Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is known for his straightforward words. He does not hold back on criticism – not toward the United States, not toward Europe, and not toward Germany. But the Ukrainian leadership has so far been exceedingly quiet about China, of all countries. In his analysis, Frank Sieren looks into the reasons for this conspicuous reservation – and identifies them mainly in the monetary sphere.
Meanwhile, extremely good news for Beijing came from Hungary and Serbia. Viktor Orbán and Aleksandar Vučić, two very pro-China politicians, won their respective parliamentary elections. The European Commission could now unintentionally push Hungary further toward the People’s Republic, writes Amelie Richter. Similarly, Serbia also considers China, rather than Russia, to be its “new best friend in the East”. But this development is not yet marked in stone. One country in particular, which is currently experiencing its own change of relations with China, could still have a decisive influence: Germany.
I would also like to draw your attention to today’s Profile. It’s about Wang Jixian, a Chinese programmer who currently lives and works in the Ukrainian port city of Odessa. Some refer to him as the “last Chinese in Odessa”. Fabian Peltsch reveals how Wang Jixian became one of the most recognizable Chinese in the Ukraine crisis in just a few weeks. Because, while the government in Beijing performs a veritable balancing act in this war, Wang takes a clear stance. Read in today’s Profile how and why he compares his face to porn.
After weeks of tense communication between the EU and China, the latest news from Hungary may at least have led to a small sigh of relief in Beijing. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party scored a major victory in Hungary’s parliamentary elections just over a week ago – and the People’s Republic thus retains its most avid supporter inside the European Union.
Orbán now enters his fifth term in office, and his party holds two-thirds of the seats in parliament, giving it a “supermajority”. China will continue to support Hungary in “preserving its independent choice of development path,” said China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi during a congratulatory telephone call with his Hungarian counterpart Péter Szijjártó last week. Beijing thus hopes – or insists – on a continuation of its current China policy. With Orbán at the helm, the chances are good.
And yet, in 2021 and at the beginning of this year, there were times when it looked as if the China-critical opposition had a real chance against Orbán in the parliamentary elections this time. The plans to build a branch of China’s Fudan University in Budapest sparked protests.
On this occasion, the opposition confronted the government with the China question for the first time, explains Roland Freudenstein, Vice President and Head of the Brussels office of the Central European think tank Globsec. “But in the first months of 2022, thanks to their overwhelming dominance in media, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Fidesz managed to set the topics of public debate ahead of the elections, and China was not part of it,” Freudenstein tells China.Table.
After his election victory, Orbán is “like on steroids,” says Freudenstein – a departure from Hungary’s current China policy is unlikely. On the contrary: “He will try to step up most of his policy strategies. Including his idea that an increasingly totalitarian China is the future and the ‘old West’ is the past.” Hungary serves as China’s Trojan horse in the EU, Freudenstein believes.
A powerful soft-power tool in this respect would be the Fudan campus in the heart of the Hungarian capital. The fate of the billion-dollar project is currently unclear. The mayor of Budapest, Gergely Karácsony, has managed to collect enough votes for a referendum to still prevent the construction (China.Table reported). According to local media reports, the vote could take place in the summer at the earliest. It is expected to be held in October – if the Fidesz-dominated parliament approves the referendum.
Head of GLOBSEC Brussels Freudenstein expects that the Fudan offshoot will be built. “Precisely because Fidesz feels so untouchable.” But that could still change: Hungary faces severe financial problems, in part because EU funds may be cut for constitutional matters, Freudenstein warns. Hungary is the first EU country to face proceedings for possible violations of the rule of law.
The EU Commission accuses Orbán’s government of siphoning off EU funds into obscure channels. The lengthy mechanism Brussels launched against Budapest last week could result that Hungary’s annual share of the EU budget, amounting to €6.14 billion, could be frozen.
The lowered financial prospects could cause Budapest to look for other benefactors, says Matej Šimalčík, Executive Director of the Central European Institute of Asian Studies think-tank. “This can of course make Hungary closer to China as an alternative source of finance,” Šimalčík told South China Morning Post.
