Expectations for the meeting between the foreign ministers of China and the United States in Alaska, which begins today, could not be more different. While the US side first wants to discuss security and human rights issues with its Chinese counterparts, the Chinese side speaks of an opportunity that Washington and Beijing should use to conduct high-level strategic dialogues. We’ll analyze for you the extent to which the talks are really with each other or rather at cross purposes. In any case, despite mild temperatures in Anchorage, the mood couldn’t be frostier; at the moment, not even a joint dinner is planned.
The EU has sent a clear signal ahead of the meeting in Alaska. Shortly before the China-US meeting, EU diplomats in Brussels let it be known that they had agreed on sanctions against China because of human rights violations against the Muslim minority of the Uyghurs. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has also resorted to sanctions to criticize Beijing’s electoral reforms in Hong Kong.
The business platform LinkedIn has received an equally clear signal from the Chinese authorities. For the time being, no new users can register with LinkedIn in China. Beijing dislikes the accusation by LinkedIn parent Microsoft that the hacking attacks in early March were directed by China. But the interdependencies are too great for there to be any severe dislocation, Finn Mayer-Kuckuk predicts.
I still join the wish of Philipp Staab, whom China.Table presents in the Profile today. The professor of sociology in Berlin, who talks to his students about geopolitical developments in China, the US, and Europe, would like to learn more about China in the Tagesschau – at least as much as USA.
Microsoft has received a warning in China: LinkedIn, the professional social network owned by Microsoft, is not allowed to accept new members there for the time being “until it has ensured to be in compliance with applicable laws”. Since then, no new signups have been possible. However, there were no other restrictions for the 45 million Chinese users.
Initially, there was hope that the dropout would be short-lived. LinkedIn is an important networking tool between the Chinese and Western business communities. There are not many common platforms that bridge both worlds. Facebook/WhatsApp are difficult to access in China, while Europeans and Americans generally don’t use WeChat. With its professional feel, LinkedIn also suits people who prefer to talk about factual topics and can do without the political discussions that other social media occupy.
Speculation is now already taking place in the Chinese business community about the consequences of a long-term LinkedIn ban. The impact is thought to be minor in the short term because all interested parties already have an account. But in the long term, a loss of access would be considered a loss for LinkedIn.
Observers can only speculate what is behind the warning to LinkedIn. Question number 1: What did the network do wrong, what is the accusation? There is a fairly obvious answer to that. LinkedIn has always been merely tolerated, when in fact it has allowed too much free exchange. As a shared platform for Western and Chinese users, it was much more porous than other social networks. Facebook, for example, faced a demand for the country’s usual censorship back in 2009, which it refused to give in to. The government, however, has tolerated LinkedIn because it is useful for its own businessmen. Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution points to yet another use of LinkedIn by China: Intelligence agencies in the country may have used it to recruit informants in the West.
Question number 2 is: Does the warning shot to LinkedIn have anything to do with the behavior of the parent company Microsoft? The proximity in time of two events certainly invites speculation about a connection. On March 3rd, Microsoft specifically called attention to state-directed hacking attacks from China; on March 8th, it issued a directive to LinkedIn to review its practices. The Bloomberg news agency quotes an expert from the Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank, who sees this as an expression of “displeasure” at the direct accusation by Microsoft.
The Global Times propaganda newspaper published a scathing article the following day indignantly denying any connection between the hacking allegation and the LinkedIn admissions freeze. However, that can just as easily be read as an endorsement. In a politicized environment like the Global Times, when two incidents are already mentioned together, it tends to imply a connection. The same goes for LinkedIn’s own assurance that there is no connection. The denial – like many denials – is worthless from the outset. After all, the company’s goal is to be able to continue its business as usual.
As an act of trade policy, a tit-for-tat approach would be typical. At the same time, the leadership in Beijing is showing companies that it has the upper hand when it comes to market access. Microsoft is also known for playing along and adapting in China – the market for software of all kinds is highly attractive. When Google shut down its search engine in 2010 because of censorship demands in mainland China, Microsoft kept Bing. Since then, the Chinese version of Bing has met all regulatory requirements. It also stores Chinese customers’ cloud data in China for the government to view, as required. That’s the price of being in the market.
Now Microsoft has pointed the finger at China over the use of the Exchange vulnerability by multiple groups of attackers. The company’s security experts will have had good reasons for making this so clear. Nonetheless, the country managers in China will have been less than pleased. At the same time, it is unlikely that the cornerstones of Microsoft’s China business will change in the long term. The relationship is too important for both sides.
It is after 7 p.m., and the statement could be interpreted as well-intentioned care: “Don’t stay too long, you still have a small child at home,” says the boss of a company with billions in sales and more than 1,000 employees in China to one of his female employees. But in the case of the 35-year-old Beijing woman, the statement, which may have been meant in a nice way, rather leads to concern that she can no longer hope for any great opportunities for promotion in the department – because her male colleagues have also heard the boss’s words, and they too have children at home. But they are not indirectly expected to juggle children and work (China.Table reported).
For many women in China’s metropolises, this is everyday life. Even if, as is usually the case, grandparents step in, and children in cities also have at least as long a day as their working parents with tutoring and remedial classes. But it’s not just the social role that puts pressure on women’s career opportunities. Women’s incomes also lag behind men’s when it comes to salaries. The World Economic Forum (WEF) ranked China 106th out of 153 on the Gender Gap Index, which ranks countries by gender gap, from best, meaning little difference, descending to worst. In terms of the gender gap in economic participation and opportunity, the WEF ranks China 91st out of 153 – behind other emerging economies such as Brazil and Russia.
Above all, the companies themselves contribute to the fact that women in China are not treated equally on the labor market. It is not uncommon for companies in China to advertise vacancies for male candidates only. A report released this spring by Human Rights Watch (HRW) showed that more than eleven percent of all public sector job advertisements are tailored to “men only” or “men preferred”.
