A deep, fact-based, and as balanced as possible coverage of the People’s Republic in the USA – that was the goal of “The China Project”. It has failed. A few weeks ago, editor-in-chief Jeremy Goldkorn had to announce its closure. Prior to that, both political sides had taken shots at the platform. Critics from the USA and China leveled serious accusations against the ambitious project. In an interview with Fabian Peltsch, Goldkorn talks about his experiences, the anti-China atmosphere in the USA, and why he is considering completely turning away from the topic. Apparently, it takes too much effort to maintain a differentiated perspective.
A differentiated view might also do good for the classification of China as a developing country. The largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world tenaciously insists on this status, especially when it comes to climate finance. Industrialized countries must pay for global climate action while developing countries even have a claim to assistance. However, at the ongoing COP28 climate conference, it may not be so easy for China to maintain this narrative, writes Christiane Kuehl. Not only traditional industrialized countries but also small vulnerable island states have long been demanding that emerging economies like China do more.
Many consider the end of The China Project a huge loss for nuanced reporting on China in the English-speaking world. What do you think are the dangers of increasingly under-complex coverage of the People’s Republic for public discourse?
In some ways, there is more in-depth information about China in foreign media than there was ten years ago: The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times all have big China teams, and China is frequently at the top of the major news providers’ home pages. On the other hand, it is very difficult for foreign journalists to operate in China, and just a few are doing so now. And journalists in China face constant surveillance and harassment, at the same time as the Chinese government is blocking more and more online sources of information.
Do you find the current media coverage of China by the major media houses balanced enough?
Much of the China reporting follows only buzzy, current topics that appeal to the average Western reader, and the stories are quite similar throughout different media publishers. In the US, the content follows mostly the conventional wisdom of Washington D.C. and Wall Street, and this isn’t challenged much. We wanted to do it differently. We wanted to report more nuance, and present a wider range of viewpoints – both those that are very hard on China and those that are sympathetic.
Although you attempted to provide nuanced reporting, you were caught in the political crossfire from both sides. Did it come as a surprise to you to be attacked by hawks like US Republican Marco Rubio for being too pro-China while being simultaneously blocked by the Chinese government?
I was actually quite surprised that we weren’t blocked earlier in China than 2018. What I didn’t expect was the vicious attack that we experienced in the spring of 2022. It started with a blog post by a nationalist blogger on WeChat about a report we did on Chinese netizens’ reactions on the Ukraine war. Then a number of stories all over the state media followed up with stories that we were intentionally trying to make China look bad. Some commenters said that we want to force regime change and that we were funded by the US military.
Marco Rubio accused her team of being agents of the Chinese government.
The Marco Rubio thing came out of the blue. We had a former employer that filed a so-called “whistleblower complaint” against us. I wasn’t expecting anything like that. It seemed so removed from reality and so far off of any legitimate critique of us. The idea that we were somehow controlled or paid by the Communist Party seemed outrageous to me, but I shouldn’t have been surprised. The atmosphere in the United States right now is so reflexively anti-China. It’s literally the only thing in this country that the two big parties can agree on: this idea that we have to get tough on China. Even local politicians in places like Tennessee do campaigns with slogans about “combatting China.” As if there weren’t problems that really concerned their people like potholes in the streets or opioid addiction.
Was this the reason you had to ultimately shut down The China Project?
We were an investment-driven online business. We were expecting a chunk of money, one specific investment, and nothing led us to believe it was in question. But this person changed their mind. The investor lost the appetite for risk and we seemed to be too risky politically to get involved. It all happened very quickly and we sadly realized that without that money, we would be facing debt that we wouldn’t be able to pay back, like salaries and freelance payments.
In your farewell post, you also mentioned high legal costs as the reason for shutting down. What kind of legal disputes did you have to fight?
The so-called whistleblower report raised some very serious allegations. It was prepared by a law firm that is quite famous in Washington D.C., led by a former CIA guy. So we were pretty scared. We could be accused of serious crimes like acting as agents of a foreign power. These allegations could have opened us up to national security charges.
But worse for us as a business, potential investors were also very spooked: Who wants to invest in something that can potentially get in trouble with the government? It was hanging over our heads and I think that’s what ultimately led to said investor not to invest.
How did you feel about the many messages you received from readers after announcing the end of The China Project?
