“What we’re seeing is China stepping up as a world power, that is the reality of our time,” Dan Smith said over the weekend. The Director of the Sipri Peace Research Institute based his observation on the growing number of Chinese nuclear weapons. 410 now. 60 more than at the last count.
Common sense would say this is 410 nuclear weapons too many. From a military perspective, however, it is nothing. The Americans and Russians each own more than twelve times the (Chinese) number. But China’s nuclear build-up raises far more alarm in Asia than Russia’s stockpile. And more than the American arsenal, anyway.
Finn Mayer-Kuckuk, therefore, takes a look at China’s neighborhood. South Korea and Japan are already toying with having their own nuclear weapons, which is not only seen as a reaction to North Korea’s threats but is also meant to deter Beijing.
This China, which is expanding its nuclear arsenal, would like to present itself as a messenger of peace in Ukraine. Beijing hopes to gain credibility with help from Berlin and Paris, which is why politicians like Scholz and Macron are offered the Chinese initiative as a cover to justify their cooperation with China, says Alexander Gabuev, Director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.
Gabuev spoke with Michael Radunkski about the People’s Republic’s dishonesty. In his opinion, no other country in the world shapes its foreign policy with such self-interest in mind as China. And let’s be honest, calling for peace in Ukraine and simultaneously supplying Russia with weapons seems rather contradictory.
A few days ago, reports surfaced that China is supplying Russia with weapons. What do you know about this?
Yes, that’s right. However, these are not deadly weapons in large quantities, but apparently certain quantities of small arms, armored vehicles or drones. In addition, the Chinese military industry is said to supply some parts for Russian weapon systems. But these connections go back a long way and take place between sanctioned Chinese and sanctioned Russian companies.
All without consequences. So will China be delivering more soon?
If China were to do more, it would be exposed immediately – and all efforts to position itself as a neutral actor would be nullified. China knows that Russia needs Chinese weapons to win, but Russia is not losing this war. China is completely agnostic. Whether the front line runs 100 kilometers to the west, or whether a Russian or Ukrainian flag flies over Bakhmut, China doesn’t give a damn. Beijing cares about Putin’s fate. The maximum I can think of would be an artillery shell exchange where North Korea sends more to Russia and then China supplies North Korea.
In light of these reports, how honest is China’s diplomatic approach to Ukraine?
China’s foreign policy is all about China. Not that it’s unique to China, there are a lot of selfish countries, but I think that China is the embodiment of this pragmatic egoism wrapped in the PR coverage that would enable China to position itself as a force for good in the international community.
But wasn’t it more of a PR disaster that China, as a self-proclaimed mediator, didn’t talk to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy for so long?
China’s approach is driven by risk perception. And China thought that the risks of talking to President Zelensky far outweighed the potential benefits.
What risks?
There was a real risk that when a discussion between Xi and Zelenskiy will happen, Zelenskiy will take a very aggressive tone. He will put China on the spot for enabling Russian aggression, continue to be the largest trading partner of Russia and so on. So if President Zelenskiy would have taken such an approach that would have been the real PR disaster for China.
So what made Xi Jinping finally talk to Zelenskiy?
To a certain degree the pressure from the West. China has a couple of interests that it needs to balance. First, Russia as a junior partner, which is very beneficial for China as an outcome of this war. Second, there is the strategic competition with the United States. That will not go away. And third, it’s partnership with Europe
So Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz were successful with their approach to China?
Let’s take a look from the Chinese side: China is very smart to figure out that people like Scholz and Macron need to have some justification for reaching out to the CCP. So Beijing had to give them just sufficient amounts of deliverables. Xi Jinping figured out that positioning China as a force for diplomacy and peaceful resolution is good AND also provides Western leaders that want to make pragmatic deals with China about the economy a cheap cover. For Scholz and Macron, but also for Meloni, Sanchez and so on.
And how do you specifically assess China’s solution for Ukraine?
So far, China is doing pretty well.
Really? The fighting continues relentlessly, the war is far from over.
