemic, visitors from abroad are generally not allowed. This was already the case with the Summer Olympic Games in Tokyo. Only in the case of Japan, this had no political meaning.
But the US government has now called on other countries to join the diplomatic boycott. And some countries may indeed heed Washington’s call. Australia, which has also been in a bitter dispute with China for years, has already refused to sign an agreement to keep politics out of the Games, along with 19 other countries. The Sydney Morning Herald reported in its Wednesday edition, citing government sources, that Australia would not send any officials or politicians to the Games. Whether Prime Minister Scott Morrison will declare a formal diplomatic boycott has not yet been decided.
Washington’s demand is also putting the new German traffic light coalition in Berlin under pressure. Last week, Foreign Minister-designate Annalena Baerbock of the Green Party had considered a boycott of the Games in an interview with China.Table. ” When I see how China’s leadership deals with tennis player Peng Shuai or with the arrested citizen journalist Zhang Zhan, then, of course, we should take a closer look at the Olympic Games,” Baerbock said. “There are different ways for governments to deal with that, which will certainly be discussed in the coming weeks.”
Foreign policy spokesman of the Green Party, Omid Nouripour, joined in on Tuesday and explicitly welcomed the US decision. With massive human rights violations, it was “necessary to also send a clear signal,” Nouripour said Tuesday on rbb-Inforadio. Nouripour also did not call for a full boycott. “Athletes who have spent a lifetime working towards a goal” should not be victims of politics, he said. But the US approach of not sending government representatives to the Games was the “right approach,”. He expressed the hope that “Germany would follow suit”.
However, Chancellor-designate Olaf Scholz (SPD) is putting the brakes on. The German government would discuss its handling of China “very carefully with us, between us and with its partners in Europe and the world,” he said on Tuesday. Many countries that Germany maintains ties with have “forms of government that are completely different from what we consider right,” Scholz said. He said the new federal government needs to “know about the differences and still get along well with each other in the world.” This would be a “clever understanding of politics”.
Finance Minister-designate Christian Lindner (FDP) remained equally vague. The future shaping of relations with China should also take the economic importance of the People’s Republic into account, he now stressed. The government would “continue to take the special role of the Chinese internal market for the German economy into account,” Lindner said. “On the other hand, we have decided to also show a commitment to human rights, respect for international law, and multilateralism on the global stage.” There needs to be an “open exchange” with China.
The FDP had also criticized the previous government for taking a too cautious China policy despite the massive increase in human rights violations in the People’s Republic. Now, however, Germany’s economic interests in China also seem to be more important to the FDP. In 2020, the volume of bilateral foreign trade between China and Germany was well over €220 billion, higher than with any other EU country. For Germany’s carmakers, in particular, the Middle Kingdom has long been by far the biggest market in the world.
But those who ask around European diplomats in Beijing are often told behind closed doors that Germany’s cautious China policy can no longer be maintained among the increasingly polarized climate. It’s also being said that the closed borders and exchanges, limited to telephone calls and video conferences, make it more and more difficult for embassy staff in Beijing to explain this fundamental change in the People’s Republic under Xi Jinping to the relevant government representatives in Berlin.
If you listen more closely to company representatives in China, you will mostly hear nothing but an embarrassed silence. This should not come as a surprise, given the heated atmosphere, any critical statement could be punished with economic retaliation. At the same time, companies face just as much pressure on their domestic market – due to new supply chain laws and consumers’ increased moral awareness.
The German Chamber of Commerce in Beijing attempts a compromise: A telephone conversation with Managing Director Jens Hildebrandt is not possible for “scheduling reasons”, instead they send a generic statement: “If the Federal Government wants to shape a comprehensive China strategy in Germany within the framework of the joint EU-China policy and continue the government consultations, this also makes sense from the point of view of the German Chamber of Commerce in China. We suggest continuing the dialogue between Germany and China in various forms” the statement says. Contribution by Fabian Kretschmer
For a few days, the state of Lithuania apparently no longer existed for China’s customs officials. A Lithuanian wood exporter reported on a news portal that 300 containers were stuck outside Chinese ports. This was quickly followed by other Lithuanian companies, who also reported that their goods were not cleared by customs. “It seems that such a country is non-existent on China’s custom system,” said Vidmantas Janulevičius, president of the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists.