And there was also good news for Beijing from Hungary’s neighbor Serbia in early April. President Aleksandar Vučić secured another term in office. Vučić and Orbán even went on a joint campaign tour in mid-March – at the inauguration of the high-speed rail line from Belgrade to Novi Sad. With the new train connection, Serbia is taking steps “into the future,” Vučić happily remarked at the inauguration of the first section of the China-funded high-speed rail line.
In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China becomes an increasingly important partner for non-EU member Serbia, political scientist Vuk Vuksanovic of the think tank Belgrade Center for Security Policy already explained before the election: “The war in Ukraine provides Serbia with an opportunity to continue and boost the policy, which was already unfolding even before the war, of replacing Russia with China as Serbia’s primary non-Western partner,” Vuksanovic wrote in The Diplomat.
At least since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Serbia has gradually replaced Russia with China as its “best friend in the East,” says the political scientist. He cites a telling example: Serbia’s President Vučić kissed the Chinese flag in gratitude for Beijing’s medical aid – medical aid from Russia was not met with the same enthusiasm. “This episode showed that Beijing had resources that Moscow did not and exposed the hidden mistrust between Serbia and Russia,” Vuksanovic says.
Serbia currently also receives military support from Beijing: Over the weekend, six Y-20 transport aircraft of the Chinese Air Force were sighted at Belgrade’s civil airport, according to state and Western media reports. They are believed to have delivered the Chinese HQ-22 surface-to-air missile system to Serbia, writes the Chinese newspaper Global Times. The weapons delivery, which was not confirmed initially, across the territory of at least two NATO member states, Turkey and Bulgaria, was considered by observers to be Beijing’s demonstration of its growing global influence.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly turned out to be a turning point for China relations in Eastern and Central Europe. The call for a reassessment of dependence on other autocratic regimes, first and foremost China, is growing louder. Hungary, however, seems to be bucking the EU trend. Orbán voted in favor of EU sanctions against Russia, but then drew a red line when it came to arms transports through Hungarian territory. During the last EU summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky explicitly reprimanded Orbán for his unclear stance.
Orbán’s behavior isolates him even further in the EU, concludes the platform China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (Choice). He is less and less able to use his connections to authoritarian regimes as a means of exerting pressure. What is remarkable in this context is the “current recalibration of Berlin’s foreign policy agenda,” Choice’s authors write. Since Germany remains Hungary’s number one economic partner, Berlin plays a special role in Budapest’s foreign policy deliberations. Germany’s position toward China thus signals how much leeway Orbán will have for his balancing act.
Guangzhou, a metropolis with a population of 16 million, is the next major Chinese city to prepare for a lockdown. The city government has already issued a long list of containment measures for the Baiyun district. Pandemic packs containing masks and rapid tests have also been distributed to households throughout the city. Elementary schools are switching to distance classes. People are now only allowed to leave the city if they present a negative test result. Most ominously, a huge quarantine facility is under construction at the Pazhou International Convention and Exhibition Center – in addition to existing isolation centers.
Many citizens of Guangzhou reacted by stockpiling. Footage and reports of the lockdown in Shanghai, where food is in short supply, prompted people to stock up as much as possible. Recent videos of empty supermarket shelves add to tensions. Meanwhile, authorities are assuring that there is enough food for everyone – and are likely to fuel mistrust.
Meanwhile, the first round of mass testing started in Guangzhou – like in Shanghai at the approach of the big lockdown. Long lines formed outside the sampling stations. And authorities already sent some districts into pre-lockdown. Similarly, the situation in Shanghai also gradually deteriorated.
This was the Guangzhou municipal government’s response to 22 confirmed Covid cases. Since the Omicron variant of Sars-CoV-2 is highly contagious, the ongoing mass testing could unearth a whole series of asymptomatic cases. These would warrant a lockdown under zero-covid logic.
Overall, there is a growing impression that other Chinese metropolises are learning from the debacle in Shanghai. While dogs of Covid-positive citizens are killed on Shanghai’s streets, Shenzhen operates a quarantine center for pets. While food distribution fails in Shanghai, Guangdong boosts its delivery drivers.