Among the nearly 14,000 job postings in the list of civil service positions, HRW found that six percent directly favored male applicants, and five percent even abruptly stated a requirement for male applicants. The discriminatory job postings cite “frequent overtime”, “heavy workload”, and “frequent travel” as reasons for excluding women.
It was not until 2015 that a court ruling was handed down in China for the first time, declaring discrimination on the basis of gender in hiring to be inadmissible. Ma Hu, a woman from Beijing, had sued because her application to work for a parcel delivery company was rejected on the grounds that employees had to carry heavy parcels.
Although China’s female labor force participation rate is one of the highest in the world, it has been declining since the 1990s. One of the reasons for this decline may be the general improvement in livelihoods, combined with certain difficulties women face in fulfilling their work and care responsibilities.
These difficulties could be exacerbated in light of the adopted two-child family policy in the context of a rapidly aging population. Women who have to take care of two children and their parents may decide to enter the labor market later, Claire Courteille-Mulder, director of the International Labor Organization’s country office for China and Mongolia, warned in a paper back in 2019.
Yet it is women who are of great economic importance. In Xi Jinping’s latest plan of dual circulation, in which the domestic and export markets are to be strengthened, they are also among the main players in consumption through the two-child policy. For example, through household money. Especially in the southern Chinese provinces, this is managed mainly by women. Husbands there hand over their wages to their wives, who then allow their husbands little of their salaries each month, apart from transport and food money.
At first glance, this looks like a lot of control and also financial power for women in the private four walls – but in public life and in the professional world, it is often the other way around. Although many women earn good degrees and attain middle management positions in industry, universities, or services, few, if any, make it to the executive floors.
For example, women held 25.4 percent of director-level positions last year, up 0.4 percentage points from 2018. In addition, while more women chose to study science, technology, engineering, and math, leading to more female graduates in the fields. However, more than 70 percent of employees in the 15 highest-paid technical positions were still men.
At the same time, an unprecedented amount of wealth has migrated into the hands of Chinese women, especially in recent years: In home ownership alone, according to a survey by a Chinese real estate platform, the share of women has increased significantly in recent years: In 2018, for example, about 48 percent of buyers of second-hand homes were women, compared with 30 percent in 2014.
And the number of self-made female billionaires in China has also increased almost every year for years. The Hurun list of the richest women even shows that of the world’s ten richest self-made billionaires, nine are from China.
With their improved economic status, Chinese women have also developed a strong interest in growing their money through financial planning and investing. According to Lufax, one of the largest fintech companies in China, about 54 percent of active users in 2020 were women, who outperformed their male counterparts in many areas, including the number of their assets and the frequency of their investments.
Things are also happening on the legal front towards greater equality in the workplace: In February 2019, China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, together with eight other national institutions, issued a new policy to eliminate discrimination in hiring. The policy prohibits direct discrimination, such as gender-based job advertisements or questions related to applicants’ marital status or parental status during an interview.
The Chinese Confederation of Trade Unions also made an important contribution by publishing its handbook on promoting gender equality in the workplace in March 2019 to enable female workers to access equal opportunities and remuneration, maternity protection, and better work-life balance.
But the fact that the reality is still often different is perhaps demonstrated by the exception that proves the rule. “My son graduated from kindergarten to college without me visiting the school once,” said China’s self-made billionaire Dong Mingzhu during a speech a few years ago, when she had long since risen from a sales executive to CEO at one of the country’s largest home appliance manufacturers.
China and Russia will jointly build a space station on the moon. As announced by the Chinese space agency CNSA, Zhang Kejian, head of CNSA, and Dimitri Rogozin, head of the Russian space agency Roskosmos recently signed a memorandum of understanding on such cooperation.
With the Russian space agency Roskosmos, China has thus found a strong, experienced partner. However, the CNSA reiterated in its statement that this project is “open to all interested nations and international partners“.
An exact date for establishing the moon base of China and Russia has not yet been set, and plans for how the collaboration might work out in concrete terms are still quite vague. The talk is that both agencies will bring their experience together to jointly create a roadmap for the construction of an “international lunar research station” (ILRS). This is to be a base “on the surface and/or in orbit of the Moon”. According to experts, the moon is attractive to the Chinese for several reasons. One is national prestige and international importance. Furthermore, it is assumed that the moon is suitable for the extraction of helium-3, titanium, and water ice.
The Russians bring decades of space research to the collaboration and, with the Soyuz spacecraft, one of the most reliable and safest transportation systems in space history. Especially in manned spaceflight, where China is still little experienced, the Russians already bring a lot of valuable experience.
“Russia’s expertise in liquid oxygen and kerosene propulsion technology, as well as the comprehensive and world’s best system in astronaut training, will undoubtedly accelerate our program,” Pang Zhihao, former researcher of the Chinese Academy of Space Technology, told Chinese state media.
The US is thus losing a thoroughly reliable and experienced partner for its own lunar program. With its Artemis program, the USA is pursuing a similar, also very ambitious mission. By 2024, they want to land the first woman on the moon and then gradually build a permanent space station called Gateway, which will orbit the moon and have landing capsules available for surface missions. Similar projects had been repeatedly launched and then abandoned due to cost. Most recently, former US President Donald Trump revived the plans by executive order. In the long term, the moon base is also to become a springboard for manned missions to more distant regions of space, such as the planned missions to Mars.
However, the fact that Roskosmos has now decided in favor of the Chinese program comes as little surprise. Dimitri Rogozin, the head of the Russian space agency, had repeatedly criticized the Artemis Gateway project as being too US-centric.
