Pierre Haski does not have anything nice to say about Emmanuel Macron’s trip to China last month. The former China correspondent should know: As one of the few French journalists on the president’s plane, he witnessed Macron’s comments on Taiwan, which not only embarrassed the EU but also the USA and the Taiwanese. In an interview with Amelie Richter, Haski provides further insights into the trip’s behind-the-scenes. Macron’s political worldview and his clumsy handling of China become somewhat clearer as a result.
France’s president had traveled to Beijing with the noble goal of ending the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible, Haski explains. To gain Xi Jinping’s support, he believed he had to offer something – “a kind of transaction”. However, in the end, Macron was seduced by the Chinese charm offensive and made certain statements that Beijing could ultimately exploit for its own purposes. Unfortunately, the European dimension of the trip was completely neglected.
The hope of many Western investors that the era of regulatory crackdowns in China could be over after the pandemic is also shattered. Under the guise of his anti-corruption campaign, Xi Jinping continues to tighten the reins: After the tech sector, the world of banking has now come under the scrutiny of the feared Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), Beijing’s enforcer in matters of corruption.
There have never been so many penalties for high-ranking government officials and managers in China in such a short time, as Joern Petring reports. In March alone, investigations were launched against eight leading managers of state financial institutions. As usual, there is also an ideological component to the move. Among other things, the discipline commission accuses the bankers of “hedonism” and an excessively “luxurious lifestyle”. This goes against the spirit of “common prosperity”, that Xi Jinping espouses more than almost anything else.
Monsieur Haski, you accompanied Emmanuel Macron to China. How did you experience the whole atmosphere of the visit? What was the vibe?
The Chinese made a lot of effort to stage a grand reception for Macron. And I think he was very receptive to that. Xi spent like seven hours with him, both in Beijing and Guangzhou. There was this relaxed moment in Guangzhou where they both were tieless and had a tea ceremony. It was a high-level visit because the Chinese side had decided it would be on that high level and the French wanted it to be spectacular too.
The reception and treatment of the EU Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, was quite different.
Ursula von der Leyen is not a head of state, and therefore the protocol downgraded her. I think the French side handled this poorly. Because the trip was supposed to be a European trip, and it ended up being a very French trip.
Was the protocol the only problem?
Macron probably made another mistake in the sense that he had Europe and Ukraine in mind when he arrived. The Chinese leaders think of the United States and Taiwan. We are not talking from the same starting point. Whatever you say in China is heard and analyzed by the other side through their own agenda – and that is a confrontation with the US and the question of Taiwan. That’s what Macron probably underestimated. And I think it backfired on him. He was going there with the idea of having a European approach, and he ended up dividing Europe.
So, the comments that he made about Taiwan. How did it come to be?
Macron developed this very complex thinking: He thinks we must solve the Ukraine crisis as soon as possible if we don’t want to become vassals to the US In his view, the longer the war continues in Ukraine, the more we will be dependent on the US And therefore, the European autonomic strategy will be jeopardized. That is his starting point. To end the war in Ukraine as soon as possible, we need to engage China. And that led him to this stand on Taiwan. He made a mistake because he felt that to get China’s support on Ukraine, he had to give something – a kind of transactional attitude. What he was giving was the neutrality on Taiwan. Maybe my interpretation is wrong. But I think it is close to reality, and I think it is a big mistake.
He made the remarks during the flight on Friday from Beijing to Guangzhou. The military drills started on Saturday. Was he a victim of bad timing?
We knew something was cooking. Everybody knew when the Chinese had announced reprisal. The interview was published when we were back in Paris. The drill started when we boarded the plane in Guangzhou to return to Paris. And at that moment, Macron said it was elegant of them to wait until we boarded the plane to announce it.
How did the question about Taiwan come up on the plane?
It was asked because we knew from briefings during the visit that this was a big part of the conversations and that Xi Jinping had raised the topic. And during the briefing, Macron gave the media in Beijing, he had already answered weirdly about Taiwan. He said: ‘I’m in charge of what I can really handle. And I’m not in charge of the Taiwan question.’ I found this answer surprising. Therefore, I asked him the question in the interview about his view on Taiwan.
