Despite critical debate about excessive dependence, German companies once again invest heavily in the People’s Republic, de-risking or not. That is not the only thing to be concerned about, says economist and China expert Juergen Matthes from the German Economic Institute in Cologne in an interview with Amelie Richter. “We see that companies increasingly want to serve the Chinese market with local production – and not with exports from Germany.” And in the end, that means more Chinese jobs and fewer German ones.
China remains a large and attractive market. And China still lays out the red carpet for companies whose technology it needs, says Matthes. “Companies that are no longer needed instead have to expect to be increasingly thrown a spanner in the works.”
Meanwhile, China continues to mourn former Premier Li Keqiang. However, state media show little sympathy for the late former premier. They mainly posted platitudes and, after the promised obituary, downright abruptly returned to business as usual, which means, above all, celebrating Xi Jinping’s plans and achievements.
Despite the few words from the official side, hundreds of people gathered in Li’s hometown of Hefei to place mourning wreaths. On social media, many reminisced about Li’s efforts to combat smog or his concern for the economic hardships of the people after the Covid pandemic. Public criticism of Xi’s government, however, remained elusive beyond sharp, and quickly deleted, comments. But so far, it doesn’t look like Li’s death will become a platform to express discontent, writes Finn Mayer-Kuckuk.
Mr Matthes, you have taken a closer look at German direct investment in China for the German Economic Institute (IW). What have you discovered?
We have seen that German companies have continued to invest heavily in the People’s Republic so far this year. In the first half of this year alone, we are talking about 10.3 billion euros. German direct investment in China thus corresponds to 16.4 percent of total German direct investment flows abroad. This run has been going on for the last two or three years. Last year we had the highest level of new investment. Contrary to what one might expect, given the more critical discussion about China, we do not see a decrease in direct investments or even a withdrawal from China. On the contrary, even more is being invested in China.
So, more and more business capital is flowing from Germany to China?
No, not exactly. The additional direct investments in China consist of various components. The strong driver of the past years is primarily that the profits generated in China have remained there and flowed into new investments. So that has been the main source recently, and less new capital from Germany.
How would you explain the even stronger rush to China despite warnings from politicians?
Unfortunately, the figures of the German Bundesbank do not tell us that. However, we know from other studies that there are certain differences depending on whether one looks at large companies or medium-sized companies. It seems that various large companies continue to invest heavily in China. Medium-sized companies, at least some of them, seem to be more cautious about China.
So, most of the direct investment is money generated in China. Do the profits stay there entirely?
No. Last year, we prepared a study with other partners that showed that a significant share of the profits generated in China has flowed back to Germany over the last ten years. Unfortunately, we only have limited current figures on this because the Bundesbank cannot disclose relevant figures due to very restrictive confidentiality regulations. This makes it difficult to objectively analyze our economic dependencies on China and should be reconsidered politically.
But according to your current study, it looks more as if the profits are increasingly staying there.
Yes, this tendency appears to exist. But above all, we are concerned about another development: We see that companies seek to increasingly supply the Chinese market with local production – and not with exports from Germany. This ultimately means more Chinese jobs and fewer German ones. Companies are also going to China with the latest technology and use the People’s Republic as a bridgehead to export from there to Asia. In the medium term, this also potentially harms Germany as a business region, compared to a scenario in which demand in China and Asia is predominantly met by German exports.
That means no de-risking, as the German government and the EU Commission advocate?
China’s economy is not developing as expected this year. Nevertheless, China remains a large and attractive market. More and more products are being manufactured in China for China, and research is being carried out in China for China. Companies are also sourcing more inputs in China, for example, by localizing supplier structures. Many German companies there apparently have the strategy of isolating their China business more strongly, partly to make themselves less dependent on the uncertainties of geopolitics and trade wars. As desirable as this is on the one hand, it has the potential to weaken our own economy on the other. From this perspective, China threatens to become the winner of the trade war with the US.
The fact that companies want to protect themselves against geopolitical risks initially sounds understandable.
