Since Russia’s attack on Ukraine, China has been performing a rather breathtaking balancing act on the diplomatic stage. But discontent about Beijing is growing by the day. Now, on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing, Foreign Minister Wang Yi has finally found clear words – but many in the West will not be pleased. Wang made it clear to the press on whose side China is in this conflict: Russia.
There are many reasons why China, of all countries, would be predestined to act as a mediator, as today’s analysis shows. But for this to happen, China would have to live up to its own claim to be a responsible actor at the international level.
Our second piece of today also focuses on China’s influence, or more precisely, on technology. Speaking with Marcel Grzanna, longtime China author Didi Kirsten Tatlow reveals the various methods the People’s Republic uses to siphon off technological know-how from the West. Remarkably, not all of China’s 32 methods are illegal. However, it is easy to see which technologies China wants to get its hands on particular In any case, Tatlow’s warning is clear – and concerns us all: It is high time that we realize how much this threatens our models of open society.
Ms. Tatlow, for over 30 years we have watched relatively emotionlessly how technology flows out of Germany to China. Why should this matter concern us more now?
China and the world have changed. Beijing is now very assertive and has begun to export its authoritarian political values. Together with Russia, China wants to change the world order in its favor. Not even the Ukraine war can upset this alliance, as we can now see.
What does this have to do with technology?
The export of political values also primarily takes place via the economy and cyberspace. China uses communications and high technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum technology or semiconductors in ever new applications and products. In China, they contribute to perfecting a totalitarian state. But these products also flow back into our midst. So we should think very carefully about how much we want to promote this development with our own innovations.
Why should we be concerned about these products?
We should be aware that we cannot control technology from China in the long term. Take Huawei, for example. When the manufacturer’s operating system requires an update, it is sent to the cell phone from the People’s Republic. Investigations in Australia have shown that these updates have significant security vulnerabilities.
Facebook has those, too.
The law stipulates that China’s private sector must cooperate closely with the party. And, unlike in the US, we have no chance whatsoever from the outside to track down these connections through journalism, the rule of law, or civic activism. So behind all these Chinese products lies a dictatorial system to which we are, slowly but surely, at risk of technologically surrendering ourselves.
What impact would that have on our society?
On many levels. It starts with apps like TikTok, which many young people in Germany use and which is controlled by Beijing. Some studies show that TikTok censors content based on the political interests of the Chinese government. Such apps are also useful for spreading subtle and thus highly effective propaganda messages.
No one has to download TikTok.
No. But when smart city concepts are implemented around the world with Chinese technology, there must be a close exchange between the provider and the respective administration. The administration must grant the Chinese company access to its administrative processes. It should be clear to everyone that this makes us vulnerable and dependent on Chinese software and, as a result, Chinese hardware in the long term.
Where lies the danger?
Technology is not value-free. With Chinese technology and our growing dependence on it, our values are supposed to change, too, and with them, our behavior. But we have been building our values for decades. Not just ideologically. We have invested billions and billions in our education system, also to support our basic democratic order.
In your book “China’s Quest for Foreign Technology – Beyond Espionage”, you identified 32 methods used by the People’s Republic to siphon off technology from Germany and other countries. You only classify twelve of these methods as legal.
These legal methods start with research agreements and stretch all the way to capital contributions via investment companies. The problem is that most of the time we don’t look too closely at who is behind them, and therefore we don’t notice the pattern. How is it that a company like Nuctech, owned through branches by the China National Nuclear Corporation, is now one of the largest suppliers of cargo and vehicle scanners at European ports, airports, and NATO borders in 26 EU member states? This company is capable of collecting highly sensitive personal, military, or transport data.
All of this is legal. That leaves 20 illegal or semi-illegal methods.
These are contract violations, espionage, or even patent infringements. Or they move in a gray area. This includes, for example, the obligation of Chinese who return from abroad to share their knowledge with the state. Even those Chinese who do not return are reminded of their moral obligations through countless associations of the party system that work for the United Front. Enterprises or researchers have to remember the interests of the motherland.