Already before the trip, the Élysée said in briefings that the Taiwan question would only be raised if the Chinese side brought it up. Why is Macron so particular about this?
I’m not sure Macron has strong views on Taiwan. I think for him, it is a geopolitical dot on the map. It is not something he particularly cares or knows about. But he used it in this transactional relationship he had with Xi. He was obsessed with getting something from Xi on Ukraine. The second thing he is very obsessed with is the idea that Europe should not be automatically dragged into a New Cold War between the US and China. I agree that we should not blindly follow the US, but I think the timing was wrong. We are still in the middle of the Ukraine war. The role of the US in support of Ukraine is vital, and without the US, Ukraine would probably be Russian by now. Europe doesn’t have the military capacity and the political will to act alone on such a big scale.
Wang Yi and Emmanuel Bonne are supposed to keep in touch to prepare potential negotiations.
Yes, that was announced in Beijing. Macron doesn’t want Europe to be absent from the negotiating table if there is a negotiation one day. He said that publicly a few months ago. He said if only Turkey, China, or whoever else, Brazil, are the major powers, then it’s a loss for Europe not to be associated. So he wants to be involved in the preparation for a possible negotiation.
A unified European voice would be helpful for the negotiations. That trip didn’t really help with that.
I think they made a mistake with the protocol, but the intention was there. Probably, the preparation for the trip was not great. Von der Leyen also gave that speech some days before leaving. I don’t disagree with what she said, but she gave a different tone from what Macron would say. And therefore, I think the whole trip was maybe poorly handled, which is strange because von der Leyen came to Paris before departing for China. But in the end, the European dimension totally vanished from the trip.
What is the problem with that?
The problem is, and that’s probably an institutional problem of France, that the President alone decides on foreign policy. I’m unsure who he listens to, he goes by his intuitions. He did that with Trump in 2018 on Iran, and it failed. He did that with Putin in 2022, and it failed. And he’s trying again with Xi Jinping. So I think that’s not helping Macron’s image in Europe.
Do you think, personally, there’s enough debate on China in France and within the French economy?
No, obviously not. But I think this applies to almost every country in the world: I watched the TikTok hearing in the US Congress. It was pathetic. It was really pathetic. The level of information, the level of ideology, it was so bad. I think our debates are not enough based on facts, also within Europe. There has been an improvement in the past couple of years, though. The level of will to understand has increased a lot, that’s for sure. But it’s still a long way to have more fact-based debates.
Pierre Haski is a French journalist and commentator for France Inter. He worked as a correspondent in Beijing from 2000 through 2005. During his time there, he authored a blog called “Mon Journal de Chine” (“My Journal from China”). The Chinese authorities blocked it. He edited and published “The Diary of Ma Yan”. From January 2006 to 2007, he was deputy chief editor of the French newspaper Libération. He is the author of the ARTE documentary “Nous sommes Taïwan” (“We are Taiwan”), which was published in March.
China’s financial sector is in a state of alarm. The government has recently targeted several top managers of banks and other institutions. Beijing’s enforcer is the dreaded Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the Communist Party, which has launched a campaign to “resolutely” combat misconduct in the industry.
According to the CCDI, a record number of inspections were recently launched at more than 30 state-owned groups in sectors such as finance, defense and energy. The main focus is on financial institutions. Chinese state media reported that, against the backdrop of an “intensified anti-corruption campaign,” investigations were launched against eight leading managers of state-owned banks in March alone. According to the Financial Times, as many as more than a dozen managers have been investigated or punished since February.
The fight against corruption is certainly not new under President Xi Jinping. For years, the authorities have repeatedly imposed harsh penalties on high-ranking government officials and managers, but there have never been so many in such a short time in the banking sector.
The best-known manager now under investigation by the CCDI is Liu Liange. The 61-year-old was chairman of the board of Bank of China (BOC) until March, and the CCDI is also investigating Wang Jianhong, the former head of BOC’s Beijing branch. In addition, Zhao Zhiran, previously in charge of China Construction Bank in Shenzhen, has been targeted by authorities. Already indicted is Li Li, the former president of the Export-Import Bank of China. He is accused of having accepted bribes.