For the companies, yes. But the geo-economic problem is that production and research there helps the People’s Republic to become more independent of foreign countries in the medium term. This creates a certain divergence between the individual rationality of companies and the economic benefit of their activities.. From a business perspective, the companies’ behavior makes sense and is understandable under the given conditions. But from a macroeconomic and political perspective, it seems problematic when German companies help China in its strategy to become economically and technologically more independent of foreign countries. This is undoubtedly a significant dilemma for policymakers. It becomes serious when German technology ends up helping China to expand its military capabilities further.
Do you think the trend toward more China will continue?
That depends on China’s development. If the real estate crisis continues to spread or the Communist Party’s grip tightens in many areas, then the growth prospects in China are likely to cloud over for a longer period. The current uncertainty among German companies in China would then certainly grow and withdrawal tendencies would presumably increase. But if China does manage to struggle its way out and recover significantly, the situation will be different. Then, many German companies will undoubtedly want to continue to invest there and do good business.
Isn’t that naive?
There is a risk that in five or ten years, more and more companies will run into difficulties in China. We have already seen a certain tendency in this direction. China is once again laying out the red carpet for companies whose technology it needs. Companies that are no longer needed must instead expect to be increasingly thrown a spanner in the works. The problem is that the more China catches up technologically, the larger the share of companies in the second group will become. I must reiterate that you cannot accuse the companies of any economic misconduct. These are the framework conditions that we have set for the companies. And under these framework conditions, they optimize their business decisions. That is why it is so important for the China strategy to say: Companies should prepare themselves so that in case of a geopolitical conflict, they will not be able to pass on any potential losses in China to the taxpayer. This is a very important regulatory announcement.
So, Germany’s China strategy has already clearly spelled out the risk. But it does not seem to have much actual effect. Does politics have to do more to help companies specifically?
More free trade agreements between the EU and other Asian countries would be important. We also need the agreement with the Latin American Mercosur states. So it’s about more trade with other emerging countries that are sufficiently large. Admittedly, no other emerging country can match the People’s Republic alone. But all of them combined can help us de-risk and offer a substitute potential for a little less trade with China. That is why it is so important to expand partnerships with these countries quickly and consistently.
How do the other Asian countries compare?
There, too, German direct investment tends to increase, but not stronger than to China. Regarding share, no shift or de-risking is visible here so far.
Would you say that direct investment represents the overall picture of Germany’s dependence on China, or do you have to take a more differentiated view?
So far, we have only been talking about the dependence of companies. However, economic dependence has many facets. The argument that China, in general, has been so significant for our growth doesn’t have any substance. It is a false narrative, but one that is repeatedly played out in the media. If we let the empirics and the figures speak for themselves, the overall economic picture is at least different: Only about three percent of German jobs depend directly and indirectly on exports to China.
Three percent doesn’t sound like much.
Three percent is much less than most would probably estimate, because the high Chinese turnover shares of some German companies shape the public debate. These figures probably also influence our perception of Germany’s export dependence on China. But the truth is also that there are more than one million jobs behind these three percent. So, three percent is not nothing, but it is still a much smaller dependence than we think.
Meaning the dependence debate on China is ultimately overblown?
That is unfortunately not the case. We are very dependent on China, especially on the import side. This is not true for the economy as a whole, but it is all the more true for China’s sometimes very high import shares for individual products. These not only include rare earth elements. They also include electronic components, chemical and pharmaceutical raw materials. If the German government is serious, it must de-risk this import dependency. Because we are vulnerable to pressure when it comes to essential products that we cannot obtain from other sources in the short term. In the event of a potential conflict with Taiwan, this dependency will backfire and limit our political capabilities. This is why action is urgently needed here in particular.
Juergen Matthes is Head of International Economic Policy, Financial and Real Estate Markets Research Unit at the Institute for the German Economic Institute. In addition to China, his research focuses on globalization, European integration (euro and EU) and the German export model.