Meanwhile, disturbing reports are once again coming from Shanghai. The number of infections confirmed within a day rose to 26,087 on Monday, compared to just under 25,000 on Sunday. Some quarantine camps are described as chaotic and dirty. Party Secretary Li Qiang was openly insulted for the poor situation. The city announced district-wide relaxations over the weekend to relieve some of the pressure.
The lockdown in the overwhelmed city is marked by personal tragedies. The case of the mother of Larry Hsien Ping Lang, an economist working in Hong Kong, received widespread attention. She reportedly died in an emergency room because hospital staff had not checked on her for four hours. She could not provide a negative test. fin
He has become accustomed to the nightly strikes and the howling of sirens, says Wang Jixian. On his 38th birthday, the explosions came so close that black, oily dust settled on the windows of his top-floor apartment. Wang lives and works in the Ukrainian city of Odessa. Some media have called him the “last Chinese in Odessa”. What is certain is that within a few weeks, Wang has become one of the most recognizable Chinese in this conflict.
While his government maintains a balancing act back home to avoid upsetting Russia and continues to avoid the word “war”, Wang openly condemns Russian President Vladimir Putin as an aggressor and calls for consequences. Russia must be held accountable for its actions, and the sooner the better, Wang believes.
On his YouTube channel “Jixian Wang 我是王吉贤 这是大号“, the Beijing-born programmer speaks in his native language about the bleak atmosphere in the coastal city by the Black Sea, which Putin has been shelling with rockets and grenades for weeks. Fear and terror reign in Odessa; residents fear an invasion by Russian troops. Wang does not rule out that he, too, could die. In any case, he has already written his will and published it in one of his videos.
In his first audio-visual war logs, which he posted online shortly after the attacks began, Wang still wore a Chinese flag on his lapel. He quickly took it off, says the Beijing Union University graduate. The Chinese government’s failure to condemn the Russian attacks not only disappoints him, it disgusts him. “Chinese state media translate what Russian media reports. But if it is only a ‘special military operation,’ why do we see bombed-out housing complexes and dead civilians here? It’s so cowardly not to take your own position on this.”
With such statements, Wang has made himself persona non grata in his home country. He can no longer be found on China’s social media channels like Weibo. Chinese censors now even filter images of his face from the web using AI software, the IT specialist says. “My face is treated like porn in China. You can only see it with a VPN or ask a friend to burn it for you on DVD,” he says snarkily. “The government would love to put a bag over my head.”
In the comment sections on YouTube and Twitter, Wang receives a lot of support, but also threats from Chinese nationalists, who call him a traitor and a tool of Western powers. The fact that he works for an American company is used as evidence. Wang’s employer, software developer RegDesk, transferred him from Macedonia to Ukraine in July 2021. Back then, he already started posting videos of his everyday life, for just 36 followers. Now he has 110,000 followers, and major newspapers like the New York Times have published stories about him.
His new popularity as a political influencer doesn’t seem to faze Wang – on the contrary. On Instagram, he posts selfies with wide smiles and even sometimes bare-chested. At a time when self-censorship seems to be in the blood of many Chinese – and more and more foreigners – Wang’s open criticism of his government is already a sensation. “There are other Chinese in Ukraine. They are braver than me,” Wang says. “Some are defending their homes and families with guns.” The big difference, he says, is that they don’t show their faces. “I have a pretty face, why should I hide it?” he asks ironically and smugly.
His family in China is now also under pressure because of his videos. “But my father is not intimidated by this. Like father, like son,” Wang says and laughs. He is not afraid to return to China. “What could be more dangerous for me than missile attacks and potential nuclear attacks? I have to deal with that here every day.” Fabian Peltsch
The first steel box girder is in place. Construction of the Hongqimen Bridge began this weekend. By 2024, 76 more girders are to be added to connect the Nansha district and the city of Zhongshan. The 32-kilometer bridge is an important part of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area infrastructure project.