The disappearance of Bao Fan also caused a stir in February. The Chinese billionaire and head of the Hong Kong-listed financial firm Renaissance has not yet reappeared, and Bao Fan’s family has been informed that the 53-year-old is involved in an investigation, Bloomberg reported.
Industry insiders suspect Bao’s disappearance is linked to the problems of another Renaissance manager named Cong Lin, who was arrested in September. He is being investigated in connection with his former work for the financial leasing arm of the state-owned Industrial and Commercial Bank (ICBC), the Chinese business magazine Caixin reported.
Foreign investors are watching events in China’s financial sector very closely, having just noted with great relief that the regulatory crackdown on the technology sector, which lasted a good two years, has come to an end. In general, hopes are high that Beijing will finally loosen the reins after the Covid opening and give preference to pragmatism.
The state-run Global Times, for example, argues that the current crackdown is necessary to avoid financial risks such as those recently experienced by the US regional banks. However, there is also a lot of ideology involved. The disciplinary commission criticizes the industry’s “hedonism” and inappropriate “luxurious lifestyle”, a choice of words reminiscent of Xi Jinping’s “general prosperity”.
The president used this slogan, which is aimed at a fairer redistribution of wealth, no less than four times at the party congress last fall, causing great uncertainty among wealthy Chinese and in the private sector. Many Chinese banks already reacted at that time with salary and bonus cuts for their top managers.
Around 2,200 people learn German every year at the Goethe-Institut in Beijing. However, as the deputy director and head of language work, Sabine Wilmes is not only busy with language courses and exams. The Goethe-Institut alone supports more than eighty schools in China, giving German particularly high importance as part of the “Schools: Partners for the Future” initiative. In addition, the organization cooperates with other educational institutions that teach German.
Wilmes appreciates this variety of tasks. “I specifically applied for this position in Beijing and had no other applications running alongside,” says the 44-year-old, who previously worked at the Goethe-Institut in São Paulo and was not yet familiar with the Asian continent. Before joining the Goethe-Institut, Wilmes led a research and development program of the federal and state governments at the ‘Mercator Institute for Language Support and German as a Second Language’ in Cologne. After completing her studies, she also worked at universities in Brazil and Dortmund, the European Academy in Bolzano, and the Brussels Goethe-Institut.
Due to the pandemic, Wilmes initially worked for seven months for the Goethe-Institut office in Beijing from Brazil. After her arrival in August 2021, she spent three weeks in AHK quarantine in Qingdao. Now, she can travel to partner institutes in different regions of China again. “During the pandemic, I was already used to barely being able to move outside the apartment in Brazil,” says Wilmes, who now lives in Beijing with her husband. “I hadn’t expected to be relatively free on the streets in Beijing and be able to go to the office most of the time.”
Through the Goethe-Institut’s various activities, people in China come into contact with Germany, even if very few speak perfect German. “Anyone who achieves an A2 level despite the linguistic distance between German and Chinese through lessons at a Chinese school has already dealt intensively with the language and the country,” emphasizes Wilmes. She herself sees learning the Chinese language as a great challenge.
Overall, the number of German learners in China has probably decreased in recent years due to the zero-Covid policy and current political conditions. However, it is still high worldwide. Wilmes observes that the Chinese education policy is currently reducing foreign language instruction in schools, especially English – possibly in favor of STEM subjects.
It remains to be seen what impact this will have on the German language in China. Wilmes believes that exchange projects are particularly important when it comes to maintaining mutual interest in long-term peace policy: “Of course, you can read a lot about other countries in the news,” says Wilmes. “But it makes a big difference when you personally know someone from the country.” Janna Degener-Storr
Sliding without a care in the world: A vacationer with a child on vacation at Sendi Ice and Snow Park in Nantong in the southeastern province of Jiangsu makes a brisk descent down the ice slope.
