It is fairly normal in the news business. And yet, it is alarming just how quickly the voices of the Hong Kong democracy movement have been pushed into the background in the face of the Ukraine war and the increasingly apparent climate crisis in the global public sphere. And yet Hong Kong activists from their exiles in London, Taiwan, the USA and Berlin continue to campaign for civil liberties in their home city.
One of them is Samuel Chu. Long-term political efforts would need political institutions to be built right now, says the experienced activist in an interview with Fabian Peltsch. “It’s hard, tough, and sometimes frustrating.” But this is the only way the movement can grow and develop – it requires perseverance.
The Chinese government is relying less on perseverance and more on muscle when it comes to reviving the battered second-largest economy. This time, however, it is no longer just investing billions in building more highways, railways and skyscrapers, but in the 5G network, cloud computing and renewable energies. A right and sensible decision, as the analysis by our author team in Beijing shows.
And the Europeans? They should probably prepare for more than just a winter with an imminent gas shortage. We could also use similar programs for the expansion of modern infrastructures that China is now launching.
At the end of May, you visited Oslo, where a copy of the “Pillar of Shame” was erected on a university campus during the Freedom Forum Conference. You are currently working to ensure that a copy of the artwork by Danish artist Jens Galshiøst also finds a temporary home in Berlin. What symbolic value do you attach to the work?
On the one hand, I see it as a sign of solidarity with the people of Hong Kong, who have lost a large part of the rights granted to them under the principle of “one country, two systems”. The sculpture is intended as a reminder of how quickly the decline of these rights in Hong Kong has occurred and how reliable China’s promises really are. On the other hand, I also see the “Pillar of Shame” as a kind of canary in the coal mine: If a copy comes to Berlin, numerous opponents will come out in the open, Chinese students will protest against it, Chinese agents will become visible. And also people in politics. That’s good. This way, we can expose how big China’s influence already is in Germany.
When I meet politicians, even here in Germany, I talk to them about why a free Hong Kong is in their interest. And that what is happening in Hong Kong can also be a prelude to what could happen elsewhere in the world.
You also associate a personal story with the artwork.
My father was one of the first to be contacted by Jens about bringing the artwork to Hong Kong. My father was then, in the mid-1990s, one of the leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance, the largest organization promoting democracy and Tiananmen remembrance culture in Hong Kong. They really wanted to erect the statue before the handover of the British Crown Colony in Hong Kong. It was to be a test of how far China would actually uphold the rights of Hong Kong citizens after 1997. For 32 years it stood in the city and was almost forgotten. It only became the great visible international symbol of the decline of free Hong Kong in 2021, when it had to be removed due to political pressure.
Your father, Baptist reverend and Occupy Central co-founder Chu Yiu-ming, is one of Hong Kong’s best-known human rights activists. What influence did your family background have on your political work?
In 1989, my father led Operation Yellow Bird, which helped bring political refugees out of China and abroad via Hong Kong. As a result, I spent a lot of time with political refugees when I was young. We played soccer and cards while they waited for their humanitarian visas to other countries. This shaped my perspective on the diaspora and dissidents. The Chinese government was effective in its crackdown on them for a long time because it knew that once the activists had fled overseas, they would soon not be heard from again. Political groups were isolated abroad, and the energy of the protests petered out. My work today is to change that.
To what extent?
I’ve dedicated my entire career to building political movements in the democratic world, from climate change to LGBTQ to Black Lives Matter groups. All of them are about growing from a protest movement into something bigger, more permanent. We do have a tendency to romanticize protest movements. But what I keep preaching here is: protest movements rely a lot on individual charismatic people. But long-term political efforts must rely on political institutions. And these need to be built now. It’s hard, tough, and sometimes frustrating. But it’s the only way the movement can grow and evolve.
A Hong Kong journalist now living in Germany told me that many Hong Kongers who sacrificed themselves for the city locally find little cohesion as a diaspora abroad. Have you observed something similar?
You have protesters there who have fought for their rights as a matter of life and death. Many are stuck in this “protest” mindset. They get up every morning and want to shout to the world, “Look what’s happening in Hong Kong!” You have to remember that Hong Kong was never a democracy. People could basically do nothing but protest to be heard. The diaspora is so consumed and always reactive to what’s happening at home in Hong Kong that they can’t engage in building long-term relationships and influence with the local political community. But that’s what’s needed to make a difference in the long run. That doesn’t mean they give up on Hong Kong.
