China’s leadership expressed deep sorrow over the death of Henry Kissinger at the age of 100, highlighting Kissinger’s high esteem in the People’s Republic. Online, there were numerous condolences. Michael Radunski recounts how Kissinger became the most influential figure in Sino-American relations and why condolences also carry a hint of criticism towards the Biden administration.
China itself acknowledges its intention to shift global power dynamics in its favor. Australian top politician, diplomat and sinologist Kevin Rudd suggests paying attention to this. In a conversation with Nana Brink and Felix Lee, he outlines his vision for an effective approach to dealing with China. He advocates for a consistent strategy of deterrence. Properly employed, it doesn’t lead to escalation but raises the cost of seizing Taiwan to unacceptable levels.
For the real estate giant Evergrande, the situation is getting tight. The insolvent company has until Monday to present a credible debt restructuring plan. Otherwise, dissolution and the sale of valuable assets to serve creditors loom. Such a process would send shockwaves through China’s financial world, as Joern Petring reports. It would also have significant political implications, considering that much of China’s savings are invested in residential properties.
Could China play a mediating role in the recent Middle East conflict? The Chinese leadership also maintained good relations with Israel, at least until Oct. 7.
If geopolitical circumstances allow, I do believe that China could become more active in negotiations. But as long as the leadership in Beijing refuses to clearly condemn Hamas’ crimes, Israel will remain skeptical of China.
In the case of former archenemies Saudi Arabia and Iran, China has surprisingly succeeded in bringing them together.
It wasn’t that surprising. China may seem like a newcomer to the region. However, his historical frame of reference extends to the late 1970s. At that time, Beijing established a close relationship with Iran, supported by the Chinese military and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. From that point on, China became a major supplier of military goods – and conversely, systematically increased its oil imports from Iran. China’s recent rapprochement with the Gulf monarchies is primarily concerned with its growing need for hydrocarbons. The U.S. is importing less energy from the Gulf states, while the Chinese are filling the gap and using the deals to expand geopolitical relations in the region. China’s great interest in Israel over the past decade and a half has again been in access to technology, especially in the military sphere. But with China’s close relationship with Iran, China is out of the question as a long-term strategic partner for Tel Aviv.
Israel initially found it difficult to take a clear position on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
Yes, Israel has tried to take a neutral stance in the case of Ukraine. However, in view of the various meetings that Putin is hosting in Moscow, in which representatives of Hamas are also involved, the attitude of the Netanyahu government is likely to have changed. This should make the geopolitical lines clearer.
Let’s go to another conflict region: the Indo-Pacific. China’s aggression against Taiwan and the countries bordering the South China Sea is undeniable. But is a new US-led security alliance in the Indo-Pacific, comparable to NATO, really the appropriate response?
It is important to understand that China describes itself as a power that does not want to sustain the status quo. Also, Beijing wants to take Taiwan. With the so-called nine-dash line, and the ten dash line, China claims that the South China Sea is in effect a Chinese territorial sea. And China wants to take the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea from Japan. In addition, there are disputes over offshore islands off South Korea and a large territory in dispute with India. China wants to redraw all these borders. How should the democracies of Asia respond to any unilateral efforts by China to change the status quo? I believe that a strategy of deterrence is appropriate. It operates on a military, economic and technological level. It must be made clear to the military leadership in Beijing that China will have to pay a high price for any attempt to conquer Taiwan by unilateral force, politically, militarily and economically.
What makes you so sure that Japan, South Korea and the countries of Southeast Asia will really pull together with Australia and the US in dealing with China? Some of these countries are also economically very dependent on China.
Do Europeans agree on everything? Nevertheless, NATO is basically capable of acting. As far as US allies in Asia are concerned, we do not have a collective security organization, but bilateral security agreements with the United States. At the same time, however, the countries of North-Asia are moving closer together. At the trilateral summit in Camp David in August, for example, South Korean President Yoon, Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida and US President Biden explicitly expressed their support for Taiwan. This was unprecedented. And the Philippines are also cooperating more closely with the United States than it has in decades. In the rest of Southeast Asia, as you rightly say, there are different views. The same applies to India. However, the overall strategic goal throughout the Indo-Pacific is to maintain the strategic status quo and some degree of strategic balance.
But is the West really moving closer together in its dealings with China?
At the very least, I see an increasingly strategic stance on the part of all NATO countries. NATO now also invites Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand to their summits. And I also see an increasingly tough stance towards China in the China strategy that the German government has recently developed. A fundamental systemic rivalry, increasing competition, but also the possibility of continuing to cooperate in certain areas of climate, the global economy and trade – in this respect, the European strategy does not differ much from the US or Australian strategy. We are all trying to be systemically clear about the red lines, as well as the intensity of strategic competition in the economy, but at the same time to be open to cooperation with Beijing on global public goods such as climate change, global debt and a possible future pandemic.