However, some companies praise the fact that their patents are now better protected in China.
That may be the case when it comes to design or technologies that have nothing to do with the key economic sectors. In other areas, things are different. Just a few days ago, the EU filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization because it feels that the key technologies of European companies are not sufficiently protected in China.
China is threatening heavy fines should European companies make use of their rights in third countries in case of infringement of their patents.
In this way, companies are coerced into accepting license fees while Chinese competitors take advantage of their technology. That is why Japan will ban the usual patent publication after 18 months in certain sectors by 2023 and make default payments to affected Japanese companies.
Chinese investment in Germany has slowed in recent years. That hardly looks like a big appetite for German technology?
Following the sale of Kuka in 2016, German policymakers have become more aware of the situation and have raised the barriers. Growing skepticism in Germany is also prompting China to exercise restraint. But investments are only a small part of the technology outflow. China has long been reaching out to our talents. These are people with the best expertise, who are paid a lot of money and given the opportunity to conduct almost any kind of research they want.
Where should we draw the line on investment and cooperation from and with China?
The Chinese government’s five-year plans offer us a guideline. Everything listed there as key technologies for certain sectors is of particular interest to China in Germany. The utmost caution must be exercised here.
Greater shielding would not be met with approval from everyone in Germany. Some researchers and companies might see it as an attack on their own interests.
This is also due to the fact that the existing threat is simply not yet sufficiently communicated. Our relationship with China over the past 20 years has been characterized by being particularly nice and sometimes looking the other way. But if we continue to behave in this way, we will become highly susceptible to manipulation. This also raises the question whether looking the other way is actually respectful. Because this also means that we still don’t take China seriously enough. But we should, because the system there is a huge challenge for our open societies.
When China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi addressed the press on Monday, tensions were high. The National People’s Congress is convening in Beijing, and it is one of those rare moments of the year when China’s leadership publicly presents its plans and goals for the coming year (China.Table reported).
And these are currently urgently needed in foreign policy: Global discontent over China’s behavior in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is growing with each passing day (China.Table reported). Since the Russian attack on Ukraine, China has been performing an almost breathtaking balancing act: On the one hand, it emphasizes its commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territoriality; on the other hand, Beijing avoids condemning the Russian attack, which is tearing this very sovereignty and territoriality apart.
But on this Monday afternoon, Wang Yi speaks frankly in Beijing – but his words are not what many in the West had hoped for. When asked if China will finally use its influence on Russia to put an end to the Ukraine crisis, Wang replies, “No matter how perilous the international landscape, we will maintain our strategic focus and promote the development of a comprehensive China-Russia partnership in the new era.”
To fully understand China’s position, you have to listen carefully: The foreign minister does not use words like war, invasion, or attack. Instead, he speaks of a “Ukraine problem” or the “situation in Ukraine. This “situation” has “complex causes” and, above all, the “legitimate security needs of all parties” must be taken into account. From China’s perspective, this means Russia, in particular.
The statement made by China’s foreign minister at the start of the week is an act of revelation. From the perspective of the leadership in Beijing, not only China and Russia benefit from the close amity between the two states. Sino-Russian cooperation “not only advances the interests of both peoples but also contributes to peace, stability, and development in the world.” China’s friendship with Russia is “rock solid” and “one of the most crucial bilateral relationships in the world,” he said. This should finally correct many an illusion in the West.
But Wang also voiced criticism, especially of the United States. America, he said, was stuck in a Cold War mentality, fueling confrontations and causing division and instability. In the Indo-Pacific, for example, the US government is trying “to maintain the US-led system of hegemony.”
Concerning the human suffering in Ukraine, Wang called for humanitarian issues not to be “politicized.” Rather, the warring parties should ensure safe access for humanitarian aid. According to Wang, the Red Cross Society of China will also send aid packages to Ukraine.
But China remains true to itself on Monday. Despite all its loyalty to Moscow, Beijing does not want to place all its political weight on Putin. As clear as Wang’s statements sound, there are also voices in China that criticize Beijing’s ties to Moscow. In an open letter, professors from China’s five most prestigious universities condemn Russia’s aggression in violation of international law and call for an end to the war in Ukraine.
