Every mayor wants to provide for their citizens while creating the right conditions for the economy. This is no different in China. But Chinese municipalities have obviously gone a bit overboard. In Bishan, a district of the metropolis of Chongqing, the directive is now: “Sell everything to save the day.” This is because the weight of the accumulated debt is overwhelming.
Finn Mayer-Kuckuk has taken a closer look at the situation of Chinese municipalities and analyzes possible ways out of the debt trap. His conclusion: The situation is dramatic and has far-reaching implications – for the municipalities as well as for China’s general economic development.
On Wednesday, Beijing will host the country’s “largest diplomatic event since the COVID-19 pandemic” – at least that’s how the Chinese leadership puts it. It is the China-Africa Forum. The first African government leaders met with President Xi Jinping at the beginning of the week. On the streets, banners proclaim that Africa and China are “joining hands to advance modernization.” But is that true? Lucia Weiss from Africa.Table has taken a closer look at the upcoming forum for us and investigates more than just this question.
Chinese local governments are selling off property en masse to keep their finances afloat. Thanks to falling property prices, the long-standing debt problems have turned into a crisis, permanently burdening the economy.
The extent of municipal debt is currently receiving growing attention in China. One document from the Chongqing district of Bishan is making the rounds on social media. The local government had set up a working group with the task of “selling everything to save the day.” This was reported by the business portal Caixin.
It sounds dramatic. The city council wants to “smash iron pots, sell the steel.” The metaphor is reminiscent of the Great Leap Forward and nowadays means something like “selling the family silver.” Bishan is home to 760,000 people.
Local governments in China have several ways of borrowing money:
The IMF sees LGFVs as “significant sources of macro-financial risk.” Many municipalities are unable to repay the loans. They run into financial difficulties and sell the family silver just to be able to service the next loan installment. This means they can no longer spend as much money, putting a strain on the economy. If they cannot repay anything at all, the lenders will not receive the expected interest and repayments. This is also bad for the economy.
Loan providers of LGFVs are primarily buyers of bonds issued by finance institutions. If the buyers are banks, for example, they would have to become more cautious about lending and investing in times of rising defaults. The result is a vicious circle of increasingly stingy institutions. Then China’s great growth wheel will not only come to a standstill; it will start turning backward.
The reason for the extreme slump is the property market crisis. China’s municipalities have long been borrowing heavily to finance all the beautiful construction projects that regularly amaze Western observers. However, rising property prices have so far masked the potential problems. After all, higher income could be generated from land sales year after year.
Now, loan defaults are occurring. The Shanghai-based financial research firm DZH has counted around 100 cities and municipalities with payment problems between 2023 and mid-2024. This should come as no surprise. The municipal finance companies, i.e., the LGFVs, have borrowed billions and billions, yet most municipalities do not have the huge revenues to pay anything back, apart from land sales.
Unlike companies, municipalities do not generate regular profits from which they can repay investors. They only have their tax revenues and any earnings from state-owned companies. The investments made by the municipalities were bets on the future, but the extreme boom is over. This leaves the municipalities with only one way to service their debts: taking out new loans.
But this will be difficult, as there has long been a consensus that the debt wave must not swell any further. At a conference last year, renowned economist Yao Yang from Peking University insisted that market discipline should finally be enforced. Yao expressed his regret that this had not happened sooner. He said that the problem had long been recognized, but the debt had only continued to explode.
Chinese municipalities have only been allowed to take out direct loans since 2015. The idea was to enable big-spending cities and municipalities to cover their financial needs without having to resort to tricks. By the end of 2019, this direct municipal debt had grown to 22 percent of gross domestic product. An alarming figure.
In the same period, LGFV’s debt increased steadily. Poorer provinces, in particular, have taken on a lot of debt. According to Yao, however, this was not only due to development needs such as constructing new roads and housing. He hypothesizes that cities and municipalities worldwide always tend to spend more money than they earn.