The fact that China’s proposal does not go into detail on crucial issues is not an accident, but intentional. In its 12-point-position China doesn’t name Russia as the aggressor, and even doesn’t mention war at all. But nonetheless, China positions itself as a force for good and a bilateral partner for Ukraine. The Ukrainian readout is also very beneficial. It talks about long-standing commitment, doesn’t criticize China and basically says: We are happy about the partnership. So good scores for China.
And for peace?
I wouldn’t expect that China’s 12-points will materialize into more serious engagement. China understands that there is no real demand for peace at this point in either Moscow or Kyiv. Zelenskiy went all in, and he cannot dial the expectations down, at least before the counteroffensive is over. And Putin believes that time is on his side. His army is doing miserably, but he’s not losing this war. His expectation is that Ukraine will be just another Syria, Libya for the West, and at some point the US and American partners will get tired and distracted.
Without a meaningful result for the people of Ukraine.
Well, I don’t think that China is interested in resolving the conflict, not that they are interested in the conflict going on indefinitely. I think that they are simply adapting to the situation on the ground.
You stick by your opinion: This is a good result for China?
From Beijing’s perspective: Yes. Since Russia is becoming their junior partner, it’s very beneficial for China. Russia was on this trajectory, but now it’s a junior partnership on steroids and China still wants to get access to Russia’s cheap energy resources, fertilizers, metals, agricultural capacity. Everything that Russia has to offer, China gets access to, even to the most advanced Russian military technology. Unthinkable a few years ago.
How much influence does China have over Russia?
It has leverage, and it’s growing. My metaphor would be China’s relationship with North Korea, although North Korea is so much more dependent on China and a far smaller power than Russia. But even there: Kim Jong-un’s policy is not dictated by Beijing. He’s doing stuff that China doesn’t want to see but still has to tolerate because Kim knows how to navigate this. Russia will be the same, but in a different category. China is smart, they know how to manage this and they know how to massage the ego of Putin, how to cultivate these long term bonds that will increasingly make Russia’s elite anti-Western.
Would China’s influence be enough to end the war?
No. China does not have leverage on the Ukrainian side. And its leverage on Russia in this sense is slightly overestimated. If China would fully withdraw its support from Russia, will Putin stop, dis-invade Ukraine and buy himself a ticket to Hague? Unlikely. It’s likely that Russia will still continue. Russia with Putin can hardly accept an agreement with Ukraine.
How dangerous is this China-Russia-partnership for the West?
With the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Russia, the Kremlin has fewer options and is more dependent on China than ever before. At the same time, China’s fierce competition with the US makes Moscow an indispensable junior partner in Beijing’s efforts to push back the US and its allies. China has no other friend that has so much to offer. And Xi, preparing his country for a long period of confrontation with the most powerful country on the planet, may need all the help he can get.
Where will that lead to?
If we enter a new Cold War with China, China is the next Soviet Union and Russia is the next Warsaw Pact. Just one difference: Russia is there voluntarily, not unlike the Warsaw Pact countries that have been occupied by the Soviet Union.
This makes the situation more dangerous than in the past.
No doubt, the China-Russia-partnership is dangerous for the West. NATO’s border with China will be its border with Russia. Any serious military planner should look at China-Russia increasingly as an entity, even without a formal alliance. That has tremendous consequences for the West where to focus its resources, and where to spend money. For example, Russia could be asked by China to do a large military drill in the Baltics or escalate there to tie Western one’s up in order to allow China to do something in Asia. That’s the scenario we should increasingly focus on.
Alexander Gabuev is Director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. He leads a team of analysts who were formerly staff members of the Carnegie Moscow Center, which the Kremlin closed in 2022. His own research focuses on Russian foreign policy, the war in Ukraine and Sino-Russian relations.
China is the country that added the most new nuclear weapons to its arsenal last year. This is reported by the research institute Sipri in Stockholm. Russia has twelve more warheads than last year, while the other nuclear powers have only seen single-digit fluctuations – except for China, which has significantly increased its stockpile with 60 new bombs.