What role do you think Germany can and should play in the wake of these geopolitical tensions?
Germany is a deeply respected member of the international community. That’s why what Germany says normatively carries enormous weight – not only in Europe but also in the Indo-Pacific. I have been to Berlin many times over the years. My impression is that the German public sometimes underestimates the impact and importance of the German voice in the world. After all, the German Bundeswehr has from time to time deployed in the Indo-Pacific, including from Australian bases. This is an important message: Germany is also committed to upholding international law, international maritime law and freedom of navigation. Although Germany is first and foremost a European power, it also has a global voice.
At the last BRICS summit in Beijing, not only did six more countries join the BRICS, but 40 more countries applied for membership, and 100 more expressed interest. Isn’t it a dramatic turning point for the West when China is attracting so many countries of the Global South to its side?
China has made enormous progress in the countries of the Global South through the Belt and Road Initiative but also through the BRICS. These institutions are outside the international rules-based systems and the institutions that we created together after 1945. China has simply realized that there are a lot of investment opportunities in these countries. But what is also true is that numerous countries have piled up enormous debts to China. And China tends not to forgive debt. But of course, the multilateral development banks have a duty to invest much much more in these countries of the Global South. Otherwise, they have nowhere to go.
China itself has massive economic problems. How firmly is Xi Jinping established as party and state leader?
I have spent most of my life analyzing China’s domestic politics. And despite recent events, I have come to the conclusion that Xi can continue to be confident in his hold on the leadership. Anyone who believes that the dismissal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Minister of Defense is an indication of potential leadership change, in my opinion, failed to understand the internal dynamics of the Communist leadership. In China, there are currently major debates about the future course of the Chinese economy and about the changes to the Chinese economic model introduced by Xi Jinping over the past five years. But to deduce from this that Xi’s power is at risk is, in my opinion, a misguided analysis. Xi’s hold on power is formidable.
Kevin Rudd served as the Prime Minister of Australia from 2007 to 2010 and again for three months in 2013. Currently, he is Australia’s ambassador to the United States. However, he gave this interview in his capacity as an author and former politician. Rudd is a trained sinologist and speaks Mandarin fluently.
In the ongoing drama surrounding the highly indebted Chinese real estate conglomerate Evergrande, a crucial date is approaching on Monday. In Hong Kong, a decision will be made in court on whether Evergrande will be formally sent into liquidation.
At the end of October, the presiding judge, Linda Chan, granted Evergrande a final five-week extension to reach an agreement with its creditors. She scheduled the final hearing for Dec. 4, which is Monday. The following scenarios are now possible:
Evergrande is in deep crisis and is considered the world’s most heavily indebted real estate company. It has accumulated debts of over 300 billion dollars. In January 2022, the company announced a restructuring plan but has since been unable to reach an agreement with its creditors. The real estate crisis in China has also affected numerous other companies, but Evergrande is under special scrutiny due to its sheer size.
It is clear that the order for liquidation by Judge Chan would by no means be the end of the Evergrande saga. The legal situation is complex. Evergrande is a Chinese company headquartered on the Chinese mainland, while the court proceedings are taking place in Hong Kong, where it is listed on the stock exchange.
The implementation of liquidation under Hong Kong law would have significant implications for the Chinese real estate market, the economy, and hundreds of thousands of homebuyers. Observers therefore believe that the mainland Chinese authorities may not readily follow the Hong Kong judgment.
In fact, the enforcement of judgments by Hong Kong courts on the Chinese mainland can be complex due to different legal systems and political considerations. In such cases, the implementation depends on the willingness of the central or local Chinese governments. In the case of Evergrande, Beijing has different intentions than selling assets as quickly as possible and distributing proceeds to creditors, especially those abroad.
More important is social stability in their own country. “The government’s priority will clearly be to deliver unsold and unfinished housing to homebuyers,” said Christopher Beddor of consulting firm Gavekal Dragonomics to Reuters. According to Gavekal’s analysis, Evergrande has contract liabilities of about 604 billion yuan (approximately 83 billion dollars), equivalent to about 600,000 unfinished homes.
Even industry experts are finding it difficult these days to predict the further course of events. The situation is becoming increasingly unclear. In the latest twist, parts of the Evergrande conglomerate are now suing each other.
The Evergrande Property Services Group announced on Tuesday in Hong Kong that one of its units had initiated legal proceedings against Hengda Real Estate Group and the construction unit China Evergrande. The unit, Jinbi Property Management, intends to recover approximately 280 million dollars in pledged guarantees. This move is likely to have further damaged the trust of Evergrande creditors.
Dec. 4, 2023; 6 p.m. (Dec. 5, 1 a.m. Beijing time)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Webinar: Japan, China, and Global Economic Orders More
Dec. 5, 2023; 2 p.m. Uhr (9 p.m. Beijing time)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Webcast: Previewing Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election More
Dec. 5, 2023; 3:30 p.m. Beijing time
Rödl & Partner, Roadshow (in Shanghai): Navigating through a day of a Key Manager in China in 2024 More
Dec. 5, 2023; 4 p.m.