It was a bit like attending my own funeral. Most people said nice things and words of support. That was very gratifying. Despite the nice messages, it is not realistic for us to go on as a company. If there was less political hostility between China and the US, it would have easier to get money and subscribers. Better relations between China and the rest of the world would have helped too.
Do you already know which projects and formats will continue and in what form?
I think the Sinica podcast with Kaiser Kuo will find a way to be continued. I also hope that some of our editors and journalists will continue writing about China. There’s a generation of freelancers that we helped to nurture. Some of them have already found new jobs in other media houses. For myself I haven’t had the chance to carefully think what’s next for me. To be honest, I needed a break anyway.
Will you continue to write about China?
Maybe I will move away from this topic. It has become a difficult space to report on. You constantly write about horrible things in China and at the same time face this mindless hostility towards the country on the other side of the Pacific. I often feel that I am stuck in the middle. That is exhausting. It makes me think that maybe I should write about a country like Bhutan or Jamaica instead.
Jeremy Goldkorn (Chinese: 金玉米; Jīn Yùmǐ) was born in Johannesburg. He moved to China in 1995, where he founded the platform Danwei, which covered Chinese media, markets, politics and business and was acquired by the Financial Times in 2013. Goldkorn developed the website “The China Project” and was editor-in-chief of the platform, which specialized in in-depth analysis, until its closure in November 2023. He has lived in Nashville, Tennessee, since 2015.
Is China a developing country or not? This question already sparked controversy at COP27 in Egypt. And it also came to the fore at COP28 from the very beginning. After all, a lot of money is at stake: Developed countries have to make a financial contribution toward global climate action while developing countries are entitled to aid. At the start of the COP, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was the first country that did not belong to the Annex I countries of the Framework Convention – i.e., countries already considered developed countries in 1992 – to make a climate finance pledge. Instead, it is one of the countries that can still call itself a developing country when it comes to climate action.
The UAE’s pledge of 100 million euros for the new loss and damage fund (LDF), intended to compensate for damage in poor countries, highlights how outdated the categorizations of 1992 are. For instance, the EU calls on “non-traditional” donor countries, which have become richer since 1992 and could now take on more responsibility for climate financing: Saudi Arabia, South Korea – and, above all, China.
Despite its rapid development, however, China insists on its positions as a developing country. This is in line with the Communist Party’s self-perception. And it is financially advantageous. After all, developing countries are entitled to privileges in climate action that save them a lot of money – according to the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” The fact that China still wants to be seen as an equal partner on the global stage to its rival, the United States, is not perceived as a contradiction in Beijing.
On Saturday, the climate delegations from both countries spent hours together, with the two climate envoys, Xie Zhenhua and John Kerry, also joining in. Their cooperation is crucial to the COP’s success. At a press conference on Saturday, Xie said that he hoped for a “correct future direction with good vibes and the greatest inclusiveness, so that everyone can accept and be satisfied with the results.”
One of the most controversial issues at COP28 is a common position on reducing and phasing out fossil fuels. Even before the conference, Xie rejected a mandatory fossil fuel phase-out as “unrealistic” for China, where coal, in particular, is considered key to energy security. On the other hand, China is open to the planned tripling of renewable energies, as the country is already strong in this field.
China generally rejects international obligations wherever possible. So it was already considered a breakthrough when President Xi Jinping announced a climate target for the first time in 2021: Emissions peak before 2030, net zero by 2060. At the COPs, China consistently positions itself as an integral part of the G77/China group of developing countries. Even before COP28, Beijing’s climate politicians reiterated their well-known position: Developed countries should pay; each country has different conditions and should be given its own timeframe for decarbonization.
This is why China does not want to pay into the climate action fund for developing countries, but emphasizes that it will voluntarily contribute to climate financing and only allocate funds through its own channels. According to the state news agency Xinhua, China has signed 43 agreements on South-South climate cooperation with 38 developing countries and has trained around 2,000 officials and specialists in climate action in more than 120 countries.
For example, China hosted a video conference on climate change for the BRICS countries in 2022. It also intends to make the New Silk Road infrastructure program greener. The Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), for its part, announced in late September that it would triple its climate financing to at least seven billion US dollars annually by 2030. So far, however, only very small sums have been disbursed.