Some people in Hong Kong may still have hope that events in their hometown can be reversed one way or another.
There is no magic formula that can restore Hong Kong to what it was. The UN Human Rights Council recently called on the Hong Kong government to revoke the National Security Act. I’m glad, of course, that that was put on the record. But you can’t undo the fact that 10,000 people have been arrested for peaceful protests and 200+ have been arrested under the National Security Law Jimmy Lai.
Two years ago, a warrant was also issued for your arrest in Hong Kong. And this was despite the fact that you have lived in the US for 30 years and are a US citizen. A precedent.
To a certain extent, I helped to rewrite the rules and the strategy. I do my political work mainly behind the scenes. When the protests reached a peak in 2019, I didn’t fly to Hong Kong to speak to the cameras. I founded the Hong Kong Democracy Council, an advocacy organization run overseas by US citizens. It’s an organization that can actually influence laws and doesn’t just rely on protests and commemorative events. That kind of organization is much more powerful and formidable going up against the Chinese government. After that, I founded The Campaign for Hong Kong – which I lead now.
And that makes you an enemy of the state?
In the National Security Law, there is a paragraph that seems to be aimed directly at me, my organizations and our work. It says, loosely translated, no matter who you are or where you come from, we’re going to get you. I have taken the movement from the streets to Congress and from there to the White House. That’s a shift that China’s government didn’t expect. That’s why they had to revise their playbook and target foreign activists as well. In that sense, maybe I’m a bit like the Pillar Of Shame myself. Where I appear, invisible Chinese forces become visible.
BIO: Samuel Chu, 44, is the president of The Campaign for Hong Kong, an organization committed to advocating for American and global leadership and policies that advance human rights and democracy in Hong Kong. He was previously the founder and director of the Washington, D.C.-based Hong Kong Democracy Council (HKDC), and played a leading role in passing several landmark legislations in support of Hong Kong in the US Congress. In July 2020, Hong Kong authorities issued an arrest warrant for Chu, making him the first foreign national to be targeted as a result of the National Security Law.
“If you want to get rich, you must first build a road.” The old Chinese saying seems to have become obsolete, as is apparent from Beijing’s new infrastructure plans. In the second half of the year, the government wants to boost the economy, which has been slowed down by harsh Covid measures. The economy grew by just 0.4 percent in the second quarter. The leadership does not plan to settle for that again. More than ¥1 trillion (about €145 billion) of additional funds will be provided as a result.
Unlike previous infrastructure offensives, this time there will be fewer roads, railways and airports to boost the economy. Beijing wants to use the money primarily to expand “new infrastructure”. “Renewable energy, technology and water management projects are set to be among the largest beneficiaries of China’s latest infrastructure investment boom,” writes the Chinese business magazine Caixin, and speaks of the biggest stimulus package since the 2008 financial crisis. At that time, Beijing mobilized around ¥4 trillion, which triggered a huge construction boom. In parallel, the debt of state-owned companies and local governments had skyrocketed.
Fourteen years later, other sectors are now supposed to benefit from the stimulus billions. “The country already has an adequate network of railroads, highways and airports,” says Beijing macroeconomist Zhu Changzheng. Areas classified as “new infrastructure” by the responsible Beijing Development and Reform Commission could now expect cash inflows. Among them are the promotion of artificial intelligence, blockchain applications, cloud computing, Big Data and 5G. Renewable energy sources are also likely to receive a further boost.
The fact that the money is flowing in a completely different direction this time around has already been evident for several months. According to Caixin, spending on new railways and roads fell by 4.4 percent and 0.2 percent respectively in the first half of the year compared to the same period last year. In contrast, the expansion of new energy sources has experienced a boom. Spending on new photovoltaic plants alone rose by 173 percent to the equivalent of $41 billion in the first half of the year. Meanwhile, $58 billion or 107 percent more than in the first half of 2021 was spent on new wind projects, as calculated by analysts at Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF).
