On behalf of the WHO, scientists describe their search for the source of the COVID-19 in Wuhan on a good 120 pages – but they could not find it. “We have not yet found the source of the virus”, said WHO head Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. All theories are still on the table.
In the long-awaited report, the team concludes that the virus could originate in pangolins as well as bats. The scientists stressed that further studies are essential to get to the bottom of the matter. They described the theory that the virus could have escaped from a laboratory, however, as “extremely unlikely”.
Researchers at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), meanwhile, have been able to take a closer look at 100 Chinese loan agreements with developing and emerging countries for the first time – and found secrecy clauses and possible political influence by Beijing in the countries. Nico Beckert was able to view and analyze the study in advance for China.Table.
The economic drama surrounding the freighter “Ever Given”, which got stuck in the Suez Canal, has set alarm bells ringing in Beijing. Because another strait is even more dangerous for China’s supplies: the Strait of Malacca near Singapore. Beijing is looking for alternatives to the bottleneck, as Frank Sieren reports.
Ted Hui was a parliamentarian in Hong Kong. He has been on the run with his family since December. He spoke to Marcel Grzanna about his fate and that of his fellow campaigners.
Since the early 2000s, China has signed more than 2,000 loan agreements with developing and emerging countries. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing finances infrastructure projects in dozens of countries. When it comes to energy projects, Chinese development banks have been among the biggest lenders for years. China, for example, holds at least 21 percent of African countries’ debt. For the first time, a research team led by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) has now managed to evaluate 100 credit agreements of Chinese development banks (84), the central government (4), state-owned commercial banks (8) and supplier credits (4) to 24 states amounting to more than $36 billion and to compile them in a database.
Normally, such contracts – not only Chinese ones – are subject to strict secrecy. The researchers compared the Chinese contracts with 142 Cameroonian contracts that the African state had signed with private and bilateral and multilateral donors and made publicly available.
All loan agreements signed between China and partner states after 2014 contain “far-reaching confidentiality clauses“, according to the study. The year 2014 marks a clear turning point here. Most of these clauses require the borrower to keep the terms of the contract, and sometimes even the existence of the debt, secret. By comparison, only 2 of the 142 loan contracts in the comparative sample from Cameroon contain similarly strong confidentiality clauses.
This secrecy makes it difficult to assess a country’s true indebtedness. The authors warn that impending over-indebtedness cannot be detected early enough. However, they also criticize the fact that just over one-third of the contracts from the Cameroonian comparative sample contain confidentiality clauses, albeit in weaker formulations. While creditors share certain information with the public and other creditors, there are no uniform transparency standards.
According to the study, China is trying to gain advantages over other lenders. Debt rescheduling clauses were revealed in nearly 75 percent of the Chinese loan agreements analyzed. These oblige the debtor state to continue servicing the Chinese loans in the event of imminent insolvency instead of including them in rescheduling programs like other loans. Not a single contract in the comparative sample contains such clauses. China would theoretically benefit if another lender granted debt relief. But governments are “reluctant to grant debt relief if they end up subsidizing other creditors,” the authors said. If China insists on complying with the rescheduling clause, the debtor is unlikely to receive debt relief from other donors.
This conflict has stood in the way of debt relief in the past. However, last year China agreed for the first time at the G20 level to restructure its claims on the poorest sovereign debtors together with the members of the Paris Club. This shows that what is written in the loan agreements is not necessarily implemented by Beijing.
Beijing could also use special contractual clauses to influence the domestic and foreign policies of debtors, the study said. If the debtor country “significantly” changed its policies, Beijing could insist on immediate repayment for 90 percent of the loans. In the case of China Development Bank contracts, this is even possible if the partner country breaks off its diplomatic relations with China – for example, if it turns its attention to Taiwan. Many loan agreements do not define what is meant by a significant change in the law. Often, China has the right to decide what significant means, Sebastian Horn of the IfW told China.Table. The fact that Beijing is the largest lender to a large number of states, meaning they lack alternatives, shows the potential power of such clauses.
Beijing’s contractual clauses could also prevent improvements in labor law or environmental protection in the debtor countries. 30 percent of Chinese loan agreements contain so-called stabilization clauses. In concrete terms, this means that if the debtor country introduces laws that affect projects financed with Chinese loans, the debtor country would have to compensate the Chinese lender – for example, in the form of tax breaks or concession extensions.
This can become a costly affair that could prevent legislative changes in labor law or environmental protection. But Western countries also use such stabilization clauses. According to the comparative sample from Cameroon, they even occur more frequently there than in Chinese contracts. However, according to the authors, the clauses of the Chinese Exim Bank are the most stringent.
