Today we are introducing you to a very special medium: the magazine Mang Mang, founded by Chinese exiles. The Chinese-language publication will appear for the third time in January and pursues noble goals. It aims to promote cohesion between Chinese exiles, strengthen the country’s civil society, and connect activists worldwide. This is not only a huge task, but also quite simply very courageous.
The Chinese state has its eyes and ears in all parts of the Chinese diaspora through the foreign organizations of its united front. Several active and former employees of Mang Mang have already been interrogated on their return to China and questioned about the magazine’s background. Relatives have also been summoned. The makers are not interested in opposition and certainly not in revolution, writes Fabian Peltsch.
However, the united front is not only there to nip political dissent among compatriots abroad in the bud, but also to exert Chinese influence on business and political elites around the world. The aim is to link mutual interests. The deeper the players are entangled in this network, the easier it is to formulate common goals. This is simple sociology. And it is not forbidden. China is allowed to establish close contact with whomever it wants.
Nevertheless, the British secret service MI5 apparently sees the need to publicize the case of a Chinese businessman who has built up good relations with the royal family and Downing Street. Amelie Richter describes the reasons why Great Britain is now alarmed.
Enjoy today’s issue and have a wonderful day!
After the coronavirus lockdowns, many people left China to make a fresh start abroad, including many young Chinese. Some were already political idealists and took to the streets to protest against the draconian measures. Others felt the realities of the authoritarian state for the first time and applied for student and work visas to take time out. From the outside, they took a look at their own homeland. “The lockdown period was a political awakening for many young Chinese,” says Kim (name changed), an exchange student living in Berlin who, together with like-minded people, publishes the diaspora magazine Mang Mang (莽莽), which translates roughly as “vast wilderness”.
With the professionally designed Chinese-language magazine, which is also published online, the team primarily aims to promote cohesion between exiles, many of whom are unable or unwilling to return to their home country for the time being for political reasons, including those from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Mang Mang was founded in 2022 by Chinese expatriates living in Berlin following a solidarity protest for the “Bridge Man” arrested in Beijing.
Initially, the main aim was to keep the momentum of the protests alive – including the “white paper protests“, whose images went around the world only a short time later as a spontaneous expression against Beijing’s state despotism. “But we now cover far more topics,” says Kim, who is responsible for networking, among other things. “Our strength is that we are part of the community ourselves and know what issues move the younger generation.”
Mang Mang deals with topics such as unemployment, the lack of freedom of speech at universities, unfair gender distribution, and sexual harassment in the spirit of #MeToo. “In China itself, the spaces for such discussions have become smaller and smaller over the past 15 years,” says Kim. That’s why they want to make the voices of outsiders heard, for example those of the still marginalized members of the LGBTQ+ community.
However, Mang Mang also provides exclusive content that looks deep inside the propaganda machinery, such as interviews with online censors who Mang Mang anonymously asked about their day-to-day work. Quite a few of them are from the same generation as the magazine’s creators. Many started such a job without knowing the exact circumstances and tasks. The description simply advertised that you could become part of a “prestigious tech company”.
Another article deals with the decline in prosperity of the Chinese middle class. Using the example of Li Jiaming, born in 1991, it tells how the dream of limitless growth led to a bitter awakening for many. “All that remains is the struggle to adapt and survive,” concludes the article.
Mang Mang is part of the diaspora organization “Coalition against Transnational Repression in Germany“. Funding comes mainly from subscriptions and donations. “You can buy the magazine in selected bookshops all over the world,” says Kim. And not just in the West, but wherever young Chinese abroad are drawn to, for example Japan, Taiwan, or Thailand, where the magazines are available in the “Nowhere” bookstores run by exiles.
For many Chinese who simply come abroad to study, Mang Mang gives them a different political perspective for the first time, beyond the official propaganda. Of course, the articles also meet with opposition from newly arrived Chinese, for example when it comes to the status of Taiwan or Tibet. “Overall, however, we encounter a lot of curiosity and openness,” says Kim.