According to Bloomberg analyst Nannan Kou, green infrastructure is currently China’s main investment method to revive its flagging economy in the second half of the year. But China is also driving investment in other fields. According to Caixin, a lot of money will also be spent on flood protection. The modernization of the ailing gas network is also on Beijing’s to-do list.
Although economists agree that the infrastructure package will give the economy a certain tailwind, it will be difficult to achieve the growth target of around five percent. According to state newspaper Global Times, China’s infrastructure spending in July alone jumped by 15 percent compared to the previous year. However, the entire infrastructure package will probably only be able to generate about one percentage point of additional growth by the end of the year. Gregor Koppenburg/Joern Petring
David Santoro conducts research on nuclear weapons under palm trees. He has been the Director of the Pacific Forum since 2011 and observes the nuclear world from Hawaii. The relaxed atmosphere on the islands contrasts with his field: Nuclear relations between the United States and China. A topic currently not for the faint of heart.
Santoro grew up in a Paris suburb in the 1980s. Like many of his generation, the attacks of September 11, 2001, brought him to the big questions of security policy. But early on, Santoro senses that “the future is Asia,” and he was proven right. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Asian tiger economies also started to become relevant for security policy. For his doctoral thesis, Santoro moved to Australia, and in the late 2000s the Pacific Forum brought him to Hawaii. Here, Santoro is able to combine security policy with Asian expertise and has climbed the ladder from junior researcher to President.
The Pacific Forum is a privately funded research institute co-founded in 1975 by an ex-US Army general. The goal was to make the region safer and to keep a dialogue going among the Pacific states.
While Santoro’s personal world trip came to an end in Hawaii for the time being, the path of the Pacific Forum is far from over: “I want us to become more of a think tank and not so much a do-tank.” That means more research and innovative thinking incorporated into policy. It also means broadening the spectrum of subjects. According to Santoro, the future lies in cybersecurity, technology and the Indo-Pacific region.
Hawaii is a dream destination for the Pacific Forum’s work. “We’re far away from everything,” and the distance from the political bubble in Washington makes researchers freer, Santoro explains. Plus, the US Pacific Fleet is stationed in Hawaii. That means a lot of military presence and a close line to the people who have to act in an emergency.
It is precisely these soldiers and strategists who are currently facing a formidable challenge. China has been expanding its nuclear arsenal and renewing its delivery systems over the past few years. Santoro is following this with concern. The US owns 5,428 nuclear warheads, China 350, meaning both sides have enough bombs to annihilate each other.
While the possibility of using nuclear weapons has been quiet for some time, recently more thought-provoking discussions have resurfaced that include the nuclear option. “This will continue and the Chinese have made it clear that they are not interested in discussing this with us,” Santoro explains. So the signs point to confrontation. The trick here is damage control. Santoro hopes that China and the US will at least be able to agree on trust-building measures and crisis management. One example: Hotlines and rules of conduct. While this will not automatically bring stability, it will at least contribute to stabilization, says Santoro.
An important step would be for the US to acknowledge its strategic vulnerability to China. That would be politically delicate at home, but it would be wise from a foreign policy perspective. After all, the ultimate goal is to ensure that tensions in the Taiwan Strait or the Indo-Pacific do not escalate into a nuclear war between the US and China. Jonathan Lehrer
Sometimes there really is something fishy with learning a language. You make a monkey out of yourself with reckless statements and then try to get the cow off the ice. Or you stand there like a dying duck in a thunderstorm during a conversation and wonder if all your hard work has been for nothing. But hold your horses, that is where you are wrong! Because you venture into territory where your own native language differs greatly from the foreign language. This not only yields aha-experiences, but occasionally also entertaining ones. It is worth taking a little safari through the linguistic zoo of animalistic Chinese expressions.
In China, for example, people do not throw pearls before swine, but play the zither for cows (对牛弹琴 duì niú tán qín – “talking against the wall, preaching to deaf ears”). When “chickens fly and dogs jump” (鸡飞狗跳 jī fēi gǒu tiào) there is total havoc. And where a “cat cries for a mouse” (猫哭耗子 māo kū hàozi) the cat is out of the bag and a person has revealed himself as a “hypocrite” shedding crocodile tears. Meanwhile, there is a big fuss when a chicken is killed, namely to shock the monkeys. 杀鸡警猴 shā jī jǐng hóu is the Chinese word for this, literally “killing a chicken to warn the monkeys”, meaning “making an example”.
