Welcome to our last issue of the year! We’re glad you’ve found the time to read us in these last stressful days of preparing for the holidays!
Today, I would like to recommend the interview that Andreas Landwehr conducted with Taiwanese government advisor Chen Ming-chi. In it, Chen explains why he considers a maritime quarantine the most likely scenario in which the Chinese government could force the Taiwanese government to give in. Chen believes that an invasion would by no means guarantee a victory for the People’s Liberation Army. A blockade or quarantine, on the other hand, “require less military capability. They can be repeated again and again.” Should they fail, Xi Jinping would have a “face-saving way out.”
Perhaps you are still looking for one more gift? Or reading material for the holidays? As every year, our editorial team has put together some China book recommendations for you. If you want to learn more about how Xi Jinping sees the world or how an anarchist experienced the Cultural Revolution, you might find what you are looking for here.
The next issue China.Table issue will appear on January 2. I wish you a relaxing holiday season, a Merry Christmas and a good start to the New Year!
Do you think the risk of war has increased?
Well, we don’t see an imminent war. Could it happen by 2027? Possibly, but that depends heavily on how prepared we are – and how prepared our like-minded partners are. Given Xi Jinping’s ambitions and his vision of rejuvenating the Chinese nation, Taiwan is probably just the first step in his plan to be perceived as a supreme leader. He has a similar mindset to (Russian President Vladimir) Putin. We firmly believe that we need to strengthen our national defense.
How great is the risk of a naval blockade or an inspection regime – measures to quarantine merchant vessels?
This is the most likely option, probably even more likely than an amphibious landing as it would cost less. Xi Jinping may consider that an amphibious invasion is a significant challenge for the People’s Liberation Army and that a failed invasion could cost him power. A blockade or quarantine, on the other hand, could be repeatedly enforced. Should it fail, he would have a “face-saving” way out. The costs are not as high, and it requires less military capabilities. And they have started preparations for it. For example, they have included Coast Guard units in recent exercises.
Quarantine would mean inspecting ships and requiring permission for them to sail to Taiwan. How would Taiwan’s government respond?
Quarantine is both easy and difficult for us to handle. Easy because we could counter the Chinese Coast Guard with ours. However, a naval-backed sea blockade would be more challenging. To break it, we would need frigates. Taiwan cannot meet this challenge alone. We need support from allies, Japan, the US and probably other countries that have an interest in keeping the Taiwan Strait open. That is what we are working on.
Taiwan is also preparing all of society to become more resilient. This includes communication, food, medical care and energy. We are working on decentralizing and diversifying our energy grid. I think we are a bit better prepared than we were before the Ukraine war.
A quarantine or blockade would bring both sides’ coast guards and armed forces into potential conflict by raising the likelihood of miscalculations or provocations, right?
Yes, that is the danger. For Xi Jinping, a quarantine or blockade is a cost-effective way to achieve political goals, although it also carries the risk of escalation – even if he wants to avoid a full-blown war. The aim is to exert maximum pressure on Taiwan’s population and leadership to see if they will surrender.
That is why Taiwan must have a strong consensus on preserving our democratic way of life. We need leaders who do not surrender easily. We are sure that no leader of the (ruling) Progressive Party DPP would give in, even if the pressure is high. I am less confident about other party leaders.
For example, if there were a Kuomintang president, it would probably be natural for him to surrender under pressure, negotiate and possibly support China’s interests to end a blockade, and lead Taiwan on a path similar to Hong Kong. Taiwan could remain nominally sovereign, but under an arrangement that would limit our military and diplomacy.
In the event of a war, do you think the USA would support Taiwan with troops?
It appears to be in the national interest of the United States to help in some way, even if we are not sure exactly how. Sanctions or tariffs alone would certainly not be enough. China is preparing for the eventuality of facing sanctions or getting caught in a state of siege.
Donald Trump’s first term in office has ushered in a new era. China has been recognized as a threat, and the administration has changed its China policy. However, this change was partly driven by mid-level officials, so it is hard to predict what Trump will do this time. He mentioned that Xi Jinping knows very well how “crazy” he is. But we are not sure and are worried about the development. China has built a formidable navy and air force. Their ability to execute an amphibious landing has increased significantly. That’s why the US is of great importance to us.
You have been observing Chinese politics closely for many years. What shifts have you noticed in China’s approach towards Taiwan?