China Netzwerk Baden-Wuerttemberg, Berlin Naehkaestle with Felix Lee (on site): Sonja Muehlberger: Interview with a contemporary witness – born in Shanghai in 1939 as the child of emigrants More
Dec. 5, 2023; 5 p.m. (12 a.m. Beijing time)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Webcast: Prospects for China’s Growth and Foreign Relations in an Era of Competition More
Dec. 6, 2023; 2:30 p.m. (9:30 p.m. Beijing time)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Webcast: China’s Food Security Challenges More
Dec. 6, 2023; 2:30 p.m.
People’s Government of Ningbo City, networking event (in Munich): The perfect wave – business surfing in Ningbo More
Dec. 6, 2023; 6 p.m. (Dec. 5, 1 a.m. Beijing time)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Critical Issues Confronting China Series: China’s New Playbook More
Dec. 7, 2023; 9 a.m.
China Team GmbH, discussion with Wolfgang Hirn and others: Turning point or new normal for German SMEs? More
Dec. 7, 2023; 11 a.m. (6 p.m. Beijing time)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Global China Conversations #27: The future of technology standards: Germany and China in competition? More
Dec. 7-8, 2023
Research Institute for Automotive Engineering and Vehicle Engines Stuttgart, Symposium (on site): 7th Shanghai-Stuttgart Symposium Automotive and Powertrain Technology More
Dec. 8, 2023; 2 p.m. (9 p.m. Beijing time)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Book Event: Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality in China More
Dec. 8, 2023; 7:30 p.m.
Konfuzius-Institut München e.V., lecture (in Munich): Presentation of the “China-Germany Youth Interns Exchange Program” More
The German government has reservations about EU anti-dumping tariffs on EVs. “EU compensatory tariffs could protect EU industry but could also have negative effects,” says the classified statement by the German government on the 2024 work program of the EU Commission, which Table.Media has obtained.
EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had announced an anti-subsidy investigation into battery-EVs from China. At the same time, she suggested that there were indications of impermissible subsidization. It is now only a matter of time before the Commission imposes anti-dumping tariffs on EVs from China.
The German government fears negative consequences of the tariffs for German manufacturers. Without mentioning German companies directly, the statement warns of negative consequences “directly (for EU manufacturers in China exporting to the EU) and indirectly (in the case of possible retaliatory measure(s) by China)”.
The background is that German brands such as Mercedes, BMW and VW make up to 40 percent of their sales in China and have built large production capacities in China itself. French manufacturers, on the other hand, are not active in the Chinese market but have long been calling for EU tariffs on EVs from China because Chinese brands compete massively with EVs from French manufacturers in the EU and take away market share.
The German government urges a “rule-compliant and open-ended investigation” as part of the anti-subsidy procedure and that “the respective interests be taken into account within the framework of the Union interest”. Member states are to be “closely involved in the procedure given its political sensitivity”. The document also contains a clear criticism of the Commission: The anti-subsidy investigation has the “peculiarity that it was initiated ex officio and thus not based on an application from an EU manufacturer.” The message from the German government is that the Commission allowed itself to be pushed by the French government. Markus Grabitz
BMW and Mercedes-Benz plan to establish a joint network of fast charging stations for EVs in China starting next year. A joint venture will be created for this purpose, the companies announced on Thursday. By the end of 2026, at least 1,000 public stations with approximately 7,000 charging points are planned nationwide. These will be available to all vehicle brands. However, customers of the two premium manufacturers are expected to benefit from exclusive services such as advance reservation of charging points. In Europe, the two manufacturers already collaborate with the charging station operator Ionity.
China has the most EV charging points globally: By the end of 2022, 5.2 million charging points were registered in China and estimates suggest an expansion of the charging network to 6.8 million points by the end of 2023. This is in contrast to over 18 million EVs now on Chinese roads. This number could reach 20 million by the end of the year. rtr/jul
This accusation by investor Grizzly Research caused a decline in SenseTime’s valuation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The company, however, has rejected all allegations in a statement posted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s website.
Short sellers like Grizzly are aggressive investors aiming to expose falsehoods in the stories of highly valued companies. They engage in financial market transactions (short selling) to bet on falling prices and then bring about those declines through negative reports about the companies. fin
In the paper, China states that the UN Security Council should intensify its diplomatic mediation, revive the two-state solution and promptly convene a “more authoritative and effective” international peace conference. The Beijing government also urged the Security Council to adhere to a comprehensive ceasefire to end the fighting.