Pierre Haski does not have anything nice to say about Emmanuel Macron’s trip to China last month. The former China correspondent should know: As one of the few French journalists on the president’s plane, he witnessed Macron’s comments on Taiwan, which not only embarrassed the EU but also the USA and the Taiwanese. In an interview with Amelie Richter, Haski provides further insights into the trip’s behind-the-scenes. Macron’s political worldview and his clumsy handling of China become somewhat clearer as a result.
France’s president had traveled to Beijing with the noble goal of ending the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible, Haski explains. To gain Xi Jinping’s support, he believed he had to offer something – “a kind of transaction”. However, in the end, Macron was seduced by the Chinese charm offensive and made certain statements that Beijing could ultimately exploit for its own purposes. Unfortunately, the European dimension of the trip was completely neglected.
The hope of many Western investors that the era of regulatory crackdowns in China could be over after the pandemic is also shattered. Under the guise of his anti-corruption campaign, Xi Jinping continues to tighten the reins: After the tech sector, the world of banking has now come under the scrutiny of the feared Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), Beijing’s enforcer in matters of corruption.
There have never been so many penalties for high-ranking government officials and managers in China in such a short time, as Joern Petring reports. In March alone, investigations were launched against eight leading managers of state financial institutions. As usual, there is also an ideological component to the move. Among other things, the discipline commission accuses the bankers of “hedonism” and an excessively “luxurious lifestyle”. This goes against the spirit of “common prosperity”, that Xi Jinping espouses more than almost anything else.
Monsieur Haski, you accompanied Emmanuel Macron to China. How did you experience the whole atmosphere of the visit? What was the vibe?
The Chinese made a lot of effort to stage a grand reception for Macron. And I think he was very receptive to that. Xi spent like seven hours with him, both in Beijing and Guangzhou. There was this relaxed moment in Guangzhou where they both were tieless and had a tea ceremony. It was a high-level visit because the Chinese side had decided it would be on that high level and the French wanted it to be spectacular too.
The reception and treatment of the EU Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, was quite different.
Ursula von der Leyen is not a head of state, and therefore the protocol downgraded her. I think the French side handled this poorly. Because the trip was supposed to be a European trip, and it ended up being a very French trip.
Was the protocol the only problem?
Macron probably made another mistake in the sense that he had Europe and Ukraine in mind when he arrived. The Chinese leaders think of the United States and Taiwan. We are not talking from the same starting point. Whatever you say in China is heard and analyzed by the other side through their own agenda – and that is a confrontation with the US and the question of Taiwan. That’s what Macron probably underestimated. And I think it backfired on him. He was going there with the idea of having a European approach, and he ended up dividing Europe.
So, the comments that he made about Taiwan. How did it come to be?
Macron developed this very complex thinking: He thinks we must solve the Ukraine crisis as soon as possible if we don’t want to become vassals to the US In his view, the longer the war continues in Ukraine, the more we will be dependent on the US And therefore, the European autonomic strategy will be jeopardized. That is his starting point. To end the war in Ukraine as soon as possible, we need to engage China. And that led him to this stand on Taiwan. He made a mistake because he felt that to get China’s support on Ukraine, he had to give something – a kind of transactional attitude. What he was giving was the neutrality on Taiwan. Maybe my interpretation is wrong. But I think it is close to reality, and I think it is a big mistake.
He made the remarks during the flight on Friday from Beijing to Guangzhou. The military drills started on Saturday. Was he a victim of bad timing?
We knew something was cooking. Everybody knew when the Chinese had announced reprisal. The interview was published when we were back in Paris. The drill started when we boarded the plane in Guangzhou to return to Paris. And at that moment, Macron said it was elegant of them to wait until we boarded the plane to announce it.
How did the question about Taiwan come up on the plane?
It was asked because we knew from briefings during the visit that this was a big part of the conversations and that Xi Jinping had raised the topic. And during the briefing, Macron gave the media in Beijing, he had already answered weirdly about Taiwan. He said: ‘I’m in charge of what I can really handle. And I’m not in charge of the Taiwan question.’ I found this answer surprising. Therefore, I asked him the question in the interview about his view on Taiwan.
