German and Chinese universities currently maintain around 1,400 collaborations. But which research projects can still be pursued jointly with Chinese partners in the future and where should caution be exercised? And how should this be evaluated and by whom? Universities are uncertain and the debate surrounding Chinese influence is emotionally charged. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk spoke with Matthias Stepan from the Ruhr University Bochum to introduce some clarity to the discussion.
China’s censorship and regulatory authorities are used to playing cat and mouse on the internet. For years, they have been cracking down on content that, in the view of the communist leadership, is “not in line with the party’s core socialist values”. And as we know, their definition is very broad.
And yet artificial intelligence also presents the CP with new challenges. Because on the one hand, the country cannot afford to lag behind in the development of such promising technology. On the other hand, China also wants to be at the forefront in the fight against deepfakes, in other words, fake videos and images – for fear of losing power and control. And that, in turn, could hamper AI development. As Fabian Peltsch observes, the arms race between companies and regulators has long been underway in China.
As the first German university, the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg has decided to only accept CSC scholarship holders if they have also been selected by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). What does that say about the stance on university cooperation with China?
This decision is a clear signal that cooperation between German universities and China will not continue as it is. It will certainly not remain an isolated case and other universities will follow or have already silently changed their policies.
What signal does the decision convey?
As far as the signaling effect is concerned, I do not see it as a matter of accepting or rejecting individual junior researchers with scholarships from the Chinese government. The university’s decision goes much further: It is about how to deal with security-relevant research and which research projects can still be pursued with Chinese partners in the future.
The German government’s China strategy does not yet speak this language. It mainly encourages continued cooperation. Can researchers now confidently continue to initiate collaborations with China or not?
The strategy itself is not very specific in this regard. However, the first clarification from the government came shortly after the strategy was published in the form of a press statement from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). It said that health and climate research would continue to be welcome in the future. But everything beyond these fields will be critically reviewed for technology leakage or military use.
The BMBF’s implementation is thus expected to be stricter than the outline in the strategy.
The BMBF has only limited authority regarding bans on actors in science and research – freedom of science is a valuable asset and universities are the responsibility of the federal states. The BMBF will certainly continue to raise awareness and provide information.
Will the universities heed its advice?
From my point of view, the activities of the past years primarily reach the international offices of universities. Unfortunately, people with research seniority in particular do not always listen to what the university administration has to say. In order to reach them, one would have to specifically contact the professional societies. For instance, the German Physical Society. They could offer formats for reaching scientists. For many scientists, the strategy itself is far away. But the effects of the China debate are reaching the players, as the example of the University of Nuremberg-Erlangen now shows.
The debate is at times highly charged. Can you explain the two poles that have formed in the evaluation of cooperation with China?
Over the past five years, two camps have formed on the extreme fringes. One side says, in short, ‘Don’t do anything more with China.’ And the other side says: ‘By all means, keep going.’ Many of the players in the middle do realize that it is time to rethink and that we need to approach cooperation with China differently. In reality, neither the ‘carry on’ nor the ‘break off contact’ have much support.
The extreme voices are quite loud at times.
They are often lone wolves who then call each other naïve or stupid. I think we should sit down together here and not provoke each other even further. It is important to name the risks concretely, to evaluate and classify them. But the overcharged discussions lead nowhere.
Is it possible to pinpoint when China started to change like this?
That was in 2017/18, when China officially announced to advance civilian-military integration. Research is part of that. We also saw that many Chinese universities that many formerly more liberal were being criticized for their research fields. This was a wake-up call in informed circles. Since then, the BMBF and other agencies have provided information and raised awareness, and they have started discussions with various actors. Many institutions have already adjusted their cooperation with China based on this.
This debate mainly involves social scientists and sinologists. But many natural scientists out there cooperate with Chinese universities in a very practical way.
The public argument is clearly dominated by sinologists – but they are only a small sub-group when it comes to cooperation. We generally need to distinguish between two groups. First, those who have China as their research subject – be it social scientists or economists. For them, having access to the country, being able to conduct field research there, is crucial. Their public debate is far removed from the second group.