The fundamental approach has not changed significantly. They continue to use the so-called “two-handed” policy, alternating between hard and soft approaches. For example, they carry out military operations and then Xi Jinping sends a conciliatory message aimed at the Taiwanese people. They are trying to divide the Taiwanese government and the general population.
Taiwan is increasingly becoming part of China’s greater global ambitions. Despite the current economic slump, Xi Jinping remains willing to increase military spending, and the defense budget has again been increased this year.
Under Xi’s leadership, China seems more determined and capable, although its economic strength is not as strong as it used to be. The best strategy for Taiwan is to buy time. We must use this time to improve our defense capabilities. China has effectively been converting its economic prosperity into military power, but as the economy slows, military resources may dwindle.
Is China trying to change the status quo in order to put pressure on the Taiwanese government?
Not just on the Taiwanese government. China is also trying to put pressure on the United States, Japan and even the Philippines. They are working towards gaining dominance within the first island chain. They have already achieved a certain degree of control, for example, in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. China has gained substantial control over the South China Sea without direct conflict. Its “below the threshold of war” tactic, which avoids open conflict while exerting pressure, is effective. It exploits people’s fear of war and demonstrates military strength.
What tactic or strategy do you recommend for Taiwan?
Resilience is crucial; it is the foundation for all other measures. We are confident that we will not be forced to surrender through a blockade or quarantine. Secondly, we need to invest in our military capabilities. We need a broader social consensus that defense is essential for Taiwan’s survival. We must ensure that our people understand the situation and do not perceive a highly dangerous situation as normal.
Chen Min-chi previously served as Taiwan’s deputy minister of the Mainland Affairs Council and security advisor to former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. He then headed the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), a think tank of the Ministry of Defense in Taipei. Today, Chen works as an advisor to the new government of President Lai Ching-te and as a professor at National Tsing Hua University.
Kevin Rudd has already achieved much in his life. He has been Australia’s diplomat in Stockholm and Beijing, served his country as prime minister and foreign minister, headed the US think tank The Asia Society and currently holds the post of Australian ambassador in Washington. Rudd’s overarching theme in life is China. At the not-so-tender age of 59, the sinologist started working on a doctoral thesis – “not for the faint-hearted,” he notes – which he completed in 2022 after five years of research. It formed the foundation for his book “On Xi Jinping.”
“What does Xi Jinping really think and what influence does this have on China and the world?” is the question that drives Rudd. He does not have any more intimate insights into Xi Jinping’s mind than others. Instead, he focuses on what is “hidden in plain sight,” namely Xi Jinping’s official speeches and essays. Rudd first places Xi’s thought in the context of his predecessors and China’s Marxist and classical political theory. He then compares it with the events of his twelve years in office, during which Xi managed to center the political system entirely around himself.
“The collapse of a regime often begins on the ideological field,” says Xi. Once the ideological defensive walls have been breached, the rest can soon follow. Ideology is an essential tool in Xi’s efforts to “reinvent a disciplined Leninist Party,” “as an irreplaceable political machine at the heart of the Chinese military, state and nation,” writes Rudd. And yet it is much more than a tool: Rudd is convinced that Xi really believes in what he says.
When Xi came to power, he saw his party in a state of decline after 35 years of reform, during which his predecessors Deng, Jiang and Hu had focused entirely on China’s economic rise. Economic development may be important, explains Xi, but “one pretty thing can hide a hundred ugly things.” Apart from material aspects, there is also an urgent need for spiritual aspects. Xi finds these in the spiritual heritage of Marxism-Leninism. And thus in the concept of struggle, the confrontation between progressive and reactionary forces – something that has always been essential in Marxism but was pushed into the background under Xi’s predecessors. Rudd sees Xi in a “Manichean ideological struggle with the West” for China’s soul. Xi laments that the People’s Republic has long been far too defensive against the West, despite the Chinese nation having every reason to be confident: “The truth is on our side.” Of all the values of Chinese-style socialism, “patriotism is the deepest, most fundamental and most enduring,” explains Xi.