The phenomenon of spendthrift local governments is also well-known in Germany. After all, every mayor wants to provide their citizens with something and create the right economic conditions. According to calculations by the Federal Statistical Office, the debts of German municipalities totaled 313 billion euros two years ago. The statisticians took a close look and included debts from public funds, municipal companies and special budgets. Just like in China.
On average, municipal schools in Germany spend more than 4,000 euros per capita. While the average in China is 5,000 euros, the German statistics do not include city-states such as Berlin. Despite all the differences, the per capita debt of local authorities in Germany and China is at a similar level.
The debate about selling the family silverware is also well-known in Germany. Since the 1990s, German municipalities have been selling off their housing stock or public facilities. In the 2000s, city treasurers filled their coffers in the short term by selling sewerage systems, wastewater treatment plants, tram tracks, school buildings or waste incineration plants to US investors; since then, they have had to rent them back for use in return for high fees.
So German municipalities are by no means more far-sighted and frugal than Chinese ones. The level of development in relation to borrowing is merely higher – and the phase of selling off the family silver happened later on the wealth creation curve.
Even before the 9th edition of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) officially begins in Beijing, the China-Africa Summit de facto has already kicked off. Chinese state media have been flooding the internet with pictures of the pompous reception for the arrival of African heads of state and government and their delegations in China. They will reportedly all be there – except for the tiny kingdom of Eswatini, which is at odds with China over the Taiwan question.
The communication strategy is as simple as it is effective: China presents itself as a friendly, welcoming host with an open ear. There are not only the red carpets, but also many preliminary meetings with President Xi himself as part of preceding state visits. For example, between DR Congo’s head of government, Félix Tshisekedi, and Xi, Senegal’s President Diomaye Faye and Xi, or Xi and South Africa’s President Ramaphosa.
“The biggest developing country” – this is how China usually describes itself when it comes to partnership with Africa. The common ground is – rhetorically – quickly found: Africa is, after all, the continent with the most “developing countries,” according to official Chinese documents.
China considers itself part of the Global South for geopolitical reasons and, against this backdrop, repeatedly sets itself apart from the Global North or the West, depending on the context. The developing country narrative has allowed China to play an important role in the expansion of the BRICS, making the bloc an increasingly important counterpart, particularly to the USA, Europe and parts of the Asia-Pacific region (Japan, Australia).
Because of the US elections in particular, this is a clever way for China to secure a privileged position in its relations with Africa. The US has recently pursued a very tough policy against China – the 100 percent import tariff on Chinese EVs, which Canada has also joined, is a symbolic example. If Trump wins, who has so far not considered Africa to be strategically important, China will have an even easier time on the continent – because the gap for Chinese involvement and investment in Africa will then be larger.
What helps China convey its narrative of the big brother in the family of developing countries is the carefully built media network on the continent – while Western media barely covers Africa in relation to the scope of developments and events. At the same time, flagships such as the BBC lay off hundreds of jobs. In addition to some Chinese media that have firmly established themselves in Africa – such as CGTN or the Xinhua news agency – there is a more discreet and long-term stable form of cooperation.
On the one hand, China is training African journalists. On the other hand, China is capitalizing on the prevailing understanding of the media in many African countries: There is usually a state or at least a very state-affiliated news agency, a kind of in-house newspaper, as well as state television. Time and again, there are partnerships whose scope and purpose are not transparent. For example, the Senegalese APS and Xinhua have been working together for decades.
Other middle powers that increasingly want to expand their position in Africa are also learning from China: Not only has the format of the Africa summits been copied everywhere (US-Africa Summit, Japan-Africa Summit, Russia-Africa Summit), but also the proximity to the press.
In August, for example, Iran’s ambassador held out the prospect of the exciting opportunities he saw in cooperation with the pro-government daily newspaper Le Soleil in Senegal. There were plans to train journalists and – in all seriousness – an open offer to donate a few nice cars to the press fleet.