China’s loan agreements “differ not in type but in degree from commercial and other bilateral lenders,” the study says. All creditors seek to “maximize the prospect of repayment through all legal, economic, and political means at their disposal.” China, however, is also breaking new ground. One reason could be that China is one of the largest donors. In general, the risk of default is high for developing countries. Accordingly, the clauses serve as a hedge. They “allow some high-risk countries like Venezuela, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Sierra Leone to receive such large loans in the first place,” says Sebastian Horn of the IfW. China is trying to minimize the high default risk through contractual clauses.
Whether and in how many cases China also implements the contractual clauses cannot be assessed by the authors, as this was not the focus of the study. However, there is anecdotal evidence: When Argentina’s new government wanted to stop a Chinese-financed dam project due to environmental concerns, the China Development Bank threatened to stop financing other ongoing projects in the country. Argentina’s government quickly relented.
The authors also warn that some credit clauses could become a problem in debt and financial crises. A first step towards more cooperation and coordination could be China’s commitment to the G20 Common Framework, which should lead to debt relief for the poorest countries.
China has also played an “important role” in the past, for example, in supporting African states and their debt. Between 2000 and 2019, Beijing “restructured” – that is, extended debt service or set lower interest rates on – $7.5 billion of debt owed by 10 African nations. China has also canceled $3.4 billion of African debt.
In general, the IfW research team calls for government debt to be transparent and public in terms of its amount and borrowing conditions so that citizens can hold their governments accountable.
The end of Hong Kong’s electoral system, as he knew it, was met with mixed feelings by Ted Hui from a safe distance. While in Beijing, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Tuesday unanimously (167-0) signed a law reform that gives the People’s Republic of China ultimate control over appointments to all key political posts in Hong Kong, Hui is organizing his new life in exile. Until September 2020, the 38-year-old was a democratically elected member of the city’s Legislative Council, the Hong Kong parliament. Since early December, he has been on the run from authorities investigating him for violations of the National Security Act. Hui had reached Australia with his wife and two children via Denmark and Britain in early March.
With the decision of the Standing Committee, the democratic opposition in Hong Kong also loses the last tools to exert relevant influence on the political future of the metropolis. The parliament will be increased from 70 to 90 seats, the committee to elect the head of government will grow by 25 percent to 1500 eligible voters. The Chinese government wants to award the additional mandates to lobbyists who will create guaranteed majorities for Beijing’s interests.
“We (democrats) have lost our seats in parliament, all influence on Hong Kong’s politics, our freedom and civic space,” Hui sums up in a telephone conversation with China.Table, more than a year and a half after the start of the protest movement in Hong Kong against the increasingly authoritarian structures that Beijing is imposing on the city. Actually, that’s a grim conclusion after many months of an unequal struggle between students, pro-democracy oppositionists, the politically interested as well as the disinterested, some radicals on one side and perhaps the world’s most resilient dictatorship on the other, determined and ready to use violence. But Hui is certain “that the movement has won the hearts of the people.” As many as two million people initially took to the streets together.
The movement has succeeded in putting the regime under such pressure that it has only been able to maintain its power at the cost of an enormous loss of international reputation. However, the price that Hui, as well as numerous other politicians and student leaders, personally pay for this is high. Many face long prison sentences. Ted Hui’s world also completely changed. Returning to Hong Kong? Seems out of the question for many years, if not for life. “It’s painful not being able to go home and hard for the kids to understand that we may never go back. But in Australia, I feel safe from arbitrary arrest,” he says.
Hong Kong’s National Security Act has given the state and investigators the legal basis to charge any opposition figure or activist since the middle of last year. In a statement to China.Table, the security bureau spoke of nine charges in four cases against Hui, including “damaging property, accessing computers with fraudulent intend, attempting to bend the law and contempt of court.” Hui is unlikely to clear these charges because the vaguely worded security law gives investigators enough leeway to construct the allegations. The allegations are also related to Hui’s involvement in organizing unofficial Democratic primary elections last year. Authorities consider that a conspiracy to subvert state power. Possible sentence: life in prison.
While 53 of his fellow activists were arrested in early January, Hui beat the authorities to the punch. In December, he accepted an official invitation from Danish politicians to attend a supposed conference in Copenhagen (China.Table reported). The event was fictitious. But with the written invitation, Hui persuaded the Hong Kong authorities to hand over his confiscated passport. Police are investigating fraud. Hui flew to Denmark, and his family to London shortly after. There they met again.
A dozen other activists, the so-called “Hong Kong 12”, had failed in their escape attempt last year. Their speedboat, which was supposed to take them from Hong Kong to Taiwan, was stopped by Chinese security forces. For months, the members of the group were detained in Shenzhen. Eight of them were handed over to Hong Kong authorities last Monday, including Andy Li, co-founder of the Fight for Freedom – Stand for Hong Kong campaign, a crowdfunding platform that raised around €2 million to support the protests. His trial is scheduled for today, Wednesday, without him being present. Li is being held separately from the seven others in a psychiatric ward until the end of a two-week quarantine, the Apple Daily reports. Two of the “Hong Kong 12” had already been extradited from China in December, while two others are still in custody in Shenzhen.