Many readers suddenly felt moved to find out for themselves, for example about what constitutes the identity of a Hong Kong citizen. “Some people also ask us whether we have a WeChat channel. We then have to explain why that’s not a good idea,” says Kim. He is alluding to the strict monitoring of content on WeChat by the Chinese authorities. Kim himself grew up in a household where political issues could be discussed openly.
Several active and former employees of Mang Mang were already interrogated on their return to China and questioned about the background of the magazine. Relatives have also been summoned. “In our first issue, we had a map showing where protests against the lockdown measures were taking place in China. This apparently gave certain people in the government the impression that we were a kind of headquarters for the movement.” Kim says that they have now trained themselves better to protect the anonymity of those involved. They have also become more cautious internally in order to protect themselves against the influence of spies. Cases such as the suspected AfD spy Jian Guo or the dissident Wang Jingyu, who was exposed as a fraudster, are warning examples.
People who join a protest movement initially have a clear goal and a mission, says Kim, for example to achieve more freedom. After a while abroad, many experience a state of resignation. “There are also many political differences of opinion in the Chinese diaspora itself, for example regarding Germany’s stance on the war in Gaza,” he points out.
In order to create long-term perspectives, it is important to network activists and organizations worldwide, “be it through our articles or private events,” says Kim. Old-school exiles could also provide important insights, such as those who fled after the Tiananmen protests were suppressed in 1989. However, Mang Mang’s goal is not to start a political opposition party abroad or to incite a revolution. “Our motivation is more to raise awareness of the possibilities and power of civil society,” says Kim. “Reading or even publishing a political magazine of this kind is a privilege that many Chinese people have never had in their lives.” The third issue of Mang Mang will be published in mid-January 2025.
A suspected case of espionage involving the royal family is making headlines in the UK: Businessman Yang Tengbo is said to have established close links with Prince Andrew on behalf of the United Front in order to strengthen China’s influence in London. Yang, a 50-year-old Chinese citizen who has already been banned from entering the UK for security reasons, was publicly named earlier this week after a British judge lifted an anonymity order.
The businessman, who can also be seen in photos with former British Prime Ministers David Cameron and Theresa May, provided his network of contacts with business opportunities and contacts in the People’s Republic, according to the British MI5. According to British media reports, Yang was twice a guest at Buckingham Palace. The man is also said to be the founder of an investment fund in China initiated by Prince Andrew and headed the Pitch@Palace project in the People’s Republic, a platform for British entrepreneurs to make new contacts there.
Yang is said to have been prevented from entering the UK at the end of 2021. However, the case has only now become public due to the court’s decision. Yang himself had applied to the court for the anonymity order to be lifted so that he could challenge “unfounded” allegations against him, British media reported. According to the court ruling, the intelligence services had long suspected that the man was acting as a Chinese spy and had carried out “hostile activities” in the UK.
But that’s not all. In addition to the Yang case, Christine Ching Kui Lee lost a lawsuit against the UK security services on Tuesday. The British lawyer had been accused of “political interference” by MI5 in 2022 – Lee had made a large donation to Labour MP Barry Gardiner.
“Prince Andrew, Christine Lee, and Barry Gardiner have done more in five days to put the issue of Chinese influence on the political agenda than MPs, the media and others have done in five years,” Charles Parton, a fellow of the British think tank Council on Geostrategy and ex-diplomat in China and Hong Kong, told the Financial Times. He added: “Useful idiots? You bet they are.”
The Chinese embassy in London called on the UK “not to cause trouble”. Yang himself denies any wrongdoing. In British politics, the incidents have triggered calls for the UK to classify the People’s Republic as a threat to national security. In the House of Commons on Monday, several senior Tory MPs called for stricter measures to protect the UK from covert Chinese influence.
The alleged cases of Chinese political influence allegedly reaching into the upper echelons of British society raise a number of uncomfortable questions for Keir Starmer’s government. And they present him with a dilemma: The Labour government hopes to strengthen relations with China in order to boost economic growth.
“Economic cooperation with China creates and secures trade and jobs – bilateral trade between the two countries amounted to 87.7 billion pounds last year and accounted for 5.1 percent of total UK trade,” explains Sam Hogg, Non-Resident Expert at the Oxford China Policy Lab, when asked by Table.Briefings. But: “China is complicated.”