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is known for his straightforward words. He does not hold back on criticism – not toward the United States, not toward Europe, and not toward Germany. But the Ukrainian leadership has so far been exceedingly quiet about China, of all countries. In his analysis, Frank Sieren looks into the reasons for this conspicuous reservation – and identifies them mainly in the monetary sphere.
Meanwhile, extremely good news for Beijing came from Hungary and Serbia. Viktor Orbán and Aleksandar Vučić, two very pro-China politicians, won their respective parliamentary elections. The European Commission could now unintentionally push Hungary further toward the People’s Republic, writes Amelie Richter. Similarly, Serbia also considers China, rather than Russia, to be its “new best friend in the East”. But this development is not yet marked in stone. One country in particular, which is currently experiencing its own change of relations with China, could still have a decisive influence: Germany.
I would also like to draw your attention to today’s Profile. It’s about Wang Jixian, a Chinese programmer who currently lives and works in the Ukrainian port city of Odessa. Some refer to him as the “last Chinese in Odessa”. Fabian Peltsch reveals how Wang Jixian became one of the most recognizable Chinese in the Ukraine crisis in just a few weeks. Because, while the government in Beijing performs a veritable balancing act in this war, Wang takes a clear stance. Read in today’s Profile how and why he compares his face to porn.
After weeks of tense communication between the EU and China, the latest news from Hungary may at least have led to a small sigh of relief in Beijing. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party scored a major victory in Hungary’s parliamentary elections just over a week ago – and the People’s Republic thus retains its most avid supporter inside the European Union.
Orbán now enters his fifth term in office, and his party holds two-thirds of the seats in parliament, giving it a “supermajority”. China will continue to support Hungary in “preserving its independent choice of development path,” said China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi during a congratulatory telephone call with his Hungarian counterpart Péter Szijjártó last week. Beijing thus hopes – or insists – on a continuation of its current China policy. With Orbán at the helm, the chances are good.
And yet, in 2021 and at the beginning of this year, there were times when it looked as if the China-critical opposition had a real chance against Orbán in the parliamentary elections this time. The plans to build a branch of China’s Fudan University in Budapest sparked protests.
On this occasion, the opposition confronted the government with the China question for the first time, explains Roland Freudenstein, Vice President and Head of the Brussels office of the Central European think tank Globsec. “But in the first months of 2022, thanks to their overwhelming dominance in media, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Fidesz managed to set the topics of public debate ahead of the elections, and China was not part of it,” Freudenstein tells China.Table.
After his election victory, Orbán is “like on steroids,” says Freudenstein – a departure from Hungary’s current China policy is unlikely. On the contrary: “He will try to step up most of his policy strategies. Including his idea that an increasingly totalitarian China is the future and the ‘old West’ is the past.” Hungary serves as China’s Trojan horse in the EU, Freudenstein believes.
A powerful soft-power tool in this respect would be the Fudan campus in the heart of the Hungarian capital. The fate of the billion-dollar project is currently unclear. The mayor of Budapest, Gergely Karácsony, has managed to collect enough votes for a referendum to still prevent the construction (China.Table reported). According to local media reports, the vote could take place in the summer at the earliest. It is expected to be held in October – if the Fidesz-dominated parliament approves the referendum.
Head of GLOBSEC Brussels Freudenstein expects that the Fudan offshoot will be built. “Precisely because Fidesz feels so untouchable.” But that could still change: Hungary faces severe financial problems, in part because EU funds may be cut for constitutional matters, Freudenstein warns. Hungary is the first EU country to face proceedings for possible violations of the rule of law.
The EU Commission accuses Orbán’s government of siphoning off EU funds into obscure channels. The lengthy mechanism Brussels launched against Budapest last week could result that Hungary’s annual share of the EU budget, amounting to €6.14 billion, could be frozen.
The lowered financial prospects could cause Budapest to look for other benefactors, says Matej Šimalčík, Executive Director of the Central European Institute of Asian Studies think-tank. “This can of course make Hungary closer to China as an alternative source of finance,” Šimalčík told South China Morning Post.
