If you talk to people in African countries such as Kenya or Namibia, you often hear good things about China and the many Chinese investments on the continent. For example, people say that the Chinese finish what they start. Or: If China has managed to become so rich in just a few decades, then maybe we can do the same.
The Global South perceives China not so much as a threat, but as a role model and a beacon of hope for its own progress. Andrew Chubb and his team from the American Asia Society have substantiated this sentiment with 2,500 survey results from 160 countries. In an interview with Angela Köckritz, Chubb explains: “Chinese companies, and finance, have strong presences in various places that other countries’ development agencies and commercial companies have largely stayed away from.”
The elites in these countries happily look the other way when it comes to human rights violations or environmental damage caused by Chinese actors. Many government leaders have a lot to gain from good relations with China. For most of them, however, this does not mean having to pick sides between the US and China, says Chubb. Ideally, they want to benefit from both.
And it is a Catholic priest of all people who advises the Vatican to maintain good relations with Beijing. Michael Bauer has been working in the German-speaking community in Shanghai since 2004. He witnessed first-hand that, despite Beijing’s strict stance on religious freedom, the Catholics in Shanghai still have the freedom to practice their faith without having to completely bow to the state. In his opinion piece, he explains what has already improved thanks to Pope Francis’ rapprochement and why Beijing tolerates a cleric like him there at all.
Over the past few decades, the number of surveys measuring citizens’ sentiments towards China worldwide has exploded. You and your team have compiled 2,500 survey results from 160 countries into a single data set – including an interactive map that is fun to play with. At first glance, the rift between a Global North that perceives China much more negatively than the Global South is striking – but a closer look reveals a much more nuanced picture.
That’s right – the negativity in the Global North is very prevalent, and it’s true the Global South in aggregate leans positive, but in the Global South, the exceptions are so great that they really cut against the idea that the Global South’s view of China can be characterized in any general way. It would be more accurate to say views in the Global North tend to be negative, while views in the Global South are much more varied.
China is particularly popular in Russia, Pakistan and many Central Asian countries, the Middle East and Africa. You write that China is not only appreciated by African elites, but also enjoys great popularity among African citizens. Why is that?
It’s a good question and one that goes beyond what we can really know from this kind of quantitative data. But my speculation is that the positive views of China in most parts of Africa reflect a sense that China has shown the way in terms of development and that it brings development and economic opportunities to the places it is present in. Chinese companies and finance have strong presences in various places that other countries’ development agencies and commercial companies have largely avoided. So, that generates a sense that China is showing up and doing things where others aren’t.
Chinese media companies are highly active on the African continent. China also invites many journalists from all over the world to China and offers training programs. Could that also play a role?
That’s one possible interpretation, but I think the jury is out on whether that’s the case. The GPOC data show views of China across the African continent staying solidly positive over time. The sorts of economic factors I mentioned above could potentially explain those consistent positive results, rather than the CCP’s foreign-directed media and propaganda drive. At the same time, though, the Chinese media’s expansion may have helped prevent a steeper decline in African perceptions of China over the pandemic.
Surprisingly, the mass internment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang has not affected sentiment toward China in most Muslim countries – with some notable exceptions, such as Turkey and Palestine.
This has been a cause of bewilderment to many in the West – why aren’t Muslim-majority countries more outraged about China’s extreme repression of Islamic religious practice there? Many of these countries’ leaders see a lot to gain from good relations with China, and therefore have motivations to offer praise for China’s repressive policies, for instance, describing them as “achievements” in counter-terrorism. In addition, by contrast with the African example we’ve just discussed, I think you can make a stronger case that propaganda, or at least narratives, may have been effective on the Xinjiang crisis – not in boosting China’s image, but in countering the effects of negative information from other media sources such as Al Jazeera. I tend to see those possible propaganda effects as a complement to the local leaders, though. If state leaders in the Middle East were roundly condemning China’s atrocities against Muslims in Xinjiang, I doubt the CCP’s propaganda organs would be able to prevent a deterioration in China’s image.
Another interesting development is that China’s popularity in Iran has suffered greatly. Why?