The paper contains five points and is rather vaguely formulated. Other demands include the protection of civilians and humanitarian assistance. However, there are no specific proposals on how the People’s Republic itself can contribute to resolving the conflict. China had also presented a so-called peace plan in the Ukraine conflict, with twelve points, similarly vague. In recent months, the People’s Republic has been increasingly positioning itself as a mediator in international conflicts. rtr/jul
To understand how important Henry Kissinger was for relations between the USA and China, one only needs to go back a few months. Washington was trying to normalize contact with Beijing. John Kerry, as a climate envoy, met his Chinese counterpart, and Finance Minister Janet Yellen also traveled to China. But only one person was allowed to meet Xi Jinping: Henry Kissinger – 100 years old and without any official position.
“The relations between China and the United States will forever be associated with the name Kissinger,” said China’s party and state leader as the two men sat side by side in cream-colored armchairs discussing the relations between the two superpowers. “I express my deep respect to you.”
The tone was clear: Only Kissinger, with his around 100 visits, understands China. Foreign Minister Wang Yi even said, “US policy towards China requires diplomatic wisdom in the style of Kissinger and political courage in the style of Nixon.”
The importance of the meeting with Kissinger is also evident in the choice of location: The same building where Kissinger had met the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai half a century earlier: Villa No. 5 of the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse.
In 1971, Kissinger secretly traveled to Beijing – to the city that had not hosted an official US delegation since the Communists took power in 1949. However, Kissinger wanted to win China as a partner against the Soviet Union and, therefore, establish communication channels. After his meeting with Zhou Enlai, he telegraphed Nixon a single word: Eureka – the code word that the mission was a complete success.
What followed is well known: A year later, Nixon became the first US president to visit the People’s Republic of China. This visit, in turn, led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and communist-ruled China in 1979.
He was born as Heinz Alfred Kissinger in Fuerth, Middle Franconia, in 1923, the son of a Jewish family. At the age of 15, he fled to the United States with his parents and brother to escape the Nazis. Heinz became Henry – and one of the most influential US politicians in the following decades. Kissinger became an expert in international politics at Harvard University. Richard Nixon brought him to the White House as National Security Adviser. Later, he became the US Secretary of State.
Kissinger once said he simply wanted to prevent a repetition of the wars from 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945 that had destroyed his childhood in Germany and large parts of the world. Applied to today this means preserving peace between China and the United States.
One may indeed have divided opinions about Henry Kissinger. Some praise him as a politician who brought relaxation during the Cold War and as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. Others criticize him as a ruthless power politician who did not shy away from power politics (and victims).
Minorities and the weaker ones are at risk of being left behind. Wu’er Kaixi, a Uyghur and one of the student leaders in the Tiananmen protests of 1989, wrote on X: “Kissinger’s long pro-China political position not only helped the CCP regime in consequence harmed the Chinese people, but also hurt US interests.” There were also quite critical tones from Taiwan on Thursday.
In the People’s Republic, however, the appreciation for the former US Secretary of State knows almost no bounds. China’s leadership expressed collective shock over Kissinger’s death on Thursday. Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin praised Kissinger as a “pioneer and architect of Sino-American relations”.
Party and state leader Xi Jinping sent condolences to US President Joe Biden. Prime Minister Li Qiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi also expressed their condolences. Xie Feng, China’s ambassador to the United States, wrote on X: “He will always remain alive in the hearts of the Chinese people as a most valued old friend.”
Not only China’s political leadership fell into collective mourning. Also, in social media, Kissinger’s death, with more than 400 million views, was the top topic on the Weibo microblogging service. A top comment with thousands of likes read: “Farewell, old friend of the Chinese people”.
Kissinger believed that stability between China and the United States depended on Beijing and Washington tolerating their differences. China, according to Kissinger, sees the current world order as an American order. And Beijing only wants room for adjustments – not a complete overturn.
Some are reminded of the assurances of the current leadership in Beijing. Thus, the almost overflowing mourning in China should also be seen as criticism of the current US leadership. While Nixon and Kissinger once relied on dialogue, Trump and Biden increasingly show toughness towards China. Michael Radunski
Isabelle Harbrecht is the new coordinator of the China Competence Training Center (CCTC) at Humboldt University Berlin. She was previously head of the International Office at the Potsdam University of Applied Sciences. The CCTC at the HU aims to strengthen China expertise in the administration of Berlin’s universities.
Djordje Milovankic has been a Junior Researcher for the topic “Man-made disasters in China” at the major reinsurer Swiss Re since November. He previously completed his Master’s degree in Sinology at the University of Zurich.
Is something changing in your organization? Let us know at heads@table.media!
The workers and builders of the Harbin Ice and Snow Festival still have a lot to do. They need to shape and stack 250,000 cubic meters of ice into huge and artistic, brightly illuminated structures such as pagodas, towers and slides. The building material consists of meter-thick blocks cut from the ice cover of the Songhua River. The festival in northeastern China, north of the Russian city of Vladivostok, is celebrating its 25th anniversary and will last until the end of February, when the sun will slowly melt the intricate structures.