Visibility in the media and on the ground is important for Chinese activities in Africa. Anyone visiting any major African city can usually name something that China has built or co-financed – usually eye-catching, prestigious buildings: The new ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, the Africa Museum in Dakar – the first of its kind on the continent, one of the major bridges over the Niger in Niamey, known for the sake of simplicity as the “Pont des chinois” (bridge of the Chinese). What plays less of a role is that in the reality of life in African cities, there is usually hardly any contact with Chinese company representatives, students or visitors.
However, Africa has not yet borrowed as much from China as it seems. After the previous FOCAC summit in Dakar in 2021 provided the usual three-year outlook, China also published its medium-term plans in the “China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035,” which ties in with the “China Vision 2035.” At eight pages, the comparatively short document prioritizes promoting green energy and industries, among other things. This topic is expected to also be high on the agenda for China-Africa deals in 2024.
What is missing is the African perspective on China’s plans. No government or even the AU has officially responded with its own statement. This relatively passive attitude regarding China’s announcements also continues in this year’s FOCAC. Instead of purposefully and publicly formulating goals, wishes and expectations in advance, African governments tend to keep a low profile. They are also not prepared for questions from the international media. This is a wasted opportunity for African countries, which would certainly have more room to shape relations with China in their favor. This leaves them with cosmetic measures, such as the co-chairmanship of FOCAC, which this time is held by the DR Congo.
When Yang Yu moved to rural Germany as a teenager in the mid-1980s, he was surprised by many things. But none were as surprising as the fact that his classmates from the richest homes were listening to anti-capitalist punk music.
Yang had moved with his family from Beijing because his father, a German studies graduate and expert on wave data, had been offered a job on a research project on IT data storage near Bonn. It was a strange, sometimes confusing world for Yang Yu. His love of music became his anchor.
After another job-related move of the family to northern Hesse, Yang came into contact with heavy metal for the first time. “We were in the middle of nowhere. People my age were listening to metal, with long hair and leather jackets and everything,” the 49-year-old recalls. It wasn’t long before he shared cassettes with the provincial metalheads. “At first, it was just noise to me. Until I heard ‘Hells Bells’ by AC/DC. That song opened a door.”
From that moment on, he felt the music always had to be harder, faster and more brutal. After AC/DC came Iron Maiden and Metallica, then thrash metal from the Ruhr area by Sodom and Destruction, and finally, the crown jewel of brutality, death metal by Cannibal Corpse, who were notorious at the time for their blood-soaked covers and horror movie lyrics and even rated as harmful to minors in Germany. “As a teenager from China, it was completely new and overwhelming for me. I soaked it all up like a sponge.”
Soon, just listening to music was no longer enough for him; he wanted to play an active role in shaping the scene. Because his musical talent was supposedly not good enough, he founded a metal magazine. He had already gained experience as editor of the school newspaper. He painstakingly cobbled together “Evil Message,” the title of his magazine, and took it to the printers as a DIN A4 booklet. Fellow members of the local scene soon joined the editorial team. The bands that Yang Yu interviewed also grew in prominence, and “Evil Message” soon became well on the way to rival other well-established German magazines such as “Metal Hammer.”
But then his father died unexpectedly of a heart attack in 1995. Yang was forced to return to Beijing to take care of the estate, where he finally agreed to continue running his father’s company after graduating. “Family comes first.” Once again, Yang had to adapt to a new world. “China had changed a lot in 10 years,” he recalls. The Zhongguancun district, where his family lived, was no longer a marketplace for farmers, but an electronics and computer center. “Society was completely different in many respects. When I left China, it was still like East Germany. Now the private sector was flourishing. It was all about making money, nothing else mattered.”
Yang Yu worked his way into his father’s business, a data collection service for Chinese and German customers. But heavy metal did not let go of him in China either. He immersed himself in the capital’s metal underground and quickly became acquainted with pioneers such as the band Tang Dynasty and eminences such as radio presenter Zhang Youdai.