And there was also good news for Beijing from Hungary’s neighbor Serbia in early April. President Aleksandar Vučić secured another term in office. Vučić and Orbán even went on a joint campaign tour in mid-March – at the inauguration of the high-speed rail line from Belgrade to Novi Sad. With the new train connection, Serbia is taking steps “into the future,” Vučić happily remarked at the inauguration of the first section of the China-funded high-speed rail line.
In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China becomes an increasingly important partner for non-EU member Serbia, political scientist Vuk Vuksanovic of the think tank Belgrade Center for Security Policy already explained before the election: “The war in Ukraine provides Serbia with an opportunity to continue and boost the policy, which was already unfolding even before the war, of replacing Russia with China as Serbia’s primary non-Western partner,” Vuksanovic wrote in The Diplomat.
At least since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Serbia has gradually replaced Russia with China as its “best friend in the East,” says the political scientist. He cites a telling example: Serbia’s President Vučić kissed the Chinese flag in gratitude for Beijing’s medical aid – medical aid from Russia was not met with the same enthusiasm. “This episode showed that Beijing had resources that Moscow did not and exposed the hidden mistrust between Serbia and Russia,” Vuksanovic says.
Serbia currently also receives military support from Beijing: Over the weekend, six Y-20 transport aircraft of the Chinese Air Force were sighted at Belgrade’s civil airport, according to state and Western media reports. They are believed to have delivered the Chinese HQ-22 surface-to-air missile system to Serbia, writes the Chinese newspaper Global Times. The weapons delivery, which was not confirmed initially, across the territory of at least two NATO member states, Turkey and Bulgaria, was considered by observers to be Beijing’s demonstration of its growing global influence.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly turned out to be a turning point for China relations in Eastern and Central Europe. The call for a reassessment of dependence on other autocratic regimes, first and foremost China, is growing louder. Hungary, however, seems to be bucking the EU trend. Orbán voted in favor of EU sanctions against Russia, but then drew a red line when it came to arms transports through Hungarian territory. During the last EU summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky explicitly reprimanded Orbán for his unclear stance.
Orbán’s behavior isolates him even further in the EU, concludes the platform China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (Choice). He is less and less able to use his connections to authoritarian regimes as a means of exerting pressure. What is remarkable in this context is the “current recalibration of Berlin’s foreign policy agenda,” Choice’s authors write. Since Germany remains Hungary’s number one economic partner, Berlin plays a special role in Budapest’s foreign policy deliberations. Germany’s position toward China thus signals how much leeway Orbán will have for his balancing act.
Guangzhou, a metropolis with a population of 16 million, is the next major Chinese city to prepare for a lockdown. The city government has already issued a long list of containment measures for the Baiyun district. Pandemic packs containing masks and rapid tests have also been distributed to households throughout the city. Elementary schools are switching to distance classes. People are now only allowed to leave the city if they present a negative test result. Most ominously, a huge quarantine facility is under construction at the Pazhou International Convention and Exhibition Center – in addition to existing isolation centers.
Many citizens of Guangzhou reacted by stockpiling. Footage and reports of the lockdown in Shanghai, where food is in short supply, prompted people to stock up as much as possible. Recent videos of empty supermarket shelves add to tensions. Meanwhile, authorities are assuring that there is enough food for everyone – and are likely to fuel mistrust.
Meanwhile, the first round of mass testing started in Guangzhou – like in Shanghai at the approach of the big lockdown. Long lines formed outside the sampling stations. And authorities already sent some districts into pre-lockdown. Similarly, the situation in Shanghai also gradually deteriorated.
This was the Guangzhou municipal government’s response to 22 confirmed Covid cases. Since the Omicron variant of Sars-CoV-2 is highly contagious, the ongoing mass testing could unearth a whole series of asymptomatic cases. These would warrant a lockdown under zero-covid logic.
Overall, there is a growing impression that other Chinese metropolises are learning from the debacle in Shanghai. While dogs of Covid-positive citizens are killed on Shanghai’s streets, Shenzhen operates a quarantine center for pets. While food distribution fails in Shanghai, Guangdong boosts its delivery drivers.