The natural scientists.
It doesn’t just have to be natural scientists, they can also be philosophers, for example. They cooperate with the Chinese side because they want to advance the boundaries of knowledge in their field. For both groups, however, the increasingly strict data protection laws or data transfer laws in general are playing an increasing role. China researchers are already aware of the risks. But for the natural scientists, too, the data transfer rules should set off big alarm lights, precisely because large amounts of data are exchanged that are now also being controlled by the Chinese side.
Do we need a central office for evaluating China projects?
We need new evaluation structures and processes. However, I do not consider a central office to be very practical in this respect. There are around 1,400 collaborations between German and Chinese universities alone. Imagine if each of the German universities involved were to send an application to this central office once a year. I also think the focus on China would be inappropriate.
It would be a bureaucracy monster.
Yes. An alternative would be a decentralized approach with ethics committees for safety-relevant research at universities. Although the DFG and Leopoldina set up a committee years ago to strengthen the evaluation competence of universities, the majority of German universities have still not set up corresponding commissions. However, this would be a feasible approach. At the latest, the Zeitenwende and the suspension of scientific cooperation with Russian institutions should have made it clear that universities must face the questions of how to deal with security-relevant research. And not only when it comes to cooperation with institutions in China. As far as country-specific expertise is concerned, local commissions could receive help from sinologists but also experts on export controls.
Matthias Stepan heads the research project “Universities as Actors in Dialogue with China” at the Ruhr University Bochum and is responsible for knowledge management in the EU-funded project “China Horizons: Dealing with a resurgent China (DWARC).” Stepan previously headed the Beijing office of Stiftung Mercator and was part of the management board at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics).
Police authorities in the city of Baotou, Inner Mongolia, reported in May that a man was stolen the equivalent of 622,000 US dollars with the help of deepfake technology. A hacker had tricked him with a deceptively real AI clone of a friend who told him in a video call that he urgently needed money. This was not the naive victim of a grandparent scam. The victim is a senior executive at a tech company in Fuzhou. And yet, his fake friend’s lifelike body language and voice fooled him enough that he instantly pulled out his wallet.
Lip-synchronous image and video fakes using artificial intelligence, so-called “deepfakes,” can be created with increasing ease thanks to growing computing power and storage capacities. The results, which can be generated with cheap software, are almost impossible to distinguish from the original for a layperson, as proven by fake speeches of politicians such as Putin or Trump. The technology is used, for example, to generate clickbait on the Internet, for example, by placing famous actors in movies in which they have never acted.
Deepfake technology harbors huge dangers, for example, when fake politicians’ speeches are taken at face value or explicitly used in political smear campaigns. Digital identity theft is already widely used for pornographic videos and, increasingly also for blackmail. Around the world, cases of deepfake fraud have massively increased over the past three years, according to calculations by Sumsub, a company specializing in AI security. It found that the share of deepfakes in fraud crimes was exceptionally high in Australia (5.3%), Argentina (5.1%), and China (4.9%) in 2022 and 2023.
Although the scammed tech executive from Inner Mongolia recovered most of his money with the help of police, the case sparked heated debates about online security in China. The Internet Society of China warned the public to be more vigilant. The fear of online fraud is far more real in China, where the media world is permeated by professional live streamers, than elsewhere. For example, the cases of unknown online influencers posing as celebrities on video sites such as Bilibili using faceswap technology to generate hits and money have increased in recent months.
Beijing rates deepfake technology as high-risk, not least because it can potentially undermine public order. In January, China’s Cyberspace Administration (CAC) enacted a series of regulations on what it called “deepfake technology.” Content that “endangers national security and national interests and damages the national image” is banned outright, according to the “Regulations on Deep Synthesis Internet Information Services.”
