How is China positioning itself on the Ukraine conflict? At present, different tendencies are getting mixed up, and one contradictory report follows the next. But on closer inspection, China follows a rational concept. One thing is certain: Xi Jinping is solely interested in China’s rise. Russia is a useful troublemaker at best, testing the resolve of the Western alliance and at the same time making itself dependent on its remaining partner in the East.
That is why Beijing is still hesitating to take a position. First, it will wait and see how the conflict unfolds. If Putin is successful, China will be on board. If things go badly for Russia, China will quickly withdraw from the project. This step is already in preparation: On Sunday, Beijing cautiously began to distance itself from Russia’s actions. However, the choice of words still leaves all options open in the short term, as our analysis shows.
In the long term, however, Xi wants to get as much out of the situation as possible for China. One of Germany’s leading experts on China’s foreign policy puts the current events into the bigger picture for us. What is happening before our eyes is not a mere war over democratic Ukraine, it is shaping the future world order, says Janka Oertel speaking to Michael Radunski. Oertel heads the Asia program at the European Council on Foreign Relations and has previously worked at the United Nations.
The standards by which we evaluate China’s interests are no longer valid, Oertel warns. We have to abandon the certainty that the leadership is primarily concerned with growth and prosperity. It has decided to accept short-term economic damage to achieve long-term political goals.
On the bright side, the buildup of a united front of European countries over the weekend also signals to Beijing: The West is not quite as divided as it has long seemed. On the downside, we should begin to prepare for a world in which China and Russia cooperate closely, Oertel said.
Another lesson to be learned from the events involves Taiwan. Oertel advises listening carefully to autocrats when they present their plans. We should try taking their word for it instead of simply assuming strategic calculations. After all, Putin said years ago that he does not consider Ukraine to be a legitimate state. And Xi Jinping has repeatedly spoken of an imminent unification with Taiwan. All of this is currently raising enormous concerns in Taipei.
Today’s guest contribution is written by the great-granddaughter of Nikita Khrushchev, the strong man of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Nina Khrushcheva is a political scientist – and exposes Vladimir Putin for a serious error. Putin believes that he has gained an ally in China by signing an agreement at the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. In fact, Khrushcheva believes China is playing the Russians off against the West. Strategists in Beijing regard Russia as corrupt and backward and intend to turn it into a vassal state. By burning all bridges to Europe, Putin is maneuvering his country into dependence on its big neighbor to the east. Thus, China could emerge tremendously more powerful from the events, according to Khrushcheva.
The war’s impact on commodity markets is also playing into Beijing’s hands. Ukraine – and now outlawed Russia – are home to deposits of metals and gasses needed for the production of chips and electronics. So here, too, the war could exacerbate the supply chain crisis and increase European economic dependence on China. These raw materials are so important for the high-tech industry that they may even have been part of Putin’s calculations to invade Ukraine, analyzes Frank Sieren.
Ms. Oertel, China claims that its policy is consistent, clear and unambiguous. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, however, it seems as if Beijing is maneuvering and avoiding taking a clear position. On the one hand, it wants to protect the territoriality and sovereignty of states; on the other hand, it refuses to condemn Russia’s actions. China has abstained from voting in the UN Security Council. What are the reasons?
To understand this, you have to go back to Putin’s visit to Beijing shortly before the Olympic Games. Back then, Xi Jinping already chose Putin’s side, well aware of what could happen. That’s what irritates me the most. And also worries me.
Do you believe Xi already signed off on a Russian invasion of Ukraine back then?
In any case, it was already on the table at the time. After everything that we know, I find it strange to believe that Xi was not aware of the dimensions the conflict could take on. And in this situation, Xi decided to issue a joint statement with Putin in which China opposed NATO’s expansion for the first time.
But China does have its own interests in Ukraine, which are not at all compatible with a Russian invasion.
Yes. And there are many voices in China, from think tanks or the research sector, that say this is not in China’s interest. But Xi apparently has bigger plans. He seems to have determined that there is an overarching Chinese interest. That is about a new world order, and short-term political and economic goals simply have to take a back seat here. That worries me because it gives the Ukraine conflict a global dimension, and suddenly it’s about the future world order.
What can we glean from China’s words?
Refusing to call the current events an invasion, for example, or understanding Russia’s “legitimate security interests”. These are very important and far-reaching formulations. At the same time, however, it is also clear that they are still deciding what to do next. Beijing needs to assess how the Americans will react, what NATO will do, where the EU and the African states will move. The difficult balancing of conflicting interests is becoming clear. It is impossible to be in favor of state sovereignty and at the same time not condemn Russia’s invasion.
What does China want then?
They want to create a narrative that says the aggression is basically coming from the US and that it is merely a defensive action on Russia’s part. This seems to be more important than the long-standing principles of its own foreign policy, namely territorial sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine.
How do you see the relationship between Putin and Xi? Are they really as close friends as they claim?
That is really hard to say. Who knows what’s going on inside their minds. It seems as if they have their very own view of the world. Their shared resentment of the West should certainly not be underestimated. They support each other in this and thus dare to take new steps. That is unsettling.
What new steps is China taking?
In the last two years, we have seen how little value China places on maintaining a good relationship with Europe or on responding to European interests to maintain Europe’s favor. There would have been plenty of opportunities to do so. But they have been deliberately or very bunglingly destroyed.
