At 82, nanophysicist and Leopoldina member Dieter Bimberg is far from out of the game. At the Technical University of Berlin, he was once one of the first in the world to specialize in “green” photonics – energy efficiency, especially in optical data transmission and data centers. Despite his advanced age, he wants to continue researching, but regulatory hurdles stand in the way in Germany.
And so Bimberg moved to Changchun. This is where the Chinese Academy of Sciences founded the “Bimberg Chinese-German Center for Green Photonics,” named after him at the Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP). “The country allows me to put my ideas into practice,” says Bimberg. However, abandoning Germany as an innovation hub is by no means his intention. In an interview with Marcel Grzanna, Bimberg says: “We have to face the competition, we can do it.” And provides some suggestions on “how.”
Gigantic wind turbines in the middle of the ocean as high as a 63-storey building – that sounds like gigantism made in China. Indeed, several companies are currently developing mega-turbines designed to drastically increase efficiency. However, these megawatt monsters have not yet been tested under realistic conditions. Among the many challenges are typhoons, which regularly hit China’s eastern coastal regions. And installing them is also tricky. However, as You Xiaoying writes in her analysis, ten percent of China’s electricity is expected to come from offshore wind farms by 2030.
How can China solve the dilemma of deeply indebted local governments? Perhaps by looking at Europe’s handling of the euro crisis, Alfred Schipke writes an opinion piece. The Professor of International Finance at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and Director of the East Asian Institute (EAI) at the National University of Singapore identifies some similarities.
If you wish to learn more about this topic: Today at 11:00 am CET, Schipke and Ludger Schuknecht, Vice President and Corporate Secretary of the AIIB, will discuss the topic as part of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy’s (IfW) Global China Conversations event series. “Dealing with Local Government Debt: Can China Learn from the Euro Crisis?” is the title of the webinar moderated by Amelie Richter. China.Table is media partner of the event series.
Armed with so much reading material, I hope you have a good start to the week!
Professor Bimberg, the Chinese Academy of Sciences founded the “Bimberg Chinese-German Center for Green Photonics,” named after you at the Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP). (中国科学院长春光学精密机械与物理研究所). What is it that you do there?
Over twelve years ago, my group at TU Berlin was one of the first in the world to specialize in “green” photonics, that is, energy efficiency, especially in optical data transmission and in data centers. In Changchun, we conduct basic research with students. We also patent our ideas in the EU and the USA. All of our results are published – mainly in US journals.
Why don’t you do research at German institutions?
In Germany, once you reach a certain age, you are no longer allowed to use the laboratories you have set up – even if you pay for the staff yourself, for example, via EU contracts – so you are no longer allowed to research like I do. In the United States, this is unconstitutional. And in China, my experience is apparently still considered useful. The country allows me to implement my ideas.
And does it benefit from this by strengthening its innovative power compared to Germany, thanks to your help?
Germany benefits equally from our basic research. All the patents we develop are available for sale internationally. I have also been in talks with a leading German laser company for some time. Whoever buys first gets to own the innovations.
Is it correct to assume that we are falling behind China from a technological perspective? Or is the Chinese side just telling us this in order to tie us unconditionally to China?
Both are true in part. China naturally has an interest in building close relations with us. However, I believe that our economy is hesitant when it comes to acquiring patents from German universities. The TU Berlin already sold some of our patents to Asia years ago for a seven-figure sum, but not to German DAX companies.
Does this mean that the German economy rejects the results of German research?
Certainly not categorically, but during my talks with large companies, I hardly ever came across internally independent innovation managers like the ones I had when I worked for Hewlett-Packard in Palo Alto. During my time there, we regularly flew from Palo Alto to seminars at the university in Santa Barbara to learn about the latest research in areas that were important to us.
And in Germany?
We conduct a lot of basic research in Germany, both at universities and at the institutes of the Leibniz and Helmholtz Associations. This has little to do with current social needs or new company products. But even if basic research develops patents, companies are still faced with the problem that implementing processes they have not developed themselves would involve investments that they would shy away from.
How can we then bridge the gap between research and the economy so that Germany also benefits as a business hub?
With spin-offs, in other words outsourcing the patent and further developing it in a separate company. Industry representatives have told me that, as an alternative, they would invest in the purchase of mature spin-offs with sufficiently trained staff instead of converting their own production to a new process based solely on a patent.