“For the United States, this right now is a big political project. With the lunar project, we are observing our American partners retreat from principles of cooperation and mutual support” he said during an interview with Russia’s Ksomolskaya Pravda in July last year, already announcing on the same occasion that Russia would only be interested in a moon project as international cooperation. The American side rejected the criticism, pointing out that both Japan, Canada, and the ESA were already on board.
Russia’s decision is also a reflection of world politics. With growing tensions between the USA and both Russia and China, cooperation in space programs is becoming more and more complicated.
NASA is also finding it increasingly difficult to raise the necessary funding. Projects like the ISS, which has been a showcase of international cooperation for decades, are slowly coming to an end due to a lack of funding. There are still funds available until 2024, but beyond that, it looks bleak.
The American lunar program is in a similar situation. Although NASA’s budget was increased by Congress last year, the Artemis program has been severely cut, making the timetable of putting men on the moon by 2024 unrealistic.
Under certain circumstances, the USA could find itself without any representation in space from 2024 onwards. After all, NASA has no longer been able to work with the Chinese space agency CNSA since a decision by the US Congress in 2011. The concern of the Congress at the time was that China would endanger the national security of the US with the technologies disclosed. The decision still prohibits Chinese astronauts from accessing the ISS today and is similar to a policy the US discarded toward Russia in the 1970s. Subsequently, the former arch-enemies began joint space operations, bringing cooperation to a head in 2000 with the ISS.
The Chinese, meanwhile, are working flat out to launch the first module of their own orbiting space station into space. The station is to begin operations in space before the end of the year and then gradually be expanded. “Tiangong”, as the station is called, is expected to give the Chinese valuable experience for later manned space missions. Gregor Koppenburg / Joern Petring
Dutch start-up Hardt Hyperloop is the leading European manufacturer for the next generation of Transrapid technology. The company “welcomes” the Chinese push to test the new Chinese trains on the former Transrapid test track in Lathen and develop them further with European technology leaders. China.Table reported. “We are very open to it,” says one of the four founders, Mars Geuze. “For the sake of the climate alone, we need to join forces across continents and develop a globally competitive technology together,” he said.
Besides Hardt, there are other European companies developing the technology. These include a start-up from the Technical University of Munich with Virgin Hyperloop, a company owned by British entrepreneur Richard Branson, whose test capsule recently carried out its first passenger test in the USA. But the Japanese and South Koreans are also developing in this direction. The Korean train went faster than 1000 kilometers per hour for the first time at the end of last year. So the competitive pressure is on.
This is one of the reasons why the Chinese railway group CRRC, the largest in the world, wants to use the disused Transrapid line in Lathen to test its Hyperloop/Transrapid technology. At the same time, the company wants to develop the technology to series maturity together with European partners in order to save development time. In 2030, China wants to have established the first long-distance connection of more than 2,000 kilometers, in which a train floats in a vacuum tube at a speed of at least 800 kilometers per hour.
It makes no sense, either for time or economic reasons, to develop several technological approaches in parallel, says Geuze: “The sooner we cooperate, the better.” For quite some time now, the start-up has been working with well-known partners, such as Deutsche Bahn or Recaro from Stuttgart, one of the world’s leading car, train, and aircraft seat manufacturers.
But Continental AG from Hanover is also taking part. “Industry needs new efficient alternatives,” explained Hans-Jürgen Duensing, member of the Continental Executive Board. “We, therefore, see new rail transport solutions such as the Hyperloop as a promising future technology and are passing on our know-how from over 90 years of industry expertise to the engineers of tomorrow.”
German tech investor Frank Thelen has a stake in the start-up Hardt: “The sooner we are able to travel with Hyperloop technology, emission-free clear faster and more efficiently than today, the better,” says Thelen, “To this end, we should also consider combining the “Chinese and the European know-how. If it benefits both sides”. The rapid reactivation of Lathen could be “a first, important step in this,” Thelen adds, but in the end, it is important that “all Europeans work closely together to advance the technology together with the Chinese,” Geuze stresses.
The idea of the Hyperloop is old and basically consists of two technology components. One is a vacuum tube, the other is magnetic levitation technology. As early as 1825, the London and Edinburgh Vacuum Tunnel Company was convinced that rail vehicles should be able to travel through vacuum tunnels. It remained a vision until Tesla founder Elon Musk christened the concept “Hyperloop”. In the meantime, however, Hardt has moved on technologically. The developers already have a 30-meter-long test facility in operation in Delft and are building a three-kilometer-long test track in Groningen. However, unlike the more than 30-kilometer track in Lathen, these tracks are not suitable for high-speed testing.
Magnetic levitation technology was registered as a patent by Hermann Kemper in 1934 but was not developed to series maturity until the 1970s and 1980s, first by Kraus-Maffei and later by ThyssenKrupp and Siemens, and was used in everyday life in China from the turn of the millennium.
Geuze, the founder of Hardt, is particularly impressed by the “tenacity with which the Chinese have been pursuing the project for decades,” but also by “the extent to which the politicians are going along with the new technology. By 2030, the train should be hovering from Shanghai to Shenzhen in 3.5 hours. That’s about 2200 kilometers. “That’s a very ambitious plan,” says Geuze, “But it makes sense to try to do this together and share the development costs.” In the process, he says, experience must be gained on shorter routes while keeping the long haul in mind.
The advantages of the Chinese lie in “their everyday experience with maglev trains and the fact that they have the world’s largest research capacities in this field”. Hardt, on the other hand, is ahead in special developments, for example, in the field of vacuum technology or magnetic switches, the so-called HLS technology (Hyperloop Lane Switch). This lane-switching technology allows the Hyperloop capsules to change lanes without a moving component, even at high speeds.
Two Dutch ministries, as well as several companies and research organizations, announced the establishment and funding of a public-private partnership with Hardt, among others, for the development of Hyperloop in early January 2021. Chinese are not yet involved. The consortium aims to explore Hyperloop’s potential as a zero-emission, high-speed transportation solution that could play an important role in climate change while generating economic growth.