What are you thinking about?
In the pandemic, it would have taken just a bit of cooperation with the WHO or not to pursue such aggressive diplomacy afterward. The Europeans were very open to China, after all. Moreover, Donald Trump was in office. China could have used this moment strategically to move closer to Europe. And Beijing also has major economic interests in Europe, as well as major economic dependencies.
But?
But resentment about China’s behavior in and with Europe is growing steadily. Still, Beijing relentlessly acts against Lithuania – and again, that makes you think that this can’t actually be in China’s interest, to turn the whole EU against itself. But, and I think this is the crucial point: Maybe the standards by which we evaluate what is in China’s interest are no longer correct. That’s what’s happening now. We say China does have economic interests in Ukraine and with Western countries. All of that is true. But China’s leadership has apparently decided to tolerate short-term economic damage in order to pursue long-term political goals. It remains to be seen whether this calculation will change if costs continue to rise.
In the past, it has always worked: Beijing looks for a supposed weak point, it merely declares solidarity in Europe, and nothing else happens – and Beijing gets away with it. At the same time, the fairy tale of supposed unity in the West is bitterly exposed.
Yes, and even in Lithuania, this seems to have worked out again, at least in the short term. But long-term consequences are apparent. Europe is moving forward with measures and the mood has changed. I’m not sure that the assessment in Beijing is correct at this moment. If the Europeans are indeed moving closer, things could get uncomfortable for Beijing.
And you believe that’s going to happen this time?
I don’t know, but the relative unity of the West and the severity of the measures in response to the war in Ukraine hopefully send an important signal to Beijing. China is not Russia, unity would be more difficult to achieve, but one cannot ignore the current responses in Beijing.
Even if it is purely pragmatic, the relationship between China and Russia is as good as perhaps it has ever been. A problem for Europe and the West?
I wish we in Europe would quickly start thinking about what it means when China and Russia cooperate more and more closely, what kind of world that would be. The signal that both want to send: We are not isolated.
What are the implications of Russia’s actions and China’s silence for the future of Taiwan?
Taiwan is extremely worried. They are very closely observing the reaction of the West, whether they will defend Ukraine or not. This is a clear signal for Taiwan. Ukraine is very close to NATO, but it is not a NATO ally. In this situation, people in Taiwan are starting to think about what kind of alliance they have with the US, who would come to their aid in an emergency. Taiwan’s strategic importance to the US differs from that of Ukraine. But Taiwan has to look anxiously at the escalation in Ukraine. It is hard not to draw parallels. Because China is also trying to use this for its own benefit. The foundation is already being laid for a very alarming narrative.
What can Europe do? Send the frigate Bayern out again to save Taiwan?
No, that alone certainly won’t help much. But in principle, it’s about being present in the region. That is what is expected in the region. Otherwise, it is primarily a diplomatic question of what signals to send, how to keep the costs of a Chinese action as high as possible, and how to clearly and credibly communicate this.
Are you perhaps overestimating Europe in this regard?
No. But of course, this is only possible if you have the appropriate leverage. That’s why we have to integrate the Taiwan issue into our overall relationship with China. We must remain competitive and not become too dependent.
Where could Europe start? What would impress China?
Technology exports and the trade relationship in general. The fundamental issue here is whether we are taken seriously as a foreign policy player.
I fear that Berlin and Brussels are fooling themselves. Are they?
Yes. If you look at China’s behavior, it becomes clear: At present, Beijing is not taking us completely seriously. The decisive factor here is unity among the European states. As long as we are united, both on economic matters and on collective diplomacy, Europe is a strong and credible player. As soon as that is not the case, however, we have a problem.
Several times, Xi Jinping has stated very clearly that the Taiwan issue is high on his agenda.
Unfortunately, this is not taken seriously enough in Europe. The first step would be to take what is said politically seriously. When Putin says that if in doubt, I will invade Ukraine by force. We have to take that as a lesson. If Xi Jinping signals that he, too, is prepared to solve the Taiwan question through military means if need be, then that should be taken seriously. That doesn’t necessarily mean it will happen, but it would be wise to be prepared.
I don’t mean to be a pessimist, but according to the UN, one million Uyghurs are being held in Xinjiang, and nothing is happening. Treaties were to ensure Hong Kong’s independence – nothing has happened. In the South China Sea, there is even an international arbitration ruling – and China does not care about that either.
Of course, I am not saying that we will now finally take a united stand on the Taiwan issue and at least make China think twice. I can only hope that we, as Europe, will take a stronger position in conflicts that significantly affect not only our own interests, but also democracies in Asia and thus the global order.
Let me take China’s role to illustrate the problem we face in our own reasoning: What is the problem, you in the West also say that there is only one China. If we invade Taiwan, then there is no change in the status quo. There is only one China.
The argument of the status quo can no longer be maintained. The status quo has changed significantly over the past seventy years, and this status quo argument no longer works. That is why we must also ask ourselves whether our current political approach is still in line with the times or whether we are now dealing with two very different Chinas and must also adopt a clearer position here.