So the reason why we are losing innovative strength is just a lack of entrepreneurial spirit at German universities?
No, the universities lack both money and strong industrial cooperation partners. Despite its excellence status, TU Berlin can barely pay its existing staff. But it doesn’t have enough money to repair run-down buildings. We should improve the organization of the funds available to the state.
How?
The success of Helmholtz and Leibniz institutes should also be measured in terms of achieving a certain number of patents, validating them and actively pursuing spin-offs. We also need to consider integrating some of the institutes or parts of them with their resources into the universities. This would allow them to focus more on research instead of acquiring third-party funding. In many places, we fail to give more value to application-oriented research.
Why Helmholtz and Leibniz specifically?
Because they receive a lot of money over the long term. They mainly conduct basic research, which is hoped to pay off at some point. That is not enough, but they are good lobbyists for their structures. The situation is different at the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft in particular, where around 80 percent of the funding has to come from projects.
Do you believe that reallocations can permanently return Germany to the world’s top 3 innovation powerhouses?
It would at least be an important starting point. However, it would also be important to invest in the integration of international students and visiting academics – for example, through language training. We must try to make life here easier for them. Then they will stay here. But companies can also do more. The Chinese industry is much more open toward research. They put money on the table and tell universities or research institutions like ours: In one or two years, we will need this solution to a current problem, you can do it.
So it is not etched in stone that Germany is hopelessly behind China when it comes to innovation?
Of course not. There are always new challenges where everyone has to start from scratch again. A good example is vaccine development. We have to prevent ourselves from becoming isolated from China or the USA because we are afraid that someone will take something away from us. We have to face the competition. We can do that. But we also have to understand that we won’t get far with work-life balance as a core aspect of an organizational culture. We all need to invest more in workforce and intelligence. We have the potential. Business as usual will leave us falling behind.
Nano physicist and solid-state researcher Dieter Bimberg is a member of the German Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, honorary member of the Ioffe Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Fellow of the American Physical Society, Life Fellow of the Institute of Electronic and Electrical Engineers, Foreign Member of the US National Academy of Engineering. In 2012, TU Berlin awarded him the Golden Honorary Medal for outstanding achievements in research and teaching. Since 2018, he has headed the Bimberg Sino-German Center for Green Photonics named after him at the Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics.
In early October, a major Chinese state-owned company specialized in making railway equipment unveiled their new product: a mega wind turbine. The turbine called “Qihang” – meaning to set sail – is designed to float on the ocean. It is so big its blades cover an area as big as seven football pitches when they spin, its manufacturer CRRC announced.
But two days later, a bigger offshore turbine nudged Qihang out of the limelight. The product, manufactured by DongFang Electric Corporation (DEC) – a Chinese state-owned company that makes power-generation equipment – can sweep the wind in an area equivalent to 10.5 football pitches in size, the company said in a release. It is 185 meters tall, roughly the height of a 63-story building, the company added.
Both pieces of equipment represent a trend that sees Chinese companies scramble to make bigger turbines with longer blades and larger capacity. Other companies, such as Goldwind and Shanghai Electric, are making the same push:
This trend reflects China’s following ambitions:
“If the total installed capacity of an offshore wind project stays the same, using a turbine model that has a bigger capacity means less of them would be needed,” Qin Haiyan, the secretary-general of the Chinese Wind Energy Association, the main wind industry trade body in the country, told Table.Briefings This can slash the projects’ cost in many ways, from construction to maintenance, Qin said.
When a wind farm’s cost is reduced, it can sell its electricity to the grid at a lower unit price, and this can boost wind power’s competitiveness in the power system and spur its deployment, Qin noted.
In China, around 40 percent of the investment in an offshore wind farm goes to purchasing wind turbines, while 30 percent or so is spent on other equipment, such as undersea cables and power stations, according to estimates by Zhou. Zhou is manager at a consulting firm focused on renewable power projects who asked to be cited by his family name only. “Using less turbines will save cables, therefore cutting costs,” Zhou said.
Both CRRC and DEC have finished manufacturing the components of their respective mega turbines, but they have yet to install them on a wind farm for a test. Nevertheless, both companies have high hopes for them. CRRC plans to assemble and test its mega-turbine in the eastern province of Shandong before installing it in the deep sea, state broadcaster CCTV reported in early October. DEC’s mega-turbine will be installed off the coast of Fujian in southeast China in the first half of 2026, says Secretary-General Qin, citing the state news agency Xinhua.