And in China, not even a blind squirrel finds a nut once in a while. Instead, blind cats sometimes unexpectedly come across a dead mouse (瞎猫碰上死耗子 Xiā māo pèngshàng sǐ hàozi – “To succeed by pure luck”). And when something takes until the cows come home, it drags on until the “monkey year and horse month” in China (猴年马月 hóunián-mǎyuè). But in such cases there is at least enough time to get down from the high horse at a snail’s pace and to take a closer look at the little flowers at the wayside (下马看花 xià mǎ kàn huā “getting off one’s horse to view flowers” = “spending a lot of time investigating into an affair”).
But you really are in trouble when you hop on a tiger and don’t know how you’ll ever get off again. Because “who rides a tiger, can get down only with difficulty” (骑虎难下 qí hǔ nán xià), meaning: One is “in a dilemma” and/or “cannot get off the hook so easily”.
In contrast, linguistically tame are rabbits. As someone with a lot of experience, you know not to eat any grass around your borrow, so as not to offend your neighbors (兔子不吃窝边草 tùzi bù chī wōbian cǎo – “Rabbits do not eat the grass around their burrows“, i.e.: “do not offend the neighbors”). Unless, of course, you live in the middle of nowhere, or as the Chinese would call it: “In a place where no bird lays its egg” (鸟不生蛋的地方 niǎo bù shēng dàn de dìfang).
Confused yet in the face of such a menagerie? Well, the list of animal idioms could certainly be continued. And it’s well worth your while to browse the Chinese dictionary for more entertaining expressions related to dogs, cats, mice and the like.
However, excessive use of metaphors in everyday life is not advisable. Therefore, do not shower your Chinese acquaintances with Western expressions – such as killing two birds with one stone, making a beeline, looking a gift horse in the mouth or even the bull in the China shop – only do so in small doses. Otherwise, you will lead a very confusing conversation.
Hold on. There is another animal metaphor for this: When communication fails, it is like “a chicken talking to a duck” (鸡同鸭讲 jī tóng yā jiǎng), as they say in China.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
It is fairly normal in the news business. And yet, it is alarming just how quickly the voices of the Hong Kong democracy movement have been pushed into the background in the face of the Ukraine war and the increasingly apparent climate crisis in the global public sphere. And yet Hong Kong activists from their exiles in London, Taiwan, the USA and Berlin continue to campaign for civil liberties in their home city.
One of them is Samuel Chu. Long-term political efforts would need political institutions to be built right now, says the experienced activist in an interview with Fabian Peltsch. “It’s hard, tough, and sometimes frustrating.” But this is the only way the movement can grow and develop – it requires perseverance.
The Chinese government is relying less on perseverance and more on muscle when it comes to reviving the battered second-largest economy. This time, however, it is no longer just investing billions in building more highways, railways and skyscrapers, but in the 5G network, cloud computing and renewable energies. A right and sensible decision, as the analysis by our author team in Beijing shows.
And the Europeans? They should probably prepare for more than just a winter with an imminent gas shortage. We could also use similar programs for the expansion of modern infrastructures that China is now launching.
At the end of May, you visited Oslo, where a copy of the “Pillar of Shame” was erected on a university campus during the Freedom Forum Conference. You are currently working to ensure that a copy of the artwork by Danish artist Jens Galshiøst also finds a temporary home in Berlin. What symbolic value do you attach to the work?
On the one hand, I see it as a sign of solidarity with the people of Hong Kong, who have lost a large part of the rights granted to them under the principle of “one country, two systems”. The sculpture is intended as a reminder of how quickly the decline of these rights in Hong Kong has occurred and how reliable China’s promises really are. On the other hand, I also see the “Pillar of Shame” as a kind of canary in the coal mine: If a copy comes to Berlin, numerous opponents will come out in the open, Chinese students will protest against it, Chinese agents will become visible. And also people in politics. That’s good. This way, we can expose how big China’s influence already is in Germany.
When I meet politicians, even here in Germany, I talk to them about why a free Hong Kong is in their interest. And that what is happening in Hong Kong can also be a prelude to what could happen elsewhere in the world.
You also associate a personal story with the artwork.
