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The VW plant in Xinjiang has suddenly become a heated topic. We have long considered the precarious presence in Urumqi to be VW’s biggest political vulnerability. Unnoticed by Volkswagen, the wind has changed in politics. Whereas in 2012 Angela Merkel was still smiling at the signing of the contracts for the controversial plant, governments are now looking very closely at human rights.
To some extent, this is also the result of tough interest politics: The EU and the USA are pushing the issue against an unfriendly, inflexible China by banning imports that involve forced labor. Germany has now a Green Minister of Economics. In the meantime, not only the trade union but also Lower Saxony’s Minister-President Stephan Weil have joined the debate. VW is caught in the long-time-coming dilemma between Beijing’s demands and obligations to the German public.
How much courage does it take to voluntarily travel to the People’s Republic of China as a human rights activist? Lee Ming-che from Taiwan did this every year to speak privately with friends about the situation there. In March 2017, he was arrested after slipping into the country via Macau. A court saw his informational work about Taiwan on WeChat as “undermining state power”. David Demes spoke with Lee for China.Table as one of the first Western journalists after his release.
Lee is now primarily worried about his home country. After all, the economic, technical and cultural appeal of the People’s Republic can certainly be felt there. Young people use Chinese apps and speak Chinese slang. But if Taiwan were to abandon its distance from its big neighbor, its democracy would quickly be ruined. And there is one thing Lee himself would never do: betray his country.
Today’s feature is all about China’s growth. Perhaps it could be turned into an indicator in its own right: The difference between Western economic forecasts for China and the official target is currently particularly large, at over one percentage point. In our analysis, we look at the reasons for the differing assessments.
Admittedly, international institutions have good arguments for their pessimism. But in the end, the target of “close to 5.5 percent” growth will almost certainly be achieved. After all, major economic stimulus programs are currently underway. What none of the economists wanted to speak out loudly: If the incoming data do not produce the desired figure, Beijing could always cheat a little to make it at least appear on paper.
Mr. Lee, you are committed to human rights in China. To what extent was your arrest five years ago also related to the tense relations between Beijing and Taipei?
I do believe that there is a connection. Since President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP took office in 2016, China has used every opportunity to put pressure on Taiwan’s government. State security has repeatedly tried to frame me for espionage. It has constantly asked two things: Whether I received money from official sources in Taiwan, and to whom in China I would have given this money.
Have you received money?
No. Under pressure at the time, I admitted to the offense of attempted “subversion of state power,” but never espionage. After me, three other Taiwanese were arrested, all accused of espionage. I think that was an attempt to put pressure on President Tsai’s government.
What did your activities in China look like?
Together with a few Chinese friends, I managed a non-profit fund that donated aid money to Chinese political prisoners and their families. When the Nonprofit Law (慈善法) was passed in 2016, I had expected that I might be prevented from entering the country from then on. But not that China would react so excessively. I was the first Taiwanese to be charged with the crime of “undermining state power”.
Why did you admit to this offense?
The state security threatened me and told me that I might have to go to prison for life. They wanted to know if I would ever want to go home and see my father again. That’s when I relented a bit. But even then I could only confess to what I had actually done.
You say that China wanted to convict you of being a spy. Why did you not give in to the demands of state security on this issue?
If they had charged me with the crime of espionage, it would have implicated my country and Taiwan’s government. I was not willing to betray my own country like that. Apart from that, they had no reason, let alone evidence, for their accusations.
As a Taiwanese, how did you decide to campaign for human rights in the People’s Republic?
Because of the geographical location and because of the political pressure that China is putting on Taiwan, I believed that we needed to understand China better. I started by reading the Chinese news portals of Western media reporting on the situation inside China. Through the microblogging service Weibo and other Chinese social networks like QQ and WeChat, I came to know a great many Chinese people and developed a deeper understanding of China’s suppression of human rights. At that time, I wondered what I could do as a foreigner to help. Even in the history of Taiwan’s democracy movement, there were foreigners who stood up for Taiwan and helped the politically persecuted tremendously.
You have had to pay dearly for that. But you have also benefited from great international support.
Just a few days after my arrest, Taiwanese NGOs had called a press conference. Amnesty International was also already active. Two weeks after my arrest, China publicly declared that I was under investigation. In other cases, the authorities keep the fate of political prisoners secret for years.
Your wife was also a driving force for the great solidarity abroad.
Shortly after my arrest, a Chinese envoy was ordered to convince my wife to keep a low profile and not to comment publicly on my case. But she refused to give in to any pressure from China. Instead, she testified before the US Congress, among others, and convinced the UN to take up my case. As a result, my detention conditions were improved.
Your case was even tried in public.
This forced the authorities to present a minimum of suitable evidence. Without this public trial, they might have sentenced me to ten years or even life in prison. It is only thanks to the international solidarity campaign that I returned in good health after only five years.
There were threats to deprive you of your political rights and prevent you from leaving the country two years after your release from prison.