CRRC said that its Qihang, with a capacity of 20 megawatts (MW), would be able to generate up to 62 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of electricity each year, enough to meet the annual power needs of 37,000 households. In comparison, DEC’s 26MW turbine is set to keep 55,000 households running for a year with its designed annual output of 100 GWh while operating under an average wind speed of 10 meters per second, according to DEC.
Bigger turbines can harness winds blowing at higher speeds, according to Deng Simeng, a Shanghai-based renewable analyst at Rystad Energy, a consultancy headquartered in Norway. “This means wind farms can operate more hours, which will bring down the unit price of its electricity,” she told Table.Briefings.
Beijing is increasingly shifting its focus to offshore wind farms. A good example of such efficiency-seeking is OceanX, a massive floating platform commissioned by Ming Yang Smart Energy in August, which carries not one but two enormous wind turbines. The 16.6 megawatt (MW) twin-turbine platform has been installed in the South China Sea off the province of Guangdong and is due to generate 54 GWh of electricity yearly.
Other companies, such as Goldwind, Shanghai Electric and China State Shipbuilding Corporation, also launched offshore turbines with a capacity of 25 MW in October.
Chinese companies’ big-turbine strategy stems from China’s blueprint to harness wind resources far away from its shores. The country is building five major offshore wind power bases along its eastern and southern coast, each of which is set to reach at least 10 gigawatts (GW) in capacity, according to China’s renewable energy plan for 2021 to 2025. “A batch of” 1 GW offshore wind farms are also being developed, which are supposed to connect with each other when completed, the plan said.
“Vigorously” developing offshore wind has “strategic importance” for China, according to Qin. It can not only help the country fast-track energy transition and hit its climate targets but also drive the social and economic upgrade, he said.
More importantly, upscaling offshore wind power capacity can help China’s economic hubs, such as Shanghai and Guangdong, bolster energy security. “China’s onshore renewable resources are concentrated in the northwest, northeast and northern regions, while most of the electricity usage comes from the south and east of the country,” Zhou said. “If the southern and eastern coastal regions can develop offshore wind projects on a large scale, they will be able to receive large volumes of wind power without being restricted by the availability of long-distance transmission lines.”
By 2030, around 10 percent of all electricity used by China’s eastern coastal regions is expected to come from offshore wind farms, according to Wu Zhiquan, chairman of Yunnan International Power Investment under China’s State Power Investment Group. Wu projected the portion to jump to 30 percent by 2060.
But installing bigger turbines in the sea won’t be easy. “It is harder to transport and install longer blades, and higher safety requirements are needed to install and operate them,” Deng said. Another main challenge is to obtain paperwork. “It is harder for developers to receive approvals for using maritime spaces than onshore land,” she added.
For Zhou, typhoons present another hurdle. “Different from Europe, China has to deal with typhoons in its waters, so mega wind turbines must be designed to withstand them.” He added that more research is needed to enable offshore wind to be connected to the power grid at large volumes. You Xiaoying
Some of China’s provinces and autonomous regions, collectively referred to here as local governments, are grappling with significant fiscal challenges that have weighed on economic activity. These regions are economically and demographically diverse, comparable in many respects to European Union countries. For instance, Guangdong Province has a population of 126 million, while Tibet’s is just 3.6 million.
Historically, local governments in China have played a pivotal role not only in providing public services but also in driving economic growth. They were instrumental in China’s reform and opening up, spearheaded substantial public investment, and were tasked with implementing countercyclical policies. However, the sharp correction in China’s property market over the past couple of years, combined with the accumulation of off-balance-sheet debt through local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), has created acute financing challenges with both short- and medium-term implications.
Local government debt levels (including on- and off-balance-sheet liabilities) have reached thresholds comparable to Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio of 150 percent during the peak of the Euro crisis in 2010. This parallel has drawn considerable attention due to striking similarities and highlights lessons that China could learn from Europe’s experiences (Guo and Schipke, 2023). Compounding the issue, local governments have faced a dramatic decline in land sale revenues-a historically significant source of funding. For example, gross land sales contributed 8 percent of GDP in 2020 but are projected to fall to just 2.4 percent of GDP in 2024.