This is a question for experts on Iran and its domestic politics. My guess is that it may concern the COVID pandemic – Iran was one of the earliest countries to which the virus spread. So that may have harmed its image. It also appears that China’s prominent role in brokering the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia has failed to win China popularity among the public in Iran.
The Covid pandemic has had a very different impact on China’s image in different parts of the world. Its popularity hasn’t really waned in Africa, but in South America, it has fallen sharply. Can you explain why?
I think it reflects a battle of narratives. From my understanding, the Chinese state media haven’t made anywhere near as much headway in Latin America as they have in Africa. So Latin Americans, not surprisingly, seem to have bought into the idea of blaming China for the pandemic, whereas many African audiences wouldn’t have been exposed to such negative information.
Observers might assume that the popularity or unpopularity of the USA and China are connected – that where the popularity of the USA declines, that of China increases. Do you see such an effect?
I think they’re linked in some places, but mostly decoupled. It’s often said that most of the world’s countries want to avoid choosing between the US and China. They want to get benefits from both. The Sinophone Borderlands survey, one of the key projects that Global Public Opinion on China draws data together from, has found that across the Global South, both the US and China tend to be viewed positively.
Andrew Chubb is Foreign Policy and National Security Fellow at the China Center of the Asia Society Policy Institute. He is also a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University.
In October 2024, the Holy See and Beijing renewed the agreement on bishop appointments in mainland China for the third time. The terms of the agreement were not made public, but Pope Francis said that it provides for a joint commission of the Chinese government and the Vatican for bishop appointments. The extension proves that the Pope intends to continue his current China policy, which is one of understanding rather than confrontation.
This Vatican China policy is not without controversy, both inside and outside the Church, and many people accuse the Pope of making too many concessions to the Chinese side while receiving nothing in return. It has to be admitted that Rome was undoubtedly a little over-optimistic at the beginning and is certainly not entirely satisfied with what has been achieved. Nevertheless, I believe the critics are not right in their radical criticism. After all, all bishops in China are now recognized by the Holy See and, above all, no new bishop can be legally consecrated without the Pope’s approval and, according to the clarification of the Cardinal Secretary of State, no bishop can be transferred from one diocese to another without Roman placet. This can certainly be considered a success.
The Holy See’s next goal is to open an office in Beijing with local Vatican diplomats. And, astonishingly, Beijing has not yet rejected Rome’s request. Is this just a tactic? Or is it perhaps a sign that Beijing can even imagine diplomatic relations in the medium term? From a purely ecclesiastical perspective, the advantages for the Chinese rulers are rather minimal, but when geopolitical reasons come to the fore, it does make sense. All in all, the rapprochement and understanding between Rome and Beijing seems to be growing, albeit at a slow pace.
The situation of Catholicism, like all recognized religions in China, is characterized by the requirement of “sinicization,” which can only be understood to a small extent as inculturation, but is mainly a code word that signals the dominance and control of the Communist Party over religion. However, within this prescribed framework, the bishops and pastors, the dioceses and parishes still have quite a lot of pastoral freedom and can certainly engage in missionary activities. For example, there are thousands of churches in China where not only hundreds of believers come together every Sunday for church services, but also many group activities are held before and after, from catechism classes and choir rehearsals to marriage preparation courses. And all this happens with the approval of the state and the party.
Since only the critical aspects of religion in China are often reported abroad, this often creates a one-sided and sometimes distorted picture of reality. There is no doubt that there are still Christians who find themselves in a “critical situation” in China, and it is essential to support them. However, I know from experience that public protests very rarely bring them progress. It is often better to raise their concerns from the background. And that is also Pope Francis’ approach.
It should also be noted that in the field of religion, despite the overall uniformity of the implementation guidelines, there is still a certain plurality of implementation options depending on the region, and pragmatic solutions are also possible in many areas. The goal of those in power is not to destroy religion, but to integrate the religious communities into the overarching joint goal of China’s rejuvenation. It is therefore certainly true to say that the influence of the state and the party on religion is quite strong, and that anyone who rejects this influence has very little room for maneuver.
Even as a foreign priest, it is no longer possible these days to remain “under the radar” and keep as much distance as possible from all organs of religious policy. However, a certain degree of involvement in state religious policy does not only have disadvantages. It can also have advantages for foreign congregations and local Christian communities. To give an example, in many cities with foreign-language congregations children and young people are allowed to attend church services in Chinese-speaking congregations, which is not necessarily provided for in the regulations.