The joke is that I am not a citizen of the People’s Republic of China and have no political rights that could be taken away from me. But there is a legal provision that says that you are not allowed to leave the country during this additional sentence. That’s intriguing: If China really considers Taiwan to be its province, then surely it shouldn’t be an exit to a foreign country if a Taiwanese person returns to Taiwan at the end of his or her prison term.
But it did not come to that.
I didn’t realize that until three days before my release, when I was told that they wanted to buy a plane ticket for me. But I was nervous until the very end. Because of the pandemic, there are currently only a few flights to Taiwan, and the nearest airport was in Xiamen. So on the day of my release, I was taken from Hunan to Xiamen, spent the night there, and was flown out to Taiwan in the morning.
You are now back in Taiwan, a democratic country governed by the rule of law. Are you worried that the Chinese Communist Party will come after you here as well?
If they only attack me personally, then I can live with that. I am more concerned about how Taiwan is being subverted by Chinese forces and infiltrating our country in the areas of economy, culture and education. We have to be vigilant about that. I was away for five years, and there are some changes that should not be underestimated and are not accidental. For example, Taiwan’s middle school students hardly use Facebook anymore and are now all on Chinese apps like Douyin (Tiktok) and Xiaohongshu (Little Red Book). In the last two months, I have also noticed that Chinese slang is taking root in Taiwan. It was also recently reported that the Apple Daily Taiwan newspaper has been bought out by Hong Kong investors.
Will you be drawn back to China in the future? And would you advise others against a trip?
I will definitely not return to China in the future. If you want to do something like I do or if you work for an NGO, you should be careful and ask yourself if you have such a tough woman at your side like I do. Taiwanese who only do business in China probably don’t need my advice. Everyone has to know that for himself.
Lee Ming-che (李明哲), democracy activist from Taiwan, was found guilty by a court in Hunan Province in the People’s Republic of China in 2017 for his activities in online chats for “undermining state power”. He served five years in prison.
In the debate about a Volkswagen-operated plant in the Chinese Uyghur region of Xinjiang, the pressure on the automaker is rapidly increasing. The head of the German metalworkers’ union IG Metall, Joerg Hofmann, who sits on the VW’s supervisory board, even questioned the company’s activities in the region altogether. “Meanwhile there is hardly any doubt that human rights violations are taking place in Xinjiang,” the Union Chief told the German newspaper Wolfsburger Nachrichten. For this reason, the group’s board of management would have to deal with the issue.
The company’s presence in Urumqi is highly controversial; most recently, the German government even denied the company investment guarantees, citing its ties to human rights violations (China.Table reported). In the meantime, researchers have also identified the first evidence indeed linking the car company’s supply relationships to forced labor (China.Table reported). However, the company continues to maintain the site.
Although there is currently no indication that human rights violations have occurred at VW itself. “Nevertheless, the question to be asked is what it means for the company’s reputation to continue investing there,” Hofmann said.
Hofmann said in the interview that Volkswagen couldn’t just look at what was going on in its own “front yard,” but also had to pay attention to which “street” it lived on. “When human rights violations are visible on the right and left, I demand action.” The Group must take a visible and unequivocal stand against human rights violations, he said.
VW Works Council Head Daniela Cavallo also voiced criticism of her company’s activities in the Uyghur-majority region. “I am very shaken by these reports of human rights violations,” Cavallo told the newspaper Taz over the weekend. “We have a responsibility as Volkswagen.” The Works Council does define standards on working conditions and the supply chain. However, she claims to have no evidence that “anything is happening at the plant in Urumqi that is not in line with our charter”.
Lower Saxony’s Minister-President Stephan Weil (SPD), who serves on the oversight body as a representative of the state with a 20 percent stake in VW, also joined in on the discussion. “The images and reports about the severe human rights violations against the Uyghur minority in the Chinese region of Xinijang are startling.” But he said there was no evidence so far that human rights or labor rights violations had occurred at the VW plant. “However, this does not absolve the group from its responsibility to deal intensively with the issue and to closely examine the allegations regarding the human rights situation, which will be done.”
Xinjiang is now likely to become a matter of discussion for VW’s supervisory board. Volkswagen said in a statement, “We are not aware of any cases in which SAIC Volkswagen employees have been or are in detention camps.” When asked, the group added “all important topics relevant to our business are addressed” in its discussions with the Chinese government. This would include critical issues.
However, VW cannot simply withdraw from the project. Although the site in Urumqi is small and makes little economic sense, it has considerable symbolic value for the Chinese government. In 2012, Beijing had urged VW to sign the additional joint project with its long-time partner SAIC. At the time, the main aim was to create evidence of an increase in economic power in Xinjiang.
China drew its legitimacy for ruling the region from its claim to bring development and prosperity to the remote territory. Indeed, the economy did grow there at the time, and modern jobs were created. This also made it easy for the German side to accept this narrative – they were persuaded that they were doing something good for the Uyghurs.