Feng Yujun, director of the Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, also warns: Russia is attempting to exploit the confrontation between China and the United States to achieve its own goals. China should be careful because some countries are solely pursuing their own geopolitical goals in the current crisis, the academic said in an interview with the Chinese TV channel Phoenix.
And so Wang also left a small backdoor for China on Monday. When asked whether Beijing was prepared to use its influence on Russia, Wang replied that China’s President Xi Jinping had already spoken to Vladimir Putin on the phone on February 25. In that phone call, Xi had expressed his desire for Russia and Ukraine to hold peace negotiations as soon as possible. Putin responded positively – and since then two rounds of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia have already taken place. Now all hope is that further progress will be made in the upcoming third round of talks.
China was prepared to continue to play a constructive role in facilitating dialogue for peace, he said. It will continue to work with the international community to mediate. However, the minister did not give details.
Most recently, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said China had signaled to his government a desire to “stop this war”. Kuleba is convinced: “Chinese diplomacy has sufficient tools to make a difference, and we count that it is already involved … and that their efforts will be successful.”
And Europe also believes this to be the case. For example, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell also spoke out in favor of Beijing’s mediation in the Ukraine crisis (China.Table reported). “There is no alternative,” he told the Spanish newspaper El Mundo this weekend. According to Borrell, neither the Europeans nor the US can currently be considered mediators. “It has to be China.”
Indeed, China would be predestined to mediate between Russia and Ukraine – for several reasons. First, China is Russia’s most important partner – both economically and politically. Xi and Putin refer to each other as friends, and the partnership between the two countries is said to know “no limits”.
But at the same time, Ukraine is also an important partner of China. Since 2020, the country has been a member of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. It also provides large quantities of grain and corn to China. In addition, Ukraine supplies China with essential defense equipment such as gas turbine engines for guided-missile destroyers or hovercraft technology (China.Table reported).
And last but not least, China’s own aspiration is to be recognized as a responsible player in international politics. However, if Wang Yi’s statements in Beijing are anything to go by, it seems that China is not yet ready for this.
These days, Angela Stanzel laughs about her mistake: Mao Zedong is God. When she was a child, she had believed that for a moment. On a trip to China with her family, she gazed up in wonder at a gigantic statue of the “Great Helmsman”. The sheer size of the monument captivated her. So she asked her parents: Is that God? But they just laughed and explained the mistake.
Today, it is Angela Stanzel who educates others when it comes to questions and assessments about China. The scholar from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin is one of the most renowned China experts in Germany. Like no other, the 41-year-old combines her academic training in sinology with the experience she has gained in the Middle Kingdom.
She was born in Bonn, the former capital of Germany. Her mother is Taiwanese, her father a German diplomat. The family regularly travels to their mother’s home country. From 1985 to 1987, the Stanzel family lived in Yemen, where father Volker Stanzel worked at the German Embassy. In 1990, he became Head of Communications at the embassy in Beijing, and the family of four moved away from Bonn once again.
Angela was ten years old at the time. China is in turmoil. Just one year earlier, the Chinese military had bloodily suppressed the student democracy movement. Angela barely noticed the tensions in the country. She attends a German school in the capital, and rarely has contact with the locals. “A year after the Tiananmen massacre, we lived there as foreigners in a bubble,” she says. Nevertheless, she feels at home in China and only reluctantly returns to Bonn with her family in 1993. “I was rebellious and angry at my parents at the time because they just dragged me everywhere.”
Still in her teens, she moves away from home. In Berlin, she graduates from high school, works as a waitress for a while, and then decides to study Sinology. “I had already lost the Chinese skills of my childhood and thought I didn’t know the Chinese roots in me well enough.”
Then, in 2004, she was drawn to Beijing once again. “Actually, I only wanted to go there for a language year, but somehow one year turned into six years. You need two to three years to fully immerse yourself in life there,” she says. She works for a German event agency, organizing events for the German Embassy in the run-up to the 2008 Olympics. “I enjoyed building something for myself there.” There is no more living in a bubble. She only makes a brief trip to Germany later on to take her master’s exams.