China’s leadership expressed deep sorrow over the death of Henry Kissinger at the age of 100, highlighting Kissinger’s high esteem in the People’s Republic. Online, there were numerous condolences. Michael Radunski recounts how Kissinger became the most influential figure in Sino-American relations and why condolences also carry a hint of criticism towards the Biden administration.
China itself acknowledges its intention to shift global power dynamics in its favor. Australian top politician, diplomat and sinologist Kevin Rudd suggests paying attention to this. In a conversation with Nana Brink and Felix Lee, he outlines his vision for an effective approach to dealing with China. He advocates for a consistent strategy of deterrence. Properly employed, it doesn’t lead to escalation but raises the cost of seizing Taiwan to unacceptable levels.
For the real estate giant Evergrande, the situation is getting tight. The insolvent company has until Monday to present a credible debt restructuring plan. Otherwise, dissolution and the sale of valuable assets to serve creditors loom. Such a process would send shockwaves through China’s financial world, as Joern Petring reports. It would also have significant political implications, considering that much of China’s savings are invested in residential properties.
Could China play a mediating role in the recent Middle East conflict? The Chinese leadership also maintained good relations with Israel, at least until Oct. 7.
If geopolitical circumstances allow, I do believe that China could become more active in negotiations. But as long as the leadership in Beijing refuses to clearly condemn Hamas’ crimes, Israel will remain skeptical of China.
In the case of former archenemies Saudi Arabia and Iran, China has surprisingly succeeded in bringing them together.
It wasn’t that surprising. China may seem like a newcomer to the region. However, his historical frame of reference extends to the late 1970s. At that time, Beijing established a close relationship with Iran, supported by the Chinese military and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. From that point on, China became a major supplier of military goods – and conversely, systematically increased its oil imports from Iran. China’s recent rapprochement with the Gulf monarchies is primarily concerned with its growing need for hydrocarbons. The U.S. is importing less energy from the Gulf states, while the Chinese are filling the gap and using the deals to expand geopolitical relations in the region. China’s great interest in Israel over the past decade and a half has again been in access to technology, especially in the military sphere. But with China’s close relationship with Iran, China is out of the question as a long-term strategic partner for Tel Aviv.
Israel initially found it difficult to take a clear position on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
Yes, Israel has tried to take a neutral stance in the case of Ukraine. However, in view of the various meetings that Putin is hosting in Moscow, in which representatives of Hamas are also involved, the attitude of the Netanyahu government is likely to have changed. This should make the geopolitical lines clearer.
Let’s go to another conflict region: the Indo-Pacific. China’s aggression against Taiwan and the countries bordering the South China Sea is undeniable. But is a new US-led security alliance in the Indo-Pacific, comparable to NATO, really the appropriate response?
It is important to understand that China describes itself as a power that does not want to sustain the status quo. Also, Beijing wants to take Taiwan. With the so-called nine-dash line, and the ten dash line, China claims that the South China Sea is in effect a Chinese territorial sea. And China wants to take the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea from Japan. In addition, there are disputes over offshore islands off South Korea and a large territory in dispute with India. China wants to redraw all these borders. How should the democracies of Asia respond to any unilateral efforts by China to change the status quo? I believe that a strategy of deterrence is appropriate. It operates on a military, economic and technological level. It must be made clear to the military leadership in Beijing that China will have to pay a high price for any attempt to conquer Taiwan by unilateral force, politically, militarily and economically.
What makes you so sure that Japan, South Korea and the countries of Southeast Asia will really pull together with Australia and the US in dealing with China? Some of these countries are also economically very dependent on China.
Do Europeans agree on everything? Nevertheless, NATO is basically capable of acting. As far as US allies in Asia are concerned, we do not have a collective security organization, but bilateral security agreements with the United States. At the same time, however, the countries of North-Asia are moving closer together. At the trilateral summit in Camp David in August, for example, South Korean President Yoon, Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida and US President Biden explicitly expressed their support for Taiwan. This was unprecedented. And the Philippines are also cooperating more closely with the United States than it has in decades. In the rest of Southeast Asia, as you rightly say, there are different views. The same applies to India. However, the overall strategic goal throughout the Indo-Pacific is to maintain the strategic status quo and some degree of strategic balance.
But is the West really moving closer together in its dealings with China?
At the very least, I see an increasingly strategic stance on the part of all NATO countries. NATO now also invites Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand to their summits. And I also see an increasingly tough stance towards China in the China strategy that the German government has recently developed. A fundamental systemic rivalry, increasing competition, but also the possibility of continuing to cooperate in certain areas of climate, the global economy and trade – in this respect, the European strategy does not differ much from the US or Australian strategy. We are all trying to be systemically clear about the red lines, as well as the intensity of strategic competition in the economy, but at the same time to be open to cooperation with Beijing on global public goods such as climate change, global debt and a possible future pandemic.