Therefore, the Leninist dialectic of Chinese religious policy is quite ambivalent in its effects. I am sometimes asked: Can you criticize Chinese religious policy while living in Shanghai? Publicly, this is difficult and would probably immediately earn me the accusation of “interfering in Chinese internal affairs.” On the other hand, you do have the option of making “suggestions.” This is a very positive thing, considering that as a foreign pastor, you are only “tolerated” and have no official recognition. And isn’t this “dialogue” and “exchange” with representatives of Chinese religious policy also a sign of a certain de facto recognition from the Chinese side? All this shows that the situation is complex and sometimes complicated, but that there are certain – certainly limited – options.
In my opinion, there will continue to be Christians in China, some of whom will be closer to the state and others further away, and relations between Rome and Beijing will, in all probability, continue to go up and down. Nevertheless, based on my own experience as a pastor of the German-speaking congregation in Shanghai, against the background of today’s contextuality, the path of understanding with the state authorities does not seem to me to be a “betrayal of the Gospel,” but precisely a condition for enabling the message of Jesus Christ to resonate with people and in society. I therefore think it is essential to take a very nuanced view of both Pope Francis’ China policy and the situation of religion in China, and also to recognize the positive aspects.
Michael Bauer has been the Catholic priest of the German-speaking community in Shanghai since 2004.
Editor’s note: Discussing China today means – more than ever – engaging in controversial debate. We aim to reflect the diversity of viewpoints to give you an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinions do not reflect the views of the editorial team.
With a flagging economy and high unemployment, young Chinese are spending less and less money. This is not only reflected at the box office, but also when it comes to food. Under the hashtag #花小钱吃大锅 – meaning “pay little, eat a lot” – China’s netizens are giving each other advice on how to get the most out of a hot pot meal on a budget. Pro tips include going to smaller family restaurants or moving to the suburbs altogether. And, of course, even if it hurts, add more filling vegetables and tofu to the broth instead of meat.
If you talk to people in African countries such as Kenya or Namibia, you often hear good things about China and the many Chinese investments on the continent. For example, people say that the Chinese finish what they start. Or: If China has managed to become so rich in just a few decades, then maybe we can do the same.
The Global South perceives China not so much as a threat, but as a role model and a beacon of hope for its own progress. Andrew Chubb and his team from the American Asia Society have substantiated this sentiment with 2,500 survey results from 160 countries. In an interview with Angela Köckritz, Chubb explains: “Chinese companies, and finance, have strong presences in various places that other countries’ development agencies and commercial companies have largely stayed away from.”
The elites in these countries happily look the other way when it comes to human rights violations or environmental damage caused by Chinese actors. Many government leaders have a lot to gain from good relations with China. For most of them, however, this does not mean having to pick sides between the US and China, says Chubb. Ideally, they want to benefit from both.
And it is a Catholic priest of all people who advises the Vatican to maintain good relations with Beijing. Michael Bauer has been working in the German-speaking community in Shanghai since 2004. He witnessed first-hand that, despite Beijing’s strict stance on religious freedom, the Catholics in Shanghai still have the freedom to practice their faith without having to completely bow to the state. In his opinion piece, he explains what has already improved thanks to Pope Francis’ rapprochement and why Beijing tolerates a cleric like him there at all.
Over the past few decades, the number of surveys measuring citizens’ sentiments towards China worldwide has exploded. You and your team have compiled 2,500 survey results from 160 countries into a single data set – including an interactive map that is fun to play with. At first glance, the rift between a Global North that perceives China much more negatively than the Global South is striking – but a closer look reveals a much more nuanced picture.
That’s right – the negativity in the Global North is very prevalent, and it’s true the Global South in aggregate leans positive, but in the Global South, the exceptions are so great that they really cut against the idea that the Global South’s view of China can be characterized in any general way. It would be more accurate to say views in the Global North tend to be negative, while views in the Global South are much more varied.
China is particularly popular in Russia, Pakistan and many Central Asian countries, the Middle East and Africa. You write that China is not only appreciated by African elites, but also enjoys great popularity among African citizens. Why is that?