The Chinese government continues not to take a clear position on the Ukraine war. However, on Sunday, critical voices toward Russia picked up in various Chinese statements. “Present situation in Russia-Ukraine is something China doesn’t want to see,” Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in telephone calls with his European counterparts. “The safety of ordinary people’s lives and properties should be effectively safeguarded, and in particular, large-scale humanitarian crises have to be prevented.”
Earlier, head of state Xi Jinping urged Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate with Ukraine. China also abstained from voting in the United Nations Security Council when it came to condemning the attack. Russia had to veto to prevent the resolution.
However, the nature of Wang’s discussions with the Europeans remained ambiguous. The version published by China’s news agency Xinhua about his call with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock focused on a different aspect than perceived by the EU: “China does not approve of solving problems by sanctions, and even more strongly opposes unilateral sanctions not based on international law.” “China is always opposed to wilfully citing the Chapter VII in Security Council resolutions to authorize the use of force and sanctions.”
Given the unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, these words at first sound like Wang is following Russia’s narrative of self-defense against Nazis and an aggressive West. He also attributed Russia’s actions to a too-rapid NATO expansion. But at the same time, Wang accepted the Atlantic alliance’s role as a decisive force in Western Europe: “China supports NATO and the EU to restart a security dialogue with Russia.” He hinted that China could act as a mediator here.
China remains Russia’s best chance to undermine the increasingly severe sanctions imposed by the West and Japan. Over the weekend, the latter had moved to cut Russia off from international payment flows and air travel. This effectively isolates the country. Such sanctions will noticeably reduce the standard of living of the Russian population.
China could step in as a trading partner to some extent (China.Table reported). But so far, China has not indicated that it will provide economic aid on a large scale. Experts, therefore, do not assume at present that China will also allow itself to become a pariah by forming a close alliance with Russia. “Russia is an ally, but being seen to take its side would hasten China’s decoupling from the West,” says economist Mark Williams of Capital Economics in London. China is more likely to secretly support Russia without openly undermining sanctions. The importance of trade with the US, the EU and Japan far exceeds the importance of trade with Russia for China.
The US government shares this assessment. “All indications are that China is not rushing to help,” Reuters quotes a senior official in Washington as saying. China is apparently worried about harming its reputation if it openly backs Russia. There was some confirmation of this at the end of last week based on the behavior of large state-owned banks. They limited their foreign trade loans to Russian commodity companies, citing the unclear market situation.
At the same time, there are first indications of low-key help from China’s private sector, which also receives instructions from the government. Ride-hailing service app DiDi had originally planned to withdraw from the Russian market. On Sunday, however, the company backed down and announced the continuation of its service in Russia after all. This sudden change of plans sparked speculations that Beijing pulled the strings here. DiDi had originally based its planned withdrawal on “changing market conditions and other challenges” as a result of the sanctions imposed by the West.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to think that, by signing an apparent alliance agreement with Chinese President Xi Jinping on February 4 in Beijing, he has pulled off the equivalent of US President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972. But just as the Soviet Union was the big loser of the Sino-American rapprochement of 1972, Russia is likely to turn out to be the big loser from the new Putin-Xi agreement.
Nixon’s visit with Mao Zedong was a pivotal moment in the history of the Cold War, with a greater impact on its course than even the Cuban Missile Crisis. At the time, relations between China and the Soviet Union had become far more embittered than most of the world, including most Americans, ever realized.
Relations between the two communist giants began to decay significantly after Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 “secret speech,” delivered to a closed session of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which he denounced Stalin. That speech, together with Khrushchev’s broader de-Stalinization campaign, riled Mao, who decried it as revisionism – likely fearing that one day he might face similar condemnation.
Ideological and policy differences led to a breakdown of political relations, culminating in the Sino-Soviet split of 1960. Nine years later, Soviet and Chinese forces engaged in seven months of savage fighting along the Ussuri River, near Manchuria. All-out war was barely averted.
When Nixon headed to China, he sought to exploit this antagonism between the world’s two leading communist powers. But neither he nor his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, could have predicted just how successful he would be. To Leonid Brezhnev’s stagnant and stodgy Kremlin, China seemed to have switched sides in the Cold War.
Faced with the Bismarckian nightmare of a two-front war against NATO in the West and an embittered China in the East, Brezhnev quickly warmed to Kissinger’s notion of détente between the United States and the USSR. He even went so far as to sign the Helsinki Accords, which enabled the West to challenge Soviet totalitarianism on human-rights grounds.
Kissinger, it is worth noting, deserves less credit for these achievements than he would repeatedly claim; Nixon was calling for an opening to China since before he became president in 1969. In any case, Putin may well believe that he has replicated America’s diplomatic coup. By deepening ties with China, Putin seems to think that he has secured an invaluable ally in his struggle against the West.
But China’s alienation from the US had been intensifying for almost a decade – a trend that former US President Donald Trump accelerated, and that President Joe Biden has done little to mitigate. Amid growing antagonism with the West, it is China that wanted to get Russia on its side, not vice versa – and not as an equal partner.
To be sure, despite its oft-repeated mantra that national sovereignty and territorial integrity are sacrosanct, China has now effectively backed Putin’s military build-up along Ukraine’s borders, urging the West to take Russia’s “security concerns” seriously and affirming its opposition to NATO enlargement. But this probably does not mean that China will back Russia in any struggle with the US and NATO.