In September 2000, he finally published the first issue of his “Painkiller” magazine 重型音乐 – the first professional magazine in China dedicated entirely to heavy metal. It was a good time for magazines in China; for a short time, the country was even the world’s largest market for magazines and newspapers. Yang and his team designed the bi-monthly magazine in Beijing’s Haidian district. His international network helped him get in touch with bands from all over the world. Domestic groups also found a prominent place in the magazine; for example, the band Dream Spirit uses traditional instruments and references Tang Dynasty poetry in its lyrics and aesthetics.
Yang Yu and his team threw a big party to celebrate the magazine launch. 23 bands played all night and more than 1,500 visitors came to the club in downtown Beijing until the police finally turned off the power. “There were not only metal bands, but also experimental bands who came on stage with toilet bowls and basically made action art. It was wild.” Even though he lost a lot of money that night, it was only the beginning.
Yang also began to organize tours. In parallel to his main job in the IT sector, he brought more and more foreign bands to China, including legends such as the US band Testament and Kreator from the Ruhr region. “It wasn’t always easy, of course,” he sums up. “You had to submit all the lyrics to the Ministry of Culture and the authorities, both at the central and provincial level.” Songs with offensive or political lyrics often had to be removed from the setlist. “The organizers want to be on the safe side, so you have to go through all the hassle.”
To this day, his passion regularly takes him to Germany. The Wacken Festival, the world’s largest heavy metal festival near Hamburg, has chosen him as the organizer and jury member of its metal battles in China. These are band contests in which the groups first compete against each other at the national level and then play against the international competition on their own stage at Wacken. These metal battles can be found in many different places, such as India or Kenya.
Yang Yu has already accompanied several winning bands from China to Germany and back. Just this year, he was there with the Yunnan-based death metal band Five Penalties, which won third place in the end. A respectable success and a real opportunity for the band’s future international career. Although Yang now lives in China, he does not feel torn between cultures. “My home is wherever I’m sleeping,” he laughs. Fabian Peltsch
What at first glance looks anything but disciplined – contrary to the cliché of Chinese educational institutions – is a physics class experiment at an elementary school in Qingdao. After the long summer break, classes have started for 291 million students at the 498,300 schools across the country. At least at this school, it’s not just all drill. A great start to the new school year.
Every mayor wants to provide for their citizens while creating the right conditions for the economy. This is no different in China. But Chinese municipalities have obviously gone a bit overboard. In Bishan, a district of the metropolis of Chongqing, the directive is now: “Sell everything to save the day.” This is because the weight of the accumulated debt is overwhelming.
Finn Mayer-Kuckuk has taken a closer look at the situation of Chinese municipalities and analyzes possible ways out of the debt trap. His conclusion: The situation is dramatic and has far-reaching implications – for the municipalities as well as for China’s general economic development.
On Wednesday, Beijing will host the country’s “largest diplomatic event since the COVID-19 pandemic” – at least that’s how the Chinese leadership puts it. It is the China-Africa Forum. The first African government leaders met with President Xi Jinping at the beginning of the week. On the streets, banners proclaim that Africa and China are “joining hands to advance modernization.” But is that true? Lucia Weiss from Africa.Table has taken a closer look at the upcoming forum for us and investigates more than just this question.
Chinese local governments are selling off property en masse to keep their finances afloat. Thanks to falling property prices, the long-standing debt problems have turned into a crisis, permanently burdening the economy.
The extent of municipal debt is currently receiving growing attention in China. One document from the Chongqing district of Bishan is making the rounds on social media. The local government had set up a working group with the task of “selling everything to save the day.” This was reported by the business portal Caixin.
It sounds dramatic. The city council wants to “smash iron pots, sell the steel.” The metaphor is reminiscent of the Great Leap Forward and nowadays means something like “selling the family silver.” Bishan is home to 760,000 people.
Local governments in China have several ways of borrowing money:
The IMF sees LGFVs as “significant sources of macro-financial risk.” Many municipalities are unable to repay the loans. They run into financial difficulties and sell the family silver just to be able to service the next loan installment. This means they can no longer spend as much money, putting a strain on the economy. If they cannot repay anything at all, the lenders will not receive the expected interest and repayments. This is also bad for the economy.