The Communist Party saw the change of power in London in July as an opportunity to restructure parts of the relationship and “find gaps in the approach of the UK and its key allies”, Hogg said. Labour has always emphasized that the approach to the bilateral relationship with China will be based on three Cs, according to Hogg: “Compete, Cooperate, and Challenge.” In other words, similar to the EU triad.
London has traditionally aligned itself more closely with the USA than with Brussels. Trump’s second presidency will have a greater impact on the shape of British policy towards China than many other geopolitical players, says Hogg. According to him, high-ranking Labour politicians generally have better relations with the Democrats than with the future Republican government.
The extent to which the Labour Party’s approach differs from that of the previous Tories is not yet clear. Starmer signaled that the economic dialogue with China should be resumed. The statements made by British Foreign Secretary David Lammys, in which he speaks of a “genocide” in Xinjiang, have been backed away from after the takeover, says Hogg.
Lammy traveled to Beijing in October. In the days before his trip, London had launched a rather vague and undefined China audit. It remains to be seen when the results will be available. According to the Guardian, they have been postponed until after Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves’ first trip to Beijing in early January. According to the report, the focus of the trip will be on cooperation in the area of financial services between the two countries – which can be seen as the start of a London charm offensive.
This could raise concerns among China hawks that the Labor government will ultimately not respond to the pressure to subject business relations with China to closer scrutiny as strongly as announced. However, the government has already committed to introducing a registration system for foreign lobbying next summer.
With the appointment of Jamieson Greer as the new US Trade Representative, future POTUS Donald Trump is sending a clear signal: The tariff war with China is set to enter a new round. Greer is no stranger to US trade policy. He began his career as a lawyer specializing in international trade and commercial law. After graduating from the University of Virginia School of Law, the now 44-year-old worked in leading law firms, where he advised American companies on trade disputes and international competition law issues. This experience made him an expert in trade disputes at an early stage.
Jamieson Greer gained his reputation as a tough negotiator and advocate of American economic interests during his time in the office he will now head. As Chief of Staff to Robert Lighthizer, the US Trade Representative in Trump’s first term, he was instrumental in shaping the first wave of punitive tariffs against China. He was involved in numerous measures aimed at curbing Beijing’s influence on global markets. This work not only earned him recognition but also a reputation as a China hardliner.
Greer brings not only expertise but also a clear ideological stance to his new role. For him, economic competition with China is more than a bilateral conflict – it is a central component of a geopolitical power struggle. Greer is convinced that the US can retain the upper hand through a determined and strategic approach.
The trade conflict, which Greer helped to shape earlier, led to a dramatic escalation of tensions between Beijing and Washington. Together with Lighthizer, Greer pushed through tariffs that targeted the Chinese economy while simultaneously burdening American businesses and consumers.
A major problem for Beijing: Both Greer and Trump still have a score to settle. After tough negotiations, the two countries agreed on the so-called “Phase One Trade Agreement” in Trade War 1.0. This agreement provided for China to buy more US goods, particularly agricultural products, in order to reduce the trade deficit. However, the deal soon collapsed. China was unable to achieve the promised import volumes from the USA. Trump’s new approach could now be to accuse China of breaking the deal and thus justify Trade War 2.0.
Greer’s appointment does not bode well for China. But he is not even the only challenge for Beijing. Other key positions in the new cabinet are to be filled by men who are regarded as outspoken China hardliners. The designated Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and the new CIA Director John Ratcliffe share Greer’s critical stance towards the People’s Republic. The only real counterweight could be Elon Musk. The tech billionaire and close advisor to Trump is considered to be China-friendly. Jörn Petring
Maybe it’s because the dragon is omnipresent in Chinese culture? In any case, water in China does not flow from a tap, but from a “dragon’s head” (literally 龙头 lóngtóu, sometimes also 水龙头 shuǐlóngtóu, “water dragon’s head”). The next time you wash your hands, you might see the “tap“ in a new light.
Want more? Visit www.new-chinese.org!