In the first few days of COP28, Xie made predictable comments: “China is still a developing country. Controlling emissions from methane and non-Co2 greenhouse gases continues to face a series of intense difficulties and challenges,” he said. “China started late, is technologically weak, statistics are unclear and measurements are insufficient.”
However, China’s narrative is no longer as convincing. After all, according to the World Bank’s categories, the People’s Republic has long been an “upper middle-income” country in terms of per capita income, just like Turkey, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. China even lies on the threshold of “high income.” The World Bank estimated this threshold at a per capita income of 13,845 US dollars in 2023. At USD 12,720, China’s per capita income in 2022 is only slightly below.
China is also considered a developing country in other international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – which also grants privileges to developing countries.
“With every COP, China sees that it is becoming more difficult to insist on the status of a developing country,” Nis Gruenberg, an expert on China’s climate policy at the Merics Institute for China Studies in Berlin, told Table.Media. “But Beijing will not willingly abandon it as long as it doesn’t have to. One argument is the low per capita income of poor provinces such as Gansu.” China and India are even using this argument to claim money from the loss and damage fund themselves.
The People’s Republic is by far the largest emitter of greenhouse gases today and is on a par with Germany in terms of per capita emissions. However, according to Reuters, under the banner of “justice,” the group of countries around China and Saudi Arabia at COP28 repeatedly referred to the historic responsibility of the countries of the Global North that began industrializing in 1850.
In other words, climate financing will be a delicate issue, as will the phase-out of fossil fuels, once the conference enters its decisive phase. China will point to the responsibility of developed countries, says Grünberg. “It will also insist on multilateralism, according to which everything must be based on consensus.” But the debate will not be a walk in the park for Beijing. A year ago, vulnerable island states criticized China and other emerging countries for needing to step up their efforts.
Teresa Ribera, Spain’s environment minister and lead negotiator for the EU Council, told Table.Media at the conference: “Countries in the G77 know very well that China, the Emirates or the Saudis are not the same as Rwanda, Cuba or the Philippines.” And so, it is not surprising that Xie emphasized at the press conference that COP28 was the most difficult of his career: “There are so many issues to resolve.”
When Anne Renzenbrink accepted her first permanent position as a reporter at an English-language daily newspaper in Cambodia in 2012, everything was exciting. A new home, the first real job, and a new language with Khmer. But above all, the excitement for something new.
A joy that, however, quickly dampened. Shortly after Renzenbrink’s employment, Phnom Penh, a critical radio journalist in the capital, was sentenced to 20 years in prison. “For me, it was clear at that time that I didn’t just want to report journalistically on press freedom violations,” she says. “I wanted to be an activist and support my colleagues in the profession.”
Since 2016, she has been working as a representative for Asia-Pacific at Reporters Without Borders. In this role, she focuses on China, Afghanistan, Hong Kong, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Cambodia, where the situation of press freedom has deteriorated significantly due, among other things, to the spread of authoritarianism.
During her political science studies in Heidelberg, Renzenbrink was interested in the social and political structures of Asian countries. Her first semester abroad went to Shanghai, and after completing her bachelor’s degree, she studied journalism in Hong Kong and later flew back to China with a scholarship as a media ambassador. “The thought of it makes me sad because, due to my work, I can no longer easily travel to the country.”
China and its people had strongly impressed her at that time. “Contrary to propaganda, the Chinese people and the Communist Party are not a unity, and criticism of the authoritarian regime in Beijing is not criticism of 1.4 billion people.”
A focus of her work as a representative is also Beijing’s international media strategy. Anne Renzenbrink examines how the Chinese regime controls reporting outside its borders. “As part of a long-term strategy, Beijing builds its own foreign media, invests in media in other countries, or invites international journalists to training sessions in China.” In Germany, too, some examples of Chinese influence can now be found, such as cooperation between German and Chinese media and institutions, joint broadcasts, or China-friendly supplements in newspapers.