The passing of Chinese ex-premier Li Keqiang has sparked nationwide mourning. People gathered in his hometown in the province of Anhui and its capital, Hefei; some placed flowers. Li spent his teenage years living here. In other cities, too, citizens placed flowers under Li’s picture. In Beijing, however, there were no reports of gatherings in Li’s memory. Apparently, they are banned there for being too politically charged.
The displays of mourning, while unsurprising, invited interpretations from many commentators. “The mass mourning of Li Keqiang is the mourning of a China that could have been,” wrote human rights activist Wang Yaqiu of the Freedom House organization in Washington. “It is not only to show sympathy for a leader who had tried but failed to make China better, but also to express discontent with Xi and a sense of despair about China’s future.”
A thread on X by writer Hao Qun explicitly compares Li to Hu Yaobang. In the 1980s, Hu was general secretary of the CP. He represented reform. His death in 1989 was one of the triggers of the student protests. Li was considered the “last brake on the mad train” of Xi Jinping’s China.
However, these are voices of exiles who long for a profound shift in China and now also interpret the mourning for Li accordingly. So far, there are no signs of a mass movement against CP rule, and there are no reports of public criticism of Xi.
Li passed away Thursday night at the age of 68. Li had suffered from health problems in recent years and, according to reports from the premier’s contacts, was sometimes visibly in poor health. At times, he had to rest between appointments.
While China’s state media were still reluctant on Friday, the People’s Daily published an obituary on the front page of its Saturday issue. The text, however, consists mainly of a list of his career milestones plus rhetoric about his fight for communism. “Comrade Li Keqiang is immortal!” the People’s Daily ends its obituary.
Yet on the website of the People’s Daily, the article was only briefly at the top, only to be pushed aside by reports about Xi Jinping’s activities. On Sunday, the homepage was mainly about a Politburo resolution initiated by Xi to “strengthen the sense of community”; the article about Li Keqiang was no longer visible on the front page. The leadership obviously wants to signal that Li’s death will not be given too much attention.
Only condolences were allowed on the internet. But even Li’s quotes that could be interpreted as criticism of the government’s current course were censored. “China’s reform and opening-up will continue to move on. The Yellow River and Yangtze River will not flow backward” – that went too far for the opinion watchdogs. Even calling him a “good premier” crossed the red line; after all, Xi had him politically silenced. References to his sudden death were also not welcome online, apparently in order to leave no room for conspiracy theories that Li had been assassinated.
The great mourning for the premier, whom Xi politically sidelined, is also explained by acknowledegment of his policies. For instance, he led the fight against smog, says Katja Drinhausen, Head of Program Public Policy and Society at the research institute Merics. He also took the economic concerns of entrepreneurs and citizens seriously, while Xi mainly proclaimed accomplishments.
Nevertheless, as things stand, Drinhausen considers it unlikely that the mourning for Li will get out of hand. “Li Keqiang never had as high a public profile as Hu Yaobang, or a popular image as his predecessor Wen Jiabao.”
Given Xi Jinping’s dominance and the lack of alternative leaders, it is quite conceivable that Li could still become a projection screen for discontent and worries, says Drinhausen. “Because the economic and personal setbacks of Xi’s zero-Covid policy are far from overcome in China.” Drinhausen believes that the entire security and censorship apparatus is on alert.
Afghanistan, Israel, Hong Kong – James Blair Cunningham’s diplomatic career took the US-American around the world for thirty years. Even these days, as a retired diplomat, he remains an important observer of global affairs. Today, as chairman of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong (CFHK), he monitors the tensions between Hong Kong’s aspirations for freedom and the ever-growing control by the People’s Republic.
Cunningham studied psychology and political science at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. In 1990, he accompanied the US mission to the United Nations after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as deputy advisor for political affairs. Two years later, his focus shifted to Europe. His tenure as director of the State Department Office of European Security and Political Affairs included the Bosnian War and disarmament projects in Eastern Europe.