But since 2018, the Chinese government’s Uyghur policy has taken a turn for the extreme. A significant part of the population has been detained in camps; the region resembles an open-air prison with total technological surveillance (China.Table reported). Now, the very existence of the VW plant contributes to legitimizing this procedure. At the same time, China has the upper hand over VW. Without the government’s goodwill, no foreign company can do business there. Nico Beckert/Finn Mayer-Kuckuk/Reuters
What is an economic growth forecast that was announced at the beginning of March still worth? In Europe, economic forecasts are regularly readjusted as new developments emerge. China’s political economy, however, works differently. The leadership’s early March target (China.Table reported) is set in stone. There are no signs that the government in Beijing plans to end the year worse off than the announced “around 5.5 percent”. All despite endless lockdowns and continued real estate market problems.
So while Western institutions are making good arguments to downgrade the economic forecast, Chinese economists can plausibly argue that the problems were already factored into the government’s issued target and will be met. “The government still has six months to give the economy a boost through stimulus measures,” Peking University economist Justin Yifu Lin said Thursday at an event hosted by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW). This would be enough to compensate for the weak first half of the year, he added.
Every March, it is one of the rituals in China’s annual cycle to announce a growth target. This process is fundamentally different from forecasts like the German government’s spring projection. While the latter attempts to predict the development of an unpredictable economy, the Chinese figure is a target. It is a matter of credibility for the Party to meet or exceed this figure.
After the Premier’s presentation, however, the Omicron waves swept through China’s industrial hubs. The new variant could not be contained with the existing resources and brought the economy to a standstill, especially in the Shanghai economic hub.
But in fact, the target of 5.5 percent was already considered cautiously picked in March, after all, Omikron was already in action. So the government deliberately left itself some room for maneuver. In addition, the government has already launched economic stimulus programs of considerable magnitude. The news service Bloomberg has added up the value of the announced measures and came up with ¥5,300 billion, roughly €750 billion. This corresponds to a quarter of Germany’s gross domestic product.
A major portion of the aid is provided by the tax authorities. There are rebates on corporate tax, income tax and value-added tax. Tax breaks totaling ¥2,500 billion are planned for 2022 alone. The tax breaks are part of 33 stimulus measures announced by the government in late May. One important instrument concerns municipal financing. Local governments will be allowed to issue more of their own bonds. This is intended to help them finance higher spending on construction projects. Companies experiencing payment difficulties will not have to pay their power and water bills for a while.
Given these fireworks of measures, economist Lin even believes that growth of six percent is possible. He acknowledges that the year has started off very difficult, but still considers Beijing to be highly capable of action.
At the same time, Western experts wonder about what they perceive as the Chinese government’s inflexibility in dealing with the economy. One economist with a particularly close eye on China is Helge Berger, who is in charge of the country at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington. His department downgraded its forecast for China to 4.4 percent in April, with another reassessment due in July. “Yes, the government has decided to provide fiscal support,” Berger says. “But it is unlikely that the measures will have a sufficient effect.” As a result, in the IMF’s view, the gap between the target and what is still achievable is growing.
Berger lists several problems that inhibit growth:
But fellow state-affiliated Lin, who also advises the Chinese government, has equally good arguments for a rebound in economic activity in the coming months:
Despite all optimism, Lin also sees considerable problems in the real estate market. In recent years, the government has made efforts to work toward a less speculative and altogether more solid economy. Simply releasing loans is thus out of the question if the sector is to consolidate.
In their own way, both renowned economists Lin and Berger are probably right. The figure of 5.5 percent or more could indeed be met at the end of the year, as Lin predicts. But this will be the result of a typical miracle of Chinese economic control or manipulation, rather than the result of reasonably natural interacting factors.
This article refers to the eleventh part of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy’s (IfW) Global China Conversations event series, entitled “Can China Achieve its 2022 GDP Growth Target of 5.5 Percent?” China.Table is a media partner of this event series.
China has launched its third aircraft carrier. Amid tensions with the United States over Taiwan and Chinese claims in the South China Sea, the “Fujian” was launched on Friday, according to state media reports. The ship, which was designed by the People’s Republic itself, features an aircraft catapult system (China.Table reported). With its third aircraft carrier, China overtakes the United Kingdom, which only operates two such vessels. Only the United States is better equipped, with eleven aircraft carriers. Russia’s navy has one carrier named “Admiral Kuznetsov,” which is currently not operational due to repair work. rtr/nib
Is China merely the next colonial power to wreak havoc in Africa and make the continent financially dependent, while raw materials flow bountifully to the Middle Kingdom? This is the impression given by many media reports. Deborah Brautigam, Director of the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University disagrees – and is increasingly distraught by Western reporting: “I’m always surprised how much journalists still fall back into Cold War reflexes when reporting on China.”