In response to these challenges, the central government has introduced substantial fiscal support measures. Notably, the recently announced RMB 12 trillion package has eased pressures by enabling local governments to refinance more expensive LGFV debt with lower-interest official bonds of longer maturities.
These steps are crucial for de-risking and mitigating potential financial system spillovers. Depending on economic performance, further fiscal measures may be necessary to stimulate demand in the short term.
Equally critical, however, are the medium-term challenges of establishing fiscal sustainability for local governments. Recognizing this, the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held from July 15 to 18, 2024, emphasized several structural reforms in its “Resolution on Further Deepening Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernization.”
These reforms include reassessing central-local spending obligations, introducing local government taxes, and strengthening fiscal frameworks to prevent future debt accumulation. Furthermore, countercyclical fiscal policies should increasingly rely on the central government’s balance sheet. Addressing these local government challenges is paramount for China to continue achieving high and sustainable growth.
This article is part of the “Global China Conversations” event series by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW). Today, Monday (November 25, 11.00 a.m., CET), Alfred Schipke, Professor of International Finance at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and Director of the East Asian Institute (EAI) at the National University of Singapore, and Ludger Schuknecht, Vice President and Corporate Secretary of the AIIB, will discuss the topic “Dealing with Local Government Debt: Can China Learn from the Euro Crisis?” The webinar will be held in English. China.Table is media partner of this event series.
Editorial note: Now more than ever, discussing China means controversial debates. At China.Table we want to reflect the diversity of opinions to give you an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinions do not reflect the views of the editorial team.
It was again that time yesterday: 2,000 runners from over 20 countries competed in the Shanghai Tower Vertical Marathon. The name “marathon” is deceptive – fortunately. The runners did not have to cover 42 kilometers, but “only” 119 floors. The vertical route in the Shanghai Tower is 552 meters high and has 3,398 steps, making the event the highest tower run in the world. Ryoji Watanabe from Japan achieved the best time for the men: he finished in 18 minutes. Tea Faber from Croatia won the women’s race, conquering all the steps in 21 minutes and 26 seconds.
At 82, nanophysicist and Leopoldina member Dieter Bimberg is far from out of the game. At the Technical University of Berlin, he was once one of the first in the world to specialize in “green” photonics – energy efficiency, especially in optical data transmission and data centers. Despite his advanced age, he wants to continue researching, but regulatory hurdles stand in the way in Germany.
And so Bimberg moved to Changchun. This is where the Chinese Academy of Sciences founded the “Bimberg Chinese-German Center for Green Photonics,” named after him at the Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP). “The country allows me to put my ideas into practice,” says Bimberg. However, abandoning Germany as an innovation hub is by no means his intention. In an interview with Marcel Grzanna, Bimberg says: “We have to face the competition, we can do it.” And provides some suggestions on “how.”
Gigantic wind turbines in the middle of the ocean as high as a 63-storey building – that sounds like gigantism made in China. Indeed, several companies are currently developing mega-turbines designed to drastically increase efficiency. However, these megawatt monsters have not yet been tested under realistic conditions. Among the many challenges are typhoons, which regularly hit China’s eastern coastal regions. And installing them is also tricky. However, as You Xiaoying writes in her analysis, ten percent of China’s electricity is expected to come from offshore wind farms by 2030.
How can China solve the dilemma of deeply indebted local governments? Perhaps by looking at Europe’s handling of the euro crisis, Alfred Schipke writes an opinion piece. The Professor of International Finance at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and Director of the East Asian Institute (EAI) at the National University of Singapore identifies some similarities.
If you wish to learn more about this topic: Today at 11:00 am CET, Schipke and Ludger Schuknecht, Vice President and Corporate Secretary of the AIIB, will discuss the topic as part of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy’s (IfW) Global China Conversations event series. “Dealing with Local Government Debt: Can China Learn from the Euro Crisis?” is the title of the webinar moderated by Amelie Richter. China.Table is media partner of the event series.
Armed with so much reading material, I hope you have a good start to the week!
Professor Bimberg, the Chinese Academy of Sciences founded the “Bimberg Chinese-German Center for Green Photonics,” named after you at the Changchun Institute of Optics Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP). (中国科学院长春光学精密机械与物理研究所). What is it that you do there?