It is only for her doctoral thesis on Sino-Pakistani relations that she returns to Europe in 2009. But she does not settle down yet. As an Asia expert at various think tanks in Berlin and Brussels, she initially travels around Europe a lot until she starts working at the SWP in early 2020. “I wanted to get to know the everyday working life in Germany. And I longed for stability,” she says.
Today, China seems farther away than ever. “I’m afraid I won’t be able to go there in the future.” Yet she would like to show her three-year-old daughter the country soon. “As a critical scientist, you put yourself in danger in China. You can be arbitrarily detained there, for instance, if an example is to be made.” She cites Michael Kovrig as an example. The Canadian’s detention and conviction for alleged espionage is considered retaliation for the temporary detention of a Chinese Huawei executive in Vancouver. Kovrig conducted research as a Northeast Asia expert for the NGO International Crisis Group.
Stanzel tends to be quite critical of China. The current human rights situation is more precarious than ever before. She also accuses the country of geopolitical provocations. “Beijing is the author of conflicts with its neighbors, such as in the Sino-Indian border area, in the East and South China Seas, or through its threats to Taiwan. The potential for escalation has increased conspicuously since Xi Jinping came to power,” she writes in International Politics magazine.
Since Xi’s inauguration in 2013, the mood in the country has also changed. “His nationalism is becoming increasingly entrenched in the population,” says Stanzel. Europeans are now experiencing more discrimination than in the past. Beijing cabs don’t always stop for foreigners. “Many Chinese now only consider one country on par with them: the United States.” Andreas Schulte
Even Emperor Qianlong 乾隆帝 was only too happy to travel to the Slender West Lake (瘦西湖) in Yangzhou. Sitting on the shore, he delighted in his fishing luck. In the meantime, the lake has become one of China’s AAAAA tourist attractions. You can’t get more A than that. A quick glance is enough to understand why.
Since Russia’s attack on Ukraine, China has been performing a rather breathtaking balancing act on the diplomatic stage. But discontent about Beijing is growing by the day. Now, on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing, Foreign Minister Wang Yi has finally found clear words – but many in the West will not be pleased. Wang made it clear to the press on whose side China is in this conflict: Russia.
There are many reasons why China, of all countries, would be predestined to act as a mediator, as today’s analysis shows. But for this to happen, China would have to live up to its own claim to be a responsible actor at the international level.
Our second piece of today also focuses on China’s influence, or more precisely, on technology. Speaking with Marcel Grzanna, longtime China author Didi Kirsten Tatlow reveals the various methods the People’s Republic uses to siphon off technological know-how from the West. Remarkably, not all of China’s 32 methods are illegal. However, it is easy to see which technologies China wants to get its hands on particular In any case, Tatlow’s warning is clear – and concerns us all: It is high time that we realize how much this threatens our models of open society.
Ms. Tatlow, for over 30 years we have watched relatively emotionlessly how technology flows out of Germany to China. Why should this matter concern us more now?
China and the world have changed. Beijing is now very assertive and has begun to export its authoritarian political values. Together with Russia, China wants to change the world order in its favor. Not even the Ukraine war can upset this alliance, as we can now see.
What does this have to do with technology?
The export of political values also primarily takes place via the economy and cyberspace. China uses communications and high technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum technology or semiconductors in ever new applications and products. In China, they contribute to perfecting a totalitarian state. But these products also flow back into our midst. So we should think very carefully about how much we want to promote this development with our own innovations.
Why should we be concerned about these products?
We should be aware that we cannot control technology from China in the long term. Take Huawei, for example. When the manufacturer’s operating system requires an update, it is sent to the cell phone from the People’s Republic. Investigations in Australia have shown that these updates have significant security vulnerabilities.
Facebook has those, too.