Today we are introducing you to a very special medium: the magazine Mang Mang, founded by Chinese exiles. The Chinese-language publication will appear for the third time in January and pursues noble goals. It aims to promote cohesion between Chinese exiles, strengthen the country’s civil society, and connect activists worldwide. This is not only a huge task, but also quite simply very courageous.
The Chinese state has its eyes and ears in all parts of the Chinese diaspora through the foreign organizations of its united front. Several active and former employees of Mang Mang have already been interrogated on their return to China and questioned about the magazine’s background. Relatives have also been summoned. The makers are not interested in opposition and certainly not in revolution, writes Fabian Peltsch.
However, the united front is not only there to nip political dissent among compatriots abroad in the bud, but also to exert Chinese influence on business and political elites around the world. The aim is to link mutual interests. The deeper the players are entangled in this network, the easier it is to formulate common goals. This is simple sociology. And it is not forbidden. China is allowed to establish close contact with whomever it wants.
Nevertheless, the British secret service MI5 apparently sees the need to publicize the case of a Chinese businessman who has built up good relations with the royal family and Downing Street. Amelie Richter describes the reasons why Great Britain is now alarmed.
Enjoy today’s issue and have a wonderful day!
After the coronavirus lockdowns, many people left China to make a fresh start abroad, including many young Chinese. Some were already political idealists and took to the streets to protest against the draconian measures. Others felt the realities of the authoritarian state for the first time and applied for student and work visas to take time out. From the outside, they took a look at their own homeland. “The lockdown period was a political awakening for many young Chinese,” says Kim (name changed), an exchange student living in Berlin who, together with like-minded people, publishes the diaspora magazine Mang Mang (莽莽), which translates roughly as “vast wilderness”.
With the professionally designed Chinese-language magazine, which is also published online, the team primarily aims to promote cohesion between exiles, many of whom are unable or unwilling to return to their home country for the time being for political reasons, including those from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Mang Mang was founded in 2022 by Chinese expatriates living in Berlin following a solidarity protest for the “Bridge Man” arrested in Beijing.
Initially, the main aim was to keep the momentum of the protests alive – including the “white paper protests“, whose images went around the world only a short time later as a spontaneous expression against Beijing’s state despotism. “But we now cover far more topics,” says Kim, who is responsible for networking, among other things. “Our strength is that we are part of the community ourselves and know what issues move the younger generation.”
Mang Mang deals with topics such as unemployment, the lack of freedom of speech at universities, unfair gender distribution, and sexual harassment in the spirit of #MeToo. “In China itself, the spaces for such discussions have become smaller and smaller over the past 15 years,” says Kim. That’s why they want to make the voices of outsiders heard, for example those of the still marginalized members of the LGBTQ+ community.
However, Mang Mang also provides exclusive content that looks deep inside the propaganda machinery, such as interviews with online censors who Mang Mang anonymously asked about their day-to-day work. Quite a few of them are from the same generation as the magazine’s creators. Many started such a job without knowing the exact circumstances and tasks. The description simply advertised that you could become part of a “prestigious tech company”.
Another article deals with the decline in prosperity of the Chinese middle class. Using the example of Li Jiaming, born in 1991, it tells how the dream of limitless growth led to a bitter awakening for many. “All that remains is the struggle to adapt and survive,” concludes the article.
Mang Mang is part of the diaspora organization “Coalition against Transnational Repression in Germany“. Funding comes mainly from subscriptions and donations. “You can buy the magazine in selected bookshops all over the world,” says Kim. And not just in the West, but wherever young Chinese abroad are drawn to, for example Japan, Taiwan, or Thailand, where the magazines are available in the “Nowhere” bookstores run by exiles.
For many Chinese who simply come abroad to study, Mang Mang gives them a different political perspective for the first time, beyond the official propaganda. Of course, the articles also meet with opposition from newly arrived Chinese, for example when it comes to the status of Taiwan or Tibet. “Overall, however, we encounter a lot of curiosity and openness,” says Kim.