Press freedom is the basis of a democratic society, emphasizes Renzenbrink. “It is not always easy to follow the sometimes dramatic developments in Asia and still maintain hope.” But she also sees how brave journalists worldwide continue to research or find loopholes and defy censorship despite the most difficult conditions. “Even the Chinese public repeatedly seeks solutions to inform themselves and pass on information despite strong censorship, engaging in a cat-and-mouse game with the authorities.” Svenja Napp
A deep, fact-based, and as balanced as possible coverage of the People’s Republic in the USA – that was the goal of “The China Project”. It has failed. A few weeks ago, editor-in-chief Jeremy Goldkorn had to announce its closure. Prior to that, both political sides had taken shots at the platform. Critics from the USA and China leveled serious accusations against the ambitious project. In an interview with Fabian Peltsch, Goldkorn talks about his experiences, the anti-China atmosphere in the USA, and why he is considering completely turning away from the topic. Apparently, it takes too much effort to maintain a differentiated perspective.
A differentiated view might also do good for the classification of China as a developing country. The largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world tenaciously insists on this status, especially when it comes to climate finance. Industrialized countries must pay for global climate action while developing countries even have a claim to assistance. However, at the ongoing COP28 climate conference, it may not be so easy for China to maintain this narrative, writes Christiane Kuehl. Not only traditional industrialized countries but also small vulnerable island states have long been demanding that emerging economies like China do more.
Many consider the end of The China Project a huge loss for nuanced reporting on China in the English-speaking world. What do you think are the dangers of increasingly under-complex coverage of the People’s Republic for public discourse?
In some ways, there is more in-depth information about China in foreign media than there was ten years ago: The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times all have big China teams, and China is frequently at the top of the major news providers’ home pages. On the other hand, it is very difficult for foreign journalists to operate in China, and just a few are doing so now. And journalists in China face constant surveillance and harassment, at the same time as the Chinese government is blocking more and more online sources of information.
Do you find the current media coverage of China by the major media houses balanced enough?
Much of the China reporting follows only buzzy, current topics that appeal to the average Western reader, and the stories are quite similar throughout different media publishers. In the US, the content follows mostly the conventional wisdom of Washington D.C. and Wall Street, and this isn’t challenged much. We wanted to do it differently. We wanted to report more nuance, and present a wider range of viewpoints – both those that are very hard on China and those that are sympathetic.
Although you attempted to provide nuanced reporting, you were caught in the political crossfire from both sides. Did it come as a surprise to you to be attacked by hawks like US Republican Marco Rubio for being too pro-China while being simultaneously blocked by the Chinese government?
I was actually quite surprised that we weren’t blocked earlier in China than 2018. What I didn’t expect was the vicious attack that we experienced in the spring of 2022. It started with a blog post by a nationalist blogger on WeChat about a report we did on Chinese netizens’ reactions on the Ukraine war. Then a number of stories all over the state media followed up with stories that we were intentionally trying to make China look bad. Some commenters said that we want to force regime change and that we were funded by the US military.
Marco Rubio accused her team of being agents of the Chinese government.
The Marco Rubio thing came out of the blue. We had a former employer that filed a so-called “whistleblower complaint” against us. I wasn’t expecting anything like that. It seemed so removed from reality and so far off of any legitimate critique of us. The idea that we were somehow controlled or paid by the Communist Party seemed outrageous to me, but I shouldn’t have been surprised. The atmosphere in the United States right now is so reflexively anti-China. It’s literally the only thing in this country that the two big parties can agree on: this idea that we have to get tough on China. Even local politicians in places like Tennessee do campaigns with slogans about “combatting China.” As if there weren’t problems that really concerned their people like potholes in the streets or opioid addiction.
Was this the reason you had to ultimately shut down The China Project?
We were an investment-driven online business. We were expecting a chunk of money, one specific investment, and nothing led us to believe it was in question. But this person changed their mind. The investor lost the appetite for risk and we seemed to be too risky politically to get involved. It all happened very quickly and we sadly realized that without that money, we would be facing debt that we wouldn’t be able to pay back, like salaries and freelance payments.
In your farewell post, you also mentioned high legal costs as the reason for shutting down. What kind of legal disputes did you have to fight?
The so-called whistleblower report raised some very serious allegations. It was prepared by a law firm that is quite famous in Washington D.C., led by a former CIA guy. So we were pretty scared. We could be accused of serious crimes like acting as agents of a foreign power. These allegations could have opened us up to national security charges.
But worse for us as a business, potential investors were also very spooked: Who wants to invest in something that can potentially get in trouble with the government? It was hanging over our heads and I think that’s what ultimately led to said investor not to invest.
How did you feel about the many messages you received from readers after announcing the end of The China Project?