Lower Saxony’s Science Minister Bjoern Thuemler (CDU) is also positive about the project, highlighting the value of hyperloop technology as recently as February. He said it was “a true gift” that a possible test track for this technology was located in Lathen in Lower Saxony. “We must take advantage of this opportunity,” Thümler said. The state has been funding the planning since October 2019. On the other hand, the federal government confirmed as recently as February in a small question from the FDP parliamentary group that the federal government was not currently planning to promote the Hyperloop in Lathen.
However, companies in this area can apply for funding from the EU’s Horizon Europe program, the 9th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development. The Horizon program has a total budget of up to €95.5 billion for the program period 2021-2027.
According to media reports, the European Union has agreed on sanctions against China (China.Table reported). The sanctions include entry bans and the freezing of assets of four individuals and one institution, the Reuters news agency reported, citing two EU diplomats. The EU representatives said that those affected are accused of human rights violations against the Uyghur minority. The move reflects deep concerns in Europe, the US, and Canada about the situation of the Uyghurs in China, the report added. According to the report, the EU ambassadors had agreed on the punitive measures.
The names of those affected are to be announced next Monday after the meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels. The punitive measures still need to be formally rubber-stamped at the meeting. The sanctions against China are part of a list of eleven affected in several countries. The EU is using a legal framework for this, which was only adopted in December and is intended to improve the punishment of human rights violations worldwide. In addition to China, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and South Sudan are also affected by the decision.
For China, this means the first EU sanctions since the imposition of an arms embargo in 1989 following the violent crackdown on protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. ari
The European Union’s planned digital vaccination passport currently excludes Chinese vaccines from Sinopharm and Sinovac, but the EU is giving member states the freedom to decide whether to accept COVID-19 vaccines, which have not yet been approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA). The EU Commission had unveiled the digital vaccination certificate, called “Digital Green Certificate”, in Brussels yesterday.
Accordingly, each EU country must accept vaccination certificates from other states “under the same conditions” in order to exempt vaccinated entrants from quarantine or other restriction measures if necessary. According to the EU Commission’s plan, however, this only applies to vaccinated persons who have received one of the vaccines approved in the EU. The individual EU states can, however, decide independently “to accept other vaccines in addition”. In addition to the Chinese substances, this also includes the Russian vaccine Sputnik V. The EMA has not yet approved the Chinese vaccines.
Of the EU states, Hungary has so far used Sinopharm’s Chinese vaccine. Other Eastern European EU states, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, have publicly expressed interest in purchasing COVID-19 vaccines from China in recent weeks. ari
Washington has imposed sanctions on another 24 officials from Hong Kong and China. The reason given was Hong Kong’s electoral reform, which was approved by 2895 delegates at the National People’s Congress in Beijing last week (China.Table reported).
The decision for the new Hong Kong Bill includes a plan to change the size and composition of the Hong Kong legislature, increasing the number of seats from 70 to 90, reducing the overall proportion of democratically elected officials.
Critics see this as further curtailing the influence of the opposition, as the proportion of freely elected seats in parliament is also to fall in the future – and supporters from the pro-Beijing camp, in particular, are to receive even more mandates in the election committee.
Beijing’s new actions undermine the high degree of autonomy promised to Hong Kong people, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said during a visit to Japan and South Korea. China sharply criticized the announcement of the sanctions on Wednesday and announced countermeasures.
The new USA sanctions were held on the eve of a scheduled meeting between the US secretary of state and his Chinese counterpart. Blinken and US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan are scheduled to meet China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Alaska today (Thursday ). niw
“When I started studying sociology, I didn’t know what I wanted to be,” says Philipp Staab about the beginning of his academic career. The gamechanger, he says, was his second sociology course, the title of which was “Utopia, Ideology and Revolutionary Violence”. The analytical, fundamental thinking excited him, and today Staab is a professor of the Sociology of the Future of Work at Humboldt-Uni Berlin and at the Einstein Center Digital Future (ECDF). Staab has been researching digital capitalism together with seven colleagues since 2019.
The 37-year-old is concerned that digitalization and sustainability are often viewed separately in politics. “At the moment, digitalization is not a greening program for the economy. Whether artificial intelligence, bitcoins, or voice recognition – digital growth also generates greenhouse gases. From his point of view, technology must rather be used to achieve democratic goals: “It’s not about how fast you can get an appointment at the citizen’s office. We need an idea of how to put technology into a different purpose context.”
One such goal could be the transformation to a more sustainable economy. In recent years, there has been some movement on this issue. After a neoliberal phase in which the state stayed out of the economy, there is now a new enthusiasm for industrial policy. Staab is currently investigating German and European AI innovation policy in a project. He repeatedly encounters China in his research and teaching, Staab explains: “The current phase of globalization is strongly characterized by geopolitical competition.”
Every other semester, the Nuremberg native gives a lecture on the “Geopolitics of Digitalization“. “There we read texts about the western internet and system, about the 5-year plans of China and our connections to each other.” The question of system competition appears in a different light, he says, when one looks at how many players from the US, Japan, and Europe have invested in Chinese digital companies: “Tencent, Alibaba, and Co. are international or global corporations to which capital interests of players from the West are also attached.
When asked what else connects him to China, the sociology professor holds up his iPhone to the webcam: “If in doubt, this is a Chinese product. That probably applies to all the technical devices that are in this apartment.” He himself has also been to China for scientific conferences, most recently traveling to Shanghai and Ningbo in late 2019. “A month later, it was off to Wuhan.” Staab would like China to be more present in German media so that people don’t have to painstakingly gather information: “Just like you always find out what’s going on in the US on the Tagesschau, it should be easy to do the same with regard to China.” Paul Meerkamp
Expectations for the meeting between the foreign ministers of China and the United States in Alaska, which begins today, could not be more different. While the US side first wants to discuss security and human rights issues with its Chinese counterparts, the Chinese side speaks of an opportunity that Washington and Beijing should use to conduct high-level strategic dialogues. We’ll analyze for you the extent to which the talks are really with each other or rather at cross purposes. In any case, despite mild temperatures in Anchorage, the mood couldn’t be frostier; at the moment, not even a joint dinner is planned.