My father was one of the first to be contacted by Jens about bringing the artwork to Hong Kong. My father was then, in the mid-1990s, one of the leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance, the largest organization promoting democracy and Tiananmen remembrance culture in Hong Kong. They really wanted to erect the statue before the handover of the British Crown Colony in Hong Kong. It was to be a test of how far China would actually uphold the rights of Hong Kong citizens after 1997. For 32 years it stood in the city and was almost forgotten. It only became the great visible international symbol of the decline of free Hong Kong in 2021, when it had to be removed due to political pressure.
Your father, Baptist reverend and Occupy Central co-founder Chu Yiu-ming, is one of Hong Kong’s best-known human rights activists. What influence did your family background have on your political work?
In 1989, my father led Operation Yellow Bird, which helped bring political refugees out of China and abroad via Hong Kong. As a result, I spent a lot of time with political refugees when I was young. We played soccer and cards while they waited for their humanitarian visas to other countries. This shaped my perspective on the diaspora and dissidents. The Chinese government was effective in its crackdown on them for a long time because it knew that once the activists had fled overseas, they would soon not be heard from again. Political groups were isolated abroad, and the energy of the protests petered out. My work today is to change that.
To what extent?
I’ve dedicated my entire career to building political movements in the democratic world, from climate change to LGBTQ to Black Lives Matter groups. All of them are about growing from a protest movement into something bigger, more permanent. We do have a tendency to romanticize protest movements. But what I keep preaching here is: protest movements rely a lot on individual charismatic people. But long-term political efforts must rely on political institutions. And these need to be built now. It’s hard, tough, and sometimes frustrating. But it’s the only way the movement can grow and evolve.
A Hong Kong journalist now living in Germany told me that many Hong Kongers who sacrificed themselves for the city locally find little cohesion as a diaspora abroad. Have you observed something similar?
You have protesters there who have fought for their rights as a matter of life and death. Many are stuck in this “protest” mindset. They get up every morning and want to shout to the world, “Look what’s happening in Hong Kong!” You have to remember that Hong Kong was never a democracy. People could basically do nothing but protest to be heard. The diaspora is so consumed and always reactive to what’s happening at home in Hong Kong that they can’t engage in building long-term relationships and influence with the local political community. But that’s what’s needed to make a difference in the long run. That doesn’t mean they give up on Hong Kong.
Some people in Hong Kong may still have hope that events in their hometown can be reversed one way or another.
There is no magic formula that can restore Hong Kong to what it was. The UN Human Rights Council recently called on the Hong Kong government to revoke the National Security Act. I’m glad, of course, that that was put on the record. But you can’t undo the fact that 10,000 people have been arrested for peaceful protests and 200+ have been arrested under the National Security Law Jimmy Lai.
Two years ago, a warrant was also issued for your arrest in Hong Kong. And this was despite the fact that you have lived in the US for 30 years and are a US citizen. A precedent.
To a certain extent, I helped to rewrite the rules and the strategy. I do my political work mainly behind the scenes. When the protests reached a peak in 2019, I didn’t fly to Hong Kong to speak to the cameras. I founded the Hong Kong Democracy Council, an advocacy organization run overseas by US citizens. It’s an organization that can actually influence laws and doesn’t just rely on protests and commemorative events. That kind of organization is much more powerful and formidable going up against the Chinese government. After that, I founded The Campaign for Hong Kong – which I lead now.
And that makes you an enemy of the state?
In the National Security Law, there is a paragraph that seems to be aimed directly at me, my organizations and our work. It says, loosely translated, no matter who you are or where you come from, we’re going to get you. I have taken the movement from the streets to Congress and from there to the White House. That’s a shift that China’s government didn’t expect. That’s why they had to revise their playbook and target foreign activists as well. In that sense, maybe I’m a bit like the Pillar Of Shame myself. Where I appear, invisible Chinese forces become visible.
BIO: Samuel Chu, 44, is the president of The Campaign for Hong Kong, an organization committed to advocating for American and global leadership and policies that advance human rights and democracy in Hong Kong. He was previously the founder and director of the Washington, D.C.-based Hong Kong Democracy Council (HKDC), and played a leading role in passing several landmark legislations in support of Hong Kong in the US Congress. In July 2020, Hong Kong authorities issued an arrest warrant for Chu, making him the first foreign national to be targeted as a result of the National Security Law.