The consequence: Shipments from Lithuania could no longer be unloaded in China, and conversely, no exports from China came to Lithuania – no trade whatsoever was possible. Until now, such a thing was unheard of. The drama also kept the EU Commission in Brussels on its toes. Then, on Tuesday, salvation arrived: The Baltic state was found on the computers of the Chinese customs officials, as Janulevičius confirmed to the South China Morning Post (SCMP). There was talk of a technical error. The EU wanted to investigate the matter with its representation in China.
A technical error or deliberate show of force – for Vilnius and Beijing, the incident is the latest act in the dispute over the “Taiwan office” in the Lithuanian capital. The dispute between the small EU state with a population of just over 2.8 million and gargantuan China is about more than mere wood shipments – China is not an important trading partner for Lithuania.
These events are more of a test of the rules of international trade order. Moreover, the question is how to react to economic coercion by the People’s Republic against a member state of the European Union. For Brussels, China’s actions provide just the perfect prime example of a new instrument against economic punitive measures, which is to be officially presented on Wednesday.
Moreover, the focus is once again shifting to the EU’s general approach towards Beijing. The relatively small EU state of Lithuania is putting Brussels on the spot, after all. The EU Commission has to react now: In a letter to European Commissioner for Trade Valdis Dombrovskis and EU Foreign Affairs High Representative Josep Borrell, Lithuania’s Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis wrote on Monday that China was increasing the “unacceptable” economic pressure “to an unprecedentedly high level”.
Landsbergis warned of further consequences for the union: “These activities by the PRC authorities against one EU Member State have a direct impact on the entire EU and our common trade policy,” the minister wrote. “I would kindly ask you to intervene with the Chinese authorities on behalf of Lithuania with the aim of resolving the present situation.” That apparently happened. However, other Lithuanian business sources reported SCMP of ongoing problems.
The EU executive said he was in contact with Vilnius, the EU delegation in Beijing, and the Chinese authorities to gather further information and investigate the situation. Meanwhile, the EU supported Lithuania on issues related to the diplomatic assessment of the Taiwanese office. It does not have the status of an embassy and therefore does not violate the “one China policy”, stressed a spokeswoman for the Directorate-General for Trade.
And China? Beijing claims to have nothing to do with the problems of Lithuanian traders. The state propaganda paper Global Times rejected the EU state’s account earlier this week: Lithuania had “not yet” been removed from China’s customs list, it concluded. If there was no trade currently, it was solely because Chinese importers wanted to avoid risks. However, the paper did not address why customs would therefore fully refuse clearance. Instead, the paper insinuated Lithuania intended to put China in a bad light. “While the Chinese government hasn’t issued any restrictive measures on goods imported from Lithuania, it seems that the Baltic nation cannot wait to play up the so-called sanctions imposed by Chinese ports on Lithuanian products.” This action was labeled as a “stunt” orchestrated by Vilnius. At the same time, the paper sharply warned that any country that “provokes China’s core interests” would inevitably face retaliation.
However, the import/export industry stated that a customs blockade by China is possible even without an official administrative order. Rokas Radvilavičius, director of the Lithuanian-Chinese trade association, told Lithuanian media that there had been no confirmation of a trade blockade with Lithuania. He suspects “internal, unofficial instructions”.
The “core interests” referred to by the Global Times are Taiwan. The dispute between Vilnius and Beijing began in early summer and has since led to a deterioration of relations. When it became public that a “Taiwan” office was to be opened in the Lithuanian capital, China withdrew its ambassador in protest, suspended rail freight traffic to Lithuania, and revoked all import permits for foodstuffs (China.Table reported). Three days after the office officially opened in November, Beijing downgraded its diplomatic relations with Lithuania (China.Table reported).
The action against Lithuania is not a first – the leadership in Beijing had resorted to trading sanctions many times in the past. After the writer and human rights activist Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in 2010, China imposed an import ban on Norwegian salmon. Following criticism from Australia, the People’s Republic slapped punitive tariffs on Australian wine and refused to allow ships carrying coal from Australia to unload their cargo. However, to simply delete a whole state from the customs system is an unprecedented measure.
In a bid to stand up to China, but also to the US and its punitive tariffs, the EU will unveil its new countermeasure against unfair trade practices today: The so-called Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI). The ACI targets countries that “interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices” of the EU or its member states “by applying or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment”, according to a draft proposal.
What does the proposal include:
The EU Commission’s proposal is to be officially presented by EU Commissioner for Trade Dombrovskis on Wednesday. The proposal will then be submitted to the European Parliament and the EU Council for evaluation. This means that changes may still be made.