Already before the trip, the Élysée said in briefings that the Taiwan question would only be raised if the Chinese side brought it up. Why is Macron so particular about this?
I’m not sure Macron has strong views on Taiwan. I think for him, it is a geopolitical dot on the map. It is not something he particularly cares or knows about. But he used it in this transactional relationship he had with Xi. He was obsessed with getting something from Xi on Ukraine. The second thing he is very obsessed with is the idea that Europe should not be automatically dragged into a New Cold War between the US and China. I agree that we should not blindly follow the US, but I think the timing was wrong. We are still in the middle of the Ukraine war. The role of the US in support of Ukraine is vital, and without the US, Ukraine would probably be Russian by now. Europe doesn’t have the military capacity and the political will to act alone on such a big scale.
Wang Yi and Emmanuel Bonne are supposed to keep in touch to prepare potential negotiations.
Yes, that was announced in Beijing. Macron doesn’t want Europe to be absent from the negotiating table if there is a negotiation one day. He said that publicly a few months ago. He said if only Turkey, China, or whoever else, Brazil, are the major powers, then it’s a loss for Europe not to be associated. So he wants to be involved in the preparation for a possible negotiation.
A unified European voice would be helpful for the negotiations. That trip didn’t really help with that.
I think they made a mistake with the protocol, but the intention was there. Probably, the preparation for the trip was not great. Von der Leyen also gave that speech some days before leaving. I don’t disagree with what she said, but she gave a different tone from what Macron would say. And therefore, I think the whole trip was maybe poorly handled, which is strange because von der Leyen came to Paris before departing for China. But in the end, the European dimension totally vanished from the trip.
What is the problem with that?
The problem is, and that’s probably an institutional problem of France, that the President alone decides on foreign policy. I’m unsure who he listens to, he goes by his intuitions. He did that with Trump in 2018 on Iran, and it failed. He did that with Putin in 2022, and it failed. And he’s trying again with Xi Jinping. So I think that’s not helping Macron’s image in Europe.
Do you think, personally, there’s enough debate on China in France and within the French economy?
No, obviously not. But I think this applies to almost every country in the world: I watched the TikTok hearing in the US Congress. It was pathetic. It was really pathetic. The level of information, the level of ideology, it was so bad. I think our debates are not enough based on facts, also within Europe. There has been an improvement in the past couple of years, though. The level of will to understand has increased a lot, that’s for sure. But it’s still a long way to have more fact-based debates.
Pierre Haski is a French journalist and commentator for France Inter. He worked as a correspondent in Beijing from 2000 through 2005. During his time there, he authored a blog called “Mon Journal de Chine” (“My Journal from China”). The Chinese authorities blocked it. He edited and published “The Diary of Ma Yan”. From January 2006 to 2007, he was deputy chief editor of the French newspaper Libération. He is the author of the ARTE documentary “Nous sommes Taïwan” (“We are Taiwan”), which was published in March.
China’s financial sector is in a state of alarm. The government has recently targeted several top managers of banks and other institutions. Beijing’s enforcer is the dreaded Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the Communist Party, which has launched a campaign to “resolutely” combat misconduct in the industry.
According to the CCDI, a record number of inspections were recently launched at more than 30 state-owned groups in sectors such as finance, defense and energy. The main focus is on financial institutions. Chinese state media reported that, against the backdrop of an “intensified anti-corruption campaign,” investigations were launched against eight leading managers of state-owned banks in March alone. According to the Financial Times, as many as more than a dozen managers have been investigated or punished since February.
The fight against corruption is certainly not new under President Xi Jinping. For years, the authorities have repeatedly imposed harsh penalties on high-ranking government officials and managers, but there have never been so many in such a short time in the banking sector.
The best-known manager now under investigation by the CCDI is Liu Liange. The 61-year-old was chairman of the board of Bank of China (BOC) until March, and the CCDI is also investigating Wang Jianhong, the former head of BOC’s Beijing branch. In addition, Zhao Zhiran, previously in charge of China Construction Bank in Shenzhen, has been targeted by authorities. Already indicted is Li Li, the former president of the Export-Import Bank of China. He is accused of having accepted bribes.