This means China still has far fewer nuclear weapons than the US and Russia. But the nuclear arms build-up is contributing to the growing nervousness in a region where nuclear ambitions are on the rise:
China and Russia are now ranked first and second on the list of countries undergoing the fastest nuclear build-up, followed by North Korea and Pakistan. As the second-largest nuclear power after Russia, the US now plays the decisive role. Its behavior, however, is two-faced. Biden may seek disarmament but does not want to appear soft in the election campaign.
The Biden administration is therefore exploring the chances for disarmament negotiations in Moscow and Beijing. But on a factual level, Washington tends to fuel the race. “Together with our NATO Allies, we’ve been laser focused on modernizing the Alliance’s nuclear capabilities,” Jake Sullivan said earlier this month. Biden’s security adviser enumerated a long list of technical innovations in nuclear weapons at the Arms Control Association Annual Forum.
Sullivan names China, in particular, as the culprit behind the erosion of nuclear security. He expects China to have over 1,500 warheads by 2035. At the same time, Sullivan criticizes Beijing’s refusal to engage in dialogue on the issue. This is certainly a problem since China has long played a decisive role in shaping the geopolitical landscape.
China has shown itself to be unapproachable and uncompromising, as was demonstrated last year at the review conference of the UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The conference is held every five years. But US observers said that Beijing’s stance is blocking international progress, as viable agreements require consensus between all major nuclear states.
The situation is different from Beijing’s side. China sees itself as a responsible player in disarmament. The country was guided by Xi Jinping’s vision of comprehensive global security at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Conference. Beijing claims to respect and support the status and role of the conference.
China has consistently advocated for arms control and has held the most stable positions on the issue for decades, a government spokesperson said. While the lack of a final document is unfortunate, nuclear control efforts are an ongoing process, they added.
According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the wrong practice of placing “geopolitical interests above nuclear nonproliferation” was the reason that prevented the formulation of a final document last year. He left open whether he was referring to the US or Russia.
Gustavo Zlauvinen, President of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, complains that none of the five major nuclear powers has accepted concrete standards and commitments. He said he could not see any visible coordination between China and Russia but rather that both delegations had acted independently of each other.
Beijing’s attitude was particularly obstructive at the beginning: “The main problem was China. It was very, very openly against any improvement of the national reporting on transparency,” said Zlauvinen. In particular, about information on the size of its own arsenal. Only at the last moment did Beijing clear the way for a final document. Ultimately, the conference failed because of Russia’s opposition, not China’s resistance.
In the overall picture, Xi Jinping did not want new reporting requirements imposed upon him by the USA, France and the UK – this is in line with his suspicious stance towards the West. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons is also never in the interest of an existing nuclear power. China would, therefore, probably have been open to a correspondingly cleverly formulated offer.
If the Sipri figures are correct and China has produced 60 new nuclear warheads, this degrades its pretty words about alternative security architecture to mere lip service. Like all other major powers, China is striving for more military security instead of setting a good example in disarmament. This is necessitated above all by the behavior of its ally Russia, which owns the largest number of warheads and has proven to be hard to predict at the same time.
Civil rights activists have displayed a symbolic remnant of the Hong Kong protest movement in Frankfurt. The association, Hongkonger in Germany, presented the severed head of the Lady of Liberty on Saturday. The statue symbolizes a demonstrator wearing a hard hat, goggles and a gas mask.
Hongkongers in Germany intended their display as a reminder of the deprivation of their civil rights guaranteed in the constitution. “With this symbol, the world can clearly see how the Chinese Communist Party has broken its promises and taken away our freedom. No one should ignore China’s human rights crimes for economic interests,” said Chairperson Aniessa Andresen.
Once four meters tall and made of plaster and Styrofoam, the statue was erected by a group of students on Lion Rock in Hong Kong in a secret nighttime operation in 2019. However, it only towered over the city for a few hours before it was knocked down, dismembered and smeared by unknown persons.