The authority requires providers of more harmless content to “clearly label” AI-generated content, as it could otherwise “cause confusion among the public or lead to misidentification.” Users would have to be able to immediately distinguish authentic media content from fakes. Watermarks, for example, are mentioned. Failure to label such content is punishable as a criminal offense. All producers of deepfakes and users of deepfake services such as faceswap apps must also register with real names under the new rules. One rationale is that certain deepfakes will not be created in the first place, given the increased effort. This month, China’s Cyberspace Administration (CAC) also reiterated that all generative AI services must align with the party’s core socialist values.
China is one of the first countries to introduce comprehensive rules for dealing with deepfake technology. Other countries, such as Taiwan, England, and several US states, such as Florida, are already taking legal action against certain sub-sectors, such as artificially created porn and forged political speeches. Elsewhere, work is underway to adapt existing regulations to the new threats, for example, in Singapore, where the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), which regulates the collection, use and disclosure of personal data, is being expanded to cover deepfake risks.
The European Union also plans to limit deepfakes by introducing a set of rules on artificial intelligence, the “AI Act.” However, labeling relevant content will remain voluntary for the time being. Critics of this solution, such as SPD leader Saskia Esken, believe that this is not enough to prevent real damage.
Swift action will be needed in any case. With constantly increasing bandwidths, it will soon be possible to not only fake people, but entire scenarios with such realism that it will be impossible to distinguish them from actual events. In his latest book, a future outlook into the year 2041, AI expert Kai-Fu Lee writes that anti-deepfake programs will soon be as common as anti-virus software.
Both Facebook and Google have already offered rewards for the best deep fake detection software. But fakes will likely get better and better in the process, too. A cat-and-mouse game with an unknown outcome, Lee believes. He says we have to get used to a world in which we have to question everything on the Internet even more than we do today. This is one of the reasons why it simply won’t work without binding laws and appropriate penalties.
The severe flooding in northeastern China has killed another ten people near Beijing. Authorities issued a tally on Saturday for the city of Baoding, located about 150 kilometers southwest of the capital Beijing. It brought the total death toll in the region due to heavy flooding to at least 30, according to a report by the AFP news agency. The extreme rainfall is a consequence of the tropical storm Doksuri.
According to the authorities, 18 people are still missing in Boading, which has a population of about 11.5 million, with more than 600,000 people evacuated. In Beijing, the warning for the population remained in effect due to the risks posed by landslides. Cleanup efforts continued in the region after flooding submerged entire districts and damaged infrastructure.
The city of Shulan in the province of Jilin experienced its fifth consecutive day of rain. Six people died, and four people were missing, state media reported. According to the local disaster management authority, about 19,000 people were evacuated from the city of 700,000. The state news agency China News Service showed pictures of flooded streets.
The shopping streets in Zhouzhou in the province of Hebei turned into brown rivers. Fields in the area were also completely flooded. The floods covered several kilometers. According to AFP information, rescue workers distributed noodles, bread and drinking water to flood victims who were unable or unwilling to leave their homes.
Videos of a protest in Bazhou, Hebei, went viral on social media. According to the postings, the protesters accused the authorities of diverting floodwaters away from Beijing and in their direction in order to protect the capital.
According to China’s weather service, Beijing saw the heaviest rainfall since weather records began 140 years ago. ari
The arrest of human rights lawyer Lu Siwei could continue an alarming trend of Chinese interference in the judiciary of other countries. Lu had been arrested in Laos in late July. Activists and relatives of the lawyer now fear for his illegal extradition to the authorities of the People’s Republic of China.
“We are gravely concerned that he is at serious risk of forced repatriation to China where he faces the high likelihood of torture and other ill-treatment,” a statement signed by 79 human rights organizations said, calling for international political support for Lu. Third-country governments should act immediately to allow Lu contact with relevant UN authorities and a lawyer of his choice.
Lu had made it to Laos in the middle of last month despite being barred from leaving China. From there, he had planned to travel on to Thailand by train, eventually boarding a plane bound for the United States. He was accompanied by two friends living in the US, who publicized his arrest by Laotian police. More than ten officers had intercepted Lu before he could board the train, forced him into a car, and dragged him off to an unknown location.