When Brautigam criticizes reporting – for example, on China’s supposed debt traps – it doesn’t have the sharp, bitter tone that some media critics from the periphery of society adopt. Her criticism is based on years of field research on the ground, so it has a solid foundation. For her latest book, for example, Brautigam traveled to Africa and spoke with local farmers. After food prices soared in the late noughties, explanations were sought. “At the time, there were a lot of rumors circulating in Western media about Chinese land grabs in Africa,” Brautigam explains.
It was assumed that the Chinese would use bought-up land to ship food back home. In 2010, the New York Times reported about African farmers who were being driven off their land by foreign investors. The Chinese would have a particular eye on sugar cane plantations. Brautigam and her team evaluated the corresponding Chinese investments. What they discovered was a very different story. “Only in one major project did the Chinese invest in food on African soil,” Brautigam says. That project involved rice farming in Mozambique. The yields were intended for local markets.
Brautigam has been researching Chinese activities in Africa for more than 40 years. In the early 1980s, the US American was one of the first to focus on Chinese development aid in Africa and to research what goals the Chinese were pursuing. In doing so, she looks back to the Mao era of the 1960s. She is now one of the world’s foremost experts on Chinese-African relations. Brautigam’s interest in Asian cultures and China, in particular, is rooted in a four-year backpacking trip from Istanbul to Thailand in the late 1970s right after she graduated from college. It was a time of change in Asia. “When I left Iran, the Shah was overthrown. When I left Afghanistan, the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan was beginning,” Brautigam says. At least, Thailand remained largely stable. There, Brautigam gave English courses and learned Thai.
It wasn’t until she returned to America that she decided to learn Mandarin. “It was a purely practical decision between Chinese, Japanese or Korean,” Brautigam says. She chose Mandarin because most people speak it – in retrospect, it was exactly the right decision. David Renke
I will not allow myself to become a pot carrier. Perhaps you should simply throw this phrase into the room as a ruse the next time someone wants to turn you into a scapegoat. This linguistic maneuver will certainly cause confusion at first and will gain you time to shift the blame. If there are any questions, just stay cool and explain expertly that in China you don’t get the blame, but have to “carry a black pot” (背黑锅 bēi hēiguō). The others then have to google (or baidu) that first.
Originally, 背锅 bēiguō (“to carry a pot”) was the colloquial term for a hunchback in some parts of China (just imagine someone carrying around a large wok on their back and the image will solidify). “Black pot” (黑锅 hēiguō), meanwhile, was considered synonymous with “scapegoat” (A complicated history having to do with consonants and dialectal influences – I’ll spare you the details here). In any case, the net community has recently happily combined the two terms into 背黑锅 bēi hēiguō (“to carry the black pot”) and then shortened it to 背锅 bēiguō “to carry the pot”. Hunched scapegoats are, after all, prime meme material. Et voilà – the Chinese buzzword for “being the scapegoat” was born.
The counterpart, by the way, is 甩锅 shuǎiguō – to “shake off” or “throw off” the pot, i.e. to pass the buck to others. Such “shake-off” works great with other things as well. For example, people: 甩人 shuǎirén (“to shake someone off”) means “to dump someone”.
But let’s take a closer gaze into the Chinese pots. It’s worth it, both linguistically and culturally, as well as culinary. One of the most famous pots is undoubtedly the “fire pot” (火锅 huǒguō), commonly known as hotpot. But have you ever heard of mandarin duck pots (鸳鸯锅 yuānyangguō)? Don’t worry, here the name doesn’t say it all. There are no colorful-feathered fowl in the soup. Rather, it refers to special potware. The word refers to fondue pots with dividers that leave room for two broths instead of just one (for example, a toned-down mild broth for hot pot beginners). Mandarin ducks (鸳鸯 yuānyang) are considered a symbol of inseparable lovers in China. And the two broths, separated only by a divider, are also inseparable in a sense, simmering in the same pot. Another little hint for hot pot newbies: Don’t be surprised if the Chinese waitress asks if you’ve chosen your “pot bottom” (锅底 guōdǐ) yet. In hotpot jargon, this refers to the broth and not the bottom of the pot.
In crowded hotpot restaurants, things are sometimes chaotic, especially when you can grab ingredients from the self-service buffet. This sometimes ends up in complete mayhem, or as the Chinese would say: it is “as chaotic as a pot of rice porridge” (乱成一锅粥 luàn chéng yī guō zhōu – “complete chaos, great mayhem”). If empty stomachs then leave the nerves on edge during the battle at the buffet, pushing and shoving can heat up the tempers and cause the camel’s back to break – pardon: “the pot to explode” (炸锅 zhàguō), which we would rather translate as “to cause a ruckus” or “to create a commotion”.
Finally, here are a few amusing expressions that we probably won’t understand at first when Chinese acquaintances pull them out of the pot:
So once again, it goes to show: There is a suitable linguistic lid for every situational pot in Chinese!