It’s a good question and one that goes beyond what we can really know from this kind of quantitative data. But my speculation is that the positive views of China in most parts of Africa reflect a sense that China has shown the way in terms of development and that it brings development and economic opportunities to the places it is present in. Chinese companies and finance have strong presences in various places that other countries’ development agencies and commercial companies have largely avoided. So, that generates a sense that China is showing up and doing things where others aren’t.
Chinese media companies are highly active on the African continent. China also invites many journalists from all over the world to China and offers training programs. Could that also play a role?
That’s one possible interpretation, but I think the jury is out on whether that’s the case. The GPOC data show views of China across the African continent staying solidly positive over time. The sorts of economic factors I mentioned above could potentially explain those consistent positive results, rather than the CCP’s foreign-directed media and propaganda drive. At the same time, though, the Chinese media’s expansion may have helped prevent a steeper decline in African perceptions of China over the pandemic.
Surprisingly, the mass internment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang has not affected sentiment toward China in most Muslim countries – with some notable exceptions, such as Turkey and Palestine.
This has been a cause of bewilderment to many in the West – why aren’t Muslim-majority countries more outraged about China’s extreme repression of Islamic religious practice there? Many of these countries’ leaders see a lot to gain from good relations with China, and therefore have motivations to offer praise for China’s repressive policies, for instance, describing them as “achievements” in counter-terrorism. In addition, by contrast with the African example we’ve just discussed, I think you can make a stronger case that propaganda, or at least narratives, may have been effective on the Xinjiang crisis – not in boosting China’s image, but in countering the effects of negative information from other media sources such as Al Jazeera. I tend to see those possible propaganda effects as a complement to the local leaders, though. If state leaders in the Middle East were roundly condemning China’s atrocities against Muslims in Xinjiang, I doubt the CCP’s propaganda organs would be able to prevent a deterioration in China’s image.
Another interesting development is that China’s popularity in Iran has suffered greatly. Why?
This is a question for experts on Iran and its domestic politics. My guess is that it may concern the COVID pandemic – Iran was one of the earliest countries to which the virus spread. So that may have harmed its image. It also appears that China’s prominent role in brokering the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia has failed to win China popularity among the public in Iran.
The Covid pandemic has had a very different impact on China’s image in different parts of the world. Its popularity hasn’t really waned in Africa, but in South America, it has fallen sharply. Can you explain why?
I think it reflects a battle of narratives. From my understanding, the Chinese state media haven’t made anywhere near as much headway in Latin America as they have in Africa. So Latin Americans, not surprisingly, seem to have bought into the idea of blaming China for the pandemic, whereas many African audiences wouldn’t have been exposed to such negative information.
Observers might assume that the popularity or unpopularity of the USA and China are connected – that where the popularity of the USA declines, that of China increases. Do you see such an effect?
I think they’re linked in some places, but mostly decoupled. It’s often said that most of the world’s countries want to avoid choosing between the US and China. They want to get benefits from both. The Sinophone Borderlands survey, one of the key projects that Global Public Opinion on China draws data together from, has found that across the Global South, both the US and China tend to be viewed positively.
Andrew Chubb is Foreign Policy and National Security Fellow at the China Center of the Asia Society Policy Institute. He is also a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University.
In October 2024, the Holy See and Beijing renewed the agreement on bishop appointments in mainland China for the third time. The terms of the agreement were not made public, but Pope Francis said that it provides for a joint commission of the Chinese government and the Vatican for bishop appointments. The extension proves that the Pope intends to continue his current China policy, which is one of understanding rather than confrontation.
This Vatican China policy is not without controversy, both inside and outside the Church, and many people accuse the Pope of making too many concessions to the Chinese side while receiving nothing in return. It has to be admitted that Rome was undoubtedly a little over-optimistic at the beginning and is certainly not entirely satisfied with what has been achieved. Nevertheless, I believe the critics are not right in their radical criticism. After all, all bishops in China are now recognized by the Holy See and, above all, no new bishop can be legally consecrated without the Pope’s approval and, according to the clarification of the Cardinal Secretary of State, no bishop can be transferred from one diocese to another without Roman placet. This can certainly be considered a success.