By invoking the “spirit of world history,” Xi is taking the side of the vanguard that will one day overcome the reactionary forces of Western capitalist hegemony. In this phase, problems are unavoidable, says Xi, “but if we are afraid to face these challenges, they will bring us irreparable damage.” This thinking explains the shift towards China’s much more assertive foreign policy. Much of what Rudd describes, the anti-corruption crackdown, the zero-covid policy, etc., is, of course, well-known to China observers, and yet one gains a deeper, more three-dimensional view of it when one understands the motives and worldview with which Xi made these decisions. Rudd’s book helps to better understand a man who is likely to shape China and world politics for a long time to come. Xi takes ideology very seriously. We should do the same. Angela Köckritz
Kevin Rudd: On Xi Jinping – How Xi’s Marxist Nationalism Is Shaping China and the World, Oxford University Press, 432 pages
Wang Xiaobo, who died in 1997 at the age of just 44, was an enfant terrible of China’s post-revolutionary literature. Ostracized in his home country for allegedly being unable to convey “positive and inspiring messages” to young people, he was celebrated during his lifetime, particularly in Taiwan. His first major novel, “The Golden Age” from 1993, is about Wang Er, an autobiographical good-for-nothing who is sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution but is guided less by the party than by his “little monk” and soon begins an affair with a rural physician.
However, the sex scenes alone are not enough to understand why “黄金时代” is still considered a scandalous book today. Wang Er embodies the rebirth of a figure that is actually well known in the Chinese literary canon: the anarchist and self-chosen outsider who only follows his own, usually deeply poetic conventions. However, here, he does not appear in the form of the Daoist hermit or the drunken poet, but as an anti-hero who holds up a mirror to the mad tumult of the Cultural Revolution instigated by Mao through black humor. Back in civilization, Wang Er then becomes, of all things, a chemistry professor who is entrusted with an explosives project.
“The Golden Age” has long since become an iconic book in mainland China, and – although neither politically correct nor politically in line – it is being rediscovered from generation to generation. It is an important reminder that China is not as authoritarian and conformist a country as many believe – fortunately, its traditional fascination with individualists and troublemakers remains strong. Fabian Peltsch
Wang Xiaobo: The Golden Age, Astra House, 288 pages
In his new book, long-time China correspondent Philipp Mattheis outlines the socio-economic development of the People’s Republic of China in recent years in a very vivid and entertaining way and looks at the country’s future role in the geopolitical and technological rivalry with the USA. He also discusses whether the collision between the two rivals can even be resolved peacefully and what their rivalry means for Germany.
The book closely examines the idea of the “Chinese dream,” explores the question of how China’s President Xi Jinping wants to realize it, and compares aspiration and reality. To this end, Mattheis introduces readers to people he met and places their fates, needs, successes and failures in the broader context. This creates a picture of the People’s Republic pursuing a dream with all its contradictions, whose fulfillment affects the whole world.
Mattheis takes readers to hotspots in Southeast Asia, Africa and Europe and explains their relevance to China’s geostrategy. He presents the various political fronts where China is fighting a battle to break Western supremacy and heal the Chinese wounds of the “century of humiliation.” Through numerous examples, Mattheis shows the resulting collateral damage – politically, economically and ecologically. Yet there is no guarantee that the “Chinese dream” will become reality. Could China trip over its own feet and its dream disappear into thin air? Marcel Grzanna
Philipp Mattheis: Der chinesische (Alb)Traum: Wie aus Chinas Aufstieg die größte geopolitische Herausforderung für den Westen wurde, Goldmann, 288 pages, available in German
The first co-written book by China specialists Felix Lee and Finn Mayer-Kuckuk offers a deep insight into the challenges that China and, by extension, the German economy are facing. The book sees itself as a guide that addresses fundamental issues regarding “China and us”: How can Germany catch up technologically? How can it reconcile its moral standards with the risks to its prosperity?
The authors’ first aim is to gain a better understanding of Chinese thought and the motivations of power politician Xi Jinping. As a key to deeper insight, a dedicated chapter deals with the Art of War by strategist Sunzi, which is, naturally, often drawn on for Beijing’s goals – but in a far more coherent way than one usually reads in this context. Of course, Lee and Mayer-Kuckuk do not have the answer to the problem at hand, but they do offer many clever approaches that appeal to European self-confidence.
It features in-depth expert knowledge, clear language and many expert voices, such as Jörg Wuttke and Xifan Yang, to shed light on the complex dynamics that have shaped and will continue to shape Germany’s relationship with China. A fundamental book for German China expertise. Amelie Richter
Felix Lee & Finn Mayer-Kuckuk: China. Auswege aus einem Dilemma, Ch. Links Verlag, 256 pages, available in German
It is well known that electromagnetic waves can be emitted or received with the help of “sky threads” (commonly known as “antennas” in English). The Chinese word is made up of the characters 天 tiān “sky, day” and 线 xiàn “wire, line, thread, beam.” Incidentally, the English word is related to the Latin tendere or Greek teinein, which means “to stretch” or “to tighten.”