Over twelve years ago, my group at TU Berlin was one of the first in the world to specialize in “green” photonics, that is, energy efficiency, especially in optical data transmission and in data centers. In Changchun, we conduct basic research with students. We also patent our ideas in the EU and the USA. All of our results are published – mainly in US journals.
Why don’t you do research at German institutions?
In Germany, once you reach a certain age, you are no longer allowed to use the laboratories you have set up – even if you pay for the staff yourself, for example, via EU contracts – so you are no longer allowed to research like I do. In the United States, this is unconstitutional. And in China, my experience is apparently still considered useful. The country allows me to implement my ideas.
And does it benefit from this by strengthening its innovative power compared to Germany, thanks to your help?
Germany benefits equally from our basic research. All the patents we develop are available for sale internationally. I have also been in talks with a leading German laser company for some time. Whoever buys first gets to own the innovations.
Is it correct to assume that we are falling behind China from a technological perspective? Or is the Chinese side just telling us this in order to tie us unconditionally to China?
Both are true in part. China naturally has an interest in building close relations with us. However, I believe that our economy is hesitant when it comes to acquiring patents from German universities. The TU Berlin already sold some of our patents to Asia years ago for a seven-figure sum, but not to German DAX companies.
Does this mean that the German economy rejects the results of German research?
Certainly not categorically, but during my talks with large companies, I hardly ever came across internally independent innovation managers like the ones I had when I worked for Hewlett-Packard in Palo Alto. During my time there, we regularly flew from Palo Alto to seminars at the university in Santa Barbara to learn about the latest research in areas that were important to us.
And in Germany?
We conduct a lot of basic research in Germany, both at universities and at the institutes of the Leibniz and Helmholtz Associations. This has little to do with current social needs or new company products. But even if basic research develops patents, companies are still faced with the problem that implementing processes they have not developed themselves would involve investments that they would shy away from.
How can we then bridge the gap between research and the economy so that Germany also benefits as a business hub?
With spin-offs, in other words outsourcing the patent and further developing it in a separate company. Industry representatives have told me that, as an alternative, they would invest in the purchase of mature spin-offs with sufficiently trained staff instead of converting their own production to a new process based solely on a patent.
So the reason why we are losing innovative strength is just a lack of entrepreneurial spirit at German universities?
No, the universities lack both money and strong industrial cooperation partners. Despite its excellence status, TU Berlin can barely pay its existing staff. But it doesn’t have enough money to repair run-down buildings. We should improve the organization of the funds available to the state.
How?
The success of Helmholtz and Leibniz institutes should also be measured in terms of achieving a certain number of patents, validating them and actively pursuing spin-offs. We also need to consider integrating some of the institutes or parts of them with their resources into the universities. This would allow them to focus more on research instead of acquiring third-party funding. In many places, we fail to give more value to application-oriented research.
Why Helmholtz and Leibniz specifically?
Because they receive a lot of money over the long term. They mainly conduct basic research, which is hoped to pay off at some point. That is not enough, but they are good lobbyists for their structures. The situation is different at the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft in particular, where around 80 percent of the funding has to come from projects.
Do you believe that reallocations can permanently return Germany to the world’s top 3 innovation powerhouses?
It would at least be an important starting point. However, it would also be important to invest in the integration of international students and visiting academics – for example, through language training. We must try to make life here easier for them. Then they will stay here. But companies can also do more. The Chinese industry is much more open toward research. They put money on the table and tell universities or research institutions like ours: In one or two years, we will need this solution to a current problem, you can do it.
So it is not etched in stone that Germany is hopelessly behind China when it comes to innovation?
Of course not. There are always new challenges where everyone has to start from scratch again. A good example is vaccine development. We have to prevent ourselves from becoming isolated from China or the USA because we are afraid that someone will take something away from us. We have to face the competition. We can do that. But we also have to understand that we won’t get far with work-life balance as a core aspect of an organizational culture. We all need to invest more in workforce and intelligence. We have the potential. Business as usual will leave us falling behind.
Nano physicist and solid-state researcher Dieter Bimberg is a member of the German Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, honorary member of the Ioffe Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Fellow of the American Physical Society, Life Fellow of the Institute of Electronic and Electrical Engineers, Foreign Member of the US National Academy of Engineering. In 2012, TU Berlin awarded him the Golden Honorary Medal for outstanding achievements in research and teaching. Since 2018, he has headed the Bimberg Sino-German Center for Green Photonics named after him at the Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics.