Not likely, analyzes Viking Bohman of the Swedish National China Centre in a report. First, Bohman argues, China’s aggressive diplomacy is unlikely to be deterred by a threat of punitive action. Thus, a cycle of retaliation would more likely ensue. If applied ineptly, the EU could thus harm itself. Second, the ACI cannot be used against coercive acts that are not made public by either the aggressor or the target, which could leave the EU Commission oblivious.
Better than retaliation is “absorption,” the China Center report states: Member states whose trade with China is blocked by coercive economic measures should be supported to develop other supply chains. Financial compensation through a solidarity fund could also cushion coercion.
Bohman is critical of the proposal with the implementation competence resting with Brussels: “I seriously doubt that it will stay that way. EU member states will want to have a say in how it is used.” The resulting problems with China were “highly political in nature”. “Member countries would be the ones under attack, and their economies would have to bear the cost of both China’s actions and the EU’s countermeasures.”
Jonathan Hackenbroich, head of the task force of the think tank European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), which deals with the EU’s options against economic coercion and had provided important impulses in the ACI drafting process, takes a similar view. The say of the member states is now a big question – and whether the plan will be watered down during the negotiations. Hackenbroich sees a risk in this: “If it ends up becoming a ‘lowest common denominator’ instrument, that would be bad. A weak instrument would be the worst possible outcome.” Concerns that ACI could lead to protectionism are also a risk for the EU, according to Hackenbroich. The right balance would need to be struck here.
Hackenbroich also questions the effectiveness of the proposed measures. The US government under the Trump administration has also resorted to punitive tariffs, but this has hardly led to a change in China’s behavior.
“We can expect intensive discussions,” Reuters news agency quoted an EU diplomat as saying. France, which will hold the rotating EU presidency in the first half of 2022, supports the measure. However, more market-oriented states such as Sweden and the Czech Republic could potentially see it as too protectionist. Even before the official presentation, Stockholm had expressed concerns on Tuesday: According to a Bloomberg report, the Swedish government stressed that it wasn’t convinced the problem was big enough to even justify the EU Commission’s proposal in this form.
Sinolytics is a European consulting and analysis company that focuses entirely on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in China.
“I am a travel reporter with a preference for countries that have a bad reputation,” Stephan Orth describes himself. On the ground, however, the motto of the professional couchsurfer, despite extensive travel preparation, is: “Approach everything with an open mind.” And that’s exactly what is needed: Couchsurfers look for free accommodation at strangers’ homes via the Internet. Where, and how comfortable this form of travel away from the tourist trade ultimately is, is almost always a surprise.
Having already published two successful books about his couchsurfing experiences, Orth flew to China in 2018 with the idea of a new book. With some previous experience in his luggage – the journalist had already made three trips to China before – he traveled across the country for three months alone and with only basic Chinese skills. He was often not allowed to mention that he was a couchsurfing guest in front of friends of his hosts, because this kind of accommodation of strangers is uncommon in China. The fact that visitors must report to the local police department within 24 hours further complicates the process. Orth’s travel impressions ultimately resulted in the book Couchsurfing in China, published in 2019, a literary mosaic of encounters and different perspectives that reveal China’s various facets.
The travel journalist wasn’t always sure that he would work in this genre: “I had long thought of writing more about cultural or social topics.” The switch to travel journalism came about through his master’s studies in Australia. “Because I traveled there for a few months,” Orth says. In addition to Australia, he explored New Zealand, the Fiji archipelago and the Cook Islands. Later, the journalist published his work in the travel section of Spiegel Online for a few years. “And now I’m a travel journalist with a big focus on social and cultural topics – and somehow it all fits together.”
He dedicated his China book to the dog Xiao Bai, who ended up as his guest meal at a family in Guangxi province. In these moments he had to decide: “Do I want to be polite and eat with the others or do I want to break ranks here […]?” Dogs are only considered food in some regions in China. On the YouTube channel In Bed With, Stephan Orth describes that the urban young middle class, in particular, tends to keep dogs and cats as pets. The author knows what he’s talking about: At one point during his travels, he had to share his sleeping quarters with five cats.
As a journalist, however, Stephan Orth was also interested in media censorship in China. When the Chinese news portal Tiantian kuai bao asked for an interview in 2018, he experienced it first-hand. Because even the film crew wasn’t aware that, shortly before, a law had been passed prohibiting the live broadcast of interviews with foreigners. The material had to be reviewed first, he was told, and he was put off indefinitely. And his book will probably never reach the Chinese market either.