It was a bit like attending my own funeral. Most people said nice things and words of support. That was very gratifying. Despite the nice messages, it is not realistic for us to go on as a company. If there was less political hostility between China and the US, it would have easier to get money and subscribers. Better relations between China and the rest of the world would have helped too.
Do you already know which projects and formats will continue and in what form?
I think the Sinica podcast with Kaiser Kuo will find a way to be continued. I also hope that some of our editors and journalists will continue writing about China. There’s a generation of freelancers that we helped to nurture. Some of them have already found new jobs in other media houses. For myself I haven’t had the chance to carefully think what’s next for me. To be honest, I needed a break anyway.
Will you continue to write about China?
Maybe I will move away from this topic. It has become a difficult space to report on. You constantly write about horrible things in China and at the same time face this mindless hostility towards the country on the other side of the Pacific. I often feel that I am stuck in the middle. That is exhausting. It makes me think that maybe I should write about a country like Bhutan or Jamaica instead.
Jeremy Goldkorn (Chinese: 金玉米; Jīn Yùmǐ) was born in Johannesburg. He moved to China in 1995, where he founded the platform Danwei, which covered Chinese media, markets, politics and business and was acquired by the Financial Times in 2013. Goldkorn developed the website “The China Project” and was editor-in-chief of the platform, which specialized in in-depth analysis, until its closure in November 2023. He has lived in Nashville, Tennessee, since 2015.
Is China a developing country or not? This question already sparked controversy at COP27 in Egypt. And it also came to the fore at COP28 from the very beginning. After all, a lot of money is at stake: Developed countries have to make a financial contribution toward global climate action while developing countries are entitled to aid. At the start of the COP, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was the first country that did not belong to the Annex I countries of the Framework Convention – i.e., countries already considered developed countries in 1992 – to make a climate finance pledge. Instead, it is one of the countries that can still call itself a developing country when it comes to climate action.
The UAE’s pledge of 100 million euros for the new loss and damage fund (LDF), intended to compensate for damage in poor countries, highlights how outdated the categorizations of 1992 are. For instance, the EU calls on “non-traditional” donor countries, which have become richer since 1992 and could now take on more responsibility for climate financing: Saudi Arabia, South Korea – and, above all, China.
Despite its rapid development, however, China insists on its positions as a developing country. This is in line with the Communist Party’s self-perception. And it is financially advantageous. After all, developing countries are entitled to privileges in climate action that save them a lot of money – according to the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” The fact that China still wants to be seen as an equal partner on the global stage to its rival, the United States, is not perceived as a contradiction in Beijing.
On Saturday, the climate delegations from both countries spent hours together, with the two climate envoys, Xie Zhenhua and John Kerry, also joining in. Their cooperation is crucial to the COP’s success. At a press conference on Saturday, Xie said that he hoped for a “correct future direction with good vibes and the greatest inclusiveness, so that everyone can accept and be satisfied with the results.”
One of the most controversial issues at COP28 is a common position on reducing and phasing out fossil fuels. Even before the conference, Xie rejected a mandatory fossil fuel phase-out as “unrealistic” for China, where coal, in particular, is considered key to energy security. On the other hand, China is open to the planned tripling of renewable energies, as the country is already strong in this field.
China generally rejects international obligations wherever possible. So it was already considered a breakthrough when President Xi Jinping announced a climate target for the first time in 2021: Emissions peak before 2030, net zero by 2060. At the COPs, China consistently positions itself as an integral part of the G77/China group of developing countries. Even before COP28, Beijing’s climate politicians reiterated their well-known position: Developed countries should pay; each country has different conditions and should be given its own timeframe for decarbonization.
This is why China does not want to pay into the climate action fund for developing countries, but emphasizes that it will voluntarily contribute to climate financing and only allocate funds through its own channels. According to the state news agency Xinhua, China has signed 43 agreements on South-South climate cooperation with 38 developing countries and has trained around 2,000 officials and specialists in climate action in more than 120 countries.
For example, China hosted a video conference on climate change for the BRICS countries in 2022. It also intends to make the New Silk Road infrastructure program greener. The Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), for its part, announced in late September that it would triple its climate financing to at least seven billion US dollars annually by 2030. So far, however, only very small sums have been disbursed.