Instead, Xi did what was needed to lock Russia into a vassal-like dependency on China. And Putin chose to walk straight into his trap, thinking that partnership with Xi would help him in his confrontation with the West.
What could be better for China than a Russian economy completely cut off from the West? All the natural gas that does not flow westward to Europe could flow eastward to an energy-hungry China. All Siberia’s mineral wealth, which Russia has required Western capital and expertise to exploit, would be available only to China, as would major new infrastructure projects in Russia.
Anyone who doubts the abandon with which Xi will exploit Russia’s isolation need only look to the actions of Xi’s predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. At first, relations appeared warm. Putin signed a Treaty of Friendship with China in 2001. And with Russia financially isolated, China provided a $6 billion loan in late 2004, so that Russia’s state-owned oil company Rosneft could finance the purchase of the largest production unit of Yukos Oil Company (a firm that Putin’s government would succeed in bankrupting in 2006).
In 2005, however, in a move many believe was directly tied to the Yukos loan, China used its leverage over Russia to compel the Kremlin to return some 337 square kilometers (130 square miles) of disputed lands, in exchange for China’s withdrawal of other territorial claims. But Putin seems to be ignoring that China’s leaders and people view Russia as a corrupt country, which stole more Chinese territory in the nineteenth century than any other. Just two years ago, I witnessed their disdain firsthand when taking a ferry across the Amur river from Blagoveshchensk in Russia to Heihe, a small Chinese town. The local Chinese merchants openly mocked the Russians as they sold them cheap phones and knockoff furs.
China will neither risk its own prosperity by openly challenging the US in defense of Russia, nor prop up Russia’s economy by investing on the scale needed to offset the impact of the mighty sanctions the West will impose if Putin launches an invasion of Ukraine. Instead, China will do the bare minimum to enable Russia to sustain its confrontation with the West, and thus divert the West’s attention from the strategic challenge posed by China itself. That bare minimum of Chinese assistance may be just enough to keep Putin in the Kremlin, which is all he cares about. But the Kremlin’s master will be ruling over a Russian economy that is slowly being bled white.
Nina L. Khrushcheva, Professor of International Affairs at The New School, is the co-author (with Jeffrey Tayler), most recently, of In Putin’s Footsteps: Searching for the Soul of an Empire Across Russia’s Eleven Time Zones (St. Martin’s Press, 2019).
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2022.
www.project-syndicate.org
Choleric boss, lousy co-workers, crappy paycheck? Time to change the feeding trough! Originally, the Chinese horse term was 跳槽 tiàocáo (literally “to jump to another trough”), namely when disloyal hoofed animals simply defected to another owner where the food was more bountiful. In the meantime, the metaphor has become a common synonym for changing jobs (because tastier conditions beckon elsewhere). Especially after the Chinese New Year, Chinese employees like to take the plunge. By then, the Spring Festival bonus (a counterpart to our Christmas bonus) has already been cashed in as a salary cherry on the cake. So it’s a good time to look for greener pastures.
It’s no wonder that around Chunjie time, commuters are bombarded with large-scale advertising messages from various job portals at bus and subway stops in China’s metropolises. Among the industry’s bandwagons are “Boss Direct Application” (Boss 直聘 Boss zhípìn – slogan: “If you’re looking for a job, talk directly to the boss” 找工作，直接和老板谈 Zhǎo gōngzuò, zhíjiē hé lǎobǎn tán), “Smart Connection” (智联招聘 zhìlián zhāopìn) and “Job Hunters” (猎聘 lièpìn).
By the way, in China, when you change jobs, you don’t throw in the proverbial towel, but “lay down the carrying bar” (撂挑子 liào tiāozi). For example, if one feels exploited as a “work mutt” (上班狗 shàngbāngǒu) or “overtime dog” (加班狗 jiābāngǒu) – the sarcastic self-description of overworked Chinese white-collar workers. Those who are lucky do not have to look for themselves, but are “hit on” by a headhunter (猎头 liètóu). And the following is indeed called like that: “digging at the foundation of a wall” (挖墙脚 wā qiángjiǎo) or “digging someone up” (挖人 wā rén) are Chinese expressions for poaching human resources from the competition.
On the other hand, anyone who merely “pats fish” at work (you may recall: that was the synonym for “taking it easy at work”) runs the risk of being fired into fried squid. Indeed, 炒鱿鱼 chǎo yóuyú (“to fry squid”) means (depending on the context) “to get fired” or “to quit your job.” The expression is said to have its origins in a time when people still arrived at the workplace with their own bedding, since they also conveniently lodged on site. So anyone who packed up his things – that is, “rolled up the bedding” (卷铺盖 juǎn pūgài) – left or was left. Therefore, “to roll up the bedding” became a winged word. This, in turn, is said to have reminded some people of the little arms of squid that curl up when fried. And so this even more indirect description gradually became a euphemism for the unpleasant occurrence of losing one’s job.
If you don’t want to be fried or change the feeding trough, the last option might be to pat the horses’ bottoms in the boss’s office. 拍马屁 pāi mǎpì (“to pat the horse’s butt”) means “to crawl up someone’s ass” in German (linguistically not much better). So if you are unhappy with your job and seek change, don’t spare the horses!
Verena Menzel runs the language school New Chinese.