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
The VW plant in Xinjiang has suddenly become a heated topic. We have long considered the precarious presence in Urumqi to be VW’s biggest political vulnerability. Unnoticed by Volkswagen, the wind has changed in politics. Whereas in 2012 Angela Merkel was still smiling at the signing of the contracts for the controversial plant, governments are now looking very closely at human rights.
To some extent, this is also the result of tough interest politics: The EU and the USA are pushing the issue against an unfriendly, inflexible China by banning imports that involve forced labor. Germany has now a Green Minister of Economics. In the meantime, not only the trade union but also Lower Saxony’s Minister-President Stephan Weil have joined the debate. VW is caught in the long-time-coming dilemma between Beijing’s demands and obligations to the German public.
How much courage does it take to voluntarily travel to the People’s Republic of China as a human rights activist? Lee Ming-che from Taiwan did this every year to speak privately with friends about the situation there. In March 2017, he was arrested after slipping into the country via Macau. A court saw his informational work about Taiwan on WeChat as “undermining state power”. David Demes spoke with Lee for China.Table as one of the first Western journalists after his release.
Lee is now primarily worried about his home country. After all, the economic, technical and cultural appeal of the People’s Republic can certainly be felt there. Young people use Chinese apps and speak Chinese slang. But if Taiwan were to abandon its distance from its big neighbor, its democracy would quickly be ruined. And there is one thing Lee himself would never do: betray his country.
Today’s feature is all about China’s growth. Perhaps it could be turned into an indicator in its own right: The difference between Western economic forecasts for China and the official target is currently particularly large, at over one percentage point. In our analysis, we look at the reasons for the differing assessments.
Admittedly, international institutions have good arguments for their pessimism. But in the end, the target of “close to 5.5 percent” growth will almost certainly be achieved. After all, major economic stimulus programs are currently underway. What none of the economists wanted to speak out loudly: If the incoming data do not produce the desired figure, Beijing could always cheat a little to make it at least appear on paper.
Mr. Lee, you are committed to human rights in China. To what extent was your arrest five years ago also related to the tense relations between Beijing and Taipei?
I do believe that there is a connection. Since President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP took office in 2016, China has used every opportunity to put pressure on Taiwan’s government. State security has repeatedly tried to frame me for espionage. It has constantly asked two things: Whether I received money from official sources in Taiwan, and to whom in China I would have given this money.
Have you received money?
No. Under pressure at the time, I admitted to the offense of attempted “subversion of state power,” but never espionage. After me, three other Taiwanese were arrested, all accused of espionage. I think that was an attempt to put pressure on President Tsai’s government.
What did your activities in China look like?
Together with a few Chinese friends, I managed a non-profit fund that donated aid money to Chinese political prisoners and their families. When the Nonprofit Law (慈善法) was passed in 2016, I had expected that I might be prevented from entering the country from then on. But not that China would react so excessively. I was the first Taiwanese to be charged with the crime of “undermining state power”.
Why did you admit to this offense?
The state security threatened me and told me that I might have to go to prison for life. They wanted to know if I would ever want to go home and see my father again. That’s when I relented a bit. But even then I could only confess to what I had actually done.
You say that China wanted to convict you of being a spy. Why did you not give in to the demands of state security on this issue?
If they had charged me with the crime of espionage, it would have implicated my country and Taiwan’s government. I was not willing to betray my own country like that. Apart from that, they had no reason, let alone evidence, for their accusations.
As a Taiwanese, how did you decide to campaign for human rights in the People’s Republic?
Because of the geographical location and because of the political pressure that China is putting on Taiwan, I believed that we needed to understand China better. I started by reading the Chinese news portals of Western media reporting on the situation inside China. Through the microblogging service Weibo and other Chinese social networks like QQ and WeChat, I came to know a great many Chinese people and developed a deeper understanding of China’s suppression of human rights. At that time, I wondered what I could do as a foreigner to help. Even in the history of Taiwan’s democracy movement, there were foreigners who stood up for Taiwan and helped the politically persecuted tremendously.
You have had to pay dearly for that. But you have also benefited from great international support.
Just a few days after my arrest, Taiwanese NGOs had called a press conference. Amnesty International was also already active. Two weeks after my arrest, China publicly declared that I was under investigation. In other cases, the authorities keep the fate of political prisoners secret for years.
Your wife was also a driving force for the great solidarity abroad.
Shortly after my arrest, a Chinese envoy was ordered to convince my wife to keep a low profile and not to comment publicly on my case. But she refused to give in to any pressure from China. Instead, she testified before the US Congress, among others, and convinced the UN to take up my case. As a result, my detention conditions were improved.
Your case was even tried in public.
This forced the authorities to present a minimum of suitable evidence. Without this public trial, they might have sentenced me to ten years or even life in prison. It is only thanks to the international solidarity campaign that I returned in good health after only five years.
There were threats to deprive you of your political rights and prevent you from leaving the country two years after your release from prison.