In 2019, Hong Kong had seen months of protests against the growing influence of the Communist Party. The demonstrations culminated in the introduction of the National Security Law and the political purge of opposition voices. grz
Wu Ming-yi is one of the most famous writers of contemporary literature in his native Taiwan. In 2018, he was the first Taiwanese to be nominated for the Booker Prize for his historical novel “The Stolen Bicycle.” His novel “The Man with Compound Eyes” is classified as so-called eco-fiction – literature that deals with the human influence on nature.
In his novel, which is as imaginative as it is drastic, Wu describes, among other things, how a massive island of waste approaches Taiwan’s coast, bringing together people whose paths would never have crossed had it not been for the man-made disaster.
Born in Taoyuan in 1971, the writer and literature professor at Dong Hwa National University also sees himself as an activist. He was already involved in Taiwanese environmental groups in the 1980s. At that time, they mainly protested against multinational corporations that were lured to Taiwan by tax breaks and low labor costs, he explains. The plastics and chemical industries, in particular, had fuelled Taiwan’s economic miracle from the late 1950s onwards. The environmental costs were enormous.
In 1986, the construction of a titanium dioxide factory by the American chemical giant Dupont gave rise to Taiwan’s first major environmental protection movement. Wu also closely followed the events at the time. In 2011, he joined large protests against a petrochemical project in the coastal city of Changhua. They were the largest protests in Southeast Asia and resulted in the most comprehensive climate action protest in Taiwan to date. “A book I conceived was published at the time coinciding with the protests, pooling the opposing voices of many scientists, intellectuals and authors.” The protest had an effect. Then-president Ma Ying-jeou prohibited the 20 billion dollar project.
Wu has acquired much of the detailed knowledge that comes to bear in his science-based novels over the years of his activist work. For example, the island of waste floating in the sea in the novel actually exists: the “Great Pacific Garbage Patch” is a whirlpool of up to 50 years old trash that now stretches over 1.6 million square kilometers – an area four times the size of Germany.
“Environmental regulations have become stricter and more stringent for foreign companies since the first protests in the 1980s,” says Wu. “Today’s Taiwan has achieved high environmental standards – this is also evident in everyday life, as you can see in waste recycling, for example.” Still, the island is at a crossroads, the writer says. “Taiwan is faced with the choice of either becoming an ecological role model for the whole of Southeast Asia or an abandoned wasteland pining for ever more economic growth.”
Like many other Islands in the world, Taiwan is acutely threatened by rising temperatures. Due to rising sea levels, floods and extreme storms will increase. The Taiwanese government has set itself the goal of becoming climate neutral by 2050. In contrast, the economy’s energy demand is growing. The flourishing semiconductor industry, in particular, requires enormous energy. But traditional sectors such as steel, cement or chemicals also need electricity. “The topic that is most heatedly debated in Taiwan today is which energy source is best for us: gas, nuclear or renewables?” Taiwan has set out to generate around 20 percent of its electricity from alternative sources by 2025, up from just five percent in 2018. Nuclear power is not to be used at all after 2025.
In addition to solar and geothermal energy, offshore wind power is expected to play a vital role in Taiwan’s energy transition. The conditions in the Taiwan Strait are promising: The waters are shallow, and the winds are strong. One risk that is once again coming into focus here is the threat from China. “We see in Ukraine how important energy supply is in the event of war,” says Wu. “Taiwan needs to be independent simply because of its national security. In addition, marine protection has become more important. Before, we often focused the discussion on Chinese influence on our ‘land.’ Now we are looking more at the sea.”
Another problem resulting from China’s territorial claims over Taiwan is the island’s political isolation, which is also reflected in global environmental cooperation. “Taiwan has hardly any influence in international organizations – whether they are official or unofficial. This makes it difficult for Taiwan to gain an international foothold on environmental protection.” Fabian Peltsch, Collaboration: Ziyi Huang
Taiwan’s Hsieh Su-wei (right) and China’s Wang Xinyu (second from right) won the doubles final of the French Open against the US-Canadian duo Townsend and Fernandez. Depending on one’s political beliefs, the triumph can be interpreted as a symbol for the chances of Chinese-Taiwanese unification or as an example of the chances of peaceful co-existence.