The disappearance of Bao Fan also caused a stir in February. The Chinese billionaire and head of the Hong Kong-listed financial firm Renaissance has not yet reappeared, and Bao Fan’s family has been informed that the 53-year-old is involved in an investigation, Bloomberg reported.
Industry insiders suspect Bao’s disappearance is linked to the problems of another Renaissance manager named Cong Lin, who was arrested in September. He is being investigated in connection with his former work for the financial leasing arm of the state-owned Industrial and Commercial Bank (ICBC), the Chinese business magazine Caixin reported.
Foreign investors are watching events in China’s financial sector very closely, having just noted with great relief that the regulatory crackdown on the technology sector, which lasted a good two years, has come to an end. In general, hopes are high that Beijing will finally loosen the reins after the Covid opening and give preference to pragmatism.
The state-run Global Times, for example, argues that the current crackdown is necessary to avoid financial risks such as those recently experienced by the US regional banks. However, there is also a lot of ideology involved. The disciplinary commission criticizes the industry’s “hedonism” and inappropriate “luxurious lifestyle”, a choice of words reminiscent of Xi Jinping’s “general prosperity”.
The president used this slogan, which is aimed at a fairer redistribution of wealth, no less than four times at the party congress last fall, causing great uncertainty among wealthy Chinese and in the private sector. Many Chinese banks already reacted at that time with salary and bonus cuts for their top managers.
Around 2,200 people learn German every year at the Goethe-Institut in Beijing. However, as the deputy director and head of language work, Sabine Wilmes is not only busy with language courses and exams. The Goethe-Institut alone supports more than eighty schools in China, giving German particularly high importance as part of the “Schools: Partners for the Future” initiative. In addition, the organization cooperates with other educational institutions that teach German.
Wilmes appreciates this variety of tasks. “I specifically applied for this position in Beijing and had no other applications running alongside,” says the 44-year-old, who previously worked at the Goethe-Institut in São Paulo and was not yet familiar with the Asian continent. Before joining the Goethe-Institut, Wilmes led a research and development program of the federal and state governments at the ‘Mercator Institute for Language Support and German as a Second Language’ in Cologne. After completing her studies, she also worked at universities in Brazil and Dortmund, the European Academy in Bolzano, and the Brussels Goethe-Institut.
Due to the pandemic, Wilmes initially worked for seven months for the Goethe-Institut office in Beijing from Brazil. After her arrival in August 2021, she spent three weeks in AHK quarantine in Qingdao. Now, she can travel to partner institutes in different regions of China again. “During the pandemic, I was already used to barely being able to move outside the apartment in Brazil,” says Wilmes, who now lives in Beijing with her husband. “I hadn’t expected to be relatively free on the streets in Beijing and be able to go to the office most of the time.”
Through the Goethe-Institut’s various activities, people in China come into contact with Germany, even if very few speak perfect German. “Anyone who achieves an A2 level despite the linguistic distance between German and Chinese through lessons at a Chinese school has already dealt intensively with the language and the country,” emphasizes Wilmes. She herself sees learning the Chinese language as a great challenge.
Overall, the number of German learners in China has probably decreased in recent years due to the zero-Covid policy and current political conditions. However, it is still high worldwide. Wilmes observes that the Chinese education policy is currently reducing foreign language instruction in schools, especially English – possibly in favor of STEM subjects.
It remains to be seen what impact this will have on the German language in China. Wilmes believes that exchange projects are particularly important when it comes to maintaining mutual interest in long-term peace policy: “Of course, you can read a lot about other countries in the news,” says Wilmes. “But it makes a big difference when you personally know someone from the country.” Janna Degener-Storr
Sliding without a care in the world: A vacationer with a child on vacation at Sendi Ice and Snow Park in Nantong in the southeastern province of Jiangsu makes a brisk descent down the ice slope.