In the early 2000s, the top diplomat started his career as an ambassador: First in 2001 as acting US ambassador to the United Nations, then from 2005, he took over the position of consul general in Hong Kong and Macau for three years. This was followed by stints as US ambassador to Israel and, until 2014, to Afghanistan. He then left the diplomatic service.
Since then, Cunningham has been active as a consultant, as well as an adjunct professor at his alma mater, Syracuse University, and, since 2015, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank.
In 2021, he took over the board position at CFHK. The US-based organization fights to preserve Hong Kong’s independence, democracy and civil liberties. “Hong Kong was once a shining light of global enterprise, its success testament to what a free society coupled with an open and welcoming economy could achieve,” Cunningham wrote in the online medium Conservative Home. “Now, it is a shell of its former self, crushed by the weight of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) authoritarian might.”
The diplomat sees China’s actions against Hong Kong and pro-democracy activists as a sneak preview of China’s political future. In Cunningham’s view, other countries must show their colors and take a stand: “For democratic governments worldwide, there is a choice to be made. They can call out the persecution of Lai (publisher Jimmy Lai, ed.) and many others in Hong Kong for the rank injustice that it is, or they can remain silent and therefore complicit,” Cunningham writes.
Before the US Senate Subcommittee on Financial Trade, Cunningham described Hong Kong’s situation in 2021 as the result of a Chinese show of force: “Beijing did not need to gut the high degree of autonomy it had promised in order to maintain stability.”
The cause, in his eyes, is one thing above all: China’s insecurity. “That it chose to do so out of fear and perhaps impatience serves as a reminder of how easily Beijing can eschew political dialogue, ignore its commitments and dismiss the regard of the international community.” Svenja Schlicht
Happy handover: On Thursday, the astronauts of China’s “Tiangong” space station celebrated their relief by the three astronauts of the “Shenzhou-17″ mission who had just arrived by spacecraft. The new crew, under the command of experienced astronaut Tang Hongbo, will spend about six months in space conducting scientific experiments and paving the way for China’s upcoming lunar mission.
Despite critical debate about excessive dependence, German companies once again invest heavily in the People’s Republic, de-risking or not. That is not the only thing to be concerned about, says economist and China expert Juergen Matthes from the German Economic Institute in Cologne in an interview with Amelie Richter. “We see that companies increasingly want to serve the Chinese market with local production – and not with exports from Germany.” And in the end, that means more Chinese jobs and fewer German ones.
China remains a large and attractive market. And China still lays out the red carpet for companies whose technology it needs, says Matthes. “Companies that are no longer needed instead have to expect to be increasingly thrown a spanner in the works.”
Meanwhile, China continues to mourn former Premier Li Keqiang. However, state media show little sympathy for the late former premier. They mainly posted platitudes and, after the promised obituary, downright abruptly returned to business as usual, which means, above all, celebrating Xi Jinping’s plans and achievements.
Despite the few words from the official side, hundreds of people gathered in Li’s hometown of Hefei to place mourning wreaths. On social media, many reminisced about Li’s efforts to combat smog or his concern for the economic hardships of the people after the Covid pandemic. Public criticism of Xi’s government, however, remained elusive beyond sharp, and quickly deleted, comments. But so far, it doesn’t look like Li’s death will become a platform to express discontent, writes Finn Mayer-Kuckuk.
Mr Matthes, you have taken a closer look at German direct investment in China for the German Economic Institute (IW). What have you discovered?
We have seen that German companies have continued to invest heavily in the People’s Republic so far this year. In the first half of this year alone, we are talking about 10.3 billion euros. German direct investment in China thus corresponds to 16.4 percent of total German direct investment flows abroad. This run has been going on for the last two or three years. Last year we had the highest level of new investment. Contrary to what one might expect, given the more critical discussion about China, we do not see a decrease in direct investments or even a withdrawal from China. On the contrary, even more is being invested in China.
So, more and more business capital is flowing from Germany to China?