Loan providers of LGFVs are primarily buyers of bonds issued by finance institutions. If the buyers are banks, for example, they would have to become more cautious about lending and investing in times of rising defaults. The result is a vicious circle of increasingly stingy institutions. Then China’s great growth wheel will not only come to a standstill; it will start turning backward.
The reason for the extreme slump is the property market crisis. China’s municipalities have long been borrowing heavily to finance all the beautiful construction projects that regularly amaze Western observers. However, rising property prices have so far masked the potential problems. After all, higher income could be generated from land sales year after year.
Now, loan defaults are occurring. The Shanghai-based financial research firm DZH has counted around 100 cities and municipalities with payment problems between 2023 and mid-2024. This should come as no surprise. The municipal finance companies, i.e., the LGFVs, have borrowed billions and billions, yet most municipalities do not have the huge revenues to pay anything back, apart from land sales.
Unlike companies, municipalities do not generate regular profits from which they can repay investors. They only have their tax revenues and any earnings from state-owned companies. The investments made by the municipalities were bets on the future, but the extreme boom is over. This leaves the municipalities with only one way to service their debts: taking out new loans.
But this will be difficult, as there has long been a consensus that the debt wave must not swell any further. At a conference last year, renowned economist Yao Yang from Peking University insisted that market discipline should finally be enforced. Yao expressed his regret that this had not happened sooner. He said that the problem had long been recognized, but the debt had only continued to explode.
Chinese municipalities have only been allowed to take out direct loans since 2015. The idea was to enable big-spending cities and municipalities to cover their financial needs without having to resort to tricks. By the end of 2019, this direct municipal debt had grown to 22 percent of gross domestic product. An alarming figure.
In the same period, LGFV’s debt increased steadily. Poorer provinces, in particular, have taken on a lot of debt. According to Yao, however, this was not only due to development needs such as constructing new roads and housing. He hypothesizes that cities and municipalities worldwide always tend to spend more money than they earn.
The phenomenon of spendthrift local governments is also well-known in Germany. After all, every mayor wants to provide their citizens with something and create the right economic conditions. According to calculations by the Federal Statistical Office, the debts of German municipalities totaled 313 billion euros two years ago. The statisticians took a close look and included debts from public funds, municipal companies and special budgets. Just like in China.
On average, municipal schools in Germany spend more than 4,000 euros per capita. While the average in China is 5,000 euros, the German statistics do not include city-states such as Berlin. Despite all the differences, the per capita debt of local authorities in Germany and China is at a similar level.
The debate about selling the family silverware is also well-known in Germany. Since the 1990s, German municipalities have been selling off their housing stock or public facilities. In the 2000s, city treasurers filled their coffers in the short term by selling sewerage systems, wastewater treatment plants, tram tracks, school buildings or waste incineration plants to US investors; since then, they have had to rent them back for use in return for high fees.
So German municipalities are by no means more far-sighted and frugal than Chinese ones. The level of development in relation to borrowing is merely higher – and the phase of selling off the family silver happened later on the wealth creation curve.
Even before the 9th edition of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) officially begins in Beijing, the China-Africa Summit de facto has already kicked off. Chinese state media have been flooding the internet with pictures of the pompous reception for the arrival of African heads of state and government and their delegations in China. They will reportedly all be there – except for the tiny kingdom of Eswatini, which is at odds with China over the Taiwan question.
The communication strategy is as simple as it is effective: China presents itself as a friendly, welcoming host with an open ear. There are not only the red carpets, but also many preliminary meetings with President Xi himself as part of preceding state visits. For example, between DR Congo’s head of government, Félix Tshisekedi, and Xi, Senegal’s President Diomaye Faye and Xi, or Xi and South Africa’s President Ramaphosa.
“The biggest developing country” – this is how China usually describes itself when it comes to partnership with Africa. The common ground is – rhetorically – quickly found: Africa is, after all, the continent with the most “developing countries,” according to official Chinese documents.