They will “investigate the whereabouts of the fugitive offenders in various lawful ways and pursue (the offenders),” the security bureau announced. But despite the threat, Hui continues to play politics. In England, he met Nathan Law, a former Hong Kong student leader who was also elected to the city’s parliament in 2016. The following year, Law served an eight-month prison sentence for his central role in the 2014 protests and went into exile in the UK for fear of another conviction. For weeks, Hui and Law, along with six other fugitives, including Glacier Kwong as the only woman, discussed their strategy for the future. Hui is by far the oldest of the group, whose members are on average younger than 30. He agreed to go to Australia to lobby, while the others will remain active in North America and Europe. The activists are trying to influence China’s policy in their host countries.
Last week, Hui and Law exchanged views with the European Union’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) in a video conference. It was an opportune time to talk with the 27 EU ambassadors from member states. The body had been sanctioned by China shortly before, after the EU, in turn, imposed sanctions on Chinese officials over human rights crimes against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Accordingly, the Europeans were interested in the assessments of the two Hong Kong politicians. The planned half-hour turned into 60 minutes. Among other things, Law and Hui appealed to the EU representatives to tie the ratification of the CAI investment agreement with China by the EU Parliament to tougher conditions.
The group’s lobbying will also reach German politics, which is considered a supporting element of the European attitude towards China. Since his escape, Ted Hui has spoken with numerous EU parliamentarians. His conclusion: Germany, as the continent’s largest economy, must do more for human rights. CAI had served German industry above all, he said. “It is hard for me to understand that Germany, with its large negotiating mass, prioritizes its trade interests. Initially, I had the feeling that Germany would be very supportive of our cause. But the wind seems to have changed,” Hui said. The group therefore definitely wants to intensify the exchange with German politicians.
Then a few days ago, the eight-member group published the 2021 Hong Kong Charter. The document is a call for democracy and the rule of law. In 25 points, it blames the Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China for its authoritarian policies. It calls for an end to political repression and autonomy for Hong Kong’s citizens. And it calls for worldwide alliances to oppose Beijing’s “global aggression.” The call is meant to give courage, “especially to the Hong Kong diaspora everywhere abroad,” Hui says. “It’s our signal to show that we’re here and we’re going to keep going.” To that end, the paper’s authors bridged their political differences. They come from three camps of the Democratic opposition. Exile, at the latest, has finally united them.
The name 2021 Hong Kong Charter was not chosen at random. The year in the title is inspired by Charter 08, which Liu Xiaobo, who later won the Nobel Peace Prize, initiated before the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 and was imprisoned for it, where he later died. In principle, anyone can sign the paper, but first and foremost, it should be Hong Kong citizens who want to express their solidarity. The activists have a lot at stake. They want to find out whether they are lone wolves or have broad support among their compatriots abroad. Around 600 individuals and three dozen organizations and groups have signed so far.
The calamity was inevitable. The Biden administration’s China policy, which is now clearly visible, is also forcing the Europeans to think more about their China policy. So far, however, only a willingness to be aggressive in line with American expectations is apparent. This has little to do with a success-oriented and constructive policy. In Germany in particular, the issue could become particularly explosive after a possible change of government. China is not necessarily making things easy for us.
Only one thing is clear at present: China’s economic rise has power-political consequences and the potential to fundamentally shift the geopolitical balance of the 21st century. This is certainly not a new idea, but the more clearly the consequences of this development become perceptible, the more unease is growing among Western politicians, entrepreneurs and commentators. The willingness to think in extremes is increasing: Is Matthias Doepfner right in calling for a close alignment with the USA or, on the contrary, Stefan Baron, who leaves it at a misleading but simple “Yankee go home”? Or rather Sigmar Gabriel, who, in last week’s China.Table, reflected matter-of-factly on the “farewell to the Atlantic”, but in the end only joined in the eternal chants of hope for a Europe that is finally capable of acting on an equal footing with Washington?
First, we should not indulge in delusions of grandeur that we can “manage” China’s rise. China cannot be managed from the outside, just as it cannot be contained, by the way. Our American friends have not yet understood this and are under the delusion that it is still time to take the necessary steps to stop China’s rise in power politics. And just because they believe in the hammer of their military, they also believe China is a nail that only needs to be hammered in again. Between the hammer and the nail in this case, however, is their own thumb.