No, not exactly. The additional direct investments in China consist of various components. The strong driver of the past years is primarily that the profits generated in China have remained there and flowed into new investments. So that has been the main source recently, and less new capital from Germany.
How would you explain the even stronger rush to China despite warnings from politicians?
Unfortunately, the figures of the German Bundesbank do not tell us that. However, we know from other studies that there are certain differences depending on whether one looks at large companies or medium-sized companies. It seems that various large companies continue to invest heavily in China. Medium-sized companies, at least some of them, seem to be more cautious about China.
So, most of the direct investment is money generated in China. Do the profits stay there entirely?
No. Last year, we prepared a study with other partners that showed that a significant share of the profits generated in China has flowed back to Germany over the last ten years. Unfortunately, we only have limited current figures on this because the Bundesbank cannot disclose relevant figures due to very restrictive confidentiality regulations. This makes it difficult to objectively analyze our economic dependencies on China and should be reconsidered politically.
But according to your current study, it looks more as if the profits are increasingly staying there.
Yes, this tendency appears to exist. But above all, we are concerned about another development: We see that companies seek to increasingly supply the Chinese market with local production – and not with exports from Germany. This ultimately means more Chinese jobs and fewer German ones. Companies are also going to China with the latest technology and use the People’s Republic as a bridgehead to export from there to Asia. In the medium term, this also potentially harms Germany as a business region, compared to a scenario in which demand in China and Asia is predominantly met by German exports.
That means no de-risking, as the German government and the EU Commission advocate?
China’s economy is not developing as expected this year. Nevertheless, China remains a large and attractive market. More and more products are being manufactured in China for China, and research is being carried out in China for China. Companies are also sourcing more inputs in China, for example, by localizing supplier structures. Many German companies there apparently have the strategy of isolating their China business more strongly, partly to make themselves less dependent on the uncertainties of geopolitics and trade wars. As desirable as this is on the one hand, it has the potential to weaken our own economy on the other. From this perspective, China threatens to become the winner of the trade war with the US.
The fact that companies want to protect themselves against geopolitical risks initially sounds understandable.
For the companies, yes. But the geo-economic problem is that production and research there helps the People’s Republic to become more independent of foreign countries in the medium term. This creates a certain divergence between the individual rationality of companies and the economic benefit of their activities.. From a business perspective, the companies’ behavior makes sense and is understandable under the given conditions. But from a macroeconomic and political perspective, it seems problematic when German companies help China in its strategy to become economically and technologically more independent of foreign countries. This is undoubtedly a significant dilemma for policymakers. It becomes serious when German technology ends up helping China to expand its military capabilities further.
Do you think the trend toward more China will continue?
That depends on China’s development. If the real estate crisis continues to spread or the Communist Party’s grip tightens in many areas, then the growth prospects in China are likely to cloud over for a longer period. The current uncertainty among German companies in China would then certainly grow and withdrawal tendencies would presumably increase. But if China does manage to struggle its way out and recover significantly, the situation will be different. Then, many German companies will undoubtedly want to continue to invest there and do good business.
Isn’t that naive?
There is a risk that in five or ten years, more and more companies will run into difficulties in China. We have already seen a certain tendency in this direction. China is once again laying out the red carpet for companies whose technology it needs. Companies that are no longer needed must instead expect to be increasingly thrown a spanner in the works. The problem is that the more China catches up technologically, the larger the share of companies in the second group will become. I must reiterate that you cannot accuse the companies of any economic misconduct. These are the framework conditions that we have set for the companies. And under these framework conditions, they optimize their business decisions. That is why it is so important for the China strategy to say: Companies should prepare themselves so that in case of a geopolitical conflict, they will not be able to pass on any potential losses in China to the taxpayer. This is a very important regulatory announcement.
So, Germany’s China strategy has already clearly spelled out the risk. But it does not seem to have much actual effect. Does politics have to do more to help companies specifically?