The EU has sent a clear signal ahead of the meeting in Alaska. Shortly before the China-US meeting, EU diplomats in Brussels let it be known that they had agreed on sanctions against China because of human rights violations against the Muslim minority of the Uyghurs. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has also resorted to sanctions to criticize Beijing’s electoral reforms in Hong Kong.
The business platform LinkedIn has received an equally clear signal from the Chinese authorities. For the time being, no new users can register with LinkedIn in China. Beijing dislikes the accusation by LinkedIn parent Microsoft that the hacking attacks in early March were directed by China. But the interdependencies are too great for there to be any severe dislocation, Finn Mayer-Kuckuk predicts.
I still join the wish of Philipp Staab, whom China.Table presents in the Profile today. The professor of sociology in Berlin, who talks to his students about geopolitical developments in China, the US, and Europe, would like to learn more about China in the Tagesschau – at least as much as USA.
Microsoft has received a warning in China: LinkedIn, the professional social network owned by Microsoft, is not allowed to accept new members there for the time being “until it has ensured to be in compliance with applicable laws”. Since then, no new signups have been possible. However, there were no other restrictions for the 45 million Chinese users.
Initially, there was hope that the dropout would be short-lived. LinkedIn is an important networking tool between the Chinese and Western business communities. There are not many common platforms that bridge both worlds. Facebook/WhatsApp are difficult to access in China, while Europeans and Americans generally don’t use WeChat. With its professional feel, LinkedIn also suits people who prefer to talk about factual topics and can do without the political discussions that other social media occupy.
Speculation is now already taking place in the Chinese business community about the consequences of a long-term LinkedIn ban. The impact is thought to be minor in the short term because all interested parties already have an account. But in the long term, a loss of access would be considered a loss for LinkedIn.
Observers can only speculate what is behind the warning to LinkedIn. Question number 1: What did the network do wrong, what is the accusation? There is a fairly obvious answer to that. LinkedIn has always been merely tolerated, when in fact it has allowed too much free exchange. As a shared platform for Western and Chinese users, it was much more porous than other social networks. Facebook, for example, faced a demand for the country’s usual censorship back in 2009, which it refused to give in to. The government, however, has tolerated LinkedIn because it is useful for its own businessmen. Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution points to yet another use of LinkedIn by China: Intelligence agencies in the country may have used it to recruit informants in the West.
Question number 2 is: Does the warning shot to LinkedIn have anything to do with the behavior of the parent company Microsoft? The proximity in time of two events certainly invites speculation about a connection. On March 3rd, Microsoft specifically called attention to state-directed hacking attacks from China; on March 8th, it issued a directive to LinkedIn to review its practices. The Bloomberg news agency quotes an expert from the Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank, who sees this as an expression of “displeasure” at the direct accusation by Microsoft.
The Global Times propaganda newspaper published a scathing article the following day indignantly denying any connection between the hacking allegation and the LinkedIn admissions freeze. However, that can just as easily be read as an endorsement. In a politicized environment like the Global Times, when two incidents are already mentioned together, it tends to imply a connection. The same goes for LinkedIn’s own assurance that there is no connection. The denial – like many denials – is worthless from the outset. After all, the company’s goal is to be able to continue its business as usual.
As an act of trade policy, a tit-for-tat approach would be typical. At the same time, the leadership in Beijing is showing companies that it has the upper hand when it comes to market access. Microsoft is also known for playing along and adapting in China – the market for software of all kinds is highly attractive. When Google shut down its search engine in 2010 because of censorship demands in mainland China, Microsoft kept Bing. Since then, the Chinese version of Bing has met all regulatory requirements. It also stores Chinese customers’ cloud data in China for the government to view, as required. That’s the price of being in the market.
Now Microsoft has pointed the finger at China over the use of the Exchange vulnerability by multiple groups of attackers. The company’s security experts will have had good reasons for making this so clear. Nonetheless, the country managers in China will have been less than pleased. At the same time, it is unlikely that the cornerstones of Microsoft’s China business will change in the long term. The relationship is too important for both sides.
It is after 7 p.m., and the statement could be interpreted as well-intentioned care: “Don’t stay too long, you still have a small child at home,” says the boss of a company with billions in sales and more than 1,000 employees in China to one of his female employees. But in the case of the 35-year-old Beijing woman, the statement, which may have been meant in a nice way, rather leads to concern that she can no longer hope for any great opportunities for promotion in the department – because her male colleagues have also heard the boss’s words, and they too have children at home. But they are not indirectly expected to juggle children and work (China.Table reported).
For many women in China’s metropolises, this is everyday life. Even if, as is usually the case, grandparents step in, and children in cities also have at least as long a day as their working parents with tutoring and remedial classes. But it’s not just the social role that puts pressure on women’s career opportunities. Women’s incomes also lag behind men’s when it comes to salaries. The World Economic Forum (WEF) ranked China 106th out of 153 on the Gender Gap Index, which ranks countries by gender gap, from best, meaning little difference, descending to worst. In terms of the gender gap in economic participation and opportunity, the WEF ranks China 91st out of 153 – behind other emerging economies such as Brazil and Russia.
Above all, the companies themselves contribute to the fact that women in China are not treated equally on the labor market. It is not uncommon for companies in China to advertise vacancies for male candidates only. A report released this spring by Human Rights Watch (HRW) showed that more than eleven percent of all public sector job advertisements are tailored to “men only” or “men preferred”.