Welcome to our last issue of the year! We’re glad you’ve found the time to read us in these last stressful days of preparing for the holidays!
Today, I would like to recommend the interview that Andreas Landwehr conducted with Taiwanese government advisor Chen Ming-chi. In it, Chen explains why he considers a maritime quarantine the most likely scenario in which the Chinese government could force the Taiwanese government to give in. Chen believes that an invasion would by no means guarantee a victory for the People’s Liberation Army. A blockade or quarantine, on the other hand, “require less military capability. They can be repeated again and again.” Should they fail, Xi Jinping would have a “face-saving way out.”
Perhaps you are still looking for one more gift? Or reading material for the holidays? As every year, our editorial team has put together some China book recommendations for you. If you want to learn more about how Xi Jinping sees the world or how an anarchist experienced the Cultural Revolution, you might find what you are looking for here.
The next issue China.Table issue will appear on January 2. I wish you a relaxing holiday season, a Merry Christmas and a good start to the New Year!
Do you think the risk of war has increased?
Well, we don’t see an imminent war. Could it happen by 2027? Possibly, but that depends heavily on how prepared we are – and how prepared our like-minded partners are. Given Xi Jinping’s ambitions and his vision of rejuvenating the Chinese nation, Taiwan is probably just the first step in his plan to be perceived as a supreme leader. He has a similar mindset to (Russian President Vladimir) Putin. We firmly believe that we need to strengthen our national defense.
How great is the risk of a naval blockade or an inspection regime – measures to quarantine merchant vessels?
This is the most likely option, probably even more likely than an amphibious landing as it would cost less. Xi Jinping may consider that an amphibious invasion is a significant challenge for the People’s Liberation Army and that a failed invasion could cost him power. A blockade or quarantine, on the other hand, could be repeatedly enforced. Should it fail, he would have a “face-saving” way out. The costs are not as high, and it requires less military capabilities. And they have started preparations for it. For example, they have included Coast Guard units in recent exercises.
Quarantine would mean inspecting ships and requiring permission for them to sail to Taiwan. How would Taiwan’s government respond?
Quarantine is both easy and difficult for us to handle. Easy because we could counter the Chinese Coast Guard with ours. However, a naval-backed sea blockade would be more challenging. To break it, we would need frigates. Taiwan cannot meet this challenge alone. We need support from allies, Japan, the US and probably other countries that have an interest in keeping the Taiwan Strait open. That is what we are working on.
Taiwan is also preparing all of society to become more resilient. This includes communication, food, medical care and energy. We are working on decentralizing and diversifying our energy grid. I think we are a bit better prepared than we were before the Ukraine war.
A quarantine or blockade would bring both sides’ coast guards and armed forces into potential conflict by raising the likelihood of miscalculations or provocations, right?
Yes, that is the danger. For Xi Jinping, a quarantine or blockade is a cost-effective way to achieve political goals, although it also carries the risk of escalation – even if he wants to avoid a full-blown war. The aim is to exert maximum pressure on Taiwan’s population and leadership to see if they will surrender.
That is why Taiwan must have a strong consensus on preserving our democratic way of life. We need leaders who do not surrender easily. We are sure that no leader of the (ruling) Progressive Party DPP would give in, even if the pressure is high. I am less confident about other party leaders.
For example, if there were a Kuomintang president, it would probably be natural for him to surrender under pressure, negotiate and possibly support China’s interests to end a blockade, and lead Taiwan on a path similar to Hong Kong. Taiwan could remain nominally sovereign, but under an arrangement that would limit our military and diplomacy.
In the event of a war, do you think the USA would support Taiwan with troops?
It appears to be in the national interest of the United States to help in some way, even if we are not sure exactly how. Sanctions or tariffs alone would certainly not be enough. China is preparing for the eventuality of facing sanctions or getting caught in a state of siege.
Donald Trump’s first term in office has ushered in a new era. China has been recognized as a threat, and the administration has changed its China policy. However, this change was partly driven by mid-level officials, so it is hard to predict what Trump will do this time. He mentioned that Xi Jinping knows very well how “crazy” he is. But we are not sure and are worried about the development. China has built a formidable navy and air force. Their ability to execute an amphibious landing has increased significantly. That’s why the US is of great importance to us.
You have been observing Chinese politics closely for many years. What shifts have you noticed in China’s approach towards Taiwan?