The law stipulates that China’s private sector must cooperate closely with the party. And, unlike in the US, we have no chance whatsoever from the outside to track down these connections through journalism, the rule of law, or civic activism. So behind all these Chinese products lies a dictatorial system to which we are, slowly but surely, at risk of technologically surrendering ourselves.
What impact would that have on our society?
On many levels. It starts with apps like TikTok, which many young people in Germany use and which is controlled by Beijing. Some studies show that TikTok censors content based on the political interests of the Chinese government. Such apps are also useful for spreading subtle and thus highly effective propaganda messages.
No one has to download TikTok.
No. But when smart city concepts are implemented around the world with Chinese technology, there must be a close exchange between the provider and the respective administration. The administration must grant the Chinese company access to its administrative processes. It should be clear to everyone that this makes us vulnerable and dependent on Chinese software and, as a result, Chinese hardware in the long term.
Where lies the danger?
Technology is not value-free. With Chinese technology and our growing dependence on it, our values are supposed to change, too, and with them, our behavior. But we have been building our values for decades. Not just ideologically. We have invested billions and billions in our education system, also to support our basic democratic order.
In your book “China’s Quest for Foreign Technology – Beyond Espionage”, you identified 32 methods used by the People’s Republic to siphon off technology from Germany and other countries. You only classify twelve of these methods as legal.
These legal methods start with research agreements and stretch all the way to capital contributions via investment companies. The problem is that most of the time we don’t look too closely at who is behind them, and therefore we don’t notice the pattern. How is it that a company like Nuctech, owned through branches by the China National Nuclear Corporation, is now one of the largest suppliers of cargo and vehicle scanners at European ports, airports, and NATO borders in 26 EU member states? This company is capable of collecting highly sensitive personal, military, or transport data.
All of this is legal. That leaves 20 illegal or semi-illegal methods.
These are contract violations, espionage, or even patent infringements. Or they move in a gray area. This includes, for example, the obligation of Chinese who return from abroad to share their knowledge with the state. Even those Chinese who do not return are reminded of their moral obligations through countless associations of the party system that work for the United Front. Enterprises or researchers have to remember the interests of the motherland.
However, some companies praise the fact that their patents are now better protected in China.
That may be the case when it comes to design or technologies that have nothing to do with the key economic sectors. In other areas, things are different. Just a few days ago, the EU filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization because it feels that the key technologies of European companies are not sufficiently protected in China.
China is threatening heavy fines should European companies make use of their rights in third countries in case of infringement of their patents.
In this way, companies are coerced into accepting license fees while Chinese competitors take advantage of their technology. That is why Japan will ban the usual patent publication after 18 months in certain sectors by 2023 and make default payments to affected Japanese companies.
Chinese investment in Germany has slowed in recent years. That hardly looks like a big appetite for German technology?
Following the sale of Kuka in 2016, German policymakers have become more aware of the situation and have raised the barriers. Growing skepticism in Germany is also prompting China to exercise restraint. But investments are only a small part of the technology outflow. China has long been reaching out to our talents. These are people with the best expertise, who are paid a lot of money and given the opportunity to conduct almost any kind of research they want.
Where should we draw the line on investment and cooperation from and with China?
The Chinese government’s five-year plans offer us a guideline. Everything listed there as key technologies for certain sectors is of particular interest to China in Germany. The utmost caution must be exercised here.
Greater shielding would not be met with approval from everyone in Germany. Some researchers and companies might see it as an attack on their own interests.
This is also due to the fact that the existing threat is simply not yet sufficiently communicated. Our relationship with China over the past 20 years has been characterized by being particularly nice and sometimes looking the other way. But if we continue to behave in this way, we will become highly susceptible to manipulation. This also raises the question whether looking the other way is actually respectful. Because this also means that we still don’t take China seriously enough. But we should, because the system there is a huge challenge for our open societies.
When China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi addressed the press on Monday, tensions were high. The National People’s Congress is convening in Beijing, and it is one of those rare moments of the year when China’s leadership publicly presents its plans and goals for the coming year (China.Table reported).