What role do you think Germany can and should play in the wake of these geopolitical tensions?
Germany is a deeply respected member of the international community. That’s why what Germany says normatively carries enormous weight – not only in Europe but also in the Indo-Pacific. I have been to Berlin many times over the years. My impression is that the German public sometimes underestimates the impact and importance of the German voice in the world. After all, the German Bundeswehr has from time to time deployed in the Indo-Pacific, including from Australian bases. This is an important message: Germany is also committed to upholding international law, international maritime law and freedom of navigation. Although Germany is first and foremost a European power, it also has a global voice.
At the last BRICS summit in Beijing, not only did six more countries join the BRICS, but 40 more countries applied for membership, and 100 more expressed interest. Isn’t it a dramatic turning point for the West when China is attracting so many countries of the Global South to its side?
China has made enormous progress in the countries of the Global South through the Belt and Road Initiative but also through the BRICS. These institutions are outside the international rules-based systems and the institutions that we created together after 1945. China has simply realized that there are a lot of investment opportunities in these countries. But what is also true is that numerous countries have piled up enormous debts to China. And China tends not to forgive debt. But of course, the multilateral development banks have a duty to invest much much more in these countries of the Global South. Otherwise, they have nowhere to go.
China itself has massive economic problems. How firmly is Xi Jinping established as party and state leader?
I have spent most of my life analyzing China’s domestic politics. And despite recent events, I have come to the conclusion that Xi can continue to be confident in his hold on the leadership. Anyone who believes that the dismissal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Minister of Defense is an indication of potential leadership change, in my opinion, failed to understand the internal dynamics of the Communist leadership. In China, there are currently major debates about the future course of the Chinese economy and about the changes to the Chinese economic model introduced by Xi Jinping over the past five years. But to deduce from this that Xi’s power is at risk is, in my opinion, a misguided analysis. Xi’s hold on power is formidable.
Kevin Rudd served as the Prime Minister of Australia from 2007 to 2010 and again for three months in 2013. Currently, he is Australia’s ambassador to the United States. However, he gave this interview in his capacity as an author and former politician. Rudd is a trained sinologist and speaks Mandarin fluently.
In the ongoing drama surrounding the highly indebted Chinese real estate conglomerate Evergrande, a crucial date is approaching on Monday. In Hong Kong, a decision will be made in court on whether Evergrande will be formally sent into liquidation.
At the end of October, the presiding judge, Linda Chan, granted Evergrande a final five-week extension to reach an agreement with its creditors. She scheduled the final hearing for Dec. 4, which is Monday. The following scenarios are now possible:
Evergrande is in deep crisis and is considered the world’s most heavily indebted real estate company. It has accumulated debts of over 300 billion dollars. In January 2022, the company announced a restructuring plan but has since been unable to reach an agreement with its creditors. The real estate crisis in China has also affected numerous other companies, but Evergrande is under special scrutiny due to its sheer size.
It is clear that the order for liquidation by Judge Chan would by no means be the end of the Evergrande saga. The legal situation is complex. Evergrande is a Chinese company headquartered on the Chinese mainland, while the court proceedings are taking place in Hong Kong, where it is listed on the stock exchange.
The implementation of liquidation under Hong Kong law would have significant implications for the Chinese real estate market, the economy, and hundreds of thousands of homebuyers. Observers therefore believe that the mainland Chinese authorities may not readily follow the Hong Kong judgment.
In fact, the enforcement of judgments by Hong Kong courts on the Chinese mainland can be complex due to different legal systems and political considerations. In such cases, the implementation depends on the willingness of the central or local Chinese governments. In the case of Evergrande, Beijing has different intentions than selling assets as quickly as possible and distributing proceeds to creditors, especially those abroad.
More important is social stability in their own country. “The government’s priority will clearly be to deliver unsold and unfinished housing to homebuyers,” said Christopher Beddor of consulting firm Gavekal Dragonomics to Reuters. According to Gavekal’s analysis, Evergrande has contract liabilities of about 604 billion yuan (approximately 83 billion dollars), equivalent to about 600,000 unfinished homes.
Even industry experts are finding it difficult these days to predict the further course of events. The situation is becoming increasingly unclear. In the latest twist, parts of the Evergrande conglomerate are now suing each other.
The Evergrande Property Services Group announced on Tuesday in Hong Kong that one of its units had initiated legal proceedings against Hengda Real Estate Group and the construction unit China Evergrande. The unit, Jinbi Property Management, intends to recover approximately 280 million dollars in pledged guarantees. This move is likely to have further damaged the trust of Evergrande creditors.
Dec. 4, 2023; 6 p.m. (Dec. 5, 1 a.m. Beijing time)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Webinar: Japan, China, and Global Economic Orders More
Dec. 5, 2023; 2 p.m. Uhr (9 p.m. Beijing time)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Webcast: Previewing Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election More
Dec. 5, 2023; 3:30 p.m. Beijing time
Rödl & Partner, Roadshow (in Shanghai): Navigating through a day of a Key Manager in China in 2024 More
Dec. 5, 2023; 4 p.m.