The joke is that I am not a citizen of the People’s Republic of China and have no political rights that could be taken away from me. But there is a legal provision that says that you are not allowed to leave the country during this additional sentence. That’s intriguing: If China really considers Taiwan to be its province, then surely it shouldn’t be an exit to a foreign country if a Taiwanese person returns to Taiwan at the end of his or her prison term.
But it did not come to that.
I didn’t realize that until three days before my release, when I was told that they wanted to buy a plane ticket for me. But I was nervous until the very end. Because of the pandemic, there are currently only a few flights to Taiwan, and the nearest airport was in Xiamen. So on the day of my release, I was taken from Hunan to Xiamen, spent the night there, and was flown out to Taiwan in the morning.
You are now back in Taiwan, a democratic country governed by the rule of law. Are you worried that the Chinese Communist Party will come after you here as well?
If they only attack me personally, then I can live with that. I am more concerned about how Taiwan is being subverted by Chinese forces and infiltrating our country in the areas of economy, culture and education. We have to be vigilant about that. I was away for five years, and there are some changes that should not be underestimated and are not accidental. For example, Taiwan’s middle school students hardly use Facebook anymore and are now all on Chinese apps like Douyin (Tiktok) and Xiaohongshu (Little Red Book). In the last two months, I have also noticed that Chinese slang is taking root in Taiwan. It was also recently reported that the Apple Daily Taiwan newspaper has been bought out by Hong Kong investors.
Will you be drawn back to China in the future? And would you advise others against a trip?
I will definitely not return to China in the future. If you want to do something like I do or if you work for an NGO, you should be careful and ask yourself if you have such a tough woman at your side like I do. Taiwanese who only do business in China probably don’t need my advice. Everyone has to know that for himself.
Lee Ming-che (李明哲), democracy activist from Taiwan, was found guilty by a court in Hunan Province in the People’s Republic of China in 2017 for his activities in online chats for “undermining state power”. He served five years in prison.
In the debate about a Volkswagen-operated plant in the Chinese Uyghur region of Xinjiang, the pressure on the automaker is rapidly increasing. The head of the German metalworkers’ union IG Metall, Joerg Hofmann, who sits on the VW’s supervisory board, even questioned the company’s activities in the region altogether. “Meanwhile there is hardly any doubt that human rights violations are taking place in Xinjiang,” the Union Chief told the German newspaper Wolfsburger Nachrichten. For this reason, the group’s board of management would have to deal with the issue.
The company’s presence in Urumqi is highly controversial; most recently, the German government even denied the company investment guarantees, citing its ties to human rights violations (China.Table reported). In the meantime, researchers have also identified the first evidence indeed linking the car company’s supply relationships to forced labor (China.Table reported). However, the company continues to maintain the site.
Although there is currently no indication that human rights violations have occurred at VW itself. “Nevertheless, the question to be asked is what it means for the company’s reputation to continue investing there,” Hofmann said.
Hofmann said in the interview that Volkswagen couldn’t just look at what was going on in its own “front yard,” but also had to pay attention to which “street” it lived on. “When human rights violations are visible on the right and left, I demand action.” The Group must take a visible and unequivocal stand against human rights violations, he said.
VW Works Council Head Daniela Cavallo also voiced criticism of her company’s activities in the Uyghur-majority region. “I am very shaken by these reports of human rights violations,” Cavallo told the newspaper Taz over the weekend. “We have a responsibility as Volkswagen.” The Works Council does define standards on working conditions and the supply chain. However, she claims to have no evidence that “anything is happening at the plant in Urumqi that is not in line with our charter”.
Lower Saxony’s Minister-President Stephan Weil (SPD), who serves on the oversight body as a representative of the state with a 20 percent stake in VW, also joined in on the discussion. “The images and reports about the severe human rights violations against the Uyghur minority in the Chinese region of Xinijang are startling.” But he said there was no evidence so far that human rights or labor rights violations had occurred at the VW plant. “However, this does not absolve the group from its responsibility to deal intensively with the issue and to closely examine the allegations regarding the human rights situation, which will be done.”
Xinjiang is now likely to become a matter of discussion for VW’s supervisory board. Volkswagen said in a statement, “We are not aware of any cases in which SAIC Volkswagen employees have been or are in detention camps.” When asked, the group added “all important topics relevant to our business are addressed” in its discussions with the Chinese government. This would include critical issues.
However, VW cannot simply withdraw from the project. Although the site in Urumqi is small and makes little economic sense, it has considerable symbolic value for the Chinese government. In 2012, Beijing had urged VW to sign the additional joint project with its long-time partner SAIC. At the time, the main aim was to create evidence of an increase in economic power in Xinjiang.
China drew its legitimacy for ruling the region from its claim to bring development and prosperity to the remote territory. Indeed, the economy did grow there at the time, and modern jobs were created. This also made it easy for the German side to accept this narrative – they were persuaded that they were doing something good for the Uyghurs.