Meanwhile, frustration is growing in the political arena, and with it, the willingness to resort to ever harsher formulations in China policy. China’s increasingly self-confident foreign policy behavior readily encourages this fury of criticism with the usual irritants: Criticism of China’s policies in Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and the Indo-Pacific is now part of the standard repertoire of a moralizing foreign policy that makes do with clear references to values but otherwise lacks any factual competence. China-bashing is booming. And sanctions are once again just the continuation of a helpless policy with opinionated means. The West might already know this in view of its sanctions record, but China has yet to learn.
European self-reminder looks increasingly clumsy. The “strategic autonomy” demanded by the French president is not even remotely reflected in reality – neither towards China nor the US. Transatlantic dreams smack of nightmares, even under Joe Biden. Because you don’t have to be an expert to recognize a simple fact: The US talks about values, but it means geopolitical influence. The Europeans do the same, but they mean economic interests. Double standards are set in both cases.
Elsewhere, even the German foreign minister acknowledges this in one of his clearer statements: Maas wants to avoid a further escalation of relations with Russia, Deutsche Welle quotes him. Maas continues: “Our position on Nord Stream 2 is well known. If the companies involved were to stop their activities, this need not have any concrete impact on the Nawalny case. We do not think it is right to isolate Russia economically. Isolating Russia economically would have the geostrategic effect of pushing Russia and China further and further together. And that cannot be in our strategic interest. If anything, it could make it even more difficult to even talk about these kinds of issues with Russia.” He is quite right about that. But anyone who says that should actually say exactly the same thing about sanctions against China. The double standards of German foreign policy and its leading representatives are always remarkable.
So what might a less moralizing China policy look like? Ideally, it should consist of at least three steps.
Military muscle-flexing is currently the order of the day in the Western Pacific. Provoked by the foreign-policy posturing of a US government that had almost been dismissed from office over Taiwan, Beijing retaliated with a targeted violation of the airspace claimed by Taiwan. As a sign of his ability to act, the new American president then moves a second aircraft carrier, the “USS Theodore Roosevelt”, into the Taiwan Strait. And suddenly, the Europeans also want to be involved: The French with their nuclear submarine “Émeraude” and the British with their aircraft carrier “HMS Queen Elizabeth”. Even the Germans want to show their colors with a frigate – if it makes it over water to the Southeast Asian lake region. Symbolic power politics along the lines of the 19th century, as if one did not know about the risks of a chance confrontation with catastrophic consequences. Europe is not a Pacific power and would be well advised to urge both the US and China to reduce their military conflict potential.
In the art of diplomacy, it is important to leave things unsaid, especially when they are obvious. China debates in the West suffer from an excess of verbal criticism. This is not to say that China criticism is not justified from a Western perspective. But what can China-bashing really achieve or improve? Let’s just take the most popular example at the moment: Using the events in Xinjiang as a reason for sanctions, as the European Union has just done, secures domestic political approval and media applause, but it does not help the people in the affected regions. Instead, it only tempts China into acts of defiance and ensures that even the last channel of dialogue is blocked.
One basic problem becomes obvious: Politicians know very well what is expected of them at home, in their constituencies and party committees, and what language they want to hear. Anyone who criticizes China loudly can be sure of applause. Often it’s not primarily about China but about visibility in the German and European media and popularity in the respective domestic politics.
Instead of pithy words, there is a tedious task ahead. Anyone who only looks at China through the lens of Western values has nothing more to learn about this complex and, for us, paradoxical country because the verdict is a foregone conclusion anyway. But anyone who claims to want to influence domestic political events in China must do everything possible to keep channels of dialogue open and not close them off with provocative and overly aggressive language.
Instead of relying on aggressive accusations and threatening military gestures, a currently less popular strategy seems to have the potential to be the silver bullet in the long run after all: So can’t we talk to China about Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet? Of course, you can. But it’s not what you say, but how you say it. If you don’t immediately put the country in the dock with pithy words, you at least have the chance to be heard – and perhaps also to score a success or two in quiet diplomacy.
Anyone who recognizes that the major global problems of our time can only be solved together with China and not without or against China should actually come up with the idea themselves, without much thought, that we need to talk, negotiate and perhaps even argue with this country and its government in order to find solutions that are acceptable to all sides. Only in this way will it be possible to ensure the joint elaboration of global goods. Only in this way will it be possible to maintain peace and prosperity.
It is high time that China policy in the West is seen as a permanent management task and not as a problem that demands a solution with all its might, quickly and definitively. The rise of China does not mean the downfall of the West, but it does mean the need to banish the fatal power-political thought patterns of the 20th century to the mothballs of history.
Eberhard Sandschneider, was Professor of Chinese Politics and International Relations at Freie Universität Berlin from 1998 to 2020. Today he is a partner at the consulting firm “Berlin Global Advisors”.