More free trade agreements between the EU and other Asian countries would be important. We also need the agreement with the Latin American Mercosur states. So it’s about more trade with other emerging countries that are sufficiently large. Admittedly, no other emerging country can match the People’s Republic alone. But all of them combined can help us de-risk and offer a substitute potential for a little less trade with China. That is why it is so important to expand partnerships with these countries quickly and consistently.
How do the other Asian countries compare?
There, too, German direct investment tends to increase, but not stronger than to China. Regarding share, no shift or de-risking is visible here so far.
Would you say that direct investment represents the overall picture of Germany’s dependence on China, or do you have to take a more differentiated view?
So far, we have only been talking about the dependence of companies. However, economic dependence has many facets. The argument that China, in general, has been so significant for our growth doesn’t have any substance. It is a false narrative, but one that is repeatedly played out in the media. If we let the empirics and the figures speak for themselves, the overall economic picture is at least different: Only about three percent of German jobs depend directly and indirectly on exports to China.
Three percent doesn’t sound like much.
Three percent is much less than most would probably estimate, because the high Chinese turnover shares of some German companies shape the public debate. These figures probably also influence our perception of Germany’s export dependence on China. But the truth is also that there are more than one million jobs behind these three percent. So, three percent is not nothing, but it is still a much smaller dependence than we think.
Meaning the dependence debate on China is ultimately overblown?
That is unfortunately not the case. We are very dependent on China, especially on the import side. This is not true for the economy as a whole, but it is all the more true for China’s sometimes very high import shares for individual products. These not only include rare earth elements. They also include electronic components, chemical and pharmaceutical raw materials. If the German government is serious, it must de-risk this import dependency. Because we are vulnerable to pressure when it comes to essential products that we cannot obtain from other sources in the short term. In the event of a potential conflict with Taiwan, this dependency will backfire and limit our political capabilities. This is why action is urgently needed here in particular.
Juergen Matthes is Head of International Economic Policy, Financial and Real Estate Markets Research Unit at the Institute for the German Economic Institute. In addition to China, his research focuses on globalization, European integration (euro and EU) and the German export model.
The passing of Chinese ex-premier Li Keqiang has sparked nationwide mourning. People gathered in his hometown in the province of Anhui and its capital, Hefei; some placed flowers. Li spent his teenage years living here. In other cities, too, citizens placed flowers under Li’s picture. In Beijing, however, there were no reports of gatherings in Li’s memory. Apparently, they are banned there for being too politically charged.
The displays of mourning, while unsurprising, invited interpretations from many commentators. “The mass mourning of Li Keqiang is the mourning of a China that could have been,” wrote human rights activist Wang Yaqiu of the Freedom House organization in Washington. “It is not only to show sympathy for a leader who had tried but failed to make China better, but also to express discontent with Xi and a sense of despair about China’s future.”
A thread on X by writer Hao Qun explicitly compares Li to Hu Yaobang. In the 1980s, Hu was general secretary of the CP. He represented reform. His death in 1989 was one of the triggers of the student protests. Li was considered the “last brake on the mad train” of Xi Jinping’s China.
However, these are voices of exiles who long for a profound shift in China and now also interpret the mourning for Li accordingly. So far, there are no signs of a mass movement against CP rule, and there are no reports of public criticism of Xi.
Li passed away Thursday night at the age of 68. Li had suffered from health problems in recent years and, according to reports from the premier’s contacts, was sometimes visibly in poor health. At times, he had to rest between appointments.
While China’s state media were still reluctant on Friday, the People’s Daily published an obituary on the front page of its Saturday issue. The text, however, consists mainly of a list of his career milestones plus rhetoric about his fight for communism. “Comrade Li Keqiang is immortal!” the People’s Daily ends its obituary.
Yet on the website of the People’s Daily, the article was only briefly at the top, only to be pushed aside by reports about Xi Jinping’s activities. On Sunday, the homepage was mainly about a Politburo resolution initiated by Xi to “strengthen the sense of community”; the article about Li Keqiang was no longer visible on the front page. The leadership obviously wants to signal that Li’s death will not be given too much attention.