“What we’re seeing is China stepping up as a world power, that is the reality of our time,” Dan Smith said over the weekend. The Director of the Sipri Peace Research Institute based his observation on the growing number of Chinese nuclear weapons. 410 now. 60 more than at the last count.
Common sense would say this is 410 nuclear weapons too many. From a military perspective, however, it is nothing. The Americans and Russians each own more than twelve times the (Chinese) number. But China’s nuclear build-up raises far more alarm in Asia than Russia’s stockpile. And more than the American arsenal, anyway.
Finn Mayer-Kuckuk, therefore, takes a look at China’s neighborhood. South Korea and Japan are already toying with having their own nuclear weapons, which is not only seen as a reaction to North Korea’s threats but is also meant to deter Beijing.
This China, which is expanding its nuclear arsenal, would like to present itself as a messenger of peace in Ukraine. Beijing hopes to gain credibility with help from Berlin and Paris, which is why politicians like Scholz and Macron are offered the Chinese initiative as a cover to justify their cooperation with China, says Alexander Gabuev, Director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.
Gabuev spoke with Michael Radunkski about the People’s Republic’s dishonesty. In his opinion, no other country in the world shapes its foreign policy with such self-interest in mind as China. And let’s be honest, calling for peace in Ukraine and simultaneously supplying Russia with weapons seems rather contradictory.
A few days ago, reports surfaced that China is supplying Russia with weapons. What do you know about this?
Yes, that’s right. However, these are not deadly weapons in large quantities, but apparently certain quantities of small arms, armored vehicles or drones. In addition, the Chinese military industry is said to supply some parts for Russian weapon systems. But these connections go back a long way and take place between sanctioned Chinese and sanctioned Russian companies.
All without consequences. So will China be delivering more soon?
If China were to do more, it would be exposed immediately – and all efforts to position itself as a neutral actor would be nullified. China knows that Russia needs Chinese weapons to win, but Russia is not losing this war. China is completely agnostic. Whether the front line runs 100 kilometers to the west, or whether a Russian or Ukrainian flag flies over Bakhmut, China doesn’t give a damn. Beijing cares about Putin’s fate. The maximum I can think of would be an artillery shell exchange where North Korea sends more to Russia and then China supplies North Korea.
In light of these reports, how honest is China’s diplomatic approach to Ukraine?
China’s foreign policy is all about China. Not that it’s unique to China, there are a lot of selfish countries, but I think that China is the embodiment of this pragmatic egoism wrapped in the PR coverage that would enable China to position itself as a force for good in the international community.
But wasn’t it more of a PR disaster that China, as a self-proclaimed mediator, didn’t talk to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy for so long?
China’s approach is driven by risk perception. And China thought that the risks of talking to President Zelensky far outweighed the potential benefits.
What risks?
There was a real risk that when a discussion between Xi and Zelenskiy will happen, Zelenskiy will take a very aggressive tone. He will put China on the spot for enabling Russian aggression, continue to be the largest trading partner of Russia and so on. So if President Zelenskiy would have taken such an approach that would have been the real PR disaster for China.
So what made Xi Jinping finally talk to Zelenskiy?
To a certain degree the pressure from the West. China has a couple of interests that it needs to balance. First, Russia as a junior partner, which is very beneficial for China as an outcome of this war. Second, there is the strategic competition with the United States. That will not go away. And third, it’s partnership with Europe
So Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz were successful with their approach to China?
Let’s take a look from the Chinese side: China is very smart to figure out that people like Scholz and Macron need to have some justification for reaching out to the CCP. So Beijing had to give them just sufficient amounts of deliverables. Xi Jinping figured out that positioning China as a force for diplomacy and peaceful resolution is good AND also provides Western leaders that want to make pragmatic deals with China about the economy a cheap cover. For Scholz and Macron, but also for Meloni, Sanchez and so on.
And how do you specifically assess China’s solution for Ukraine?
So far, China is doing pretty well.
Really? The fighting continues relentlessly, the war is far from over.