Among the nearly 14,000 job postings in the list of civil service positions, HRW found that six percent directly favored male applicants, and five percent even abruptly stated a requirement for male applicants. The discriminatory job postings cite “frequent overtime”, “heavy workload”, and “frequent travel” as reasons for excluding women.
It was not until 2015 that a court ruling was handed down in China for the first time, declaring discrimination on the basis of gender in hiring to be inadmissible. Ma Hu, a woman from Beijing, had sued because her application to work for a parcel delivery company was rejected on the grounds that employees had to carry heavy parcels.
Although China’s female labor force participation rate is one of the highest in the world, it has been declining since the 1990s. One of the reasons for this decline may be the general improvement in livelihoods, combined with certain difficulties women face in fulfilling their work and care responsibilities.
These difficulties could be exacerbated in light of the adopted two-child family policy in the context of a rapidly aging population. Women who have to take care of two children and their parents may decide to enter the labor market later, Claire Courteille-Mulder, director of the International Labor Organization’s country office for China and Mongolia, warned in a paper back in 2019.
Yet it is women who are of great economic importance. In Xi Jinping’s latest plan of dual circulation, in which the domestic and export markets are to be strengthened, they are also among the main players in consumption through the two-child policy. For example, through household money. Especially in the southern Chinese provinces, this is managed mainly by women. Husbands there hand over their wages to their wives, who then allow their husbands little of their salaries each month, apart from transport and food money.
At first glance, this looks like a lot of control and also financial power for women in the private four walls – but in public life and in the professional world, it is often the other way around. Although many women earn good degrees and attain middle management positions in industry, universities, or services, few, if any, make it to the executive floors.
For example, women held 25.4 percent of director-level positions last year, up 0.4 percentage points from 2018. In addition, while more women chose to study science, technology, engineering, and math, leading to more female graduates in the fields. However, more than 70 percent of employees in the 15 highest-paid technical positions were still men.
At the same time, an unprecedented amount of wealth has migrated into the hands of Chinese women, especially in recent years: In home ownership alone, according to a survey by a Chinese real estate platform, the share of women has increased significantly in recent years: In 2018, for example, about 48 percent of buyers of second-hand homes were women, compared with 30 percent in 2014.
And the number of self-made female billionaires in China has also increased almost every year for years. The Hurun list of the richest women even shows that of the world’s ten richest self-made billionaires, nine are from China.
With their improved economic status, Chinese women have also developed a strong interest in growing their money through financial planning and investing. According to Lufax, one of the largest fintech companies in China, about 54 percent of active users in 2020 were women, who outperformed their male counterparts in many areas, including the number of their assets and the frequency of their investments.
Things are also happening on the legal front towards greater equality in the workplace: In February 2019, China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, together with eight other national institutions, issued a new policy to eliminate discrimination in hiring. The policy prohibits direct discrimination, such as gender-based job advertisements or questions related to applicants’ marital status or parental status during an interview.
The Chinese Confederation of Trade Unions also made an important contribution by publishing its handbook on promoting gender equality in the workplace in March 2019 to enable female workers to access equal opportunities and remuneration, maternity protection, and better work-life balance.
But the fact that the reality is still often different is perhaps demonstrated by the exception that proves the rule. “My son graduated from kindergarten to college without me visiting the school once,” said China’s self-made billionaire Dong Mingzhu during a speech a few years ago, when she had long since risen from a sales executive to CEO at one of the country’s largest home appliance manufacturers.
China and Russia will jointly build a space station on the moon. As announced by the Chinese space agency CNSA, Zhang Kejian, head of CNSA, and Dimitri Rogozin, head of the Russian space agency Roskosmos recently signed a memorandum of understanding on such cooperation.
With the Russian space agency Roskosmos, China has thus found a strong, experienced partner. However, the CNSA reiterated in its statement that this project is “open to all interested nations and international partners“.
An exact date for establishing the moon base of China and Russia has not yet been set, and plans for how the collaboration might work out in concrete terms are still quite vague. The talk is that both agencies will bring their experience together to jointly create a roadmap for the construction of an “international lunar research station” (ILRS). This is to be a base “on the surface and/or in orbit of the Moon”. According to experts, the moon is attractive to the Chinese for several reasons. One is national prestige and international importance. Furthermore, it is assumed that the moon is suitable for the extraction of helium-3, titanium, and water ice.
The Russians bring decades of space research to the collaboration and, with the Soyuz spacecraft, one of the most reliable and safest transportation systems in space history. Especially in manned spaceflight, where China is still little experienced, the Russians already bring a lot of valuable experience.
“Russia’s expertise in liquid oxygen and kerosene propulsion technology, as well as the comprehensive and world’s best system in astronaut training, will undoubtedly accelerate our program,” Pang Zhihao, former researcher of the Chinese Academy of Space Technology, told Chinese state media.
The US is thus losing a thoroughly reliable and experienced partner for its own lunar program. With its Artemis program, the USA is pursuing a similar, also very ambitious mission. By 2024, they want to land the first woman on the moon and then gradually build a permanent space station called Gateway, which will orbit the moon and have landing capsules available for surface missions. Similar projects had been repeatedly launched and then abandoned due to cost. Most recently, former US President Donald Trump revived the plans by executive order. In the long term, the moon base is also to become a springboard for manned missions to more distant regions of space, such as the planned missions to Mars.
However, the fact that Roskosmos has now decided in favor of the Chinese program comes as little surprise. Dimitri Rogozin, the head of the Russian space agency, had repeatedly criticized the Artemis Gateway project as being too US-centric.