Could he imagine living in China? “I would definitely find it very interesting for a while – but in the long run, the country is a bit too exhausting for me”Juliane Scholübbers
Heavy seas: A Chinese container ship has run ashore on the west coast of the Russian island of Sakhalin. On Monday afternoon, a storm had pushed the aged barge Xing Yuan against the shore of the city of Cholmsk. The 12-member crew was evacuated by the Russian coast guard. The ship was traveling without cargo but has 103 tons of fuel in its tanks. The container giant is being investigated by divers for leaks.
Occasionally, strange “coincidences” can occur in geopolitics. For instance, Lithuania has just disappeared from China’s customs system for a few days. Curiously, trade is interrupted with the same country that recently turned to Taiwan and thus stood up to the People’s Republic. There was talk of a technical error. It is so thinly veiled that it can only be read as a message to Vilnius. Amelie Richter took a closer look at the conflict between the Baltic EU nation and China. Beijing provides a prime example of the potential use of the EU’s new instrument against economic coercion.
Whether any “technical errors” will also occur in the diplomatic boycott of the Winter Olympics by the US, in other words, whether the US will have to fear severe consequences, remains to be seen. However, Beijing has already announced “firm countermeasures”. Felix Lee reports about the reactions to the boycott from Beijing and political Berlin. In Germany, there is sympathy for a boycott among the Greens, but the coalition partners SPD and FDP are far more cautious.
To engage in a concerted refusal to have dealings with (a person, a store, an organization, etc.) usually to express disapproval – that is the definition of the term “boycott”. It goes back to the British landowner Charles Cunningham Boycott, who was known for charging usurious rates of interest to his tenants and for victimizing his employees. They all resigned and took to the streets to protest him. Villagers joined the protest and were boycotting all trade with him. Even mail was no longer delivered to him. The boycott as a form of protest was born.
The US has now announced a boycott of the Winter Olympics in Beijing. And a “diplomatic” one at that. Due to the ongoing human rights violations against the Muslim Uyghurs, among others, Washington will not send any government representatives to the Games, White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki announced. When asked why the US government refrained from a full boycott of the Games, Psaki replied that the intention was not to punish the athletes who had trained hard for the Games.
Now one might think: So what? Whether representatives of the US government will be sitting in the stands at the opening ceremony doesn’t really affect the Games. China’s rigid Covid measures do not provide for an audience from abroad anyway. In his first reaction to the decision, the spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington said on Twitter that the boycott would have no impact on the Games. “No one would care about whether these people come or not”. China’s state-run Global Times first tried to play down the conflict on Twitter: “To be honest, Chinese are relieved to hear the news, because the fewer US officials come, the fewer viruses will be brought in”
But Beijing is not taking the Olympic boycott so well after all. “The US should stop politicizing sports and stop disrupting the Beijing Winter Olympics with words or deeds,” China’s foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian stated the next morning. Otherwise, bilateral dialogue and cooperation with China on important topics or international issues could be damaged. Moreover, Washington should stop politicizing sports. The Olympics were “not a stage for political posturing and manipulation”. “The US will pay a price for its erroneous actions. You may wait and see,” Zhao threatened, announcing “firm countermeasures” without giving details. “The US attempt to interfere with the Beijing Winter Olympics out of ideological prejudice, based on lies and rumors, will only expose sinister intentions,” he added.
Apparently, the leadership had no intention of receiving many state visitors at all for the opening and also during the Winter Games between February 4 and 20. Only on Monday, Zhao had stated that China had not extended any invitations. Due to the pandemic, visitors from abroad are generally not allowed. This was already the case with the Summer Olympic Games in Tokyo. Only in the case of Japan, this had no political meaning.
But the US government has now called on other countries to join the diplomatic boycott. And some countries may indeed heed Washington’s call. Australia, which has also been in a bitter dispute with China for years, has already refused to sign an agreement to keep politics out of the Games, along with 19 other countries. The Sydney Morning Herald reported in its Wednesday edition, citing government sources, that Australia would not send any officials or politicians to the Games. Whether Prime Minister Scott Morrison will declare a formal diplomatic boycott has not yet been decided.