And these are currently urgently needed in foreign policy: Global discontent over China’s behavior in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is growing with each passing day (China.Table reported). Since the Russian attack on Ukraine, China has been performing an almost breathtaking balancing act: On the one hand, it emphasizes its commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territoriality; on the other hand, Beijing avoids condemning the Russian attack, which is tearing this very sovereignty and territoriality apart.
But on this Monday afternoon, Wang Yi speaks frankly in Beijing – but his words are not what many in the West had hoped for. When asked if China will finally use its influence on Russia to put an end to the Ukraine crisis, Wang replies, “No matter how perilous the international landscape, we will maintain our strategic focus and promote the development of a comprehensive China-Russia partnership in the new era.”
To fully understand China’s position, you have to listen carefully: The foreign minister does not use words like war, invasion, or attack. Instead, he speaks of a “Ukraine problem” or the “situation in Ukraine. This “situation” has “complex causes” and, above all, the “legitimate security needs of all parties” must be taken into account. From China’s perspective, this means Russia, in particular.
The statement made by China’s foreign minister at the start of the week is an act of revelation. From the perspective of the leadership in Beijing, not only China and Russia benefit from the close amity between the two states. Sino-Russian cooperation “not only advances the interests of both peoples but also contributes to peace, stability, and development in the world.” China’s friendship with Russia is “rock solid” and “one of the most crucial bilateral relationships in the world,” he said. This should finally correct many an illusion in the West.
But Wang also voiced criticism, especially of the United States. America, he said, was stuck in a Cold War mentality, fueling confrontations and causing division and instability. In the Indo-Pacific, for example, the US government is trying “to maintain the US-led system of hegemony.”
Concerning the human suffering in Ukraine, Wang called for humanitarian issues not to be “politicized.” Rather, the warring parties should ensure safe access for humanitarian aid. According to Wang, the Red Cross Society of China will also send aid packages to Ukraine.
But China remains true to itself on Monday. Despite all its loyalty to Moscow, Beijing does not want to place all its political weight on Putin. As clear as Wang’s statements sound, there are also voices in China that criticize Beijing’s ties to Moscow. In an open letter, professors from China’s five most prestigious universities condemn Russia’s aggression in violation of international law and call for an end to the war in Ukraine.
Feng Yujun, director of the Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, also warns: Russia is attempting to exploit the confrontation between China and the United States to achieve its own goals. China should be careful because some countries are solely pursuing their own geopolitical goals in the current crisis, the academic said in an interview with the Chinese TV channel Phoenix.
And so Wang also left a small backdoor for China on Monday. When asked whether Beijing was prepared to use its influence on Russia, Wang replied that China’s President Xi Jinping had already spoken to Vladimir Putin on the phone on February 25. In that phone call, Xi had expressed his desire for Russia and Ukraine to hold peace negotiations as soon as possible. Putin responded positively – and since then two rounds of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia have already taken place. Now all hope is that further progress will be made in the upcoming third round of talks.
China was prepared to continue to play a constructive role in facilitating dialogue for peace, he said. It will continue to work with the international community to mediate. However, the minister did not give details.
Most recently, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said China had signaled to his government a desire to “stop this war”. Kuleba is convinced: “Chinese diplomacy has sufficient tools to make a difference, and we count that it is already involved … and that their efforts will be successful.”
And Europe also believes this to be the case. For example, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell also spoke out in favor of Beijing’s mediation in the Ukraine crisis (China.Table reported). “There is no alternative,” he told the Spanish newspaper El Mundo this weekend. According to Borrell, neither the Europeans nor the US can currently be considered mediators. “It has to be China.”
Indeed, China would be predestined to mediate between Russia and Ukraine – for several reasons. First, China is Russia’s most important partner – both economically and politically. Xi and Putin refer to each other as friends, and the partnership between the two countries is said to know “no limits”.
But at the same time, Ukraine is also an important partner of China. Since 2020, the country has been a member of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. It also provides large quantities of grain and corn to China. In addition, Ukraine supplies China with essential defense equipment such as gas turbine engines for guided-missile destroyers or hovercraft technology (China.Table reported).