“For the United States, this right now is a big political project. With the lunar project, we are observing our American partners retreat from principles of cooperation and mutual support” he said during an interview with Russia’s Ksomolskaya Pravda in July last year, already announcing on the same occasion that Russia would only be interested in a moon project as international cooperation. The American side rejected the criticism, pointing out that both Japan, Canada, and the ESA were already on board.
Russia’s decision is also a reflection of world politics. With growing tensions between the USA and both Russia and China, cooperation in space programs is becoming more and more complicated.
NASA is also finding it increasingly difficult to raise the necessary funding. Projects like the ISS, which has been a showcase of international cooperation for decades, are slowly coming to an end due to a lack of funding. There are still funds available until 2024, but beyond that, it looks bleak.
The American lunar program is in a similar situation. Although NASA’s budget was increased by Congress last year, the Artemis program has been severely cut, making the timetable of putting men on the moon by 2024 unrealistic.
Under certain circumstances, the USA could find itself without any representation in space from 2024 onwards. After all, NASA has no longer been able to work with the Chinese space agency CNSA since a decision by the US Congress in 2011. The concern of the Congress at the time was that China would endanger the national security of the US with the technologies disclosed. The decision still prohibits Chinese astronauts from accessing the ISS today and is similar to a policy the US discarded toward Russia in the 1970s. Subsequently, the former arch-enemies began joint space operations, bringing cooperation to a head in 2000 with the ISS.
The Chinese, meanwhile, are working flat out to launch the first module of their own orbiting space station into space. The station is to begin operations in space before the end of the year and then gradually be expanded. “Tiangong”, as the station is called, is expected to give the Chinese valuable experience for later manned space missions. Gregor Koppenburg / Joern Petring
Dutch start-up Hardt Hyperloop is the leading European manufacturer for the next generation of Transrapid technology. The company “welcomes” the Chinese push to test the new Chinese trains on the former Transrapid test track in Lathen and develop them further with European technology leaders. China.Table reported. “We are very open to it,” says one of the four founders, Mars Geuze. “For the sake of the climate alone, we need to join forces across continents and develop a globally competitive technology together,” he said.
Besides Hardt, there are other European companies developing the technology. These include a start-up from the Technical University of Munich with Virgin Hyperloop, a company owned by British entrepreneur Richard Branson, whose test capsule recently carried out its first passenger test in the USA. But the Japanese and South Koreans are also developing in this direction. The Korean train went faster than 1000 kilometers per hour for the first time at the end of last year. So the competitive pressure is on.
This is one of the reasons why the Chinese railway group CRRC, the largest in the world, wants to use the disused Transrapid line in Lathen to test its Hyperloop/Transrapid technology. At the same time, the company wants to develop the technology to series maturity together with European partners in order to save development time. In 2030, China wants to have established the first long-distance connection of more than 2,000 kilometers, in which a train floats in a vacuum tube at a speed of at least 800 kilometers per hour.
It makes no sense, either for time or economic reasons, to develop several technological approaches in parallel, says Geuze: “The sooner we cooperate, the better.” For quite some time now, the start-up has been working with well-known partners, such as Deutsche Bahn or Recaro from Stuttgart, one of the world’s leading car, train, and aircraft seat manufacturers.
But Continental AG from Hanover is also taking part. “Industry needs new efficient alternatives,” explained Hans-Jürgen Duensing, member of the Continental Executive Board. “We, therefore, see new rail transport solutions such as the Hyperloop as a promising future technology and are passing on our know-how from over 90 years of industry expertise to the engineers of tomorrow.”
German tech investor Frank Thelen has a stake in the start-up Hardt: “The sooner we are able to travel with Hyperloop technology, emission-free clear faster and more efficiently than today, the better,” says Thelen, “To this end, we should also consider combining the “Chinese and the European know-how. If it benefits both sides”. The rapid reactivation of Lathen could be “a first, important step in this,” Thelen adds, but in the end, it is important that “all Europeans work closely together to advance the technology together with the Chinese,” Geuze stresses.
The idea of the Hyperloop is old and basically consists of two technology components. One is a vacuum tube, the other is magnetic levitation technology. As early as 1825, the London and Edinburgh Vacuum Tunnel Company was convinced that rail vehicles should be able to travel through vacuum tunnels. It remained a vision until Tesla founder Elon Musk christened the concept “Hyperloop”. In the meantime, however, Hardt has moved on technologically. The developers already have a 30-meter-long test facility in operation in Delft and are building a three-kilometer-long test track in Groningen. However, unlike the more than 30-kilometer track in Lathen, these tracks are not suitable for high-speed testing.
Magnetic levitation technology was registered as a patent by Hermann Kemper in 1934 but was not developed to series maturity until the 1970s and 1980s, first by Kraus-Maffei and later by ThyssenKrupp and Siemens, and was used in everyday life in China from the turn of the millennium.
Geuze, the founder of Hardt, is particularly impressed by the “tenacity with which the Chinese have been pursuing the project for decades,” but also by “the extent to which the politicians are going along with the new technology. By 2030, the train should be hovering from Shanghai to Shenzhen in 3.5 hours. That’s about 2200 kilometers. “That’s a very ambitious plan,” says Geuze, “But it makes sense to try to do this together and share the development costs.” In the process, he says, experience must be gained on shorter routes while keeping the long haul in mind.
The advantages of the Chinese lie in “their everyday experience with maglev trains and the fact that they have the world’s largest research capacities in this field”. Hardt, on the other hand, is ahead in special developments, for example, in the field of vacuum technology or magnetic switches, the so-called HLS technology (Hyperloop Lane Switch). This lane-switching technology allows the Hyperloop capsules to change lanes without a moving component, even at high speeds.
Two Dutch ministries, as well as several companies and research organizations, announced the establishment and funding of a public-private partnership with Hardt, among others, for the development of Hyperloop in early January 2021. Chinese are not yet involved. The consortium aims to explore Hyperloop’s potential as a zero-emission, high-speed transportation solution that could play an important role in climate change while generating economic growth.