China Netzwerk Baden-Wuerttemberg, Berlin Naehkaestle with Felix Lee (on site): Sonja Muehlberger: Interview with a contemporary witness – born in Shanghai in 1939 as the child of emigrants More
Dec. 5, 2023; 5 p.m. (12 a.m. Beijing time)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Webcast: Prospects for China’s Growth and Foreign Relations in an Era of Competition More
Dec. 6, 2023; 2:30 p.m. (9:30 p.m. Beijing time)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Webcast: China’s Food Security Challenges More
Dec. 6, 2023; 2:30 p.m.
People’s Government of Ningbo City, networking event (in Munich): The perfect wave – business surfing in Ningbo More
Dec. 6, 2023; 6 p.m. (Dec. 5, 1 a.m. Beijing time)
Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Critical Issues Confronting China Series: China’s New Playbook More
Dec. 7, 2023; 9 a.m.
China Team GmbH, discussion with Wolfgang Hirn and others: Turning point or new normal for German SMEs? More
Dec. 7, 2023; 11 a.m. (6 p.m. Beijing time)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Global China Conversations #27: The future of technology standards: Germany and China in competition? More
Dec. 7-8, 2023
Research Institute for Automotive Engineering and Vehicle Engines Stuttgart, Symposium (on site): 7th Shanghai-Stuttgart Symposium Automotive and Powertrain Technology More
Dec. 8, 2023; 2 p.m. (9 p.m. Beijing time)
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Book Event: Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality in China More
Dec. 8, 2023; 7:30 p.m.
Konfuzius-Institut München e.V., lecture (in Munich): Presentation of the “China-Germany Youth Interns Exchange Program” More
The German government has reservations about EU anti-dumping tariffs on EVs. “EU compensatory tariffs could protect EU industry but could also have negative effects,” says the classified statement by the German government on the 2024 work program of the EU Commission, which Table.Media has obtained.
EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had announced an anti-subsidy investigation into battery-EVs from China. At the same time, she suggested that there were indications of impermissible subsidization. It is now only a matter of time before the Commission imposes anti-dumping tariffs on EVs from China.
The German government fears negative consequences of the tariffs for German manufacturers. Without mentioning German companies directly, the statement warns of negative consequences “directly (for EU manufacturers in China exporting to the EU) and indirectly (in the case of possible retaliatory measure(s) by China)”.
The background is that German brands such as Mercedes, BMW and VW make up to 40 percent of their sales in China and have built large production capacities in China itself. French manufacturers, on the other hand, are not active in the Chinese market but have long been calling for EU tariffs on EVs from China because Chinese brands compete massively with EVs from French manufacturers in the EU and take away market share.
The German government urges a “rule-compliant and open-ended investigation” as part of the anti-subsidy procedure and that “the respective interests be taken into account within the framework of the Union interest”. Member states are to be “closely involved in the procedure given its political sensitivity”. The document also contains a clear criticism of the Commission: The anti-subsidy investigation has the “peculiarity that it was initiated ex officio and thus not based on an application from an EU manufacturer.” The message from the German government is that the Commission allowed itself to be pushed by the French government. Markus Grabitz
BMW and Mercedes-Benz plan to establish a joint network of fast charging stations for EVs in China starting next year. A joint venture will be created for this purpose, the companies announced on Thursday. By the end of 2026, at least 1,000 public stations with approximately 7,000 charging points are planned nationwide. These will be available to all vehicle brands. However, customers of the two premium manufacturers are expected to benefit from exclusive services such as advance reservation of charging points. In Europe, the two manufacturers already collaborate with the charging station operator Ionity.
China has the most EV charging points globally: By the end of 2022, 5.2 million charging points were registered in China and estimates suggest an expansion of the charging network to 6.8 million points by the end of 2023. This is in contrast to over 18 million EVs now on Chinese roads. This number could reach 20 million by the end of the year. rtr/jul
This accusation by investor Grizzly Research caused a decline in SenseTime’s valuation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The company, however, has rejected all allegations in a statement posted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s website.
Short sellers like Grizzly are aggressive investors aiming to expose falsehoods in the stories of highly valued companies. They engage in financial market transactions (short selling) to bet on falling prices and then bring about those declines through negative reports about the companies. fin
In the paper, China states that the UN Security Council should intensify its diplomatic mediation, revive the two-state solution and promptly convene a “more authoritative and effective” international peace conference. The Beijing government also urged the Security Council to adhere to a comprehensive ceasefire to end the fighting.