But since 2018, the Chinese government’s Uyghur policy has taken a turn for the extreme. A significant part of the population has been detained in camps; the region resembles an open-air prison with total technological surveillance (China.Table reported). Now, the very existence of the VW plant contributes to legitimizing this procedure. At the same time, China has the upper hand over VW. Without the government’s goodwill, no foreign company can do business there. Nico Beckert/Finn Mayer-Kuckuk/Reuters
What is an economic growth forecast that was announced at the beginning of March still worth? In Europe, economic forecasts are regularly readjusted as new developments emerge. China’s political economy, however, works differently. The leadership’s early March target (China.Table reported) is set in stone. There are no signs that the government in Beijing plans to end the year worse off than the announced “around 5.5 percent”. All despite endless lockdowns and continued real estate market problems.
So while Western institutions are making good arguments to downgrade the economic forecast, Chinese economists can plausibly argue that the problems were already factored into the government’s issued target and will be met. “The government still has six months to give the economy a boost through stimulus measures,” Peking University economist Justin Yifu Lin said Thursday at an event hosted by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW). This would be enough to compensate for the weak first half of the year, he added.
Every March, it is one of the rituals in China’s annual cycle to announce a growth target. This process is fundamentally different from forecasts like the German government’s spring projection. While the latter attempts to predict the development of an unpredictable economy, the Chinese figure is a target. It is a matter of credibility for the Party to meet or exceed this figure.
After the Premier’s presentation, however, the Omicron waves swept through China’s industrial hubs. The new variant could not be contained with the existing resources and brought the economy to a standstill, especially in the Shanghai economic hub.
But in fact, the target of 5.5 percent was already considered cautiously picked in March, after all, Omikron was already in action. So the government deliberately left itself some room for maneuver. In addition, the government has already launched economic stimulus programs of considerable magnitude. The news service Bloomberg has added up the value of the announced measures and came up with ¥5,300 billion, roughly €750 billion. This corresponds to a quarter of Germany’s gross domestic product.
A major portion of the aid is provided by the tax authorities. There are rebates on corporate tax, income tax and value-added tax. Tax breaks totaling ¥2,500 billion are planned for 2022 alone. The tax breaks are part of 33 stimulus measures announced by the government in late May. One important instrument concerns municipal financing. Local governments will be allowed to issue more of their own bonds. This is intended to help them finance higher spending on construction projects. Companies experiencing payment difficulties will not have to pay their power and water bills for a while.
Given these fireworks of measures, economist Lin even believes that growth of six percent is possible. He acknowledges that the year has started off very difficult, but still considers Beijing to be highly capable of action.
At the same time, Western experts wonder about what they perceive as the Chinese government’s inflexibility in dealing with the economy. One economist with a particularly close eye on China is Helge Berger, who is in charge of the country at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington. His department downgraded its forecast for China to 4.4 percent in April, with another reassessment due in July. “Yes, the government has decided to provide fiscal support,” Berger says. “But it is unlikely that the measures will have a sufficient effect.” As a result, in the IMF’s view, the gap between the target and what is still achievable is growing.
Berger lists several problems that inhibit growth:
But fellow state-affiliated Lin, who also advises the Chinese government, has equally good arguments for a rebound in economic activity in the coming months:
Despite all optimism, Lin also sees considerable problems in the real estate market. In recent years, the government has made efforts to work toward a less speculative and altogether more solid economy. Simply releasing loans is thus out of the question if the sector is to consolidate.
In their own way, both renowned economists Lin and Berger are probably right. The figure of 5.5 percent or more could indeed be met at the end of the year, as Lin predicts. But this will be the result of a typical miracle of Chinese economic control or manipulation, rather than the result of reasonably natural interacting factors.
This article refers to the eleventh part of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy’s (IfW) Global China Conversations event series, entitled “Can China Achieve its 2022 GDP Growth Target of 5.5 Percent?” China.Table is a media partner of this event series.
China has launched its third aircraft carrier. Amid tensions with the United States over Taiwan and Chinese claims in the South China Sea, the “Fujian” was launched on Friday, according to state media reports. The ship, which was designed by the People’s Republic itself, features an aircraft catapult system (China.Table reported). With its third aircraft carrier, China overtakes the United Kingdom, which only operates two such vessels. Only the United States is better equipped, with eleven aircraft carriers. Russia’s navy has one carrier named “Admiral Kuznetsov,” which is currently not operational due to repair work. rtr/nib
Is China merely the next colonial power to wreak havoc in Africa and make the continent financially dependent, while raw materials flow bountifully to the Middle Kingdom? This is the impression given by many media reports. Deborah Brautigam, Director of the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University disagrees – and is increasingly distraught by Western reporting: “I’m always surprised how much journalists still fall back into Cold War reflexes when reporting on China.”