In early October, a major Chinese state-owned company specialized in making railway equipment unveiled their new product: a mega wind turbine. The turbine called “Qihang” – meaning to set sail – is designed to float on the ocean. It is so big its blades cover an area as big as seven football pitches when they spin, its manufacturer CRRC announced.
But two days later, a bigger offshore turbine nudged Qihang out of the limelight. The product, manufactured by DongFang Electric Corporation (DEC) – a Chinese state-owned company that makes power-generation equipment – can sweep the wind in an area equivalent to 10.5 football pitches in size, the company said in a release. It is 185 meters tall, roughly the height of a 63-story building, the company added.
Both pieces of equipment represent a trend that sees Chinese companies scramble to make bigger turbines with longer blades and larger capacity. Other companies, such as Goldwind and Shanghai Electric, are making the same push:
This trend reflects China’s following ambitions:
“If the total installed capacity of an offshore wind project stays the same, using a turbine model that has a bigger capacity means less of them would be needed,” Qin Haiyan, the secretary-general of the Chinese Wind Energy Association, the main wind industry trade body in the country, told Table.Briefings This can slash the projects’ cost in many ways, from construction to maintenance, Qin said.
When a wind farm’s cost is reduced, it can sell its electricity to the grid at a lower unit price, and this can boost wind power’s competitiveness in the power system and spur its deployment, Qin noted.
In China, around 40 percent of the investment in an offshore wind farm goes to purchasing wind turbines, while 30 percent or so is spent on other equipment, such as undersea cables and power stations, according to estimates by Zhou. Zhou is manager at a consulting firm focused on renewable power projects who asked to be cited by his family name only. “Using less turbines will save cables, therefore cutting costs,” Zhou said.
Both CRRC and DEC have finished manufacturing the components of their respective mega turbines, but they have yet to install them on a wind farm for a test. Nevertheless, both companies have high hopes for them. CRRC plans to assemble and test its mega-turbine in the eastern province of Shandong before installing it in the deep sea, state broadcaster CCTV reported in early October. DEC’s mega-turbine will be installed off the coast of Fujian in southeast China in the first half of 2026, says Secretary-General Qin, citing the state news agency Xinhua.
CRRC said that its Qihang, with a capacity of 20 megawatts (MW), would be able to generate up to 62 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of electricity each year, enough to meet the annual power needs of 37,000 households. In comparison, DEC’s 26MW turbine is set to keep 55,000 households running for a year with its designed annual output of 100 GWh while operating under an average wind speed of 10 meters per second, according to DEC.
Bigger turbines can harness winds blowing at higher speeds, according to Deng Simeng, a Shanghai-based renewable analyst at Rystad Energy, a consultancy headquartered in Norway. “This means wind farms can operate more hours, which will bring down the unit price of its electricity,” she told Table.Briefings.
Beijing is increasingly shifting its focus to offshore wind farms. A good example of such efficiency-seeking is OceanX, a massive floating platform commissioned by Ming Yang Smart Energy in August, which carries not one but two enormous wind turbines. The 16.6 megawatt (MW) twin-turbine platform has been installed in the South China Sea off the province of Guangdong and is due to generate 54 GWh of electricity yearly.
Other companies, such as Goldwind, Shanghai Electric and China State Shipbuilding Corporation, also launched offshore turbines with a capacity of 25 MW in October.
Chinese companies’ big-turbine strategy stems from China’s blueprint to harness wind resources far away from its shores. The country is building five major offshore wind power bases along its eastern and southern coast, each of which is set to reach at least 10 gigawatts (GW) in capacity, according to China’s renewable energy plan for 2021 to 2025. “A batch of” 1 GW offshore wind farms are also being developed, which are supposed to connect with each other when completed, the plan said.
“Vigorously” developing offshore wind has “strategic importance” for China, according to Qin. It can not only help the country fast-track energy transition and hit its climate targets but also drive the social and economic upgrade, he said.