Washington’s demand is also putting the new German traffic light coalition in Berlin under pressure. Last week, Foreign Minister-designate Annalena Baerbock of the Green Party had considered a boycott of the Games in an interview with China.Table. ” When I see how China’s leadership deals with tennis player Peng Shuai or with the arrested citizen journalist Zhang Zhan, then, of course, we should take a closer look at the Olympic Games,” Baerbock said. “There are different ways for governments to deal with that, which will certainly be discussed in the coming weeks.”
Foreign policy spokesman of the Green Party, Omid Nouripour, joined in on Tuesday and explicitly welcomed the US decision. With massive human rights violations, it was “necessary to also send a clear signal,” Nouripour said Tuesday on rbb-Inforadio. Nouripour also did not call for a full boycott. “Athletes who have spent a lifetime working towards a goal” should not be victims of politics, he said. But the US approach of not sending government representatives to the Games was the “right approach,”. He expressed the hope that “Germany would follow suit”.
However, Chancellor-designate Olaf Scholz (SPD) is putting the brakes on. The German government would discuss its handling of China “very carefully with us, between us and with its partners in Europe and the world,” he said on Tuesday. Many countries that Germany maintains ties with have “forms of government that are completely different from what we consider right,” Scholz said. He said the new federal government needs to “know about the differences and still get along well with each other in the world.” This would be a “clever understanding of politics”.
Finance Minister-designate Christian Lindner (FDP) remained equally vague. The future shaping of relations with China should also take the economic importance of the People’s Republic into account, he now stressed. The government would “continue to take the special role of the Chinese internal market for the German economy into account,” Lindner said. “On the other hand, we have decided to also show a commitment to human rights, respect for international law, and multilateralism on the global stage.” There needs to be an “open exchange” with China.
The FDP had also criticized the previous government for taking a too cautious China policy despite the massive increase in human rights violations in the People’s Republic. Now, however, Germany’s economic interests in China also seem to be more important to the FDP. In 2020, the volume of bilateral foreign trade between China and Germany was well over €220 billion, higher than with any other EU country. For Germany’s carmakers, in particular, the Middle Kingdom has long been by far the biggest market in the world.
But those who ask around European diplomats in Beijing are often told behind closed doors that Germany’s cautious China policy can no longer be maintained among the increasingly polarized climate. It’s also being said that the closed borders and exchanges, limited to telephone calls and video conferences, make it more and more difficult for embassy staff in Beijing to explain this fundamental change in the People’s Republic under Xi Jinping to the relevant government representatives in Berlin.
If you listen more closely to company representatives in China, you will mostly hear nothing but an embarrassed silence. This should not come as a surprise, given the heated atmosphere, any critical statement could be punished with economic retaliation. At the same time, companies face just as much pressure on their domestic market – due to new supply chain laws and consumers’ increased moral awareness.
The German Chamber of Commerce in Beijing attempts a compromise: A telephone conversation with Managing Director Jens Hildebrandt is not possible for “scheduling reasons”, instead they send a generic statement: “If the Federal Government wants to shape a comprehensive China strategy in Germany within the framework of the joint EU-China policy and continue the government consultations, this also makes sense from the point of view of the German Chamber of Commerce in China. We suggest continuing the dialogue between Germany and China in various forms” the statement says. Contribution by Fabian Kretschmer
For a few days, the state of Lithuania apparently no longer existed for China’s customs officials. A Lithuanian wood exporter reported on a news portal that 300 containers were stuck outside Chinese ports. This was quickly followed by other Lithuanian companies, who also reported that their goods were not cleared by customs. “It seems that such a country is non-existent on China’s custom system,” said Vidmantas Janulevičius, president of the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists.
The consequence: Shipments from Lithuania could no longer be unloaded in China, and conversely, no exports from China came to Lithuania – no trade whatsoever was possible. Until now, such a thing was unheard of. The drama also kept the EU Commission in Brussels on its toes. Then, on Tuesday, salvation arrived: The Baltic state was found on the computers of the Chinese customs officials, as Janulevičius confirmed to the South China Morning Post (SCMP). There was talk of a technical error. The EU wanted to investigate the matter with its representation in China.
A technical error or deliberate show of force – for Vilnius and Beijing, the incident is the latest act in the dispute over the “Taiwan office” in the Lithuanian capital. The dispute between the small EU state with a population of just over 2.8 million and gargantuan China is about more than mere wood shipments – China is not an important trading partner for Lithuania.