When Brautigam criticizes reporting – for example, on China’s supposed debt traps – it doesn’t have the sharp, bitter tone that some media critics from the periphery of society adopt. Her criticism is based on years of field research on the ground, so it has a solid foundation. For her latest book, for example, Brautigam traveled to Africa and spoke with local farmers. After food prices soared in the late noughties, explanations were sought. “At the time, there were a lot of rumors circulating in Western media about Chinese land grabs in Africa,” Brautigam explains.
It was assumed that the Chinese would use bought-up land to ship food back home. In 2010, the New York Times reported about African farmers who were being driven off their land by foreign investors. The Chinese would have a particular eye on sugar cane plantations. Brautigam and her team evaluated the corresponding Chinese investments. What they discovered was a very different story. “Only in one major project did the Chinese invest in food on African soil,” Brautigam says. That project involved rice farming in Mozambique. The yields were intended for local markets.
Brautigam has been researching Chinese activities in Africa for more than 40 years. In the early 1980s, the US American was one of the first to focus on Chinese development aid in Africa and to research what goals the Chinese were pursuing. In doing so, she looks back to the Mao era of the 1960s. She is now one of the world’s foremost experts on Chinese-African relations. Brautigam’s interest in Asian cultures and China, in particular, is rooted in a four-year backpacking trip from Istanbul to Thailand in the late 1970s right after she graduated from college. It was a time of change in Asia. “When I left Iran, the Shah was overthrown. When I left Afghanistan, the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan was beginning,” Brautigam says. At least, Thailand remained largely stable. There, Brautigam gave English courses and learned Thai.
It wasn’t until she returned to America that she decided to learn Mandarin. “It was a purely practical decision between Chinese, Japanese or Korean,” Brautigam says. She chose Mandarin because most people speak it – in retrospect, it was exactly the right decision. David Renke
I will not allow myself to become a pot carrier. Perhaps you should simply throw this phrase into the room as a ruse the next time someone wants to turn you into a scapegoat. This linguistic maneuver will certainly cause confusion at first and will gain you time to shift the blame. If there are any questions, just stay cool and explain expertly that in China you don’t get the blame, but have to “carry a black pot” (背黑锅 bēi hēiguō). The others then have to google (or baidu) that first.
Originally, 背锅 bēiguō (“to carry a pot”) was the colloquial term for a hunchback in some parts of China (just imagine someone carrying around a large wok on their back and the image will solidify). “Black pot” (黑锅 hēiguō), meanwhile, was considered synonymous with “scapegoat” (A complicated history having to do with consonants and dialectal influences – I’ll spare you the details here). In any case, the net community has recently happily combined the two terms into 背黑锅 bēi hēiguō (“to carry the black pot”) and then shortened it to 背锅 bēiguō “to carry the pot”. Hunched scapegoats are, after all, prime meme material. Et voilà – the Chinese buzzword for “being the scapegoat” was born.
The counterpart, by the way, is 甩锅 shuǎiguō – to “shake off” or “throw off” the pot, i.e. to pass the buck to others. Such “shake-off” works great with other things as well. For example, people: 甩人 shuǎirén (“to shake someone off”) means “to dump someone”.
But let’s take a closer gaze into the Chinese pots. It’s worth it, both linguistically and culturally, as well as culinary. One of the most famous pots is undoubtedly the “fire pot” (火锅 huǒguō), commonly known as hotpot. But have you ever heard of mandarin duck pots (鸳鸯锅 yuānyangguō)? Don’t worry, here the name doesn’t say it all. There are no colorful-feathered fowl in the soup. Rather, it refers to special potware. The word refers to fondue pots with dividers that leave room for two broths instead of just one (for example, a toned-down mild broth for hot pot beginners). Mandarin ducks (鸳鸯 yuānyang) are considered a symbol of inseparable lovers in China. And the two broths, separated only by a divider, are also inseparable in a sense, simmering in the same pot. Another little hint for hot pot newbies: Don’t be surprised if the Chinese waitress asks if you’ve chosen your “pot bottom” (锅底 guōdǐ) yet. In hotpot jargon, this refers to the broth and not the bottom of the pot.
In crowded hotpot restaurants, things are sometimes chaotic, especially when you can grab ingredients from the self-service buffet. This sometimes ends up in complete mayhem, or as the Chinese would say: it is “as chaotic as a pot of rice porridge” (乱成一锅粥 luàn chéng yī guō zhōu – “complete chaos, great mayhem”). If empty stomachs then leave the nerves on edge during the battle at the buffet, pushing and shoving can heat up the tempers and cause the camel’s back to break – pardon: “the pot to explode” (炸锅 zhàguō), which we would rather translate as “to cause a ruckus” or “to create a commotion”.
Finally, here are a few amusing expressions that we probably won’t understand at first when Chinese acquaintances pull them out of the pot:
So once again, it goes to show: There is a suitable linguistic lid for every situational pot in Chinese!
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.