Lower Saxony’s Science Minister Bjoern Thuemler (CDU) is also positive about the project, highlighting the value of hyperloop technology as recently as February. He said it was “a true gift” that a possible test track for this technology was located in Lathen in Lower Saxony. “We must take advantage of this opportunity,” Thümler said. The state has been funding the planning since October 2019. On the other hand, the federal government confirmed as recently as February in a small question from the FDP parliamentary group that the federal government was not currently planning to promote the Hyperloop in Lathen.
However, companies in this area can apply for funding from the EU’s Horizon Europe program, the 9th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development. The Horizon program has a total budget of up to €95.5 billion for the program period 2021-2027.
According to media reports, the European Union has agreed on sanctions against China (China.Table reported). The sanctions include entry bans and the freezing of assets of four individuals and one institution, the Reuters news agency reported, citing two EU diplomats. The EU representatives said that those affected are accused of human rights violations against the Uyghur minority. The move reflects deep concerns in Europe, the US, and Canada about the situation of the Uyghurs in China, the report added. According to the report, the EU ambassadors had agreed on the punitive measures.
The names of those affected are to be announced next Monday after the meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels. The punitive measures still need to be formally rubber-stamped at the meeting. The sanctions against China are part of a list of eleven affected in several countries. The EU is using a legal framework for this, which was only adopted in December and is intended to improve the punishment of human rights violations worldwide. In addition to China, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and South Sudan are also affected by the decision.
For China, this means the first EU sanctions since the imposition of an arms embargo in 1989 following the violent crackdown on protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. ari
The European Union’s planned digital vaccination passport currently excludes Chinese vaccines from Sinopharm and Sinovac, but the EU is giving member states the freedom to decide whether to accept COVID-19 vaccines, which have not yet been approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA). The EU Commission had unveiled the digital vaccination certificate, called “Digital Green Certificate”, in Brussels yesterday.
Accordingly, each EU country must accept vaccination certificates from other states “under the same conditions” in order to exempt vaccinated entrants from quarantine or other restriction measures if necessary. According to the EU Commission’s plan, however, this only applies to vaccinated persons who have received one of the vaccines approved in the EU. The individual EU states can, however, decide independently “to accept other vaccines in addition”. In addition to the Chinese substances, this also includes the Russian vaccine Sputnik V. The EMA has not yet approved the Chinese vaccines.
Of the EU states, Hungary has so far used Sinopharm’s Chinese vaccine. Other Eastern European EU states, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, have publicly expressed interest in purchasing COVID-19 vaccines from China in recent weeks. ari
Washington has imposed sanctions on another 24 officials from Hong Kong and China. The reason given was Hong Kong’s electoral reform, which was approved by 2895 delegates at the National People’s Congress in Beijing last week (China.Table reported).
The decision for the new Hong Kong Bill includes a plan to change the size and composition of the Hong Kong legislature, increasing the number of seats from 70 to 90, reducing the overall proportion of democratically elected officials.
Critics see this as further curtailing the influence of the opposition, as the proportion of freely elected seats in parliament is also to fall in the future – and supporters from the pro-Beijing camp, in particular, are to receive even more mandates in the election committee.
Beijing’s new actions undermine the high degree of autonomy promised to Hong Kong people, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said during a visit to Japan and South Korea. China sharply criticized the announcement of the sanctions on Wednesday and announced countermeasures.
The new USA sanctions were held on the eve of a scheduled meeting between the US secretary of state and his Chinese counterpart. Blinken and US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan are scheduled to meet China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Alaska today (Thursday ). niw
“When I started studying sociology, I didn’t know what I wanted to be,” says Philipp Staab about the beginning of his academic career. The gamechanger, he says, was his second sociology course, the title of which was “Utopia, Ideology and Revolutionary Violence”. The analytical, fundamental thinking excited him, and today Staab is a professor of the Sociology of the Future of Work at Humboldt-Uni Berlin and at the Einstein Center Digital Future (ECDF). Staab has been researching digital capitalism together with seven colleagues since 2019.
The 37-year-old is concerned that digitalization and sustainability are often viewed separately in politics. “At the moment, digitalization is not a greening program for the economy. Whether artificial intelligence, bitcoins, or voice recognition – digital growth also generates greenhouse gases. From his point of view, technology must rather be used to achieve democratic goals: “It’s not about how fast you can get an appointment at the citizen’s office. We need an idea of how to put technology into a different purpose context.”
One such goal could be the transformation to a more sustainable economy. In recent years, there has been some movement on this issue. After a neoliberal phase in which the state stayed out of the economy, there is now a new enthusiasm for industrial policy. Staab is currently investigating German and European AI innovation policy in a project. He repeatedly encounters China in his research and teaching, Staab explains: “The current phase of globalization is strongly characterized by geopolitical competition.”
Every other semester, the Nuremberg native gives a lecture on the “Geopolitics of Digitalization“. “There we read texts about the western internet and system, about the 5-year plans of China and our connections to each other.” The question of system competition appears in a different light, he says, when one looks at how many players from the US, Japan, and Europe have invested in Chinese digital companies: “Tencent, Alibaba, and Co. are international or global corporations to which capital interests of players from the West are also attached.
When asked what else connects him to China, the sociology professor holds up his iPhone to the webcam: “If in doubt, this is a Chinese product. That probably applies to all the technical devices that are in this apartment.” He himself has also been to China for scientific conferences, most recently traveling to Shanghai and Ningbo in late 2019. “A month later, it was off to Wuhan.” Staab would like China to be more present in German media so that people don’t have to painstakingly gather information: “Just like you always find out what’s going on in the US on the Tagesschau, it should be easy to do the same with regard to China.” Paul Meerkamp