On behalf of the WHO, scientists describe their search for the source of the COVID-19 in Wuhan on a good 120 pages – but they could not find it. “We have not yet found the source of the virus”, said WHO head Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. All theories are still on the table.
In the long-awaited report, the team concludes that the virus could originate in pangolins as well as bats. The scientists stressed that further studies are essential to get to the bottom of the matter. They described the theory that the virus could have escaped from a laboratory, however, as “extremely unlikely”.
Researchers at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), meanwhile, have been able to take a closer look at 100 Chinese loan agreements with developing and emerging countries for the first time – and found secrecy clauses and possible political influence by Beijing in the countries. Nico Beckert was able to view and analyze the study in advance for China.Table.
The economic drama surrounding the freighter “Ever Given”, which got stuck in the Suez Canal, has set alarm bells ringing in Beijing. Because another strait is even more dangerous for China’s supplies: the Strait of Malacca near Singapore. Beijing is looking for alternatives to the bottleneck, as Frank Sieren reports.
Ted Hui was a parliamentarian in Hong Kong. He has been on the run with his family since December. He spoke to Marcel Grzanna about his fate and that of his fellow campaigners.
Since the early 2000s, China has signed more than 2,000 loan agreements with developing and emerging countries. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing finances infrastructure projects in dozens of countries. When it comes to energy projects, Chinese development banks have been among the biggest lenders for years. China, for example, holds at least 21 percent of African countries’ debt. For the first time, a research team led by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) has now managed to evaluate 100 credit agreements of Chinese development banks (84), the central government (4), state-owned commercial banks (8) and supplier credits (4) to 24 states amounting to more than $36 billion and to compile them in a database.
Normally, such contracts – not only Chinese ones – are subject to strict secrecy. The researchers compared the Chinese contracts with 142 Cameroonian contracts that the African state had signed with private and bilateral and multilateral donors and made publicly available.
All loan agreements signed between China and partner states after 2014 contain “far-reaching confidentiality clauses“, according to the study. The year 2014 marks a clear turning point here. Most of these clauses require the borrower to keep the terms of the contract, and sometimes even the existence of the debt, secret. By comparison, only 2 of the 142 loan contracts in the comparative sample from Cameroon contain similarly strong confidentiality clauses.
This secrecy makes it difficult to assess a country’s true indebtedness. The authors warn that impending over-indebtedness cannot be detected early enough. However, they also criticize the fact that just over one-third of the contracts from the Cameroonian comparative sample contain confidentiality clauses, albeit in weaker formulations. While creditors share certain information with the public and other creditors, there are no uniform transparency standards.
According to the study, China is trying to gain advantages over other lenders. Debt rescheduling clauses were revealed in nearly 75 percent of the Chinese loan agreements analyzed. These oblige the debtor state to continue servicing the Chinese loans in the event of imminent insolvency instead of including them in rescheduling programs like other loans. Not a single contract in the comparative sample contains such clauses. China would theoretically benefit if another lender granted debt relief. But governments are “reluctant to grant debt relief if they end up subsidizing other creditors,” the authors said. If China insists on complying with the rescheduling clause, the debtor is unlikely to receive debt relief from other donors.
This conflict has stood in the way of debt relief in the past. However, last year China agreed for the first time at the G20 level to restructure its claims on the poorest sovereign debtors together with the members of the Paris Club. This shows that what is written in the loan agreements is not necessarily implemented by Beijing.
Beijing could also use special contractual clauses to influence the domestic and foreign policies of debtors, the study said. If the debtor country “significantly” changed its policies, Beijing could insist on immediate repayment for 90 percent of the loans. In the case of China Development Bank contracts, this is even possible if the partner country breaks off its diplomatic relations with China – for example, if it turns its attention to Taiwan. Many loan agreements do not define what is meant by a significant change in the law. Often, China has the right to decide what significant means, Sebastian Horn of the IfW told China.Table. The fact that Beijing is the largest lender to a large number of states, meaning they lack alternatives, shows the potential power of such clauses.
Beijing’s contractual clauses could also prevent improvements in labor law or environmental protection in the debtor countries. 30 percent of Chinese loan agreements contain so-called stabilization clauses. In concrete terms, this means that if the debtor country introduces laws that affect projects financed with Chinese loans, the debtor country would have to compensate the Chinese lender – for example, in the form of tax breaks or concession extensions.
This can become a costly affair that could prevent legislative changes in labor law or environmental protection. But Western countries also use such stabilization clauses. According to the comparative sample from Cameroon, they even occur more frequently there than in Chinese contracts. However, according to the authors, the clauses of the Chinese Exim Bank are the most stringent.