Many readers suddenly felt moved to find out for themselves, for example about what constitutes the identity of a Hong Kong citizen. “Some people also ask us whether we have a WeChat channel. We then have to explain why that’s not a good idea,” says Kim. He is alluding to the strict monitoring of content on WeChat by the Chinese authorities. Kim himself grew up in a household where political issues could be discussed openly.
Several active and former employees of Mang Mang were already interrogated on their return to China and questioned about the background of the magazine. Relatives have also been summoned. “In our first issue, we had a map showing where protests against the lockdown measures were taking place in China. This apparently gave certain people in the government the impression that we were a kind of headquarters for the movement.” Kim says that they have now trained themselves better to protect the anonymity of those involved. They have also become more cautious internally in order to protect themselves against the influence of spies. Cases such as the suspected AfD spy Jian Guo or the dissident Wang Jingyu, who was exposed as a fraudster, are warning examples.
People who join a protest movement initially have a clear goal and a mission, says Kim, for example to achieve more freedom. After a while abroad, many experience a state of resignation. “There are also many political differences of opinion in the Chinese diaspora itself, for example regarding Germany’s stance on the war in Gaza,” he points out.
In order to create long-term perspectives, it is important to network activists and organizations worldwide, “be it through our articles or private events,” says Kim. Old-school exiles could also provide important insights, such as those who fled after the Tiananmen protests were suppressed in 1989. However, Mang Mang’s goal is not to start a political opposition party abroad or to incite a revolution. “Our motivation is more to raise awareness of the possibilities and power of civil society,” says Kim. “Reading or even publishing a political magazine of this kind is a privilege that many Chinese people have never had in their lives.” The third issue of Mang Mang will be published in mid-January 2025.
A suspected case of espionage involving the royal family is making headlines in the UK: Businessman Yang Tengbo is said to have established close links with Prince Andrew on behalf of the United Front in order to strengthen China’s influence in London. Yang, a 50-year-old Chinese citizen who has already been banned from entering the UK for security reasons, was publicly named earlier this week after a British judge lifted an anonymity order.
The businessman, who can also be seen in photos with former British Prime Ministers David Cameron and Theresa May, provided his network of contacts with business opportunities and contacts in the People’s Republic, according to the British MI5. According to British media reports, Yang was twice a guest at Buckingham Palace. The man is also said to be the founder of an investment fund in China initiated by Prince Andrew and headed the Pitch@Palace project in the People’s Republic, a platform for British entrepreneurs to make new contacts there.
Yang is said to have been prevented from entering the UK at the end of 2021. However, the case has only now become public due to the court’s decision. Yang himself had applied to the court for the anonymity order to be lifted so that he could challenge “unfounded” allegations against him, British media reported. According to the court ruling, the intelligence services had long suspected that the man was acting as a Chinese spy and had carried out “hostile activities” in the UK.
But that’s not all. In addition to the Yang case, Christine Ching Kui Lee lost a lawsuit against the UK security services on Tuesday. The British lawyer had been accused of “political interference” by MI5 in 2022 – Lee had made a large donation to Labour MP Barry Gardiner.
“Prince Andrew, Christine Lee, and Barry Gardiner have done more in five days to put the issue of Chinese influence on the political agenda than MPs, the media and others have done in five years,” Charles Parton, a fellow of the British think tank Council on Geostrategy and ex-diplomat in China and Hong Kong, told the Financial Times. He added: “Useful idiots? You bet they are.”
The Chinese embassy in London called on the UK “not to cause trouble”. Yang himself denies any wrongdoing. In British politics, the incidents have triggered calls for the UK to classify the People’s Republic as a threat to national security. In the House of Commons on Monday, several senior Tory MPs called for stricter measures to protect the UK from covert Chinese influence.
The alleged cases of Chinese political influence allegedly reaching into the upper echelons of British society raise a number of uncomfortable questions for Keir Starmer’s government. And they present him with a dilemma: The Labour government hopes to strengthen relations with China in order to boost economic growth.
“Economic cooperation with China creates and secures trade and jobs – bilateral trade between the two countries amounted to 87.7 billion pounds last year and accounted for 5.1 percent of total UK trade,” explains Sam Hogg, Non-Resident Expert at the Oxford China Policy Lab, when asked by Table.Briefings. But: “China is complicated.”