In the first few days of COP28, Xie made predictable comments: “China is still a developing country. Controlling emissions from methane and non-Co2 greenhouse gases continues to face a series of intense difficulties and challenges,” he said. “China started late, is technologically weak, statistics are unclear and measurements are insufficient.”
However, China’s narrative is no longer as convincing. After all, according to the World Bank’s categories, the People’s Republic has long been an “upper middle-income” country in terms of per capita income, just like Turkey, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. China even lies on the threshold of “high income.” The World Bank estimated this threshold at a per capita income of 13,845 US dollars in 2023. At USD 12,720, China’s per capita income in 2022 is only slightly below.
China is also considered a developing country in other international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – which also grants privileges to developing countries.
“With every COP, China sees that it is becoming more difficult to insist on the status of a developing country,” Nis Gruenberg, an expert on China’s climate policy at the Merics Institute for China Studies in Berlin, told Table.Media. “But Beijing will not willingly abandon it as long as it doesn’t have to. One argument is the low per capita income of poor provinces such as Gansu.” China and India are even using this argument to claim money from the loss and damage fund themselves.
The People’s Republic is by far the largest emitter of greenhouse gases today and is on a par with Germany in terms of per capita emissions. However, according to Reuters, under the banner of “justice,” the group of countries around China and Saudi Arabia at COP28 repeatedly referred to the historic responsibility of the countries of the Global North that began industrializing in 1850.
In other words, climate financing will be a delicate issue, as will the phase-out of fossil fuels, once the conference enters its decisive phase. China will point to the responsibility of developed countries, says Grünberg. “It will also insist on multilateralism, according to which everything must be based on consensus.” But the debate will not be a walk in the park for Beijing. A year ago, vulnerable island states criticized China and other emerging countries for needing to step up their efforts.
Teresa Ribera, Spain’s environment minister and lead negotiator for the EU Council, told Table.Media at the conference: “Countries in the G77 know very well that China, the Emirates or the Saudis are not the same as Rwanda, Cuba or the Philippines.” And so, it is not surprising that Xie emphasized at the press conference that COP28 was the most difficult of his career: “There are so many issues to resolve.”
When Anne Renzenbrink accepted her first permanent position as a reporter at an English-language daily newspaper in Cambodia in 2012, everything was exciting. A new home, the first real job, and a new language with Khmer. But above all, the excitement for something new.
A joy that, however, quickly dampened. Shortly after Renzenbrink’s employment, Phnom Penh, a critical radio journalist in the capital, was sentenced to 20 years in prison. “For me, it was clear at that time that I didn’t just want to report journalistically on press freedom violations,” she says. “I wanted to be an activist and support my colleagues in the profession.”
Since 2016, she has been working as a representative for Asia-Pacific at Reporters Without Borders. In this role, she focuses on China, Afghanistan, Hong Kong, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Cambodia, where the situation of press freedom has deteriorated significantly due, among other things, to the spread of authoritarianism.
During her political science studies in Heidelberg, Renzenbrink was interested in the social and political structures of Asian countries. Her first semester abroad went to Shanghai, and after completing her bachelor’s degree, she studied journalism in Hong Kong and later flew back to China with a scholarship as a media ambassador. “The thought of it makes me sad because, due to my work, I can no longer easily travel to the country.”
China and its people had strongly impressed her at that time. “Contrary to propaganda, the Chinese people and the Communist Party are not a unity, and criticism of the authoritarian regime in Beijing is not criticism of 1.4 billion people.”
A focus of her work as a representative is also Beijing’s international media strategy. Anne Renzenbrink examines how the Chinese regime controls reporting outside its borders. “As part of a long-term strategy, Beijing builds its own foreign media, invests in media in other countries, or invites international journalists to training sessions in China.” In Germany, too, some examples of Chinese influence can now be found, such as cooperation between German and Chinese media and institutions, joint broadcasts, or China-friendly supplements in newspapers.
Press freedom is the basis of a democratic society, emphasizes Renzenbrink. “It is not always easy to follow the sometimes dramatic developments in Asia and still maintain hope.” But she also sees how brave journalists worldwide continue to research or find loopholes and defy censorship despite the most difficult conditions. “Even the Chinese public repeatedly seeks solutions to inform themselves and pass on information despite strong censorship, engaging in a cat-and-mouse game with the authorities.” Svenja Napp