Lu Siwei wanted to join his wife and daughter in the United States, who have lived there for two years, to escape potential harassment by Chinese security authorities. He had been disbarred and banned from leaving China in January 2021. A few months prior, he had represented the defense of the constitutional rights of twelve Hong Kong activists in China. The young people were the driving forces of the Hong Kong protest movement of 2019 and 2020. They had attempted to flee the city by boat to Taiwan, but were caught and brought to China.
He had already attracted negative attention from the authorities in the years before for his activities as a lawyer for his Chinese colleagues who had been arrested as part of the 709 purge. The politically motivated crackdown on China’s civil rights movement had begun on July 9, 2015, giving it its numerical label. Dozens of lawyers were arrested and convicted as part of this purge. The hunt for lawyers has never stopped since. Lu Siwei is now the next one who could pay a heavy price for his civic engagement.
His extradition will likely be only a matter of time if the pattern of past cases is repeated. After all, China tends to use its political and economic weight to persuade smaller partner states to make concessions. The most recent example was the disappearance of democracy activist Dong Guangping in Vietnam, who reappeared in Chinese custody a short time later. An extreme case was that of the Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai, who was abducted from Thailand and is now serving a long prison sentence in China. As early as 2009, Cambodia was the inspiration when the country extradited Chinese Uyghurs to China, ignoring legal procedures.
Human rights organizations are now reminding the Lao government that it has been obligated under customary international law and as a state party to the UN Convention Against Torture since 2012 to prevent extradition if a person is at risk of torture. Whether that will be enough to break recent Sino-Laotian loyalty oaths is doubtful.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi had met with Lao Prime Minister Saleumxay Kommasith in April in his then capacity as China’s chief diplomat. “The Lao people wholeheartedly appreciate the strong support and selfless help of the CPC, the Chinese government and the Chinese people. Laos is ready to work with China to strengthen exchanges and cooperation,” Kommasith said at the time. grz
This farm worker is standing up to her hips in water as she picks water chestnuts in Taizhou in Jiangsu Province. The tubers, but also the straw of the aquatic plant, are widely used in China, for example as a basis for soft drinks.
German and Chinese universities currently maintain around 1,400 collaborations. But which research projects can still be pursued jointly with Chinese partners in the future and where should caution be exercised? And how should this be evaluated and by whom? Universities are uncertain and the debate surrounding Chinese influence is emotionally charged. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk spoke with Matthias Stepan from the Ruhr University Bochum to introduce some clarity to the discussion.
China’s censorship and regulatory authorities are used to playing cat and mouse on the internet. For years, they have been cracking down on content that, in the view of the communist leadership, is “not in line with the party’s core socialist values”. And as we know, their definition is very broad.
And yet artificial intelligence also presents the CP with new challenges. Because on the one hand, the country cannot afford to lag behind in the development of such promising technology. On the other hand, China also wants to be at the forefront in the fight against deepfakes, in other words, fake videos and images – for fear of losing power and control. And that, in turn, could hamper AI development. As Fabian Peltsch observes, the arms race between companies and regulators has long been underway in China.
As the first German university, the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg has decided to only accept CSC scholarship holders if they have also been selected by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). What does that say about the stance on university cooperation with China?
This decision is a clear signal that cooperation between German universities and China will not continue as it is. It will certainly not remain an isolated case and other universities will follow or have already silently changed their policies.
What signal does the decision convey?
As far as the signaling effect is concerned, I do not see it as a matter of accepting or rejecting individual junior researchers with scholarships from the Chinese government. The university’s decision goes much further: It is about how to deal with security-relevant research and which research projects can still be pursued with Chinese partners in the future.
The German government’s China strategy does not yet speak this language. It mainly encourages continued cooperation. Can researchers now confidently continue to initiate collaborations with China or not?
The strategy itself is not very specific in this regard. However, the first clarification from the government came shortly after the strategy was published in the form of a press statement from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). It said that health and climate research would continue to be welcome in the future. But everything beyond these fields will be critically reviewed for technology leakage or military use.
The BMBF’s implementation is thus expected to be stricter than the outline in the strategy.