More importantly, upscaling offshore wind power capacity can help China’s economic hubs, such as Shanghai and Guangdong, bolster energy security. “China’s onshore renewable resources are concentrated in the northwest, northeast and northern regions, while most of the electricity usage comes from the south and east of the country,” Zhou said. “If the southern and eastern coastal regions can develop offshore wind projects on a large scale, they will be able to receive large volumes of wind power without being restricted by the availability of long-distance transmission lines.”
By 2030, around 10 percent of all electricity used by China’s eastern coastal regions is expected to come from offshore wind farms, according to Wu Zhiquan, chairman of Yunnan International Power Investment under China’s State Power Investment Group. Wu projected the portion to jump to 30 percent by 2060.
But installing bigger turbines in the sea won’t be easy. “It is harder to transport and install longer blades, and higher safety requirements are needed to install and operate them,” Deng said. Another main challenge is to obtain paperwork. “It is harder for developers to receive approvals for using maritime spaces than onshore land,” she added.
For Zhou, typhoons present another hurdle. “Different from Europe, China has to deal with typhoons in its waters, so mega wind turbines must be designed to withstand them.” He added that more research is needed to enable offshore wind to be connected to the power grid at large volumes. You Xiaoying
Some of China’s provinces and autonomous regions, collectively referred to here as local governments, are grappling with significant fiscal challenges that have weighed on economic activity. These regions are economically and demographically diverse, comparable in many respects to European Union countries. For instance, Guangdong Province has a population of 126 million, while Tibet’s is just 3.6 million.
Historically, local governments in China have played a pivotal role not only in providing public services but also in driving economic growth. They were instrumental in China’s reform and opening up, spearheaded substantial public investment, and were tasked with implementing countercyclical policies. However, the sharp correction in China’s property market over the past couple of years, combined with the accumulation of off-balance-sheet debt through local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), has created acute financing challenges with both short- and medium-term implications.
Local government debt levels (including on- and off-balance-sheet liabilities) have reached thresholds comparable to Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio of 150 percent during the peak of the Euro crisis in 2010. This parallel has drawn considerable attention due to striking similarities and highlights lessons that China could learn from Europe’s experiences (Guo and Schipke, 2023). Compounding the issue, local governments have faced a dramatic decline in land sale revenues-a historically significant source of funding. For example, gross land sales contributed 8 percent of GDP in 2020 but are projected to fall to just 2.4 percent of GDP in 2024.
In response to these challenges, the central government has introduced substantial fiscal support measures. Notably, the recently announced RMB 12 trillion package has eased pressures by enabling local governments to refinance more expensive LGFV debt with lower-interest official bonds of longer maturities.
These steps are crucial for de-risking and mitigating potential financial system spillovers. Depending on economic performance, further fiscal measures may be necessary to stimulate demand in the short term.
Equally critical, however, are the medium-term challenges of establishing fiscal sustainability for local governments. Recognizing this, the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held from July 15 to 18, 2024, emphasized several structural reforms in its “Resolution on Further Deepening Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernization.”
These reforms include reassessing central-local spending obligations, introducing local government taxes, and strengthening fiscal frameworks to prevent future debt accumulation. Furthermore, countercyclical fiscal policies should increasingly rely on the central government’s balance sheet. Addressing these local government challenges is paramount for China to continue achieving high and sustainable growth.
This article is part of the “Global China Conversations” event series by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW). Today, Monday (November 25, 11.00 a.m., CET), Alfred Schipke, Professor of International Finance at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and Director of the East Asian Institute (EAI) at the National University of Singapore, and Ludger Schuknecht, Vice President and Corporate Secretary of the AIIB, will discuss the topic “Dealing with Local Government Debt: Can China Learn from the Euro Crisis?” The webinar will be held in English. China.Table is media partner of this event series.
Editorial note: Now more than ever, discussing China means controversial debates. At China.Table we want to reflect the diversity of opinions to give you an insight into the breadth of the debate. Opinions do not reflect the views of the editorial team.
It was again that time yesterday: 2,000 runners from over 20 countries competed in the Shanghai Tower Vertical Marathon. The name “marathon” is deceptive – fortunately. The runners did not have to cover 42 kilometers, but “only” 119 floors. The vertical route in the Shanghai Tower is 552 meters high and has 3,398 steps, making the event the highest tower run in the world. Ryoji Watanabe from Japan achieved the best time for the men: he finished in 18 minutes. Tea Faber from Croatia won the women’s race, conquering all the steps in 21 minutes and 26 seconds.