These events are more of a test of the rules of international trade order. Moreover, the question is how to react to economic coercion by the People’s Republic against a member state of the European Union. For Brussels, China’s actions provide just the perfect prime example of a new instrument against economic punitive measures, which is to be officially presented on Wednesday.
Moreover, the focus is once again shifting to the EU’s general approach towards Beijing. The relatively small EU state of Lithuania is putting Brussels on the spot, after all. The EU Commission has to react now: In a letter to European Commissioner for Trade Valdis Dombrovskis and EU Foreign Affairs High Representative Josep Borrell, Lithuania’s Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis wrote on Monday that China was increasing the “unacceptable” economic pressure “to an unprecedentedly high level”.
Landsbergis warned of further consequences for the union: “These activities by the PRC authorities against one EU Member State have a direct impact on the entire EU and our common trade policy,” the minister wrote. “I would kindly ask you to intervene with the Chinese authorities on behalf of Lithuania with the aim of resolving the present situation.” That apparently happened. However, other Lithuanian business sources reported SCMP of ongoing problems.
The EU executive said he was in contact with Vilnius, the EU delegation in Beijing, and the Chinese authorities to gather further information and investigate the situation. Meanwhile, the EU supported Lithuania on issues related to the diplomatic assessment of the Taiwanese office. It does not have the status of an embassy and therefore does not violate the “one China policy”, stressed a spokeswoman for the Directorate-General for Trade.
And China? Beijing claims to have nothing to do with the problems of Lithuanian traders. The state propaganda paper Global Times rejected the EU state’s account earlier this week: Lithuania had “not yet” been removed from China’s customs list, it concluded. If there was no trade currently, it was solely because Chinese importers wanted to avoid risks. However, the paper did not address why customs would therefore fully refuse clearance. Instead, the paper insinuated Lithuania intended to put China in a bad light. “While the Chinese government hasn’t issued any restrictive measures on goods imported from Lithuania, it seems that the Baltic nation cannot wait to play up the so-called sanctions imposed by Chinese ports on Lithuanian products.” This action was labeled as a “stunt” orchestrated by Vilnius. At the same time, the paper sharply warned that any country that “provokes China’s core interests” would inevitably face retaliation.
However, the import/export industry stated that a customs blockade by China is possible even without an official administrative order. Rokas Radvilavičius, director of the Lithuanian-Chinese trade association, told Lithuanian media that there had been no confirmation of a trade blockade with Lithuania. He suspects “internal, unofficial instructions”.
The “core interests” referred to by the Global Times are Taiwan. The dispute between Vilnius and Beijing began in early summer and has since led to a deterioration of relations. When it became public that a “Taiwan” office was to be opened in the Lithuanian capital, China withdrew its ambassador in protest, suspended rail freight traffic to Lithuania, and revoked all import permits for foodstuffs (China.Table reported). Three days after the office officially opened in November, Beijing downgraded its diplomatic relations with Lithuania (China.Table reported).
The action against Lithuania is not a first – the leadership in Beijing had resorted to trading sanctions many times in the past. After the writer and human rights activist Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in 2010, China imposed an import ban on Norwegian salmon. Following criticism from Australia, the People’s Republic slapped punitive tariffs on Australian wine and refused to allow ships carrying coal from Australia to unload their cargo. However, to simply delete a whole state from the customs system is an unprecedented measure.
In a bid to stand up to China, but also to the US and its punitive tariffs, the EU will unveil its new countermeasure against unfair trade practices today: The so-called Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI). The ACI targets countries that “interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices” of the EU or its member states “by applying or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment”, according to a draft proposal.
What does the proposal include:
The EU Commission’s proposal is to be officially presented by EU Commissioner for Trade Dombrovskis on Wednesday. The proposal will then be submitted to the European Parliament and the EU Council for evaluation. This means that changes may still be made.
Not likely, analyzes Viking Bohman of the Swedish National China Centre in a report. First, Bohman argues, China’s aggressive diplomacy is unlikely to be deterred by a threat of punitive action. Thus, a cycle of retaliation would more likely ensue. If applied ineptly, the EU could thus harm itself. Second, the ACI cannot be used against coercive acts that are not made public by either the aggressor or the target, which could leave the EU Commission oblivious.
Better than retaliation is “absorption,” the China Center report states: Member states whose trade with China is blocked by coercive economic measures should be supported to develop other supply chains. Financial compensation through a solidarity fund could also cushion coercion.