The BMBF has only limited authority regarding bans on actors in science and research – freedom of science is a valuable asset and universities are the responsibility of the federal states. The BMBF will certainly continue to raise awareness and provide information.
Will the universities heed its advice?
From my point of view, the activities of the past years primarily reach the international offices of universities. Unfortunately, people with research seniority in particular do not always listen to what the university administration has to say. In order to reach them, one would have to specifically contact the professional societies. For instance, the German Physical Society. They could offer formats for reaching scientists. For many scientists, the strategy itself is far away. But the effects of the China debate are reaching the players, as the example of the University of Nuremberg-Erlangen now shows.
The debate is at times highly charged. Can you explain the two poles that have formed in the evaluation of cooperation with China?
Over the past five years, two camps have formed on the extreme fringes. One side says, in short, ‘Don’t do anything more with China.’ And the other side says: ‘By all means, keep going.’ Many of the players in the middle do realize that it is time to rethink and that we need to approach cooperation with China differently. In reality, neither the ‘carry on’ nor the ‘break off contact’ have much support.
The extreme voices are quite loud at times.
They are often lone wolves who then call each other naïve or stupid. I think we should sit down together here and not provoke each other even further. It is important to name the risks concretely, to evaluate and classify them. But the overcharged discussions lead nowhere.
Is it possible to pinpoint when China started to change like this?
That was in 2017/18, when China officially announced to advance civilian-military integration. Research is part of that. We also saw that many Chinese universities that many formerly more liberal were being criticized for their research fields. This was a wake-up call in informed circles. Since then, the BMBF and other agencies have provided information and raised awareness, and they have started discussions with various actors. Many institutions have already adjusted their cooperation with China based on this.
This debate mainly involves social scientists and sinologists. But many natural scientists out there cooperate with Chinese universities in a very practical way.
The public argument is clearly dominated by sinologists – but they are only a small sub-group when it comes to cooperation. We generally need to distinguish between two groups. First, those who have China as their research subject – be it social scientists or economists. For them, having access to the country, being able to conduct field research there, is crucial. Their public debate is far removed from the second group.
The natural scientists.
It doesn’t just have to be natural scientists, they can also be philosophers, for example. They cooperate with the Chinese side because they want to advance the boundaries of knowledge in their field. For both groups, however, the increasingly strict data protection laws or data transfer laws in general are playing an increasing role. China researchers are already aware of the risks. But for the natural scientists, too, the data transfer rules should set off big alarm lights, precisely because large amounts of data are exchanged that are now also being controlled by the Chinese side.
Do we need a central office for evaluating China projects?
We need new evaluation structures and processes. However, I do not consider a central office to be very practical in this respect. There are around 1,400 collaborations between German and Chinese universities alone. Imagine if each of the German universities involved were to send an application to this central office once a year. I also think the focus on China would be inappropriate.
It would be a bureaucracy monster.
Yes. An alternative would be a decentralized approach with ethics committees for safety-relevant research at universities. Although the DFG and Leopoldina set up a committee years ago to strengthen the evaluation competence of universities, the majority of German universities have still not set up corresponding commissions. However, this would be a feasible approach. At the latest, the Zeitenwende and the suspension of scientific cooperation with Russian institutions should have made it clear that universities must face the questions of how to deal with security-relevant research. And not only when it comes to cooperation with institutions in China. As far as country-specific expertise is concerned, local commissions could receive help from sinologists but also experts on export controls.
Matthias Stepan heads the research project “Universities as Actors in Dialogue with China” at the Ruhr University Bochum and is responsible for knowledge management in the EU-funded project “China Horizons: Dealing with a resurgent China (DWARC).” Stepan previously headed the Beijing office of Stiftung Mercator and was part of the management board at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics).
Police authorities in the city of Baotou, Inner Mongolia, reported in May that a man was stolen the equivalent of 622,000 US dollars with the help of deepfake technology. A hacker had tricked him with a deceptively real AI clone of a friend who told him in a video call that he urgently needed money. This was not the naive victim of a grandparent scam. The victim is a senior executive at a tech company in Fuzhou. And yet, his fake friend’s lifelike body language and voice fooled him enough that he instantly pulled out his wallet.