China’s loan agreements “differ not in type but in degree from commercial and other bilateral lenders,” the study says. All creditors seek to “maximize the prospect of repayment through all legal, economic, and political means at their disposal.” China, however, is also breaking new ground. One reason could be that China is one of the largest donors. In general, the risk of default is high for developing countries. Accordingly, the clauses serve as a hedge. They “allow some high-risk countries like Venezuela, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Sierra Leone to receive such large loans in the first place,” says Sebastian Horn of the IfW. China is trying to minimize the high default risk through contractual clauses.
Whether and in how many cases China also implements the contractual clauses cannot be assessed by the authors, as this was not the focus of the study. However, there is anecdotal evidence: When Argentina’s new government wanted to stop a Chinese-financed dam project due to environmental concerns, the China Development Bank threatened to stop financing other ongoing projects in the country. Argentina’s government quickly relented.
The authors also warn that some credit clauses could become a problem in debt and financial crises. A first step towards more cooperation and coordination could be China’s commitment to the G20 Common Framework, which should lead to debt relief for the poorest countries.
China has also played an “important role” in the past, for example, in supporting African states and their debt. Between 2000 and 2019, Beijing “restructured” – that is, extended debt service or set lower interest rates on – $7.5 billion of debt owed by 10 African nations. China has also canceled $3.4 billion of African debt.
In general, the IfW research team calls for government debt to be transparent and public in terms of its amount and borrowing conditions so that citizens can hold their governments accountable.
The end of Hong Kong’s electoral system, as he knew it, was met with mixed feelings by Ted Hui from a safe distance. While in Beijing, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Tuesday unanimously (167-0) signed a law reform that gives the People’s Republic of China ultimate control over appointments to all key political posts in Hong Kong, Hui is organizing his new life in exile. Until September 2020, the 38-year-old was a democratically elected member of the city’s Legislative Council, the Hong Kong parliament. Since early December, he has been on the run from authorities investigating him for violations of the National Security Act. Hui had reached Australia with his wife and two children via Denmark and Britain in early March.
With the decision of the Standing Committee, the democratic opposition in Hong Kong also loses the last tools to exert relevant influence on the political future of the metropolis. The parliament will be increased from 70 to 90 seats, the committee to elect the head of government will grow by 25 percent to 1500 eligible voters. The Chinese government wants to award the additional mandates to lobbyists who will create guaranteed majorities for Beijing’s interests.
“We (democrats) have lost our seats in parliament, all influence on Hong Kong’s politics, our freedom and civic space,” Hui sums up in a telephone conversation with China.Table, more than a year and a half after the start of the protest movement in Hong Kong against the increasingly authoritarian structures that Beijing is imposing on the city. Actually, that’s a grim conclusion after many months of an unequal struggle between students, pro-democracy oppositionists, the politically interested as well as the disinterested, some radicals on one side and perhaps the world’s most resilient dictatorship on the other, determined and ready to use violence. But Hui is certain “that the movement has won the hearts of the people.” As many as two million people initially took to the streets together.
The movement has succeeded in putting the regime under such pressure that it has only been able to maintain its power at the cost of an enormous loss of international reputation. However, the price that Hui, as well as numerous other politicians and student leaders, personally pay for this is high. Many face long prison sentences. Ted Hui’s world also completely changed. Returning to Hong Kong? Seems out of the question for many years, if not for life. “It’s painful not being able to go home and hard for the kids to understand that we may never go back. But in Australia, I feel safe from arbitrary arrest,” he says.
Hong Kong’s National Security Act has given the state and investigators the legal basis to charge any opposition figure or activist since the middle of last year. In a statement to China.Table, the security bureau spoke of nine charges in four cases against Hui, including “damaging property, accessing computers with fraudulent intend, attempting to bend the law and contempt of court.” Hui is unlikely to clear these charges because the vaguely worded security law gives investigators enough leeway to construct the allegations. The allegations are also related to Hui’s involvement in organizing unofficial Democratic primary elections last year. Authorities consider that a conspiracy to subvert state power. Possible sentence: life in prison.
While 53 of his fellow activists were arrested in early January, Hui beat the authorities to the punch. In December, he accepted an official invitation from Danish politicians to attend a supposed conference in Copenhagen (China.Table reported). The event was fictitious. But with the written invitation, Hui persuaded the Hong Kong authorities to hand over his confiscated passport. Police are investigating fraud. Hui flew to Denmark, and his family to London shortly after. There they met again.
A dozen other activists, the so-called “Hong Kong 12”, had failed in their escape attempt last year. Their speedboat, which was supposed to take them from Hong Kong to Taiwan, was stopped by Chinese security forces. For months, the members of the group were detained in Shenzhen. Eight of them were handed over to Hong Kong authorities last Monday, including Andy Li, co-founder of the Fight for Freedom – Stand for Hong Kong campaign, a crowdfunding platform that raised around €2 million to support the protests. His trial is scheduled for today, Wednesday, without him being present. Li is being held separately from the seven others in a psychiatric ward until the end of a two-week quarantine, the Apple Daily reports. Two of the “Hong Kong 12” had already been extradited from China in December, while two others are still in custody in Shenzhen.