The Holy See’s next goal is to open an office in Beijing with local Vatican diplomats. And, astonishingly, Beijing has not yet rejected Rome’s request. Is this just a tactic? Or is it perhaps a sign that Beijing can even imagine diplomatic relations in the medium term? From a purely ecclesiastical perspective, the advantages for the Chinese rulers are rather minimal, but when geopolitical reasons come to the fore, it does make sense. All in all, the rapprochement and understanding between Rome and Beijing seems to be growing, albeit at a slow pace.
The situation of Catholicism, like all recognized religions in China, is characterized by the requirement of “sinicization,” which can only be understood to a small extent as inculturation, but is mainly a code word that signals the dominance and control of the Communist Party over religion. However, within this prescribed framework, the bishops and pastors, the dioceses and parishes still have quite a lot of pastoral freedom and can certainly engage in missionary activities. For example, there are thousands of churches in China where not only hundreds of believers come together every Sunday for church services, but also many group activities are held before and after, from catechism classes and choir rehearsals to marriage preparation courses. And all this happens with the approval of the state and the party.
Since only the critical aspects of religion in China are often reported abroad, this often creates a one-sided and sometimes distorted picture of reality. There is no doubt that there are still Christians who find themselves in a “critical situation” in China, and it is essential to support them. However, I know from experience that public protests very rarely bring them progress. It is often better to raise their concerns from the background. And that is also Pope Francis’ approach.
It should also be noted that in the field of religion, despite the overall uniformity of the implementation guidelines, there is still a certain plurality of implementation options depending on the region, and pragmatic solutions are also possible in many areas. The goal of those in power is not to destroy religion, but to integrate the religious communities into the overarching joint goal of China’s rejuvenation. It is therefore certainly true to say that the influence of the state and the party on religion is quite strong, and that anyone who rejects this influence has very little room for maneuver.
Even as a foreign priest, it is no longer possible these days to remain “under the radar” and keep as much distance as possible from all organs of religious policy. However, a certain degree of involvement in state religious policy does not only have disadvantages. It can also have advantages for foreign congregations and local Christian communities. To give an example, in many cities with foreign-language congregations children and young people are allowed to attend church services in Chinese-speaking congregations, which is not necessarily provided for in the regulations.
Therefore, the Leninist dialectic of Chinese religious policy is quite ambivalent in its effects. I am sometimes asked: Can you criticize Chinese religious policy while living in Shanghai? Publicly, this is difficult and would probably immediately earn me the accusation of “interfering in Chinese internal affairs.” On the other hand, you do have the option of making “suggestions.” This is a very positive thing, considering that as a foreign pastor, you are only “tolerated” and have no official recognition. And isn’t this “dialogue” and “exchange” with representatives of Chinese religious policy also a sign of a certain de facto recognition from the Chinese side? All this shows that the situation is complex and sometimes complicated, but that there are certain – certainly limited – options.
In my opinion, there will continue to be Christians in China, some of whom will be closer to the state and others further away, and relations between Rome and Beijing will, in all probability, continue to go up and down. Nevertheless, based on my own experience as a pastor of the German-speaking congregation in Shanghai, against the background of today’s contextuality, the path of understanding with the state authorities does not seem to me to be a “betrayal of the Gospel,” but precisely a condition for enabling the message of Jesus Christ to resonate with people and in society. I therefore think it is essential to take a very nuanced view of both Pope Francis’ China policy and the situation of religion in China, and also to recognize the positive aspects.
Michael Bauer has been the Catholic priest of the German-speaking community in Shanghai since 2004.
Editor’s note: Discussing China today means – more than ever – engaging in controversial debate. We aim to reflect the diversity of viewpoints to give you an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinions do not reflect the views of the editorial team.
With a flagging economy and high unemployment, young Chinese are spending less and less money. This is not only reflected at the box office, but also when it comes to food. Under the hashtag #花小钱吃大锅 – meaning “pay little, eat a lot” – China’s netizens are giving each other advice on how to get the most out of a hot pot meal on a budget. Pro tips include going to smaller family restaurants or moving to the suburbs altogether. And, of course, even if it hurts, add more filling vegetables and tofu to the broth instead of meat.