Lip-synchronous image and video fakes using artificial intelligence, so-called “deepfakes,” can be created with increasing ease thanks to growing computing power and storage capacities. The results, which can be generated with cheap software, are almost impossible to distinguish from the original for a layperson, as proven by fake speeches of politicians such as Putin or Trump. The technology is used, for example, to generate clickbait on the Internet, for example, by placing famous actors in movies in which they have never acted.
Deepfake technology harbors huge dangers, for example, when fake politicians’ speeches are taken at face value or explicitly used in political smear campaigns. Digital identity theft is already widely used for pornographic videos and, increasingly also for blackmail. Around the world, cases of deepfake fraud have massively increased over the past three years, according to calculations by Sumsub, a company specializing in AI security. It found that the share of deepfakes in fraud crimes was exceptionally high in Australia (5.3%), Argentina (5.1%), and China (4.9%) in 2022 and 2023.
Although the scammed tech executive from Inner Mongolia recovered most of his money with the help of police, the case sparked heated debates about online security in China. The Internet Society of China warned the public to be more vigilant. The fear of online fraud is far more real in China, where the media world is permeated by professional live streamers, than elsewhere. For example, the cases of unknown online influencers posing as celebrities on video sites such as Bilibili using faceswap technology to generate hits and money have increased in recent months.
Beijing rates deepfake technology as high-risk, not least because it can potentially undermine public order. In January, China’s Cyberspace Administration (CAC) enacted a series of regulations on what it called “deepfake technology.” Content that “endangers national security and national interests and damages the national image” is banned outright, according to the “Regulations on Deep Synthesis Internet Information Services.”
The authority requires providers of more harmless content to “clearly label” AI-generated content, as it could otherwise “cause confusion among the public or lead to misidentification.” Users would have to be able to immediately distinguish authentic media content from fakes. Watermarks, for example, are mentioned. Failure to label such content is punishable as a criminal offense. All producers of deepfakes and users of deepfake services such as faceswap apps must also register with real names under the new rules. One rationale is that certain deepfakes will not be created in the first place, given the increased effort. This month, China’s Cyberspace Administration (CAC) also reiterated that all generative AI services must align with the party’s core socialist values.
China is one of the first countries to introduce comprehensive rules for dealing with deepfake technology. Other countries, such as Taiwan, England, and several US states, such as Florida, are already taking legal action against certain sub-sectors, such as artificially created porn and forged political speeches. Elsewhere, work is underway to adapt existing regulations to the new threats, for example, in Singapore, where the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), which regulates the collection, use and disclosure of personal data, is being expanded to cover deepfake risks.
The European Union also plans to limit deepfakes by introducing a set of rules on artificial intelligence, the “AI Act.” However, labeling relevant content will remain voluntary for the time being. Critics of this solution, such as SPD leader Saskia Esken, believe that this is not enough to prevent real damage.
Swift action will be needed in any case. With constantly increasing bandwidths, it will soon be possible to not only fake people, but entire scenarios with such realism that it will be impossible to distinguish them from actual events. In his latest book, a future outlook into the year 2041, AI expert Kai-Fu Lee writes that anti-deepfake programs will soon be as common as anti-virus software.
Both Facebook and Google have already offered rewards for the best deep fake detection software. But fakes will likely get better and better in the process, too. A cat-and-mouse game with an unknown outcome, Lee believes. He says we have to get used to a world in which we have to question everything on the Internet even more than we do today. This is one of the reasons why it simply won’t work without binding laws and appropriate penalties.
The severe flooding in northeastern China has killed another ten people near Beijing. Authorities issued a tally on Saturday for the city of Baoding, located about 150 kilometers southwest of the capital Beijing. It brought the total death toll in the region due to heavy flooding to at least 30, according to a report by the AFP news agency. The extreme rainfall is a consequence of the tropical storm Doksuri.