Only condolences were allowed on the internet. But even Li’s quotes that could be interpreted as criticism of the government’s current course were censored. “China’s reform and opening-up will continue to move on. The Yellow River and Yangtze River will not flow backward” – that went too far for the opinion watchdogs. Even calling him a “good premier” crossed the red line; after all, Xi had him politically silenced. References to his sudden death were also not welcome online, apparently in order to leave no room for conspiracy theories that Li had been assassinated.
The great mourning for the premier, whom Xi politically sidelined, is also explained by acknowledegment of his policies. For instance, he led the fight against smog, says Katja Drinhausen, Head of Program Public Policy and Society at the research institute Merics. He also took the economic concerns of entrepreneurs and citizens seriously, while Xi mainly proclaimed accomplishments.
Nevertheless, as things stand, Drinhausen considers it unlikely that the mourning for Li will get out of hand. “Li Keqiang never had as high a public profile as Hu Yaobang, or a popular image as his predecessor Wen Jiabao.”
Given Xi Jinping’s dominance and the lack of alternative leaders, it is quite conceivable that Li could still become a projection screen for discontent and worries, says Drinhausen. “Because the economic and personal setbacks of Xi’s zero-Covid policy are far from overcome in China.” Drinhausen believes that the entire security and censorship apparatus is on alert.
Afghanistan, Israel, Hong Kong – James Blair Cunningham’s diplomatic career took the US-American around the world for thirty years. Even these days, as a retired diplomat, he remains an important observer of global affairs. Today, as chairman of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong (CFHK), he monitors the tensions between Hong Kong’s aspirations for freedom and the ever-growing control by the People’s Republic.
Cunningham studied psychology and political science at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. In 1990, he accompanied the US mission to the United Nations after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as deputy advisor for political affairs. Two years later, his focus shifted to Europe. His tenure as director of the State Department Office of European Security and Political Affairs included the Bosnian War and disarmament projects in Eastern Europe.
In the early 2000s, the top diplomat started his career as an ambassador: First in 2001 as acting US ambassador to the United Nations, then from 2005, he took over the position of consul general in Hong Kong and Macau for three years. This was followed by stints as US ambassador to Israel and, until 2014, to Afghanistan. He then left the diplomatic service.
Since then, Cunningham has been active as a consultant, as well as an adjunct professor at his alma mater, Syracuse University, and, since 2015, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank.
In 2021, he took over the board position at CFHK. The US-based organization fights to preserve Hong Kong’s independence, democracy and civil liberties. “Hong Kong was once a shining light of global enterprise, its success testament to what a free society coupled with an open and welcoming economy could achieve,” Cunningham wrote in the online medium Conservative Home. “Now, it is a shell of its former self, crushed by the weight of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) authoritarian might.”
The diplomat sees China’s actions against Hong Kong and pro-democracy activists as a sneak preview of China’s political future. In Cunningham’s view, other countries must show their colors and take a stand: “For democratic governments worldwide, there is a choice to be made. They can call out the persecution of Lai (publisher Jimmy Lai, ed.) and many others in Hong Kong for the rank injustice that it is, or they can remain silent and therefore complicit,” Cunningham writes.
Before the US Senate Subcommittee on Financial Trade, Cunningham described Hong Kong’s situation in 2021 as the result of a Chinese show of force: “Beijing did not need to gut the high degree of autonomy it had promised in order to maintain stability.”
The cause, in his eyes, is one thing above all: China’s insecurity. “That it chose to do so out of fear and perhaps impatience serves as a reminder of how easily Beijing can eschew political dialogue, ignore its commitments and dismiss the regard of the international community.” Svenja Schlicht
Happy handover: On Thursday, the astronauts of China’s “Tiangong” space station celebrated their relief by the three astronauts of the “Shenzhou-17″ mission who had just arrived by spacecraft. The new crew, under the command of experienced astronaut Tang Hongbo, will spend about six months in space conducting scientific experiments and paving the way for China’s upcoming lunar mission.