The fundamental approach has not changed significantly. They continue to use the so-called “two-handed” policy, alternating between hard and soft approaches. For example, they carry out military operations and then Xi Jinping sends a conciliatory message aimed at the Taiwanese people. They are trying to divide the Taiwanese government and the general population.
Taiwan is increasingly becoming part of China’s greater global ambitions. Despite the current economic slump, Xi Jinping remains willing to increase military spending, and the defense budget has again been increased this year.
Under Xi’s leadership, China seems more determined and capable, although its economic strength is not as strong as it used to be. The best strategy for Taiwan is to buy time. We must use this time to improve our defense capabilities. China has effectively been converting its economic prosperity into military power, but as the economy slows, military resources may dwindle.
Is China trying to change the status quo in order to put pressure on the Taiwanese government?
Not just on the Taiwanese government. China is also trying to put pressure on the United States, Japan and even the Philippines. They are working towards gaining dominance within the first island chain. They have already achieved a certain degree of control, for example, in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. China has gained substantial control over the South China Sea without direct conflict. Its “below the threshold of war” tactic, which avoids open conflict while exerting pressure, is effective. It exploits people’s fear of war and demonstrates military strength.
What tactic or strategy do you recommend for Taiwan?
Resilience is crucial; it is the foundation for all other measures. We are confident that we will not be forced to surrender through a blockade or quarantine. Secondly, we need to invest in our military capabilities. We need a broader social consensus that defense is essential for Taiwan’s survival. We must ensure that our people understand the situation and do not perceive a highly dangerous situation as normal.
Chen Min-chi previously served as Taiwan’s deputy minister of the Mainland Affairs Council and security advisor to former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. He then headed the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), a think tank of the Ministry of Defense in Taipei. Today, Chen works as an advisor to the new government of President Lai Ching-te and as a professor at National Tsing Hua University.
Kevin Rudd has already achieved much in his life. He has been Australia’s diplomat in Stockholm and Beijing, served his country as prime minister and foreign minister, headed the US think tank The Asia Society and currently holds the post of Australian ambassador in Washington. Rudd’s overarching theme in life is China. At the not-so-tender age of 59, the sinologist started working on a doctoral thesis – “not for the faint-hearted,” he notes – which he completed in 2022 after five years of research. It formed the foundation for his book “On Xi Jinping.”
“What does Xi Jinping really think and what influence does this have on China and the world?” is the question that drives Rudd. He does not have any more intimate insights into Xi Jinping’s mind than others. Instead, he focuses on what is “hidden in plain sight,” namely Xi Jinping’s official speeches and essays. Rudd first places Xi’s thought in the context of his predecessors and China’s Marxist and classical political theory. He then compares it with the events of his twelve years in office, during which Xi managed to center the political system entirely around himself.
“The collapse of a regime often begins on the ideological field,” says Xi. Once the ideological defensive walls have been breached, the rest can soon follow. Ideology is an essential tool in Xi’s efforts to “reinvent a disciplined Leninist Party,” “as an irreplaceable political machine at the heart of the Chinese military, state and nation,” writes Rudd. And yet it is much more than a tool: Rudd is convinced that Xi really believes in what he says.
When Xi came to power, he saw his party in a state of decline after 35 years of reform, during which his predecessors Deng, Jiang and Hu had focused entirely on China’s economic rise. Economic development may be important, explains Xi, but “one pretty thing can hide a hundred ugly things.” Apart from material aspects, there is also an urgent need for spiritual aspects. Xi finds these in the spiritual heritage of Marxism-Leninism. And thus in the concept of struggle, the confrontation between progressive and reactionary forces – something that has always been essential in Marxism but was pushed into the background under Xi’s predecessors. Rudd sees Xi in a “Manichean ideological struggle with the West” for China’s soul. Xi laments that the People’s Republic has long been far too defensive against the West, despite the Chinese nation having every reason to be confident: “The truth is on our side.” Of all the values of Chinese-style socialism, “patriotism is the deepest, most fundamental and most enduring,” explains Xi.