Bohman is critical of the proposal with the implementation competence resting with Brussels: “I seriously doubt that it will stay that way. EU member states will want to have a say in how it is used.” The resulting problems with China were “highly political in nature”. “Member countries would be the ones under attack, and their economies would have to bear the cost of both China’s actions and the EU’s countermeasures.”
Jonathan Hackenbroich, head of the task force of the think tank European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), which deals with the EU’s options against economic coercion and had provided important impulses in the ACI drafting process, takes a similar view. The say of the member states is now a big question – and whether the plan will be watered down during the negotiations. Hackenbroich sees a risk in this: “If it ends up becoming a ‘lowest common denominator’ instrument, that would be bad. A weak instrument would be the worst possible outcome.” Concerns that ACI could lead to protectionism are also a risk for the EU, according to Hackenbroich. The right balance would need to be struck here.
Hackenbroich also questions the effectiveness of the proposed measures. The US government under the Trump administration has also resorted to punitive tariffs, but this has hardly led to a change in China’s behavior.
“We can expect intensive discussions,” Reuters news agency quoted an EU diplomat as saying. France, which will hold the rotating EU presidency in the first half of 2022, supports the measure. However, more market-oriented states such as Sweden and the Czech Republic could potentially see it as too protectionist. Even before the official presentation, Stockholm had expressed concerns on Tuesday: According to a Bloomberg report, the Swedish government stressed that it wasn’t convinced the problem was big enough to even justify the EU Commission’s proposal in this form.
Sinolytics is a European consulting and analysis company that focuses entirely on China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in China.
“I am a travel reporter with a preference for countries that have a bad reputation,” Stephan Orth describes himself. On the ground, however, the motto of the professional couchsurfer, despite extensive travel preparation, is: “Approach everything with an open mind.” And that’s exactly what is needed: Couchsurfers look for free accommodation at strangers’ homes via the Internet. Where, and how comfortable this form of travel away from the tourist trade ultimately is, is almost always a surprise.
Having already published two successful books about his couchsurfing experiences, Orth flew to China in 2018 with the idea of a new book. With some previous experience in his luggage – the journalist had already made three trips to China before – he traveled across the country for three months alone and with only basic Chinese skills. He was often not allowed to mention that he was a couchsurfing guest in front of friends of his hosts, because this kind of accommodation of strangers is uncommon in China. The fact that visitors must report to the local police department within 24 hours further complicates the process. Orth’s travel impressions ultimately resulted in the book Couchsurfing in China, published in 2019, a literary mosaic of encounters and different perspectives that reveal China’s various facets.
The travel journalist wasn’t always sure that he would work in this genre: “I had long thought of writing more about cultural or social topics.” The switch to travel journalism came about through his master’s studies in Australia. “Because I traveled there for a few months,” Orth says. In addition to Australia, he explored New Zealand, the Fiji archipelago and the Cook Islands. Later, the journalist published his work in the travel section of Spiegel Online for a few years. “And now I’m a travel journalist with a big focus on social and cultural topics – and somehow it all fits together.”
He dedicated his China book to the dog Xiao Bai, who ended up as his guest meal at a family in Guangxi province. In these moments he had to decide: “Do I want to be polite and eat with the others or do I want to break ranks here […]?” Dogs are only considered food in some regions in China. On the YouTube channel In Bed With, Stephan Orth describes that the urban young middle class, in particular, tends to keep dogs and cats as pets. The author knows what he’s talking about: At one point during his travels, he had to share his sleeping quarters with five cats.
As a journalist, however, Stephan Orth was also interested in media censorship in China. When the Chinese news portal Tiantian kuai bao asked for an interview in 2018, he experienced it first-hand. Because even the film crew wasn’t aware that, shortly before, a law had been passed prohibiting the live broadcast of interviews with foreigners. The material had to be reviewed first, he was told, and he was put off indefinitely. And his book will probably never reach the Chinese market either.
Could he imagine living in China? “I would definitely find it very interesting for a while – but in the long run, the country is a bit too exhausting for me”Juliane Scholübbers
Heavy seas: A Chinese container ship has run ashore on the west coast of the Russian island of Sakhalin. On Monday afternoon, a storm had pushed the aged barge Xing Yuan against the shore of the city of Cholmsk. The 12-member crew was evacuated by the Russian coast guard. The ship was traveling without cargo but has 103 tons of fuel in its tanks. The container giant is being investigated by divers for leaks.