The Communist Party saw the change of power in London in July as an opportunity to restructure parts of the relationship and “find gaps in the approach of the UK and its key allies”, Hogg said. Labour has always emphasized that the approach to the bilateral relationship with China will be based on three Cs, according to Hogg: “Compete, Cooperate, and Challenge.” In other words, similar to the EU triad.
London has traditionally aligned itself more closely with the USA than with Brussels. Trump’s second presidency will have a greater impact on the shape of British policy towards China than many other geopolitical players, says Hogg. According to him, high-ranking Labour politicians generally have better relations with the Democrats than with the future Republican government.
The extent to which the Labour Party’s approach differs from that of the previous Tories is not yet clear. Starmer signaled that the economic dialogue with China should be resumed. The statements made by British Foreign Secretary David Lammys, in which he speaks of a “genocide” in Xinjiang, have been backed away from after the takeover, says Hogg.
Lammy traveled to Beijing in October. In the days before his trip, London had launched a rather vague and undefined China audit. It remains to be seen when the results will be available. According to the Guardian, they have been postponed until after Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves’ first trip to Beijing in early January. According to the report, the focus of the trip will be on cooperation in the area of financial services between the two countries – which can be seen as the start of a London charm offensive.
This could raise concerns among China hawks that the Labor government will ultimately not respond to the pressure to subject business relations with China to closer scrutiny as strongly as announced. However, the government has already committed to introducing a registration system for foreign lobbying next summer.
With the appointment of Jamieson Greer as the new US Trade Representative, future POTUS Donald Trump is sending a clear signal: The tariff war with China is set to enter a new round. Greer is no stranger to US trade policy. He began his career as a lawyer specializing in international trade and commercial law. After graduating from the University of Virginia School of Law, the now 44-year-old worked in leading law firms, where he advised American companies on trade disputes and international competition law issues. This experience made him an expert in trade disputes at an early stage.
Jamieson Greer gained his reputation as a tough negotiator and advocate of American economic interests during his time in the office he will now head. As Chief of Staff to Robert Lighthizer, the US Trade Representative in Trump’s first term, he was instrumental in shaping the first wave of punitive tariffs against China. He was involved in numerous measures aimed at curbing Beijing’s influence on global markets. This work not only earned him recognition but also a reputation as a China hardliner.
Greer brings not only expertise but also a clear ideological stance to his new role. For him, economic competition with China is more than a bilateral conflict – it is a central component of a geopolitical power struggle. Greer is convinced that the US can retain the upper hand through a determined and strategic approach.
The trade conflict, which Greer helped to shape earlier, led to a dramatic escalation of tensions between Beijing and Washington. Together with Lighthizer, Greer pushed through tariffs that targeted the Chinese economy while simultaneously burdening American businesses and consumers.
A major problem for Beijing: Both Greer and Trump still have a score to settle. After tough negotiations, the two countries agreed on the so-called “Phase One Trade Agreement” in Trade War 1.0. This agreement provided for China to buy more US goods, particularly agricultural products, in order to reduce the trade deficit. However, the deal soon collapsed. China was unable to achieve the promised import volumes from the USA. Trump’s new approach could now be to accuse China of breaking the deal and thus justify Trade War 2.0.
Greer’s appointment does not bode well for China. But he is not even the only challenge for Beijing. Other key positions in the new cabinet are to be filled by men who are regarded as outspoken China hardliners. The designated Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and the new CIA Director John Ratcliffe share Greer’s critical stance towards the People’s Republic. The only real counterweight could be Elon Musk. The tech billionaire and close advisor to Trump is considered to be China-friendly. Jörn Petring
Maybe it’s because the dragon is omnipresent in Chinese culture? In any case, water in China does not flow from a tap, but from a “dragon’s head” (literally 龙头 lóngtóu, sometimes also 水龙头 shuǐlóngtóu, “water dragon’s head”). The next time you wash your hands, you might see the “tap“ in a new light.
Want more? Visit www.new-chinese.org!