The fact that China’s proposal does not go into detail on crucial issues is not an accident, but intentional. In its 12-point-position China doesn’t name Russia as the aggressor, and even doesn’t mention war at all. But nonetheless, China positions itself as a force for good and a bilateral partner for Ukraine. The Ukrainian readout is also very beneficial. It talks about long-standing commitment, doesn’t criticize China and basically says: We are happy about the partnership. So good scores for China.
And for peace?
I wouldn’t expect that China’s 12-points will materialize into more serious engagement. China understands that there is no real demand for peace at this point in either Moscow or Kyiv. Zelenskiy went all in, and he cannot dial the expectations down, at least before the counteroffensive is over. And Putin believes that time is on his side. His army is doing miserably, but he’s not losing this war. His expectation is that Ukraine will be just another Syria, Libya for the West, and at some point the US and American partners will get tired and distracted.
Without a meaningful result for the people of Ukraine.
Well, I don’t think that China is interested in resolving the conflict, not that they are interested in the conflict going on indefinitely. I think that they are simply adapting to the situation on the ground.
You stick by your opinion: This is a good result for China?
From Beijing’s perspective: Yes. Since Russia is becoming their junior partner, it’s very beneficial for China. Russia was on this trajectory, but now it’s a junior partnership on steroids and China still wants to get access to Russia’s cheap energy resources, fertilizers, metals, agricultural capacity. Everything that Russia has to offer, China gets access to, even to the most advanced Russian military technology. Unthinkable a few years ago.
How much influence does China have over Russia?
It has leverage, and it’s growing. My metaphor would be China’s relationship with North Korea, although North Korea is so much more dependent on China and a far smaller power than Russia. But even there: Kim Jong-un’s policy is not dictated by Beijing. He’s doing stuff that China doesn’t want to see but still has to tolerate because Kim knows how to navigate this. Russia will be the same, but in a different category. China is smart, they know how to manage this and they know how to massage the ego of Putin, how to cultivate these long term bonds that will increasingly make Russia’s elite anti-Western.
Would China’s influence be enough to end the war?
No. China does not have leverage on the Ukrainian side. And its leverage on Russia in this sense is slightly overestimated. If China would fully withdraw its support from Russia, will Putin stop, dis-invade Ukraine and buy himself a ticket to Hague? Unlikely. It’s likely that Russia will still continue. Russia with Putin can hardly accept an agreement with Ukraine.
How dangerous is this China-Russia-partnership for the West?
With the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Russia, the Kremlin has fewer options and is more dependent on China than ever before. At the same time, China’s fierce competition with the US makes Moscow an indispensable junior partner in Beijing’s efforts to push back the US and its allies. China has no other friend that has so much to offer. And Xi, preparing his country for a long period of confrontation with the most powerful country on the planet, may need all the help he can get.
Where will that lead to?
If we enter a new Cold War with China, China is the next Soviet Union and Russia is the next Warsaw Pact. Just one difference: Russia is there voluntarily, not unlike the Warsaw Pact countries that have been occupied by the Soviet Union.
This makes the situation more dangerous than in the past.
No doubt, the China-Russia-partnership is dangerous for the West. NATO’s border with China will be its border with Russia. Any serious military planner should look at China-Russia increasingly as an entity, even without a formal alliance. That has tremendous consequences for the West where to focus its resources, and where to spend money. For example, Russia could be asked by China to do a large military drill in the Baltics or escalate there to tie Western one’s up in order to allow China to do something in Asia. That’s the scenario we should increasingly focus on.
Alexander Gabuev is Director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. He leads a team of analysts who were formerly staff members of the Carnegie Moscow Center, which the Kremlin closed in 2022. His own research focuses on Russian foreign policy, the war in Ukraine and Sino-Russian relations.
China is the country that added the most new nuclear weapons to its arsenal last year. This is reported by the research institute Sipri in Stockholm. Russia has twelve more warheads than last year, while the other nuclear powers have only seen single-digit fluctuations – except for China, which has significantly increased its stockpile with 60 new bombs.