How is China positioning itself on the Ukraine conflict? At present, different tendencies are getting mixed up, and one contradictory report follows the next. But on closer inspection, China follows a rational concept. One thing is certain: Xi Jinping is solely interested in China’s rise. Russia is a useful troublemaker at best, testing the resolve of the Western alliance and at the same time making itself dependent on its remaining partner in the East.
That is why Beijing is still hesitating to take a position. First, it will wait and see how the conflict unfolds. If Putin is successful, China will be on board. If things go badly for Russia, China will quickly withdraw from the project. This step is already in preparation: On Sunday, Beijing cautiously began to distance itself from Russia’s actions. However, the choice of words still leaves all options open in the short term, as our analysis shows.
In the long term, however, Xi wants to get as much out of the situation as possible for China. One of Germany’s leading experts on China’s foreign policy puts the current events into the bigger picture for us. What is happening before our eyes is not a mere war over democratic Ukraine, it is shaping the future world order, says Janka Oertel speaking to Michael Radunski. Oertel heads the Asia program at the European Council on Foreign Relations and has previously worked at the United Nations.
The standards by which we evaluate China’s interests are no longer valid, Oertel warns. We have to abandon the certainty that the leadership is primarily concerned with growth and prosperity. It has decided to accept short-term economic damage to achieve long-term political goals.
On the bright side, the buildup of a united front of European countries over the weekend also signals to Beijing: The West is not quite as divided as it has long seemed. On the downside, we should begin to prepare for a world in which China and Russia cooperate closely, Oertel said.
Another lesson to be learned from the events involves Taiwan. Oertel advises listening carefully to autocrats when they present their plans. We should try taking their word for it instead of simply assuming strategic calculations. After all, Putin said years ago that he does not consider Ukraine to be a legitimate state. And Xi Jinping has repeatedly spoken of an imminent unification with Taiwan. All of this is currently raising enormous concerns in Taipei.
Today’s guest contribution is written by the great-granddaughter of Nikita Khrushchev, the strong man of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Nina Khrushcheva is a political scientist – and exposes Vladimir Putin for a serious error. Putin believes that he has gained an ally in China by signing an agreement at the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. In fact, Khrushcheva believes China is playing the Russians off against the West. Strategists in Beijing regard Russia as corrupt and backward and intend to turn it into a vassal state. By burning all bridges to Europe, Putin is maneuvering his country into dependence on its big neighbor to the east. Thus, China could emerge tremendously more powerful from the events, according to Khrushcheva.
The war’s impact on commodity markets is also playing into Beijing’s hands. Ukraine – and now outlawed Russia – are home to deposits of metals and gasses needed for the production of chips and electronics. So here, too, the war could exacerbate the supply chain crisis and increase European economic dependence on China. These raw materials are so important for the high-tech industry that they may even have been part of Putin’s calculations to invade Ukraine, analyzes Frank Sieren.
Ms. Oertel, China claims that its policy is consistent, clear and unambiguous. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, however, it seems as if Beijing is maneuvering and avoiding taking a clear position. On the one hand, it wants to protect the territoriality and sovereignty of states; on the other hand, it refuses to condemn Russia’s actions. China has abstained from voting in the UN Security Council. What are the reasons?
To understand this, you have to go back to Putin’s visit to Beijing shortly before the Olympic Games. Back then, Xi Jinping already chose Putin’s side, well aware of what could happen. That’s what irritates me the most. And also worries me.
Do you believe Xi already signed off on a Russian invasion of Ukraine back then?
In any case, it was already on the table at the time. After everything that we know, I find it strange to believe that Xi was not aware of the dimensions the conflict could take on. And in this situation, Xi decided to issue a joint statement with Putin in which China opposed NATO’s expansion for the first time.
But China does have its own interests in Ukraine, which are not at all compatible with a Russian invasion.
Yes. And there are many voices in China, from think tanks or the research sector, that say this is not in China’s interest. But Xi apparently has bigger plans. He seems to have determined that there is an overarching Chinese interest. That is about a new world order, and short-term political and economic goals simply have to take a back seat here. That worries me because it gives the Ukraine conflict a global dimension, and suddenly it’s about the future world order.
What can we glean from China’s words?
Refusing to call the current events an invasion, for example, or understanding Russia’s “legitimate security interests”. These are very important and far-reaching formulations. At the same time, however, it is also clear that they are still deciding what to do next. Beijing needs to assess how the Americans will react, what NATO will do, where the EU and the African states will move. The difficult balancing of conflicting interests is becoming clear. It is impossible to be in favor of state sovereignty and at the same time not condemn Russia’s invasion.
What does China want then?
They want to create a narrative that says the aggression is basically coming from the US and that it is merely a defensive action on Russia’s part. This seems to be more important than the long-standing principles of its own foreign policy, namely territorial sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine.
How do you see the relationship between Putin and Xi? Are they really as close friends as they claim?
That is really hard to say. Who knows what’s going on inside their minds. It seems as if they have their very own view of the world. Their shared resentment of the West should certainly not be underestimated. They support each other in this and thus dare to take new steps. That is unsettling.
What new steps is China taking?
In the last two years, we have seen how little value China places on maintaining a good relationship with Europe or on responding to European interests to maintain Europe’s favor. There would have been plenty of opportunities to do so. But they have been deliberately or very bunglingly destroyed.