“If you want to get rich, you must first build a road.” The old Chinese saying seems to have become obsolete, as is apparent from Beijing’s new infrastructure plans. In the second half of the year, the government wants to boost the economy, which has been slowed down by harsh Covid measures. The economy grew by just 0.4 percent in the second quarter. The leadership does not plan to settle for that again. More than ¥1 trillion (about €145 billion) of additional funds will be provided as a result.
Unlike previous infrastructure offensives, this time there will be fewer roads, railways and airports to boost the economy. Beijing wants to use the money primarily to expand “new infrastructure”. “Renewable energy, technology and water management projects are set to be among the largest beneficiaries of China’s latest infrastructure investment boom,” writes the Chinese business magazine Caixin, and speaks of the biggest stimulus package since the 2008 financial crisis. At that time, Beijing mobilized around ¥4 trillion, which triggered a huge construction boom. In parallel, the debt of state-owned companies and local governments had skyrocketed.
Fourteen years later, other sectors are now supposed to benefit from the stimulus billions. “The country already has an adequate network of railroads, highways and airports,” says Beijing macroeconomist Zhu Changzheng. Areas classified as “new infrastructure” by the responsible Beijing Development and Reform Commission could now expect cash inflows. Among them are the promotion of artificial intelligence, blockchain applications, cloud computing, Big Data and 5G. Renewable energy sources are also likely to receive a further boost.
The fact that the money is flowing in a completely different direction this time around has already been evident for several months. According to Caixin, spending on new railways and roads fell by 4.4 percent and 0.2 percent respectively in the first half of the year compared to the same period last year. In contrast, the expansion of new energy sources has experienced a boom. Spending on new photovoltaic plants alone rose by 173 percent to the equivalent of $41 billion in the first half of the year. Meanwhile, $58 billion or 107 percent more than in the first half of 2021 was spent on new wind projects, as calculated by analysts at Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF).
According to Bloomberg analyst Nannan Kou, green infrastructure is currently China’s main investment method to revive its flagging economy in the second half of the year. But China is also driving investment in other fields. According to Caixin, a lot of money will also be spent on flood protection. The modernization of the ailing gas network is also on Beijing’s to-do list.
Although economists agree that the infrastructure package will give the economy a certain tailwind, it will be difficult to achieve the growth target of around five percent. According to state newspaper Global Times, China’s infrastructure spending in July alone jumped by 15 percent compared to the previous year. However, the entire infrastructure package will probably only be able to generate about one percentage point of additional growth by the end of the year. Gregor Koppenburg/Joern Petring
David Santoro conducts research on nuclear weapons under palm trees. He has been the Director of the Pacific Forum since 2011 and observes the nuclear world from Hawaii. The relaxed atmosphere on the islands contrasts with his field: Nuclear relations between the United States and China. A topic currently not for the faint of heart.
Santoro grew up in a Paris suburb in the 1980s. Like many of his generation, the attacks of September 11, 2001, brought him to the big questions of security policy. But early on, Santoro senses that “the future is Asia,” and he was proven right. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Asian tiger economies also started to become relevant for security policy. For his doctoral thesis, Santoro moved to Australia, and in the late 2000s the Pacific Forum brought him to Hawaii. Here, Santoro is able to combine security policy with Asian expertise and has climbed the ladder from junior researcher to President.
The Pacific Forum is a privately funded research institute co-founded in 1975 by an ex-US Army general. The goal was to make the region safer and to keep a dialogue going among the Pacific states.
While Santoro’s personal world trip came to an end in Hawaii for the time being, the path of the Pacific Forum is far from over: “I want us to become more of a think tank and not so much a do-tank.” That means more research and innovative thinking incorporated into policy. It also means broadening the spectrum of subjects. According to Santoro, the future lies in cybersecurity, technology and the Indo-Pacific region.
Hawaii is a dream destination for the Pacific Forum’s work. “We’re far away from everything,” and the distance from the political bubble in Washington makes researchers freer, Santoro explains. Plus, the US Pacific Fleet is stationed in Hawaii. That means a lot of military presence and a close line to the people who have to act in an emergency.