By invoking the “spirit of world history,” Xi is taking the side of the vanguard that will one day overcome the reactionary forces of Western capitalist hegemony. In this phase, problems are unavoidable, says Xi, “but if we are afraid to face these challenges, they will bring us irreparable damage.” This thinking explains the shift towards China’s much more assertive foreign policy. Much of what Rudd describes, the anti-corruption crackdown, the zero-covid policy, etc., is, of course, well-known to China observers, and yet one gains a deeper, more three-dimensional view of it when one understands the motives and worldview with which Xi made these decisions. Rudd’s book helps to better understand a man who is likely to shape China and world politics for a long time to come. Xi takes ideology very seriously. We should do the same. Angela Köckritz
Kevin Rudd: On Xi Jinping – How Xi’s Marxist Nationalism Is Shaping China and the World, Oxford University Press, 432 pages
Wang Xiaobo, who died in 1997 at the age of just 44, was an enfant terrible of China’s post-revolutionary literature. Ostracized in his home country for allegedly being unable to convey “positive and inspiring messages” to young people, he was celebrated during his lifetime, particularly in Taiwan. His first major novel, “The Golden Age” from 1993, is about Wang Er, an autobiographical good-for-nothing who is sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution but is guided less by the party than by his “little monk” and soon begins an affair with a rural physician.
However, the sex scenes alone are not enough to understand why “黄金时代” is still considered a scandalous book today. Wang Er embodies the rebirth of a figure that is actually well known in the Chinese literary canon: the anarchist and self-chosen outsider who only follows his own, usually deeply poetic conventions. However, here, he does not appear in the form of the Daoist hermit or the drunken poet, but as an anti-hero who holds up a mirror to the mad tumult of the Cultural Revolution instigated by Mao through black humor. Back in civilization, Wang Er then becomes, of all things, a chemistry professor who is entrusted with an explosives project.
“The Golden Age” has long since become an iconic book in mainland China, and – although neither politically correct nor politically in line – it is being rediscovered from generation to generation. It is an important reminder that China is not as authoritarian and conformist a country as many believe – fortunately, its traditional fascination with individualists and troublemakers remains strong. Fabian Peltsch
Wang Xiaobo: The Golden Age, Astra House, 288 pages
In his new book, long-time China correspondent Philipp Mattheis outlines the socio-economic development of the People’s Republic of China in recent years in a very vivid and entertaining way and looks at the country’s future role in the geopolitical and technological rivalry with the USA. He also discusses whether the collision between the two rivals can even be resolved peacefully and what their rivalry means for Germany.
The book closely examines the idea of the “Chinese dream,” explores the question of how China’s President Xi Jinping wants to realize it, and compares aspiration and reality. To this end, Mattheis introduces readers to people he met and places their fates, needs, successes and failures in the broader context. This creates a picture of the People’s Republic pursuing a dream with all its contradictions, whose fulfillment affects the whole world.
Mattheis takes readers to hotspots in Southeast Asia, Africa and Europe and explains their relevance to China’s geostrategy. He presents the various political fronts where China is fighting a battle to break Western supremacy and heal the Chinese wounds of the “century of humiliation.” Through numerous examples, Mattheis shows the resulting collateral damage – politically, economically and ecologically. Yet there is no guarantee that the “Chinese dream” will become reality. Could China trip over its own feet and its dream disappear into thin air? Marcel Grzanna
Philipp Mattheis: Der chinesische (Alb)Traum: Wie aus Chinas Aufstieg die größte geopolitische Herausforderung für den Westen wurde, Goldmann, 288 pages, available in German
The first co-written book by China specialists Felix Lee and Finn Mayer-Kuckuk offers a deep insight into the challenges that China and, by extension, the German economy are facing. The book sees itself as a guide that addresses fundamental issues regarding “China and us”: How can Germany catch up technologically? How can it reconcile its moral standards with the risks to its prosperity?
The authors’ first aim is to gain a better understanding of Chinese thought and the motivations of power politician Xi Jinping. As a key to deeper insight, a dedicated chapter deals with the Art of War by strategist Sunzi, which is, naturally, often drawn on for Beijing’s goals – but in a far more coherent way than one usually reads in this context. Of course, Lee and Mayer-Kuckuk do not have the answer to the problem at hand, but they do offer many clever approaches that appeal to European self-confidence.
It features in-depth expert knowledge, clear language and many expert voices, such as Jörg Wuttke and Xifan Yang, to shed light on the complex dynamics that have shaped and will continue to shape Germany’s relationship with China. A fundamental book for German China expertise. Amelie Richter
Felix Lee & Finn Mayer-Kuckuk: China. Auswege aus einem Dilemma, Ch. Links Verlag, 256 pages, available in German
It is well known that electromagnetic waves can be emitted or received with the help of “sky threads” (commonly known as “antennas” in English). The Chinese word is made up of the characters 天 tiān “sky, day” and 线 xiàn “wire, line, thread, beam.” Incidentally, the English word is related to the Latin tendere or Greek teinein, which means “to stretch” or “to tighten.”