What are you thinking about?
In the pandemic, it would have taken just a bit of cooperation with the WHO or not to pursue such aggressive diplomacy afterward. The Europeans were very open to China, after all. Moreover, Donald Trump was in office. China could have used this moment strategically to move closer to Europe. And Beijing also has major economic interests in Europe, as well as major economic dependencies.
But?
But resentment about China’s behavior in and with Europe is growing steadily. Still, Beijing relentlessly acts against Lithuania – and again, that makes you think that this can’t actually be in China’s interest, to turn the whole EU against itself. But, and I think this is the crucial point: Maybe the standards by which we evaluate what is in China’s interest are no longer correct. That’s what’s happening now. We say China does have economic interests in Ukraine and with Western countries. All of that is true. But China’s leadership has apparently decided to tolerate short-term economic damage in order to pursue long-term political goals. It remains to be seen whether this calculation will change if costs continue to rise.
In the past, it has always worked: Beijing looks for a supposed weak point, it merely declares solidarity in Europe, and nothing else happens – and Beijing gets away with it. At the same time, the fairy tale of supposed unity in the West is bitterly exposed.
Yes, and even in Lithuania, this seems to have worked out again, at least in the short term. But long-term consequences are apparent. Europe is moving forward with measures and the mood has changed. I’m not sure that the assessment in Beijing is correct at this moment. If the Europeans are indeed moving closer, things could get uncomfortable for Beijing.
And you believe that’s going to happen this time?
I don’t know, but the relative unity of the West and the severity of the measures in response to the war in Ukraine hopefully send an important signal to Beijing. China is not Russia, unity would be more difficult to achieve, but one cannot ignore the current responses in Beijing.
Even if it is purely pragmatic, the relationship between China and Russia is as good as perhaps it has ever been. A problem for Europe and the West?
I wish we in Europe would quickly start thinking about what it means when China and Russia cooperate more and more closely, what kind of world that would be. The signal that both want to send: We are not isolated.
What are the implications of Russia’s actions and China’s silence for the future of Taiwan?
Taiwan is extremely worried. They are very closely observing the reaction of the West, whether they will defend Ukraine or not. This is a clear signal for Taiwan. Ukraine is very close to NATO, but it is not a NATO ally. In this situation, people in Taiwan are starting to think about what kind of alliance they have with the US, who would come to their aid in an emergency. Taiwan’s strategic importance to the US differs from that of Ukraine. But Taiwan has to look anxiously at the escalation in Ukraine. It is hard not to draw parallels. Because China is also trying to use this for its own benefit. The foundation is already being laid for a very alarming narrative.
What can Europe do? Send the frigate Bayern out again to save Taiwan?
No, that alone certainly won’t help much. But in principle, it’s about being present in the region. That is what is expected in the region. Otherwise, it is primarily a diplomatic question of what signals to send, how to keep the costs of a Chinese action as high as possible, and how to clearly and credibly communicate this.
Are you perhaps overestimating Europe in this regard?
No. But of course, this is only possible if you have the appropriate leverage. That’s why we have to integrate the Taiwan issue into our overall relationship with China. We must remain competitive and not become too dependent.
Where could Europe start? What would impress China?
Technology exports and the trade relationship in general. The fundamental issue here is whether we are taken seriously as a foreign policy player.
I fear that Berlin and Brussels are fooling themselves. Are they?
Yes. If you look at China’s behavior, it becomes clear: At present, Beijing is not taking us completely seriously. The decisive factor here is unity among the European states. As long as we are united, both on economic matters and on collective diplomacy, Europe is a strong and credible player. As soon as that is not the case, however, we have a problem.
Several times, Xi Jinping has stated very clearly that the Taiwan issue is high on his agenda.
Unfortunately, this is not taken seriously enough in Europe. The first step would be to take what is said politically seriously. When Putin says that if in doubt, I will invade Ukraine by force. We have to take that as a lesson. If Xi Jinping signals that he, too, is prepared to solve the Taiwan question through military means if need be, then that should be taken seriously. That doesn’t necessarily mean it will happen, but it would be wise to be prepared.
I don’t mean to be a pessimist, but according to the UN, one million Uyghurs are being held in Xinjiang, and nothing is happening. Treaties were to ensure Hong Kong’s independence – nothing has happened. In the South China Sea, there is even an international arbitration ruling – and China does not care about that either.
Of course, I am not saying that we will now finally take a united stand on the Taiwan issue and at least make China think twice. I can only hope that we, as Europe, will take a stronger position in conflicts that significantly affect not only our own interests, but also democracies in Asia and thus the global order.
Let me take China’s role to illustrate the problem we face in our own reasoning: What is the problem, you in the West also say that there is only one China. If we invade Taiwan, then there is no change in the status quo. There is only one China.
The argument of the status quo can no longer be maintained. The status quo has changed significantly over the past seventy years, and this status quo argument no longer works. That is why we must also ask ourselves whether our current political approach is still in line with the times or whether we are now dealing with two very different Chinas and must also adopt a clearer position here.