It is precisely these soldiers and strategists who are currently facing a formidable challenge. China has been expanding its nuclear arsenal and renewing its delivery systems over the past few years. Santoro is following this with concern. The US owns 5,428 nuclear warheads, China 350, meaning both sides have enough bombs to annihilate each other.
While the possibility of using nuclear weapons has been quiet for some time, recently more thought-provoking discussions have resurfaced that include the nuclear option. “This will continue and the Chinese have made it clear that they are not interested in discussing this with us,” Santoro explains. So the signs point to confrontation. The trick here is damage control. Santoro hopes that China and the US will at least be able to agree on trust-building measures and crisis management. One example: Hotlines and rules of conduct. While this will not automatically bring stability, it will at least contribute to stabilization, says Santoro.
An important step would be for the US to acknowledge its strategic vulnerability to China. That would be politically delicate at home, but it would be wise from a foreign policy perspective. After all, the ultimate goal is to ensure that tensions in the Taiwan Strait or the Indo-Pacific do not escalate into a nuclear war between the US and China. Jonathan Lehrer
Sometimes there really is something fishy with learning a language. You make a monkey out of yourself with reckless statements and then try to get the cow off the ice. Or you stand there like a dying duck in a thunderstorm during a conversation and wonder if all your hard work has been for nothing. But hold your horses, that is where you are wrong! Because you venture into territory where your own native language differs greatly from the foreign language. This not only yields aha-experiences, but occasionally also entertaining ones. It is worth taking a little safari through the linguistic zoo of animalistic Chinese expressions.
In China, for example, people do not throw pearls before swine, but play the zither for cows (对牛弹琴 duì niú tán qín – “talking against the wall, preaching to deaf ears”). When “chickens fly and dogs jump” (鸡飞狗跳 jī fēi gǒu tiào) there is total havoc. And where a “cat cries for a mouse” (猫哭耗子 māo kū hàozi) the cat is out of the bag and a person has revealed himself as a “hypocrite” shedding crocodile tears. Meanwhile, there is a big fuss when a chicken is killed, namely to shock the monkeys. 杀鸡警猴 shā jī jǐng hóu is the Chinese word for this, literally “killing a chicken to warn the monkeys”, meaning “making an example”.
And in China, not even a blind squirrel finds a nut once in a while. Instead, blind cats sometimes unexpectedly come across a dead mouse (瞎猫碰上死耗子 Xiā māo pèngshàng sǐ hàozi – “To succeed by pure luck”). And when something takes until the cows come home, it drags on until the “monkey year and horse month” in China (猴年马月 hóunián-mǎyuè). But in such cases there is at least enough time to get down from the high horse at a snail’s pace and to take a closer look at the little flowers at the wayside (下马看花 xià mǎ kàn huā “getting off one’s horse to view flowers” = “spending a lot of time investigating into an affair”).
But you really are in trouble when you hop on a tiger and don’t know how you’ll ever get off again. Because “who rides a tiger, can get down only with difficulty” (骑虎难下 qí hǔ nán xià), meaning: One is “in a dilemma” and/or “cannot get off the hook so easily”.
In contrast, linguistically tame are rabbits. As someone with a lot of experience, you know not to eat any grass around your borrow, so as not to offend your neighbors (兔子不吃窝边草 tùzi bù chī wōbian cǎo – “Rabbits do not eat the grass around their burrows“, i.e.: “do not offend the neighbors”). Unless, of course, you live in the middle of nowhere, or as the Chinese would call it: “In a place where no bird lays its egg” (鸟不生蛋的地方 niǎo bù shēng dàn de dìfang).
Confused yet in the face of such a menagerie? Well, the list of animal idioms could certainly be continued. And it’s well worth your while to browse the Chinese dictionary for more entertaining expressions related to dogs, cats, mice and the like.
However, excessive use of metaphors in everyday life is not advisable. Therefore, do not shower your Chinese acquaintances with Western expressions – such as killing two birds with one stone, making a beeline, looking a gift horse in the mouth or even the bull in the China shop – only do so in small doses. Otherwise, you will lead a very confusing conversation.
Hold on. There is another animal metaphor for this: When communication fails, it is like “a chicken talking to a duck” (鸡同鸭讲 jī tóng yā jiǎng), as they say in China.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