They will “investigate the whereabouts of the fugitive offenders in various lawful ways and pursue (the offenders),” the security bureau announced. But despite the threat, Hui continues to play politics. In England, he met Nathan Law, a former Hong Kong student leader who was also elected to the city’s parliament in 2016. The following year, Law served an eight-month prison sentence for his central role in the 2014 protests and went into exile in the UK for fear of another conviction. For weeks, Hui and Law, along with six other fugitives, including Glacier Kwong as the only woman, discussed their strategy for the future. Hui is by far the oldest of the group, whose members are on average younger than 30. He agreed to go to Australia to lobby, while the others will remain active in North America and Europe. The activists are trying to influence China’s policy in their host countries.
Last week, Hui and Law exchanged views with the European Union’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) in a video conference. It was an opportune time to talk with the 27 EU ambassadors from member states. The body had been sanctioned by China shortly before, after the EU, in turn, imposed sanctions on Chinese officials over human rights crimes against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Accordingly, the Europeans were interested in the assessments of the two Hong Kong politicians. The planned half-hour turned into 60 minutes. Among other things, Law and Hui appealed to the EU representatives to tie the ratification of the CAI investment agreement with China by the EU Parliament to tougher conditions.
The group’s lobbying will also reach German politics, which is considered a supporting element of the European attitude towards China. Since his escape, Ted Hui has spoken with numerous EU parliamentarians. His conclusion: Germany, as the continent’s largest economy, must do more for human rights. CAI had served German industry above all, he said. “It is hard for me to understand that Germany, with its large negotiating mass, prioritizes its trade interests. Initially, I had the feeling that Germany would be very supportive of our cause. But the wind seems to have changed,” Hui said. The group therefore definitely wants to intensify the exchange with German politicians.
Then a few days ago, the eight-member group published the 2021 Hong Kong Charter. The document is a call for democracy and the rule of law. In 25 points, it blames the Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China for its authoritarian policies. It calls for an end to political repression and autonomy for Hong Kong’s citizens. And it calls for worldwide alliances to oppose Beijing’s “global aggression.” The call is meant to give courage, “especially to the Hong Kong diaspora everywhere abroad,” Hui says. “It’s our signal to show that we’re here and we’re going to keep going.” To that end, the paper’s authors bridged their political differences. They come from three camps of the Democratic opposition. Exile, at the latest, has finally united them.
The name 2021 Hong Kong Charter was not chosen at random. The year in the title is inspired by Charter 08, which Liu Xiaobo, who later won the Nobel Peace Prize, initiated before the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 and was imprisoned for it, where he later died. In principle, anyone can sign the paper, but first and foremost, it should be Hong Kong citizens who want to express their solidarity. The activists have a lot at stake. They want to find out whether they are lone wolves or have broad support among their compatriots abroad. Around 600 individuals and three dozen organizations and groups have signed so far.
The calamity was inevitable. The Biden administration’s China policy, which is now clearly visible, is also forcing the Europeans to think more about their China policy. So far, however, only a willingness to be aggressive in line with American expectations is apparent. This has little to do with a success-oriented and constructive policy. In Germany in particular, the issue could become particularly explosive after a possible change of government. China is not necessarily making things easy for us.
Only one thing is clear at present: China’s economic rise has power-political consequences and the potential to fundamentally shift the geopolitical balance of the 21st century. This is certainly not a new idea, but the more clearly the consequences of this development become perceptible, the more unease is growing among Western politicians, entrepreneurs and commentators. The willingness to think in extremes is increasing: Is Matthias Doepfner right in calling for a close alignment with the USA or, on the contrary, Stefan Baron, who leaves it at a misleading but simple “Yankee go home”? Or rather Sigmar Gabriel, who, in last week’s China.Table, reflected matter-of-factly on the “farewell to the Atlantic”, but in the end only joined in the eternal chants of hope for a Europe that is finally capable of acting on an equal footing with Washington?
First, we should not indulge in delusions of grandeur that we can “manage” China’s rise. China cannot be managed from the outside, just as it cannot be contained, by the way. Our American friends have not yet understood this and are under the delusion that it is still time to take the necessary steps to stop China’s rise in power politics. And just because they believe in the hammer of their military, they also believe China is a nail that only needs to be hammered in again. Between the hammer and the nail in this case, however, is their own thumb.