This means China still has far fewer nuclear weapons than the US and Russia. But the nuclear arms build-up is contributing to the growing nervousness in a region where nuclear ambitions are on the rise:
China and Russia are now ranked first and second on the list of countries undergoing the fastest nuclear build-up, followed by North Korea and Pakistan. As the second-largest nuclear power after Russia, the US now plays the decisive role. Its behavior, however, is two-faced. Biden may seek disarmament but does not want to appear soft in the election campaign.
The Biden administration is therefore exploring the chances for disarmament negotiations in Moscow and Beijing. But on a factual level, Washington tends to fuel the race. “Together with our NATO Allies, we’ve been laser focused on modernizing the Alliance’s nuclear capabilities,” Jake Sullivan said earlier this month. Biden’s security adviser enumerated a long list of technical innovations in nuclear weapons at the Arms Control Association Annual Forum.
Sullivan names China, in particular, as the culprit behind the erosion of nuclear security. He expects China to have over 1,500 warheads by 2035. At the same time, Sullivan criticizes Beijing’s refusal to engage in dialogue on the issue. This is certainly a problem since China has long played a decisive role in shaping the geopolitical landscape.
China has shown itself to be unapproachable and uncompromising, as was demonstrated last year at the review conference of the UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The conference is held every five years. But US observers said that Beijing’s stance is blocking international progress, as viable agreements require consensus between all major nuclear states.
The situation is different from Beijing’s side. China sees itself as a responsible player in disarmament. The country was guided by Xi Jinping’s vision of comprehensive global security at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Conference. Beijing claims to respect and support the status and role of the conference.
China has consistently advocated for arms control and has held the most stable positions on the issue for decades, a government spokesperson said. While the lack of a final document is unfortunate, nuclear control efforts are an ongoing process, they added.
According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the wrong practice of placing “geopolitical interests above nuclear nonproliferation” was the reason that prevented the formulation of a final document last year. He left open whether he was referring to the US or Russia.
Gustavo Zlauvinen, President of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, complains that none of the five major nuclear powers has accepted concrete standards and commitments. He said he could not see any visible coordination between China and Russia but rather that both delegations had acted independently of each other.
Beijing’s attitude was particularly obstructive at the beginning: “The main problem was China. It was very, very openly against any improvement of the national reporting on transparency,” said Zlauvinen. In particular, about information on the size of its own arsenal. Only at the last moment did Beijing clear the way for a final document. Ultimately, the conference failed because of Russia’s opposition, not China’s resistance.
In the overall picture, Xi Jinping did not want new reporting requirements imposed upon him by the USA, France and the UK – this is in line with his suspicious stance towards the West. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons is also never in the interest of an existing nuclear power. China would, therefore, probably have been open to a correspondingly cleverly formulated offer.
If the Sipri figures are correct and China has produced 60 new nuclear warheads, this degrades its pretty words about alternative security architecture to mere lip service. Like all other major powers, China is striving for more military security instead of setting a good example in disarmament. This is necessitated above all by the behavior of its ally Russia, which owns the largest number of warheads and has proven to be hard to predict at the same time.
Civil rights activists have displayed a symbolic remnant of the Hong Kong protest movement in Frankfurt. The association, Hongkonger in Germany, presented the severed head of the Lady of Liberty on Saturday. The statue symbolizes a demonstrator wearing a hard hat, goggles and a gas mask.
Hongkongers in Germany intended their display as a reminder of the deprivation of their civil rights guaranteed in the constitution. “With this symbol, the world can clearly see how the Chinese Communist Party has broken its promises and taken away our freedom. No one should ignore China’s human rights crimes for economic interests,” said Chairperson Aniessa Andresen.
Once four meters tall and made of plaster and Styrofoam, the statue was erected by a group of students on Lion Rock in Hong Kong in a secret nighttime operation in 2019. However, it only towered over the city for a few hours before it was knocked down, dismembered and smeared by unknown persons.