China considers itself part of the Global South for geopolitical reasons and, against this backdrop, repeatedly sets itself apart from the Global North or the West, depending on the context. The developing country narrative has allowed China to play an important role in the expansion of the BRICS, making the bloc an increasingly important counterpart, particularly to the USA, Europe and parts of the Asia-Pacific region (Japan, Australia).
Because of the US elections in particular, this is a clever way for China to secure a privileged position in its relations with Africa. The US has recently pursued a very tough policy against China – the 100 percent import tariff on Chinese EVs, which Canada has also joined, is a symbolic example. If Trump wins, who has so far not considered Africa to be strategically important, China will have an even easier time on the continent – because the gap for Chinese involvement and investment in Africa will then be larger.
What helps China convey its narrative of the big brother in the family of developing countries is the carefully built media network on the continent – while Western media barely covers Africa in relation to the scope of developments and events. At the same time, flagships such as the BBC lay off hundreds of jobs. In addition to some Chinese media that have firmly established themselves in Africa – such as CGTN or the Xinhua news agency – there is a more discreet and long-term stable form of cooperation.
On the one hand, China is training African journalists. On the other hand, China is capitalizing on the prevailing understanding of the media in many African countries: There is usually a state or at least a very state-affiliated news agency, a kind of in-house newspaper, as well as state television. Time and again, there are partnerships whose scope and purpose are not transparent. For example, the Senegalese APS and Xinhua have been working together for decades.
Other middle powers that increasingly want to expand their position in Africa are also learning from China: Not only has the format of the Africa summits been copied everywhere (US-Africa Summit, Japan-Africa Summit, Russia-Africa Summit), but also the proximity to the press.
In August, for example, Iran’s ambassador held out the prospect of the exciting opportunities he saw in cooperation with the pro-government daily newspaper Le Soleil in Senegal. There were plans to train journalists and – in all seriousness – an open offer to donate a few nice cars to the press fleet.
Visibility in the media and on the ground is important for Chinese activities in Africa. Anyone visiting any major African city can usually name something that China has built or co-financed – usually eye-catching, prestigious buildings: The new ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, the Africa Museum in Dakar – the first of its kind on the continent, one of the major bridges over the Niger in Niamey, known for the sake of simplicity as the “Pont des chinois” (bridge of the Chinese). What plays less of a role is that in the reality of life in African cities, there is usually hardly any contact with Chinese company representatives, students or visitors.
However, Africa has not yet borrowed as much from China as it seems. After the previous FOCAC summit in Dakar in 2021 provided the usual three-year outlook, China also published its medium-term plans in the “China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035,” which ties in with the “China Vision 2035.” At eight pages, the comparatively short document prioritizes promoting green energy and industries, among other things. This topic is expected to also be high on the agenda for China-Africa deals in 2024.
What is missing is the African perspective on China’s plans. No government or even the AU has officially responded with its own statement. This relatively passive attitude regarding China’s announcements also continues in this year’s FOCAC. Instead of purposefully and publicly formulating goals, wishes and expectations in advance, African governments tend to keep a low profile. They are also not prepared for questions from the international media. This is a wasted opportunity for African countries, which would certainly have more room to shape relations with China in their favor. This leaves them with cosmetic measures, such as the co-chairmanship of FOCAC, which this time is held by the DR Congo.
When Yang Yu moved to rural Germany as a teenager in the mid-1980s, he was surprised by many things. But none were as surprising as the fact that his classmates from the richest homes were listening to anti-capitalist punk music.
Yang had moved with his family from Beijing because his father, a German studies graduate and expert on wave data, had been offered a job on a research project on IT data storage near Bonn. It was a strange, sometimes confusing world for Yang Yu. His love of music became his anchor.
After another job-related move of the family to northern Hesse, Yang came into contact with heavy metal for the first time. “We were in the middle of nowhere. People my age were listening to metal, with long hair and leather jackets and everything,” the 49-year-old recalls. It wasn’t long before he shared cassettes with the provincial metalheads. “At first, it was just noise to me. Until I heard ‘Hells Bells’ by AC/DC. That song opened a door.”