Meanwhile, frustration is growing in the political arena, and with it, the willingness to resort to ever harsher formulations in China policy. China’s increasingly self-confident foreign policy behavior readily encourages this fury of criticism with the usual irritants: Criticism of China’s policies in Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and the Indo-Pacific is now part of the standard repertoire of a moralizing foreign policy that makes do with clear references to values but otherwise lacks any factual competence. China-bashing is booming. And sanctions are once again just the continuation of a helpless policy with opinionated means. The West might already know this in view of its sanctions record, but China has yet to learn.
European self-reminder looks increasingly clumsy. The “strategic autonomy” demanded by the French president is not even remotely reflected in reality – neither towards China nor the US. Transatlantic dreams smack of nightmares, even under Joe Biden. Because you don’t have to be an expert to recognize a simple fact: The US talks about values, but it means geopolitical influence. The Europeans do the same, but they mean economic interests. Double standards are set in both cases.
Elsewhere, even the German foreign minister acknowledges this in one of his clearer statements: Maas wants to avoid a further escalation of relations with Russia, Deutsche Welle quotes him. Maas continues: “Our position on Nord Stream 2 is well known. If the companies involved were to stop their activities, this need not have any concrete impact on the Nawalny case. We do not think it is right to isolate Russia economically. Isolating Russia economically would have the geostrategic effect of pushing Russia and China further and further together. And that cannot be in our strategic interest. If anything, it could make it even more difficult to even talk about these kinds of issues with Russia.” He is quite right about that. But anyone who says that should actually say exactly the same thing about sanctions against China. The double standards of German foreign policy and its leading representatives are always remarkable.
So what might a less moralizing China policy look like? Ideally, it should consist of at least three steps.
Military muscle-flexing is currently the order of the day in the Western Pacific. Provoked by the foreign-policy posturing of a US government that had almost been dismissed from office over Taiwan, Beijing retaliated with a targeted violation of the airspace claimed by Taiwan. As a sign of his ability to act, the new American president then moves a second aircraft carrier, the “USS Theodore Roosevelt”, into the Taiwan Strait. And suddenly, the Europeans also want to be involved: The French with their nuclear submarine “Émeraude” and the British with their aircraft carrier “HMS Queen Elizabeth”. Even the Germans want to show their colors with a frigate – if it makes it over water to the Southeast Asian lake region. Symbolic power politics along the lines of the 19th century, as if one did not know about the risks of a chance confrontation with catastrophic consequences. Europe is not a Pacific power and would be well advised to urge both the US and China to reduce their military conflict potential.
In the art of diplomacy, it is important to leave things unsaid, especially when they are obvious. China debates in the West suffer from an excess of verbal criticism. This is not to say that China criticism is not justified from a Western perspective. But what can China-bashing really achieve or improve? Let’s just take the most popular example at the moment: Using the events in Xinjiang as a reason for sanctions, as the European Union has just done, secures domestic political approval and media applause, but it does not help the people in the affected regions. Instead, it only tempts China into acts of defiance and ensures that even the last channel of dialogue is blocked.
One basic problem becomes obvious: Politicians know very well what is expected of them at home, in their constituencies and party committees, and what language they want to hear. Anyone who criticizes China loudly can be sure of applause. Often it’s not primarily about China but about visibility in the German and European media and popularity in the respective domestic politics.
Instead of pithy words, there is a tedious task ahead. Anyone who only looks at China through the lens of Western values has nothing more to learn about this complex and, for us, paradoxical country because the verdict is a foregone conclusion anyway. But anyone who claims to want to influence domestic political events in China must do everything possible to keep channels of dialogue open and not close them off with provocative and overly aggressive language.
Instead of relying on aggressive accusations and threatening military gestures, a currently less popular strategy seems to have the potential to be the silver bullet in the long run after all: So can’t we talk to China about Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet? Of course, you can. But it’s not what you say, but how you say it. If you don’t immediately put the country in the dock with pithy words, you at least have the chance to be heard – and perhaps also to score a success or two in quiet diplomacy.
Anyone who recognizes that the major global problems of our time can only be solved together with China and not without or against China should actually come up with the idea themselves, without much thought, that we need to talk, negotiate and perhaps even argue with this country and its government in order to find solutions that are acceptable to all sides. Only in this way will it be possible to ensure the joint elaboration of global goods. Only in this way will it be possible to maintain peace and prosperity.
It is high time that China policy in the West is seen as a permanent management task and not as a problem that demands a solution with all its might, quickly and definitively. The rise of China does not mean the downfall of the West, but it does mean the need to banish the fatal power-political thought patterns of the 20th century to the mothballs of history.
Eberhard Sandschneider, was Professor of Chinese Politics and International Relations at Freie Universität Berlin from 1998 to 2020. Today he is a partner at the consulting firm “Berlin Global Advisors”.