According to the authorities, 18 people are still missing in Boading, which has a population of about 11.5 million, with more than 600,000 people evacuated. In Beijing, the warning for the population remained in effect due to the risks posed by landslides. Cleanup efforts continued in the region after flooding submerged entire districts and damaged infrastructure.
The city of Shulan in the province of Jilin experienced its fifth consecutive day of rain. Six people died, and four people were missing, state media reported. According to the local disaster management authority, about 19,000 people were evacuated from the city of 700,000. The state news agency China News Service showed pictures of flooded streets.
The shopping streets in Zhouzhou in the province of Hebei turned into brown rivers. Fields in the area were also completely flooded. The floods covered several kilometers. According to AFP information, rescue workers distributed noodles, bread and drinking water to flood victims who were unable or unwilling to leave their homes.
Videos of a protest in Bazhou, Hebei, went viral on social media. According to the postings, the protesters accused the authorities of diverting floodwaters away from Beijing and in their direction in order to protect the capital.
According to China’s weather service, Beijing saw the heaviest rainfall since weather records began 140 years ago. ari
The arrest of human rights lawyer Lu Siwei could continue an alarming trend of Chinese interference in the judiciary of other countries. Lu had been arrested in Laos in late July. Activists and relatives of the lawyer now fear for his illegal extradition to the authorities of the People’s Republic of China.
“We are gravely concerned that he is at serious risk of forced repatriation to China where he faces the high likelihood of torture and other ill-treatment,” a statement signed by 79 human rights organizations said, calling for international political support for Lu. Third-country governments should act immediately to allow Lu contact with relevant UN authorities and a lawyer of his choice.
Lu had made it to Laos in the middle of last month despite being barred from leaving China. From there, he had planned to travel on to Thailand by train, eventually boarding a plane bound for the United States. He was accompanied by two friends living in the US, who publicized his arrest by Laotian police. More than ten officers had intercepted Lu before he could board the train, forced him into a car, and dragged him off to an unknown location.
Lu Siwei wanted to join his wife and daughter in the United States, who have lived there for two years, to escape potential harassment by Chinese security authorities. He had been disbarred and banned from leaving China in January 2021. A few months prior, he had represented the defense of the constitutional rights of twelve Hong Kong activists in China. The young people were the driving forces of the Hong Kong protest movement of 2019 and 2020. They had attempted to flee the city by boat to Taiwan, but were caught and brought to China.
He had already attracted negative attention from the authorities in the years before for his activities as a lawyer for his Chinese colleagues who had been arrested as part of the 709 purge. The politically motivated crackdown on China’s civil rights movement had begun on July 9, 2015, giving it its numerical label. Dozens of lawyers were arrested and convicted as part of this purge. The hunt for lawyers has never stopped since. Lu Siwei is now the next one who could pay a heavy price for his civic engagement.
His extradition will likely be only a matter of time if the pattern of past cases is repeated. After all, China tends to use its political and economic weight to persuade smaller partner states to make concessions. The most recent example was the disappearance of democracy activist Dong Guangping in Vietnam, who reappeared in Chinese custody a short time later. An extreme case was that of the Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai, who was abducted from Thailand and is now serving a long prison sentence in China. As early as 2009, Cambodia was the inspiration when the country extradited Chinese Uyghurs to China, ignoring legal procedures.
Human rights organizations are now reminding the Lao government that it has been obligated under customary international law and as a state party to the UN Convention Against Torture since 2012 to prevent extradition if a person is at risk of torture. Whether that will be enough to break recent Sino-Laotian loyalty oaths is doubtful.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi had met with Lao Prime Minister Saleumxay Kommasith in April in his then capacity as China’s chief diplomat. “The Lao people wholeheartedly appreciate the strong support and selfless help of the CPC, the Chinese government and the Chinese people. Laos is ready to work with China to strengthen exchanges and cooperation,” Kommasith said at the time. grz
This farm worker is standing up to her hips in water as she picks water chestnuts in Taizhou in Jiangsu Province. The tubers, but also the straw of the aquatic plant, are widely used in China, for example as a basis for soft drinks.