The paper contains five points and is rather vaguely formulated. Other demands include the protection of civilians and humanitarian assistance. However, there are no specific proposals on how the People’s Republic itself can contribute to resolving the conflict. China had also presented a so-called peace plan in the Ukraine conflict, with twelve points, similarly vague. In recent months, the People’s Republic has been increasingly positioning itself as a mediator in international conflicts. rtr/jul
To understand how important Henry Kissinger was for relations between the USA and China, one only needs to go back a few months. Washington was trying to normalize contact with Beijing. John Kerry, as a climate envoy, met his Chinese counterpart, and Finance Minister Janet Yellen also traveled to China. But only one person was allowed to meet Xi Jinping: Henry Kissinger – 100 years old and without any official position.
“The relations between China and the United States will forever be associated with the name Kissinger,” said China’s party and state leader as the two men sat side by side in cream-colored armchairs discussing the relations between the two superpowers. “I express my deep respect to you.”
The tone was clear: Only Kissinger, with his around 100 visits, understands China. Foreign Minister Wang Yi even said, “US policy towards China requires diplomatic wisdom in the style of Kissinger and political courage in the style of Nixon.”
The importance of the meeting with Kissinger is also evident in the choice of location: The same building where Kissinger had met the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai half a century earlier: Villa No. 5 of the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse.
In 1971, Kissinger secretly traveled to Beijing – to the city that had not hosted an official US delegation since the Communists took power in 1949. However, Kissinger wanted to win China as a partner against the Soviet Union and, therefore, establish communication channels. After his meeting with Zhou Enlai, he telegraphed Nixon a single word: Eureka – the code word that the mission was a complete success.
What followed is well known: A year later, Nixon became the first US president to visit the People’s Republic of China. This visit, in turn, led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and communist-ruled China in 1979.
He was born as Heinz Alfred Kissinger in Fuerth, Middle Franconia, in 1923, the son of a Jewish family. At the age of 15, he fled to the United States with his parents and brother to escape the Nazis. Heinz became Henry – and one of the most influential US politicians in the following decades. Kissinger became an expert in international politics at Harvard University. Richard Nixon brought him to the White House as National Security Adviser. Later, he became the US Secretary of State.
Kissinger once said he simply wanted to prevent a repetition of the wars from 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945 that had destroyed his childhood in Germany and large parts of the world. Applied to today this means preserving peace between China and the United States.
One may indeed have divided opinions about Henry Kissinger. Some praise him as a politician who brought relaxation during the Cold War and as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. Others criticize him as a ruthless power politician who did not shy away from power politics (and victims).
Minorities and the weaker ones are at risk of being left behind. Wu’er Kaixi, a Uyghur and one of the student leaders in the Tiananmen protests of 1989, wrote on X: “Kissinger’s long pro-China political position not only helped the CCP regime in consequence harmed the Chinese people, but also hurt US interests.” There were also quite critical tones from Taiwan on Thursday.
In the People’s Republic, however, the appreciation for the former US Secretary of State knows almost no bounds. China’s leadership expressed collective shock over Kissinger’s death on Thursday. Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin praised Kissinger as a “pioneer and architect of Sino-American relations”.
Party and state leader Xi Jinping sent condolences to US President Joe Biden. Prime Minister Li Qiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi also expressed their condolences. Xie Feng, China’s ambassador to the United States, wrote on X: “He will always remain alive in the hearts of the Chinese people as a most valued old friend.”
Not only China’s political leadership fell into collective mourning. Also, in social media, Kissinger’s death, with more than 400 million views, was the top topic on the Weibo microblogging service. A top comment with thousands of likes read: “Farewell, old friend of the Chinese people”.
Kissinger believed that stability between China and the United States depended on Beijing and Washington tolerating their differences. China, according to Kissinger, sees the current world order as an American order. And Beijing only wants room for adjustments – not a complete overturn.
Some are reminded of the assurances of the current leadership in Beijing. Thus, the almost overflowing mourning in China should also be seen as criticism of the current US leadership. While Nixon and Kissinger once relied on dialogue, Trump and Biden increasingly show toughness towards China. Michael Radunski
Isabelle Harbrecht is the new coordinator of the China Competence Training Center (CCTC) at Humboldt University Berlin. She was previously head of the International Office at the Potsdam University of Applied Sciences. The CCTC at the HU aims to strengthen China expertise in the administration of Berlin’s universities.
Djordje Milovankic has been a Junior Researcher for the topic “Man-made disasters in China” at the major reinsurer Swiss Re since November. He previously completed his Master’s degree in Sinology at the University of Zurich.
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The workers and builders of the Harbin Ice and Snow Festival still have a lot to do. They need to shape and stack 250,000 cubic meters of ice into huge and artistic, brightly illuminated structures such as pagodas, towers and slides. The building material consists of meter-thick blocks cut from the ice cover of the Songhua River. The festival in northeastern China, north of the Russian city of Vladivostok, is celebrating its 25th anniversary and will last until the end of February, when the sun will slowly melt the intricate structures.