From that moment on, he felt the music always had to be harder, faster and more brutal. After AC/DC came Iron Maiden and Metallica, then thrash metal from the Ruhr area by Sodom and Destruction, and finally, the crown jewel of brutality, death metal by Cannibal Corpse, who were notorious at the time for their blood-soaked covers and horror movie lyrics and even rated as harmful to minors in Germany. “As a teenager from China, it was completely new and overwhelming for me. I soaked it all up like a sponge.”
Soon, just listening to music was no longer enough for him; he wanted to play an active role in shaping the scene. Because his musical talent was supposedly not good enough, he founded a metal magazine. He had already gained experience as editor of the school newspaper. He painstakingly cobbled together “Evil Message,” the title of his magazine, and took it to the printers as a DIN A4 booklet. Fellow members of the local scene soon joined the editorial team. The bands that Yang Yu interviewed also grew in prominence, and “Evil Message” soon became well on the way to rival other well-established German magazines such as “Metal Hammer.”
But then his father died unexpectedly of a heart attack in 1995. Yang was forced to return to Beijing to take care of the estate, where he finally agreed to continue running his father’s company after graduating. “Family comes first.” Once again, Yang had to adapt to a new world. “China had changed a lot in 10 years,” he recalls. The Zhongguancun district, where his family lived, was no longer a marketplace for farmers, but an electronics and computer center. “Society was completely different in many respects. When I left China, it was still like East Germany. Now the private sector was flourishing. It was all about making money, nothing else mattered.”
Yang Yu worked his way into his father’s business, a data collection service for Chinese and German customers. But heavy metal did not let go of him in China either. He immersed himself in the capital’s metal underground and quickly became acquainted with pioneers such as the band Tang Dynasty and eminences such as radio presenter Zhang Youdai.
In September 2000, he finally published the first issue of his “Painkiller” magazine 重型音乐 – the first professional magazine in China dedicated entirely to heavy metal. It was a good time for magazines in China; for a short time, the country was even the world’s largest market for magazines and newspapers. Yang and his team designed the bi-monthly magazine in Beijing’s Haidian district. His international network helped him get in touch with bands from all over the world. Domestic groups also found a prominent place in the magazine; for example, the band Dream Spirit uses traditional instruments and references Tang Dynasty poetry in its lyrics and aesthetics.
Yang Yu and his team threw a big party to celebrate the magazine launch. 23 bands played all night and more than 1,500 visitors came to the club in downtown Beijing until the police finally turned off the power. “There were not only metal bands, but also experimental bands who came on stage with toilet bowls and basically made action art. It was wild.” Even though he lost a lot of money that night, it was only the beginning.
Yang also began to organize tours. In parallel to his main job in the IT sector, he brought more and more foreign bands to China, including legends such as the US band Testament and Kreator from the Ruhr region. “It wasn’t always easy, of course,” he sums up. “You had to submit all the lyrics to the Ministry of Culture and the authorities, both at the central and provincial level.” Songs with offensive or political lyrics often had to be removed from the setlist. “The organizers want to be on the safe side, so you have to go through all the hassle.”
To this day, his passion regularly takes him to Germany. The Wacken Festival, the world’s largest heavy metal festival near Hamburg, has chosen him as the organizer and jury member of its metal battles in China. These are band contests in which the groups first compete against each other at the national level and then play against the international competition on their own stage at Wacken. These metal battles can be found in many different places, such as India or Kenya.
Yang Yu has already accompanied several winning bands from China to Germany and back. Just this year, he was there with the Yunnan-based death metal band Five Penalties, which won third place in the end. A respectable success and a real opportunity for the band’s future international career. Although Yang now lives in China, he does not feel torn between cultures. “My home is wherever I’m sleeping,” he laughs. Fabian Peltsch
What at first glance looks anything but disciplined – contrary to the cliché of Chinese educational institutions – is a physics class experiment at an elementary school in Qingdao. After the long summer break, classes have started for 291 million students at the 498,300 schools across the country. At least at this school, it’s not just all drill. A great start to the new school year.