The Chinese government continues not to take a clear position on the Ukraine war. However, on Sunday, critical voices toward Russia picked up in various Chinese statements. “Present situation in Russia-Ukraine is something China doesn’t want to see,” Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in telephone calls with his European counterparts. “The safety of ordinary people’s lives and properties should be effectively safeguarded, and in particular, large-scale humanitarian crises have to be prevented.”
Earlier, head of state Xi Jinping urged Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate with Ukraine. China also abstained from voting in the United Nations Security Council when it came to condemning the attack. Russia had to veto to prevent the resolution.
However, the nature of Wang’s discussions with the Europeans remained ambiguous. The version published by China’s news agency Xinhua about his call with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock focused on a different aspect than perceived by the EU: “China does not approve of solving problems by sanctions, and even more strongly opposes unilateral sanctions not based on international law.” “China is always opposed to wilfully citing the Chapter VII in Security Council resolutions to authorize the use of force and sanctions.”
Given the unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, these words at first sound like Wang is following Russia’s narrative of self-defense against Nazis and an aggressive West. He also attributed Russia’s actions to a too-rapid NATO expansion. But at the same time, Wang accepted the Atlantic alliance’s role as a decisive force in Western Europe: “China supports NATO and the EU to restart a security dialogue with Russia.” He hinted that China could act as a mediator here.
China remains Russia’s best chance to undermine the increasingly severe sanctions imposed by the West and Japan. Over the weekend, the latter had moved to cut Russia off from international payment flows and air travel. This effectively isolates the country. Such sanctions will noticeably reduce the standard of living of the Russian population.
China could step in as a trading partner to some extent (China.Table reported). But so far, China has not indicated that it will provide economic aid on a large scale. Experts, therefore, do not assume at present that China will also allow itself to become a pariah by forming a close alliance with Russia. “Russia is an ally, but being seen to take its side would hasten China’s decoupling from the West,” says economist Mark Williams of Capital Economics in London. China is more likely to secretly support Russia without openly undermining sanctions. The importance of trade with the US, the EU and Japan far exceeds the importance of trade with Russia for China.
The US government shares this assessment. “All indications are that China is not rushing to help,” Reuters quotes a senior official in Washington as saying. China is apparently worried about harming its reputation if it openly backs Russia. There was some confirmation of this at the end of last week based on the behavior of large state-owned banks. They limited their foreign trade loans to Russian commodity companies, citing the unclear market situation.
At the same time, there are first indications of low-key help from China’s private sector, which also receives instructions from the government. Ride-hailing service app DiDi had originally planned to withdraw from the Russian market. On Sunday, however, the company backed down and announced the continuation of its service in Russia after all. This sudden change of plans sparked speculations that Beijing pulled the strings here. DiDi had originally based its planned withdrawal on “changing market conditions and other challenges” as a result of the sanctions imposed by the West.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to think that, by signing an apparent alliance agreement with Chinese President Xi Jinping on February 4 in Beijing, he has pulled off the equivalent of US President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972. But just as the Soviet Union was the big loser of the Sino-American rapprochement of 1972, Russia is likely to turn out to be the big loser from the new Putin-Xi agreement.
Nixon’s visit with Mao Zedong was a pivotal moment in the history of the Cold War, with a greater impact on its course than even the Cuban Missile Crisis. At the time, relations between China and the Soviet Union had become far more embittered than most of the world, including most Americans, ever realized.
Relations between the two communist giants began to decay significantly after Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 “secret speech,” delivered to a closed session of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which he denounced Stalin. That speech, together with Khrushchev’s broader de-Stalinization campaign, riled Mao, who decried it as revisionism – likely fearing that one day he might face similar condemnation.
Ideological and policy differences led to a breakdown of political relations, culminating in the Sino-Soviet split of 1960. Nine years later, Soviet and Chinese forces engaged in seven months of savage fighting along the Ussuri River, near Manchuria. All-out war was barely averted.
When Nixon headed to China, he sought to exploit this antagonism between the world’s two leading communist powers. But neither he nor his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, could have predicted just how successful he would be. To Leonid Brezhnev’s stagnant and stodgy Kremlin, China seemed to have switched sides in the Cold War.
Faced with the Bismarckian nightmare of a two-front war against NATO in the West and an embittered China in the East, Brezhnev quickly warmed to Kissinger’s notion of détente between the United States and the USSR. He even went so far as to sign the Helsinki Accords, which enabled the West to challenge Soviet totalitarianism on human-rights grounds.
Kissinger, it is worth noting, deserves less credit for these achievements than he would repeatedly claim; Nixon was calling for an opening to China since before he became president in 1969. In any case, Putin may well believe that he has replicated America’s diplomatic coup. By deepening ties with China, Putin seems to think that he has secured an invaluable ally in his struggle against the West.
But China’s alienation from the US had been intensifying for almost a decade – a trend that former US President Donald Trump accelerated, and that President Joe Biden has done little to mitigate. Amid growing antagonism with the West, it is China that wanted to get Russia on its side, not vice versa – and not as an equal partner.
To be sure, despite its oft-repeated mantra that national sovereignty and territorial integrity are sacrosanct, China has now effectively backed Putin’s military build-up along Ukraine’s borders, urging the West to take Russia’s “security concerns” seriously and affirming its opposition to NATO enlargement. But this probably does not mean that China will back Russia in any struggle with the US and NATO.