Meanwhile, disturbing reports are once again coming from Shanghai. The number of infections confirmed within a day rose to 26,087 on Monday, compared to just under 25,000 on Sunday. Some quarantine camps are described as chaotic and dirty. Party Secretary Li Qiang was openly insulted for the poor situation. The city announced district-wide relaxations over the weekend to relieve some of the pressure.
The lockdown in the overwhelmed city is marked by personal tragedies. The case of the mother of Larry Hsien Ping Lang, an economist working in Hong Kong, received widespread attention. She reportedly died in an emergency room because hospital staff had not checked on her for four hours. She could not provide a negative test. fin
He has become accustomed to the nightly strikes and the howling of sirens, says Wang Jixian. On his 38th birthday, the explosions came so close that black, oily dust settled on the windows of his top-floor apartment. Wang lives and works in the Ukrainian city of Odessa. Some media have called him the “last Chinese in Odessa”. What is certain is that within a few weeks, Wang has become one of the most recognizable Chinese in this conflict.
While his government maintains a balancing act back home to avoid upsetting Russia and continues to avoid the word “war”, Wang openly condemns Russian President Vladimir Putin as an aggressor and calls for consequences. Russia must be held accountable for its actions, and the sooner the better, Wang believes.
On his YouTube channel “Jixian Wang 我是王吉贤 这是大号“, the Beijing-born programmer speaks in his native language about the bleak atmosphere in the coastal city by the Black Sea, which Putin has been shelling with rockets and grenades for weeks. Fear and terror reign in Odessa; residents fear an invasion by Russian troops. Wang does not rule out that he, too, could die. In any case, he has already written his will and published it in one of his videos.
In his first audio-visual war logs, which he posted online shortly after the attacks began, Wang still wore a Chinese flag on his lapel. He quickly took it off, says the Beijing Union University graduate. The Chinese government’s failure to condemn the Russian attacks not only disappoints him, it disgusts him. “Chinese state media translate what Russian media reports. But if it is only a ‘special military operation,’ why do we see bombed-out housing complexes and dead civilians here? It’s so cowardly not to take your own position on this.”
With such statements, Wang has made himself persona non grata in his home country. He can no longer be found on China’s social media channels like Weibo. Chinese censors now even filter images of his face from the web using AI software, the IT specialist says. “My face is treated like porn in China. You can only see it with a VPN or ask a friend to burn it for you on DVD,” he says snarkily. “The government would love to put a bag over my head.”
In the comment sections on YouTube and Twitter, Wang receives a lot of support, but also threats from Chinese nationalists, who call him a traitor and a tool of Western powers. The fact that he works for an American company is used as evidence. Wang’s employer, software developer RegDesk, transferred him from Macedonia to Ukraine in July 2021. Back then, he already started posting videos of his everyday life, for just 36 followers. Now he has 110,000 followers, and major newspapers like the New York Times have published stories about him.
His new popularity as a political influencer doesn’t seem to faze Wang – on the contrary. On Instagram, he posts selfies with wide smiles and even sometimes bare-chested. At a time when self-censorship seems to be in the blood of many Chinese – and more and more foreigners – Wang’s open criticism of his government is already a sensation. “There are other Chinese in Ukraine. They are braver than me,” Wang says. “Some are defending their homes and families with guns.” The big difference, he says, is that they don’t show their faces. “I have a pretty face, why should I hide it?” he asks ironically and smugly.
His family in China is now also under pressure because of his videos. “But my father is not intimidated by this. Like father, like son,” Wang says and laughs. He is not afraid to return to China. “What could be more dangerous for me than missile attacks and potential nuclear attacks? I have to deal with that here every day.” Fabian Peltsch
The first steel box girder is in place. Construction of the Hongqimen Bridge began this weekend. By 2024, 76 more girders are to be added to connect the Nansha district and the city of Zhongshan. The 32-kilometer bridge is an important part of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area infrastructure project.