In 2019, Hong Kong had seen months of protests against the growing influence of the Communist Party. The demonstrations culminated in the introduction of the National Security Law and the political purge of opposition voices. grz
Wu Ming-yi is one of the most famous writers of contemporary literature in his native Taiwan. In 2018, he was the first Taiwanese to be nominated for the Booker Prize for his historical novel “The Stolen Bicycle.” His novel “The Man with Compound Eyes” is classified as so-called eco-fiction – literature that deals with the human influence on nature.
In his novel, which is as imaginative as it is drastic, Wu describes, among other things, how a massive island of waste approaches Taiwan’s coast, bringing together people whose paths would never have crossed had it not been for the man-made disaster.
Born in Taoyuan in 1971, the writer and literature professor at Dong Hwa National University also sees himself as an activist. He was already involved in Taiwanese environmental groups in the 1980s. At that time, they mainly protested against multinational corporations that were lured to Taiwan by tax breaks and low labor costs, he explains. The plastics and chemical industries, in particular, had fuelled Taiwan’s economic miracle from the late 1950s onwards. The environmental costs were enormous.
In 1986, the construction of a titanium dioxide factory by the American chemical giant Dupont gave rise to Taiwan’s first major environmental protection movement. Wu also closely followed the events at the time. In 2011, he joined large protests against a petrochemical project in the coastal city of Changhua. They were the largest protests in Southeast Asia and resulted in the most comprehensive climate action protest in Taiwan to date. “A book I conceived was published at the time coinciding with the protests, pooling the opposing voices of many scientists, intellectuals and authors.” The protest had an effect. Then-president Ma Ying-jeou prohibited the 20 billion dollar project.
Wu has acquired much of the detailed knowledge that comes to bear in his science-based novels over the years of his activist work. For example, the island of waste floating in the sea in the novel actually exists: the “Great Pacific Garbage Patch” is a whirlpool of up to 50 years old trash that now stretches over 1.6 million square kilometers – an area four times the size of Germany.
“Environmental regulations have become stricter and more stringent for foreign companies since the first protests in the 1980s,” says Wu. “Today’s Taiwan has achieved high environmental standards – this is also evident in everyday life, as you can see in waste recycling, for example.” Still, the island is at a crossroads, the writer says. “Taiwan is faced with the choice of either becoming an ecological role model for the whole of Southeast Asia or an abandoned wasteland pining for ever more economic growth.”
Like many other Islands in the world, Taiwan is acutely threatened by rising temperatures. Due to rising sea levels, floods and extreme storms will increase. The Taiwanese government has set itself the goal of becoming climate neutral by 2050. In contrast, the economy’s energy demand is growing. The flourishing semiconductor industry, in particular, requires enormous energy. But traditional sectors such as steel, cement or chemicals also need electricity. “The topic that is most heatedly debated in Taiwan today is which energy source is best for us: gas, nuclear or renewables?” Taiwan has set out to generate around 20 percent of its electricity from alternative sources by 2025, up from just five percent in 2018. Nuclear power is not to be used at all after 2025.
In addition to solar and geothermal energy, offshore wind power is expected to play a vital role in Taiwan’s energy transition. The conditions in the Taiwan Strait are promising: The waters are shallow, and the winds are strong. One risk that is once again coming into focus here is the threat from China. “We see in Ukraine how important energy supply is in the event of war,” says Wu. “Taiwan needs to be independent simply because of its national security. In addition, marine protection has become more important. Before, we often focused the discussion on Chinese influence on our ‘land.’ Now we are looking more at the sea.”
Another problem resulting from China’s territorial claims over Taiwan is the island’s political isolation, which is also reflected in global environmental cooperation. “Taiwan has hardly any influence in international organizations – whether they are official or unofficial. This makes it difficult for Taiwan to gain an international foothold on environmental protection.” Fabian Peltsch, Collaboration: Ziyi Huang
Taiwan’s Hsieh Su-wei (right) and China’s Wang Xinyu (second from right) won the doubles final of the French Open against the US-Canadian duo Townsend and Fernandez. Depending on one’s political beliefs, the triumph can be interpreted as a symbol for the chances of Chinese-Taiwanese unification or as an example of the chances of peaceful co-existence.