And last but not least, China’s own aspiration is to be recognized as a responsible player in international politics. However, if Wang Yi’s statements in Beijing are anything to go by, it seems that China is not yet ready for this.
These days, Angela Stanzel laughs about her mistake: Mao Zedong is God. When she was a child, she had believed that for a moment. On a trip to China with her family, she gazed up in wonder at a gigantic statue of the “Great Helmsman”. The sheer size of the monument captivated her. So she asked her parents: Is that God? But they just laughed and explained the mistake.
Today, it is Angela Stanzel who educates others when it comes to questions and assessments about China. The scholar from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin is one of the most renowned China experts in Germany. Like no other, the 41-year-old combines her academic training in sinology with the experience she has gained in the Middle Kingdom.
She was born in Bonn, the former capital of Germany. Her mother is Taiwanese, her father a German diplomat. The family regularly travels to their mother’s home country. From 1985 to 1987, the Stanzel family lived in Yemen, where father Volker Stanzel worked at the German Embassy. In 1990, he became Head of Communications at the embassy in Beijing, and the family of four moved away from Bonn once again.
Angela was ten years old at the time. China is in turmoil. Just one year earlier, the Chinese military had bloodily suppressed the student democracy movement. Angela barely noticed the tensions in the country. She attends a German school in the capital, and rarely has contact with the locals. “A year after the Tiananmen massacre, we lived there as foreigners in a bubble,” she says. Nevertheless, she feels at home in China and only reluctantly returns to Bonn with her family in 1993. “I was rebellious and angry at my parents at the time because they just dragged me everywhere.”
Still in her teens, she moves away from home. In Berlin, she graduates from high school, works as a waitress for a while, and then decides to study Sinology. “I had already lost the Chinese skills of my childhood and thought I didn’t know the Chinese roots in me well enough.”
Then, in 2004, she was drawn to Beijing once again. “Actually, I only wanted to go there for a language year, but somehow one year turned into six years. You need two to three years to fully immerse yourself in life there,” she says. She works for a German event agency, organizing events for the German Embassy in the run-up to the 2008 Olympics. “I enjoyed building something for myself there.” There is no more living in a bubble. She only makes a brief trip to Germany later on to take her master’s exams.
It is only for her doctoral thesis on Sino-Pakistani relations that she returns to Europe in 2009. But she does not settle down yet. As an Asia expert at various think tanks in Berlin and Brussels, she initially travels around Europe a lot until she starts working at the SWP in early 2020. “I wanted to get to know the everyday working life in Germany. And I longed for stability,” she says.
Today, China seems farther away than ever. “I’m afraid I won’t be able to go there in the future.” Yet she would like to show her three-year-old daughter the country soon. “As a critical scientist, you put yourself in danger in China. You can be arbitrarily detained there, for instance, if an example is to be made.” She cites Michael Kovrig as an example. The Canadian’s detention and conviction for alleged espionage is considered retaliation for the temporary detention of a Chinese Huawei executive in Vancouver. Kovrig conducted research as a Northeast Asia expert for the NGO International Crisis Group.
Stanzel tends to be quite critical of China. The current human rights situation is more precarious than ever before. She also accuses the country of geopolitical provocations. “Beijing is the author of conflicts with its neighbors, such as in the Sino-Indian border area, in the East and South China Seas, or through its threats to Taiwan. The potential for escalation has increased conspicuously since Xi Jinping came to power,” she writes in International Politics magazine.
Since Xi’s inauguration in 2013, the mood in the country has also changed. “His nationalism is becoming increasingly entrenched in the population,” says Stanzel. Europeans are now experiencing more discrimination than in the past. Beijing cabs don’t always stop for foreigners. “Many Chinese now only consider one country on par with them: the United States.” Andreas Schulte
Even Emperor Qianlong 乾隆帝 was only too happy to travel to the Slender West Lake (瘦西湖) in Yangzhou. Sitting on the shore, he delighted in his fishing luck. In the meantime, the lake has become one of China’s AAAAA tourist attractions. You can’t get more A than that. A quick glance is enough to understand why.