Instead, Xi did what was needed to lock Russia into a vassal-like dependency on China. And Putin chose to walk straight into his trap, thinking that partnership with Xi would help him in his confrontation with the West.
What could be better for China than a Russian economy completely cut off from the West? All the natural gas that does not flow westward to Europe could flow eastward to an energy-hungry China. All Siberia’s mineral wealth, which Russia has required Western capital and expertise to exploit, would be available only to China, as would major new infrastructure projects in Russia.
Anyone who doubts the abandon with which Xi will exploit Russia’s isolation need only look to the actions of Xi’s predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. At first, relations appeared warm. Putin signed a Treaty of Friendship with China in 2001. And with Russia financially isolated, China provided a $6 billion loan in late 2004, so that Russia’s state-owned oil company Rosneft could finance the purchase of the largest production unit of Yukos Oil Company (a firm that Putin’s government would succeed in bankrupting in 2006).
In 2005, however, in a move many believe was directly tied to the Yukos loan, China used its leverage over Russia to compel the Kremlin to return some 337 square kilometers (130 square miles) of disputed lands, in exchange for China’s withdrawal of other territorial claims. But Putin seems to be ignoring that China’s leaders and people view Russia as a corrupt country, which stole more Chinese territory in the nineteenth century than any other. Just two years ago, I witnessed their disdain firsthand when taking a ferry across the Amur river from Blagoveshchensk in Russia to Heihe, a small Chinese town. The local Chinese merchants openly mocked the Russians as they sold them cheap phones and knockoff furs.
China will neither risk its own prosperity by openly challenging the US in defense of Russia, nor prop up Russia’s economy by investing on the scale needed to offset the impact of the mighty sanctions the West will impose if Putin launches an invasion of Ukraine. Instead, China will do the bare minimum to enable Russia to sustain its confrontation with the West, and thus divert the West’s attention from the strategic challenge posed by China itself. That bare minimum of Chinese assistance may be just enough to keep Putin in the Kremlin, which is all he cares about. But the Kremlin’s master will be ruling over a Russian economy that is slowly being bled white.
Nina L. Khrushcheva, Professor of International Affairs at The New School, is the co-author (with Jeffrey Tayler), most recently, of In Putin’s Footsteps: Searching for the Soul of an Empire Across Russia’s Eleven Time Zones (St. Martin’s Press, 2019).
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2022.
www.project-syndicate.org
Choleric boss, lousy co-workers, crappy paycheck? Time to change the feeding trough! Originally, the Chinese horse term was 跳槽 tiàocáo (literally “to jump to another trough”), namely when disloyal hoofed animals simply defected to another owner where the food was more bountiful. In the meantime, the metaphor has become a common synonym for changing jobs (because tastier conditions beckon elsewhere). Especially after the Chinese New Year, Chinese employees like to take the plunge. By then, the Spring Festival bonus (a counterpart to our Christmas bonus) has already been cashed in as a salary cherry on the cake. So it’s a good time to look for greener pastures.
It’s no wonder that around Chunjie time, commuters are bombarded with large-scale advertising messages from various job portals at bus and subway stops in China’s metropolises. Among the industry’s bandwagons are “Boss Direct Application” (Boss 直聘 Boss zhípìn – slogan: “If you’re looking for a job, talk directly to the boss” 找工作，直接和老板谈 Zhǎo gōngzuò, zhíjiē hé lǎobǎn tán), “Smart Connection” (智联招聘 zhìlián zhāopìn) and “Job Hunters” (猎聘 lièpìn).
By the way, in China, when you change jobs, you don’t throw in the proverbial towel, but “lay down the carrying bar” (撂挑子 liào tiāozi). For example, if one feels exploited as a “work mutt” (上班狗 shàngbāngǒu) or “overtime dog” (加班狗 jiābāngǒu) – the sarcastic self-description of overworked Chinese white-collar workers. Those who are lucky do not have to look for themselves, but are “hit on” by a headhunter (猎头 liètóu). And the following is indeed called like that: “digging at the foundation of a wall” (挖墙脚 wā qiángjiǎo) or “digging someone up” (挖人 wā rén) are Chinese expressions for poaching human resources from the competition.
On the other hand, anyone who merely “pats fish” at work (you may recall: that was the synonym for “taking it easy at work”) runs the risk of being fired into fried squid. Indeed, 炒鱿鱼 chǎo yóuyú (“to fry squid”) means (depending on the context) “to get fired” or “to quit your job.” The expression is said to have its origins in a time when people still arrived at the workplace with their own bedding, since they also conveniently lodged on site. So anyone who packed up his things – that is, “rolled up the bedding” (卷铺盖 juǎn pūgài) – left or was left. Therefore, “to roll up the bedding” became a winged word. This, in turn, is said to have reminded some people of the little arms of squid that curl up when fried. And so this even more indirect description gradually became a euphemism for the unpleasant occurrence of losing one’s job.
If you don’t want to be fried or change the feeding trough, the last option might be to pat the horses’ bottoms in the boss’s office. 拍马屁 pāi mǎpì (“to pat the horse’s butt”) means “to crawl up someone’s ass” in German (linguistically not much better). So if you are unhappy with your job and seek change, don’t spare the horses!
Verena Menzel runs the language school New Chinese.
